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ROGERS, BETTY RITZ, Ph. D. The Radical Integration of Science, 
Religion, and Poetry in the Writings of Loren Eiseley and Richard 
Wilbur. ( 1995) Directed by Dr. Murray D. Arndt. 695pp. 
In a postmodern world turning away from t~e rigid categories 
of the past and "the univocal literalism" (Tarnas) of the modern 
mind, Loren Eiseley and Richard Wilbur bridge the schism between 
religion and science. Their essays and poems reinvigorate the 
romantic reconciliation between the '11ind and nature, subject and 
object, because, like Goethe, Wilbur and Eiseley see the human mind 
as a product of nature and the agent of nature's self revelation. 
After describing some of the ways science, religion, and poetry 
have informed and transformed one another and after placing 
Eiseley and Wilbur in the context of their life work and its critical 
reception, I consider three themes common to their writing. Chapter 
I, "Mystery, Allure, and Dread," describes their shared perception of 
the world's ineffable mystery, the sense that there is nothing in the 
world to explain the world, and the consequent drive to pursue what 
lures butwill not be caught. An agnostic who called his life a 
religious pilgrimage, Eiseley created a mythic persona, a prophet 
wandering in the "night country" uncovering the human potential for 
evil. A devout Christian, Wilbur celebrates the incarnate world, 
giving "due regard" to what he calls "a small province haunted by the 
good." Chapter II, "The Mind as Nature and the Nature of Mind" 
explores our nearest mystery--the human mind itself--by examining 
Eiseley's lyrical retelling of story of evolution (The Immense 
Journey) and his recounting of how the world came to be perceived 
as "natural," (The Firmament of Time). For Eiseley the nature of 
nature determines the nature of mind. Wilbur explore's the nature of 
mind at play in metaphor ("The Writer," "Mind," "An Event") and in 
states of altered consciousness ("The Mind-Reader," "in Limbo"). 
Both Eiseley and Wilbur recognize that with the mind came what 
Thoreau called the "wound of time." Chapter Ill, "Imagination as 
Moral Agent," considers how the imagination is able to reach past the 
known, beyond the boundaries of self, and across the trouble with 
words. For both Wilbur ("The Fourth of july," "On the Marginal 
Way") and Eiseley ("The Innocent Fox," "The Star Thrower"), the 
imagination can discover unity amid what seems only disparity and 
multiplicity and create the possibility of good. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is no science without fancy and no art without facts. 
--Nabokov 
Truth, and goodness, and beauty, are but different faces of the 
same All. --Emerson 
Science, religion and poetry begin in wonder, and each 
discipline struggles to express and understand the mysteries it 
uncovers through its particular methodology--experiment or myth or 
metaphor. Is it possible at the end of the twentieth century for a 
religious vision of the world to coexist with an allegiance to the hard 
facts of science, and can they be spoken of poetically? If Emerson 
was right that truth, goodness, and beauty are simply different facets 
of the same ultimate reality, the synthesis should not only be 
possible but essential if we are to advance in our quest to 
understand the nature of things. At the beginning of the last 
century, Goethe, a scientist as well as a poet, believed that looking at 
the phenomena, not as parts but as wholes, would develop new 
cognitive faculties, novel perceptions, and a seeing into the nature of 
things. As Richard Tarnas describes it, Goethe in his 
naturp!Ji/osopiJie attempted "to unite empircal observation and 
spiritual intuition into a science of nature .. which Goethe believed 
would be more revealing than Newton's physics. Although he 
recognized like Kant "the human mind's constructive role in 
knowledge," Goethe overcame Kant's dualism with his vision of 
nature permeating everything "including the human mind and 
imagination": 
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... nature's truth does not exist as something independent and 
objective, but is revealed in the very act of human cognition. 
The human spirit does not simply impose its order on nature .. 
. . nature's spirit brings forth its own order through man, who 
is the organ of nature's self-revelation. (Tarnas 378). 
Goethe's romantic concept reconciled mind and nature, healing the 
Cartesian/Kantian split between mind and body, spirit and world. 
Tarnas in The Passion of the Western Mind describes a 
resurgence of the romantic spirit in the postmodern turn away from 
"the univocal literalism that tended to characterized the modern 
mind" toward "a greater appreciation of the multidimensional nature 
of reality, the many-sidedness of the human spirit, and the 
multivalent, symbolically mediated nature of human knowledge and 
experience." Tarnas believes that along with this appreciation has 
come "a growing sense that the postmodern dissolving of old 
assumptions and categories" might allow "the emergence of entirely 
new prospects for conceptual and existential reintegration, with the 
possibility of richer interpretive vocabularies, more profound 
narrative coherencies." Among "the remarkable changes and self-
revisions that have taken place in virtually every contemporary 
intellectual discipline," Tarnas finds that "the fundamental modern 
schism between science and religion has been increasingly 
undermined," thereby allowing the vigorous reemergence of "the 
orginal project of Romanticism--the reconciliation of subject and 
object, human and nature, spirit and matter, conscious and 
unconscious, intellect and soul" ( 407) 
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In the late twentieth century, two writers with visions that are 
simultaneously religious and scientific have written poetically of the 
world's mysteries and the individual mind's struggles to understand 
its reasons for being. Loren Eiseley and Richard Wilbur radically 
integrate science, religion, and poetry in their essays and poems. 
Eiseley, an anthropologist who wrote primarily natural history 
essays, recreated the history of evolution in works that have been 
called the poetry of science--lyrically beautiful prose describing the 
desperate efforts of an air-hungry Crossopterygian struggling to 
breathe in a drying swamp; or the silent revolution in the 
possibilities for life when, a hundred million years ago, flowering 
plants took over the world; or the exquisite serrations on the saber 
tooth of a tiger skull fossilized over forty million years. An agnostic, 
Eiseley has been both celebrated and vilified for his "religious vision" 
of life netted together in one interdependent web, of 1 ife driven to 
incEssant change and advancing complexity by some inexorable 
evolutionary force. Wilbur is a poet who has a scientist's faith in the 
reality of the world and its discoverable truths; he is impatient with 
idealism that devalues the sensible world. He has a naturalist's eye 
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for the detail of flora and fauna and a poet's capacity for finding 
metaphorical relationships that make things wholes rather than just 
the sums of parts. A religious man, a faithful Christian, Wilbur prays 
that his eyes be opened to seeing the world but that he never fall 
into the delusive "dry disease" of believing things no more than what 
he sees--the prayer of a true scientist. Poetically, Wilbur is a 
virtuoso; his mastery of technical skit ls in the rhythmical creation of 
beauty has been resented but never doubted. 
As writers, Wilbur and Eisley share three common themes: 
They both find the world to be infinitely mysterious, and they find 
that mystery to be powerfully alluring and frankly terrifying. The 
subject that is for them most mysterious is the human mind itself: 
the result of evolutionary processes, the mind and its product (or 
precursor) language somehow make us feel displaced, cast out of the 
garden world into an unnatural awareness of self and cosmos and 
time and death. Wilbur and Eiseley both seek redemption from this 
alienation through the imagination's power to recognize truth, 
celebrate beauty, and call human beings to a higher goodness. 
Although they share these concerns and both marry science, religion, 
and poetry in their writing, Eiseley and Wilbur, in fact, follow 
different tactics and produce very different world views. Eiseley 
creates a mythic persona who becomes the central focus of his 
essays. Even when he is writing about evolution or the problems of 
space flight or Thoreau's vision of the natural world, Eiseley, like the 
"old-fashioned contemplative naturalists," is telling an essentially 
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personal story--taking the reader on a tour of "that indefinable 
country which lies between the realm of natural objects and the 
human spirit which moves among them" ("The Enchanted Glass" 480). 
Because he is telling a personal story in his natural history essays 
and because he is profoundly melancholic and perceives himself a 
homeless fugitive, Eiseley's writing moves from wonder to 
pessimism; he becomes a lone traveler in the "night country." 
Wilbur, on the other hand, focuses not on himself but on the things of 
the world. His poems are highly wrought celebrations of the 
incarnate world. "Homelessly at home," Wilbur sees tremendous 
form and energy at work whether in a climbing vine, a flowing 
brook, a gathering and dispersing flock of birds. Even his darkest 
poems suggest that behind all is an inexorable good. 
The following chapters will address the three themes common 
to Wilbur and Eiseley--their sense of the world as profoundly 
mysterious, both alluring and terrifying; their perception of the mind 
as an extension of nature, their puzzlement over the nature of mind 
and the burden of its discovery of time; and their concept of the 
imagination as a moral agent, discovering relationship and creating 
unity out of disparity. Chapter I, "Mystery, Allure, and Dread," 
begins with Whitehead's definition of religion as the pursuit of 
unattainable mystery and presents some ways of looking at the 
religious experience of mystery including: Otto's concept of the 
numinous, the m.rsterium tremendum; El iade's focus on the efforts 
of homo religiosus to create access to the sacred in the profane 
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world; Heidegger's concepts of Being and Dasein's call to respond to 
the hail of Being as it is expressed in beings; Buber's appeal to the 
creation of I through relationship with You; process theology's 
presentation of God as attractive possibility, the divine lure enticing 
beings to enhanced enjoyment through correspondence with the 
"really real"; and Huizinga's description of the celebration of mystery 
through play. Each of these approaches to mystery emphasizes the 
importance and short-comings of language, yet Vincent Buckley 
points out the extraordinary persistence in the secular twentieth 
century of the concept of poetry as a sacred or ret igious act. 
Eiseley described his life as a religious pilgrimage, a pursuit of 
the mystery he called "that vast thing sleeping in the swamps of 
time." In his essays he creates a mythic persona, a fugitive traveling 
through the night country of his own imagination-- "a shifting and 
unmapped domain of terrors" periodically i 11 uminated by the 
lightning flashes of discovery. Eiseley finds the mysteries within the 
mind as great as those without. Burdened by his p1>rception nf the 
multiform nature of humanity, he becomes a prophet inveighing 
against a Faustian civilization's compulsion to build an "invisible 
pyramid" to sc ie11tif ic technology and to transcend and dominate 
nature. Eiseley calls instead for the "paradox of return" to the green 
world from which human life came. Wilbur, too, finds the world 
profoundly mysterious but for him it is "no outer dark I But a small 
province haunted by the good." Wilbur's "unquenchable ontological 
thirst" is expressed in a pull between the immanent and the 
transcendent, but he invariably chooses to celebrate the incarnate 
world in "humble insatiety," his reverence heightened by gaiety. 
Even though Wilbur finds the world to be "comely and good," he stilt 
experiences terror in the presence of that which is invicibly other, 
and for Wilbur, love-- "the greatest mercy"--is tinged with the dread 
of loss. Like Eiseley, Wilbur confronts the sense of alienation felt by 
twentieth-century man, "a diminished thing," "unspeakably alone, .. 
who walks purposelessly, driven solely by restless urge. Unlike 
Eiseley, Wilbur finds in the heart"s unbounded wish for life the 
promise of something boundless for the heart. 
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Chapter II, "'The Mind as Nature, the Nature of Mind, .. describes 
how in the twentieth century mind has replaced soul as the subject 
of human concern. A number of scientists and philosophers 
(including Erich Harth, Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennet, and Roger 
Penrose) offer theories of how the brain produces the amazing 
complexity of a mind. Eiseley looks for his explanations of the mind-
making brain in the history of human evolution. In The Firmament 
of Time Eiseley reconstructs the r,-rocess whereby science came to see 
nature as natural, produced over eons by the same forces that 
operate in the world today, rather than as a product of a one-time 
divine fiat. When nature became natural, first death then life also 
became natural. Paradoxically, when life becomes natural, it also 
becomes wondrous; the common day seems a miracle. The puzzled 
mind, itself a manifestation of nature, grown from a lungfish and fed 
on angiosperms, is left looking for its reason for being. From the 
mind have grown language, writing, and the scientific revolution. 
Through the mind we have come to live as much in the world of 
imagination as the physical, external world. 
8 
Wilbur explores the nature of mind by creating poems in which 
the mind can observe itself at play in metaphor. The mind becomes 
a trapped starting looking for the sill of the world or a bat careening 
in a dark cave, avoiding conclusions against a wall of stone, 
occasionally through the "happiest intellections" correcting the cave 
that contains it. In other poems Wilbur suspends normal mentation 
by placing the persona of his poem on the borderland between just-
awakening consciousness and the just-fading world of dream; there 
he can explore the state of the mind generally obscured by 
consciousness. In "The Mind-Reader" Wilbur portrays a mind which 
knows too much and not enough and thereby creates an extreme of 
the human condition. Both Wilbur and Eiseley write of the biological 
drive toward being, of the limitations of consciousness, of the doom 
of taking shape, and of the mind's most terrifying discovery--time. 
Eiseley and Wit bur feet with Thoreau the "wound of time"; time 
makes all things, but time unmakes ali things. Eiseley warns darkly 
that "[t]he earth makes wraiths of us," but Wilbur finds in time 
fidelity and redemption along with inevitable decreation. 
Chapter III, "Imagination as Moral Agent," considers the mind's 
power of redemption in time. Both Wilbur and Eiseley express 
explicitly and implicitly an awareness of the preconscious life of the 
intellect which makes possible apprehension through metaphor of 
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Cflncepts that only later become accessible to logic or verbal analysis. 
Through poetic perception, both the poet and the scientist are able to 
bring new knowiedge out of the preconscious void of the mind. 
Language and writing also make possible cultural heredity; a "new 
evolution," no longer simply organic, transmits and accelerates the 
process of learning. The future gestates in the present, and the 
imagination is a moral burden because we are all creators whether 
we like it or not. Wilbur honors the imagination when it honors the 
world. His poetry expresses moments of tension between the 
formative mind and the reality his mind insists on recognizing. 
Wilbur values the world's resistance to his shaping imagination; his 
struggle "with something powerfully other" provides the images and 
metaphors whereby we know the world and ourselves. Eiseley 
considers it the real business of the artist to seek for man's salvation. 
He considers the most enormous extension of vision to be the 
projection of self into other 1 ives. 
The imagination is able to discover relationship and create 
unity amid disparity. The symbols that Eisetey and Wilbur use for 
the imagination reflect their temperaments. For Wilbur, sunlight is 
imagination. For Eisley, the imagination is symbolized by water--an 
ominous underground current or an enveloping fog. In Wilbur's 
"The Fourth of july," sunlight and imagination, words and the 
difficulties of terms bind together Lewis Carroll, Ulysses Grant, Alice 
in Wonderland, Linnaeus, Cop~rnicus, and "these states." In Eiseley's 
"The Innocent Fox" an enveloping fog brings together mad scientists, 
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a spotted dog, a wrecked boat, a dying man, and a fox cub. In "On 
the Marginal Way" Wilbur's imagination confronts the horrors of the 
human past and present and finds redemption in the world's 
goodness. In "The Star Thrower" Eiseley creates a myth that 
heretically suggests that the evolutionary struggle for survival has 
paradoxically bred creatures capable of altruism across the species 
barrier. For Eiseley and Wilbur, the imagination links conscience to 
cosmos. 
Before turning to Wilbur and Eiseley's differing responses to 
their common themes, in the remainder of this introduction I will 
describe some of the ways science, religion, and poetry have been 
seen to conflict or to interrelate--in either case, informing and 
transforming one another. Then I will look at Eiseley and Wilbur 
separately, placing each in the context of his life's work and critical 
reception. 
The Interrelationship of Science, Religion and Poetry 
Science, religion, and poetry each begin in an intense 
awareness of the presence of remarkable, puzzling, alluring 
otherness that demands attention and an attempt at explanation or, 
at least, confrontation. Science pays that attention and attempts that 
explanation through exactitude based on shared tools that extend 
and sometimes correct human perception and on methods that are 
verifiable, duplicable by other scientists. Science confronts the world 
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with knowing--observation, cataloging, ordering, testing, theorizing, 
postulating. Yet as much as religion, science requires faith--from 
scientists as well as nonscientists. Scientists must begin with a 
confidence that reality exists, that it is indeed knowable, and that it 
is subject to discernible laws that can be discovered through 
systematic application of scientific methods. Scientists must also 
have faith in the work of other scientists--work on which they must 
build. In "Voice as Summons for Belief," Walter J. Ong writes that 
"even in the most "objective' of fields, in actuality the word of 
persons is more pervasive than factual observation. Science itself 
cannot live save in a network of belief. Even in science, where fact is 
more determinative, presence is nevertheless more pervasive than 
fact" (92).1 
Rabindranath Tagore described science as "mysticism in the 
realm of material knowledge" because "lilt helps us to go beyond 
appearances and reach the inner reality of things in principles which 
at~e abstractions: it emancipates our mind from the thraldom of the 
senses to the freedom of reason" ("The Four Stages of Life" 149). 
This emancipation from "the thraldom of the senses" means that 
those who are nonscientitists must accept in faith facts of science 
which we ourselves have no capability to test and which may be in 
direct contradiction to ordinary observation. Believing that the earth 
rotates around the sun and that the earth spins on its axis demands 
denial of the clear evidence of our senses: We see the sun rise and 
move across the sky as though it rotates around the earth. We feel 
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no planetary spin, no movement through space. When the scientist-
priests visit the holy of holies through the telescope or the electron 
microscope or the superconducting supercollider, non-scientists can 
simply receive their reports from those sacred spaces; only the elect, 
those annointed through special knowledge and experience, are 
allowed to peep behind the veils of the atom and the cosmos to come 
back and report what they have found there. Even then, they often 
speak in tongues to the uninitiated. 
Poetry may mean not just the art of verse making but the 
creative use of language in general--in poetry and in prose. Or 
poetry may have an even broader meaning. jacques Maritain 
defines "Poetry" as "that intercommunication between the inner 
beings of thing and the inner being of the human Self which is a kind 
of divination .... Poetry, in this sense, is the secret life of each and 
all of the arts" (Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry 3).2 Verbal 
poetry confronts reality with attention, the attention of a creative 
imagination--a combination of intellect, sensibility, emotion, and the 
urge to play--which tries to capture within the frame of words and 
rhythm and meter the exactitude of metaphor and image that 
conveys both the consciously perceived world (including self) plus 
those intuitions which are in fact not conscious nor sayable--what 
Colin Falck calls "extra-" or ''pre-linguistic" awareness. To speak 
what can be said and what cannot be said, poetry requires the 
paradoxes of diction precise in its imprecision, images clear in their 
ambiguity, and the sense of a unifying imagination that holds 
disparate things together yet separate. The poet acknowledges, 
honors, and responds to the mystery of creation with creation. 
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Originating in the nonrational aspects of the human psyche, 
religions attempts to bind reality into a unified metaphysical vision 
by addressing the ultimate question, felt as mystery but expressed in 
reason as, "Why is everything?" Attempting to explain the origin, 
order, and purpose of all existence, religions manifest the quest for 
meaning which grows out of the seemingly unique human 
consciousness, the self-awareness that makes possible self-
transcendence--mentally stepping outside of our ongoing individual 
lives to consider them in the context of their places in some greater 
meaning. Through myth and ritual, religions bind people in 
communities of shared belief and thereby seek to reconcile the 
estrangement often felt both within the self and between self and 
others and between self and cosmos. Religions confront the profound 
dread and awe experienced as consciousness of the numina, the 
sensation of the presence of terrible overpowering otherness. 
Religions celebrate mystery. By defining the nature of the good, 
religions offer guidance in ways to live our lives. Religions offer 
explanations and consolation for the inevitable fact of death. Religion 
for the individual offers a way of being in the world that binds 
nature, self, death, good, evil, mystery, longing, dread into a usable 
fiction. For the romantic spirit, religion becomes a version of 
Negative Capability--the capacity to be "in uncertainties, Mysteries, 
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doubts, without an irritable reaching after fact and reason" to relieve 
the existential angst. 
Though they have often seemed to operate in isolation or 
outright opposition, science, religion, and poetry have actually 
informed and transformed one another, and they intertwine within 
both the individual and the culture to create a fabric of being. A 
change in the concept of reality described by any one requires 
adjustments in the world views expressed by the others. They 
influence one another in complex and reciprocal ways. For example, 
Stephen F. Mason writes that science had its historical roots in two 
primary sources--the technical tradition which passed practical skills 
from one generation to another and "the spiritual tradition through 
which "human aspirations and ideas were passed on and augmented" 
(A History of the Sciences II). Sometimes the spiritual tradition 
augmented ideas in ways that served religious ends rather than 
fostering the study of nature. The classic example is Plato"s 
articulation of a theory of natural philosophy deduced from his 
theological views. Having determined that the circle was the most 
perfect form, Plato decreed that the movements of the celestial 
bodies--"divine and noble beings"--must be circular. He thereby 
established a precept that bound astronomers for 2000 years to a 
concept of circular orbits that crippled their attempts to reconcile 
astronomical observations with their inherited preconceptions of the 
structure of the cosmos. 
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Tarnas in The Passion of the Western Mind explains how the 
Protestant Reformation, "so intensely and unambiguously religious," 
nevertheless fostered the rise of science. Luther's emphasis on the 
authority of the individual conscience in the interpretation of 
scriptures which (for some) overthrew the theological authority of 
the Catholic Church also opened the door to "the vagaries of private 
doubt and secular thinking" ( 240). Luther vehemently rejected the 
attempts by Scholastic theology to achieve "natural revelation" 
through human reason in its analysis of the natural world, because 
he believed that scripture alone could provide "the certain and 
saving knowledge of God's ways" (241 ). Tarnas says that "[tlhe 
Reformation's restoring of a predominantly biblical theology against 
a Scholastic theology helped to purge the modern mind of Hellenic 
notions in which nature was permeated with divine rationality and 
final causes"-- ironically thereby supporting the development of a 
new science of nature (241 ). 
The increased distinction made by the reformers between 
Creator and creature--between God's inscrutable will and man's 
finite intelligence, and between God's transcendence and the 
world's contingency--allowed the modern mind to approach the 
world with a new sense of nature's purely mundane character, 
with its own ordering principles that might not directly 
correspond to man's logical assumptions about God's divine 
government. The reformers' limiting of the human mind to a 
this-worldly knowledge was precisely the prerequisite for the 
opening up of that knowledge. (241) 
In so doing, the Reformation led to consequences that would have 
appalled Luther: 
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By disenchanting the world of immanent divinity, completing 
the process initiated by Christianity's destruction of pagan 
animism, the Reformation better allowed for its radical revision 
by modern science. The way was then clear for an increasingly 
naturalistic view of the cosmos, moving first to the remote 
rationalist Creator of Deism, and finally to secular agnosticism's 
elimination of any supernatural reality. (241) 
Protestantism's insistence that truth was finally and fully revealed in 
the Word of God and its rejection of what it perceived as the Catholic 
tradition's distortion of primal truth fostered "a new stress on the 
need to discover unbiased objective truth, apart from the prejudices 
and distortions of tradition," thereby supporting the growth of "a 
critical scientific mentality"--which eventually was turned on the 
Word itself (242). As Tarnas describes it, when the Protestant 
Reformation inadvertently opened the door to science, it also let in 
the agent of its own eventual subversion. In The Varieties of 
Religious Experience William james states the consequences 
succinctly by reca!ling Emerson's observation that "Luther ... would 
have cut off his right hand rather than nail his theses to the door at 
Wittenberg, if he had supposed that they were destined to lead to 
the pale negations of Boston Unitarianism" (330). 
Ironically, the original act of the scientific revolution grew out 
of religious faith and a compelling need for beauty. Copernicus, the 
Catholic canon of Frauenburg, became appalled at the "monster" 
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which had evolved out of the efforts to maintain the circular orbits of 
the stable Aristotelian/Ptolemaic geocentric cosmos in the face of 
clearly contradictory observations. The Greek/Christian system had 
become encrusted with epicycles, eccentrics, deferents, etc. as 
successive astronomers tried to explain away the discrepancies 
between observation and tradition. As described, the cosmos had 
become "an inelegant and overburdened conception which, despite 
all the complicated ad hoc corrective devices, still failed to account 
for or predict observed planetary positions with reliable accuracy" 
(Tarnas 248). Copernicus's conviction that God could not have made 
such a botch of his creation caused him to search for a better 
description of the workings of the cosmos. 
It would seem to be above all Copernicus's participation in the 
intellectual atmosphere of Renaissance Neoplatonism--and 
specifically his embrace of the Pythagorean conviction that 
nature was ultimately comprehensible in simple and 
harmonious mathematical terms of a transcendent, eternal 
quality--that pressed and guided him toward innovation. The 
divine Creator, whose works were everywhere good and 
orderly, couiu not have been slipshod with the heavens 
themselves. (Tarnas 249) 
Reverently, Copernicus offered with "greater conceptual elegance" a 
heliocentric universe in which the earth moved. 
However, what began in faith in the aesthetics of the Creator 
ended on the Index of Forbidden Books. Copernicanism came to be 
seen as "a fundamental threat to the entire Christian framework of 
cosmology, theology, and morality" (Tarnas 253). 
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Ever since the Scholastics and Dante had embraced Greek 
science and endowed it with religious meaning, the Christian 
world view had become inextricably embedded in an 
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic geocentric universe. The essential 
dichotomy between the celestial and terrestrial realms, the 
great cosmological structure of Heaven, Hell, and Purgatory, the 
circling planetary spheres with angelic hosts, God's empyrean 
throne above all, the moral drama of human life pivotally 
centered between spiritual heavens and corporeal Earth--all 
would be cast into question or destroyed altogether by the new 
theory. (Tarnas 253) 
Copernican science seemed to remove the Earth from the center of 
God's concern, and the "absolute uniqueness and significance of 
Christ's intervention into human history seemed to require a 
corresponding uniqueness and significance for the Earth" (Tarnas 
253-254). Copernican cosmology, later improved upon by Galileo 
and Kepler, appeared to rob Earth of that uniqueness. 
At the end of the last century, with science in the ascendent as 
the way of explaining the world, William james suggested using it to 
study religion. In The Varieties of Religious Exuerience, james took 
an inductive, scientific approach to the study of religions; he thought 
the methods of science could help clarify the nature of what is 
perceived as religious. Defining religion not as institutions, dogmas, 
theologies, and rituals but as "the feelings, acts, and e.:tperiences of 
indvidua/ men in their solitude, so far as the_v apprehend themselves 
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to stand in relation JviJatever t.IJe.v ma}"· consider divine," James 
collected and surveyed personal rei igious experiences of "the 
unseen," of conversion, of saintliness, of mysticism, etc. in order to 
discover among them what was religious-- "what nobody can possibly 
feel tempted to call anything else" (31, 39). In his chapter on "The 
Religion of Healthy-Mindedness," james concludes that the 
experiences considered "plainly show the universe to be a more 
many-sided affair than any sect, even the scientific sect, allows for" 
( 122). Anticipating the twentieth century's recognition that no 
observation is unbiased and each hypothesis is theory-laden, james 
asks, "What in the end, are all our verifications but experiences that 
agree with more or less isolated systems of ideas (conceptual 
systems) that our mind has framed?" ( 122).3 If that is so, James 
demands to know, " ... why in the name of common sense need we 
assume that only one such system of ideas can be true?" Asserting 
that " [ t]he obvious outcome of our total experience is that the world 
can be handled according to many systems of ideas," each with some 
profit and some loss, james says that it becomes evident that: 
... the science and the religion are both of them genuine keys 
for unlocking the world's treasure-house to him who can use 
either of them practically .... neither is exhaustive or exclusive 
of the other's simultaneous use. And why, after all, may not 
the world be so complex as to consist of many interpenetrating 
spheres of reality, which we can thus approach in alternation 
by using different conceptions and assuming different 
attitudes, just as mathematicians handle the same numercial 
and spatial facts by geometry, by analytical geometry, by 
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algebra, by the calculus, or by quaternions, and each time come 
out right? (122-123) 
Subsequently, james proposed applying the tools of science and 
philosophy to unlock the puzzles of religion by creating "a critical 
Science of Religions." Philosophy would "eliminate the local and 
accidental" from definitions of the divine, remove "historic 
incrustations" from dogma and worship, and eliminate doctrines 
found to be absurd or incongruous in light of the advances of natural 
science (Varieties of Religious Exnerience 455). Having sifted 
"unworthy formulations'" from "a residuum of conceptions" that were 
at least possible, philosophy could then test the resulting hypotheses, 
discarding some and championing others. By refining definitions and 
separating core tenets from '"innocent overbelief and symbolism," 
philosophy could mediate among believers in an effort to establish 
consensus of opinion. Such a science of religions would have to 
depend for its data "on facts of personal experience, and would have 
to square itself with personal experience through all its critical 
constructions. It could never get away from concrete 1 ife, or work in 
a conceptual vacuum" (Varieties of Ret igious Exnerience 456). Like 
every other science, the science of religions would have to confess: 
... that the subtlety of nature flies beyond it, and that its 
formulas are but approximations. Philosophy lives in words, 
but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed 
verbal formulation. There is in the living act of perception 
always something that glimmers and twinkles and will not be 
caught, and for which reflection comes too late. (45 6-457) 
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Other poets, scientists, and religionists have disagreed about 
whether their various strategies for dealing with reality are totally 
incompatible or, in fact, complementary. Emerson believed that 
science would either stimulate poetry to new heights or obliterate it: 
Observing that "[nlatural science ... is dimming and extinguishing a 
good deal that was called poetry," Emerson concluded that "[tlhese 
sublime and all-reconciling revelations of nature will exact of poetry 
a correspondent height and scope or put an end to it" (Letters 6.63). 
Walt Whitman was confident that poetry would prevail. In his 
Preface to Leaves of Grass, Whitman, a religious poet, ("the most 
inclusive of mystics," according to Wilbur) called science "the 
handmaid of poetry" and declared that "[e!xact science and its 
practical movements are no checks on the greatest poet but always 
his encouragement and support." For Whitman the matter of science 
was the stuff of poetry: 
The sailor and traveler ... the anatomist chemist astronomer 
geologist phrenologist spiritualist mathematician historian and 
lexicographer are not poets, but they are the lawgivers of poets 
and their construction underlies the structure of every perfect 
poem. (42) 
From such men, " ... always of their father-stuff must be begotten 
the sinewy races of bards" (Preface 42). Yet this mystic who 
believed that science was not inimical to poetry but would in fact 
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make poetry possible was a great trouble to traditional religion. 
William Heyen says that Whitman, "the first great American poet ... 
buried orthodoxy like a landslide, and we have had no poetry of the 
'figural imagination' since, no poetry that relates the entire human 
drama, all of history to one great myth cast with gods and replete 
with legends that tell of man's beginning, purpose, and destiny" ("On 
Richard Wilbur" 628). 
In contrast to Whitman's fuisome embrace of science, Edgar 
Allan Poe scorned that "rectangular obscenity" of mathematical 
reason and considered scientific rationalism and material ism to be 
inevitable manifestations on a planet that had fallen away from the 
unity and beauty of the divine. His "scorn of all things present" 
included philosophy and didacticism. Poe considered it the poet's 
task to induce a suspension of the outward consciousness and 
substitute a visionary contemplation of supernal beauty. In "The 
Poetic Principle," Poe identifies Alfred Tennyson as "the noblest poet 
that ever lived" because Tennyson is "so little of the earth, earthy" 
(388). In Eureka,. Poe attacks what he considers natural science and 
philosophy's crawling, circuitous routes to truth; he reduces Aristotle, 
the father of deductive reasoning, to Aries Tottle (the Ram) and 
Bacon, the father of induction, to the Hog, declaring that "Baconian" 
was simply "·an adjective invented as equivalent to Hog-ian, and at 
the same time more dignified and euphonious'" ( 12). Quoting from a 
letter dated 2848 A.O. and found floating corked in a bottle "on the 
Mare Tenebrarum--an ocean well described by the Nubian 
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geographer Ptolemy Hephestion, but little frequented in modern 
days unless by the Transcendentalists and some other divers for 
crotchets," Poe celebrates imaginative leaps as the true scientific 
method. He points out that Newton deduced the laws of gravitation 
from the laws of Kepler but that Kepler admitted that he had guessed 
his postulates. Thus, the laws on which Newton based the theory of 
gravitation, the foundation of classical physical science-- "these vital 
laws Kep1er guessed--that is to say, he imagined them" (20). 
Poe anticipated by more than a hundred years Arthur 
Koestler's view of the process of scientific discovery. In The 
Sleepwalkers: A History of Man's Changing Vision of the Universe, 
Koestler declares that "ltlhe history of cosmic theories ... may 
without exaggeration be called a history of collective obsessions and 
controlled schizophrenias; and the manner in which some of the most 
important individual discoveries were arrived at reminds one more 
of a sleepwalker's performance than an electronic brain's" (15). 
Koestler considered that both science and religion arise from a 
common source of inspiration--the creative imagination. 
I. A. Richards, however, feared that the rise of science might be 
the death of poetry. Richards describes the "the central dominant 
change" in the intellectual background of modern times to be "the 
Neutralization of Nature, the transference from the Magical View of 
the World to the scientific, a change so great that it is perhaps only 
paralleled historically by the change from whatever adumbration of 
a world-picture precederl the Magical View itself" (Poetries and 
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Sciences 50-51). Richards defines the "Magical View" as "the belief 
in a world of spirits and powers which control events, and which can 
be evoked and, to some extent, controlled themselves by human 
practices. The belief in inspiration and the beliefs underlying ritual" 
are representative of this view (5 l ). As Richards saw it, this Magical 
View fell with the extension of man's knowledge and control over 
nature. Richards believed that "I t]here is some evidence that poetry, 
together with the other arts, arose with Magir.al View" and was 
therefore concerned that "lilt is a possibility to be seriously 
considered that poetry may pass away with it" (5 I ).4 
Elizabeth Sewell has no such worries about science destroying 
poetry; she sees them of a like substance, of similar origins. Sewell, 
in her book The Ornhic Voice: Poetry and Natural Historv.:, describes 
both poetl··y and science as "activities in which thinker and 
instrument combine in some situation which is passionately exciting 
because it is fraught with possibilities of discovery" ( 14). Denying 
the four-hundred-year-old presumptions of antitheses between 
science and poetry, mathematics and words, intellect and 
imagination, Sewell declares that "lt]he human organism, that body 
which has the gift of thought does not have the choice of two kinds of 
thinking. It has only one ... " (19). For Sewell, discovery in both 
science and poetry is "a mythological situation in which the mind 
unites with a figure of its own devision as a means toward 
understanding the world" ( 20). She points out that Michael Polanyi 
in Personal Knowledg.e_ has demonstrated that just as "any good poem 
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surpasses its writer's powers of exegesis" so do scientific hypotheses 
as well as language in general (22). Taking a position similar to 
Sewell's, jacob Bronowski declares that "[t)he act of creation is ... the 
same in science as in art" ( 18). He believed that creativity comes 
when a chance is offered to the highly active and inquiring mind 
looking for hidden likenesses ( 19 ). All great acts of imagination, in 
both the arts and science, Bronowski says, "convince us because they 
fill out reality with a deeper sense of rightness" (31 ). 
George Santayana says that religious doctrine inevitably 
conflicts with science and becomes confused and incoherent when it 
pretends to deal with matters of fact and seeks sanctions "in the 
sphere of existence." While Sewell finds the similarity between 
science and poetry, Santayana says that it is religion and poetry t!Jat 
are identical in essence and that they "differ merely in the way in 
which they are attached to practical affairs" (Interpretations of 
Poetrv and Religion 3). According to Santayana, "[p)oetry is catted 
religion when it intervenes in life, and religion, when it merely 
supervenes upon life, is seen to be nothing but poetry:· (3). Unlike 
poetry, religion reacts directly upon life and is a factor in conduct: 
"Our religion is the poetry in which we believe" (20). The value of 
religion, like that of poetry, is "in its ideal adequacy, in its fit 
rendering of the meanings and value of life" (3). 
Teilhard de Chardin attempted to build a bridge across the 
chasm that Santayana saw irrevocably separating ret igion and 
science, faith and reason. In The Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard 
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offers a Christian teleological perspective on evolution whereby the 
incarnation becomes one of the inevitable steps of Christogenesis. He 
describes the process of evolution as nature becoming progressively 
aware, increasingly conscious of itself. He believed that ever-
advancing biological complexity and cephalisation led over eons to 
hominisation and the development of the "noosphere," the sphere of 
mind which is now superimposed upon the biosphere. In his 
introduction to The Phenomenon of Man .. Sir Julian Huxley writes 
that through Teilhard 's combination of wide scientific knowledge, 
deep religious feeling, and rigorous sense of values, the Jesuit 
theologian and distinguished palaeontologist "has both clarified and 
unified om· vis ion of reality": 
... it is no longer posssible to maintain that science and religion 
must operate in thought-tight compartments or concern 
separate sectors of life; they are both relevant to the whole of 
human existence. The religiously-minded can no longer turn 
their backs upon the natural world, or seek escape from its 
imperfections in a supernatural world; nor can the 
materialistically-minded deny importance to spiritual 
experience and religious feeling. (26) 
Based on his concept of myth, (olin Falck advances Santayana's 
position on the essential identity of poetry and religion by claiming 
that literary texts are, in fact, religious scriptures and that theology 
itself must become an aspect of literary criticism (.Myth, Truth and 
Literature 132).5 Falck believes that while Christianity has crumbled 
into "equality of disbelief with other myths," myth itself "as a mode 
27 
of insight into human life" has achieved a higher status. He says that 
it is to poetry and literature that we have increasingly looked "for a 
re-my1:!Jo/ogizing of our spiritual landscape": 
With the increasing, if still tacit, recognition of myth as the 
primal form both of perception and of language, and with the 
decline during the modern period of any general acceptance of 
philosophical arguments in support of the orthodox religions, 
the tendency to see imaginative literature and its 'epiphanies' 
as special, sacred or sacralizing manifestations within a de-
sacralized world--a tendency which began with the Romantic 
reaction against the mechanistic philosophies of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries--has persisted and 
grown. (Myth, Truth and Literature 134) 
Finding more truth than T. E. Hulme himself recognized in his 
comment that the poeiry and criticism of Romanticism were "spilt 
religion," Falck says that "a// poetry ... is 'spilt religion'" and that 
"poetry is religion properl.r so spilt" ( 135). Falck says that properly 
spilling religion will correct the fact that "[tlraditional religion ... has 
always dogmatically privileged certain myths ... and has thereby 
prejudged questions of truth in a way that largely precludes critical 
discussion" (122). 
Falck subscribes to and endeavors to provide a philosophical 
basis for Wallace Stevens' assertion that poetry must "take the place 
I Of empty heaven and its hymns" and Stevens' proposal that "[a]fter 
one has abandoned a belief in God, poetry is that essence which takes 
its place as life's redemption." Falck finds that Stevens in his later 
work is "essentially religious" because he regards fictions "as a 
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discovering of order in the world rather than an imposing of order on 
it" ( 144). Falck suggests that "if we are now to accept the need for a 
remythologization of religion in terms of the myths or stories which 
are authentically accessible to our imagination, then the only 
religious scriptures we shall need ... will be the poetry or literature 
to which our own culture gives us access" ( 144). 
Falck describes myth as "a form of integrated perceptual 
awareness which unites 'fact' and 'explanation,' because it is a form 
of awareness in which fact and explanation have not yet become 
disunited" ( 117). He says myth is "a mode of perception or of vision 
rather than a mode of explanation" and should not be considered 
failed attempts to explain natural phenomena without the benefit of 
science. Fictions reveal reality in ways which do not "involve their 
being literal descriptions or representations of reality" ( 127). In fact, 
Falck believes myth is necessary to put our comprehension of the 
world together after science has taken it apart: 
Natural science itself ... is a mode of comprehension which 
must for its own purposes be as far as possible purged of the 
emotional or spiritual peculiarities of human perception: when 
nature has for these special purposes been dissociated into 
'facts' and theoretical 'explanation' of facts, it will only be 
poetry (in the sense of the creative use of language in general--
which in Shelley's words 'comprehends all science')--which will 
allow us to resconstitute the unities that have been lost and to 
reinstate our human vis ion. 
(Myth, Truth and Literature 117-118) 
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Falck believes that since "all knowledge must be based in bodily 
awareness ... 'explanations' which embrace the peculia~ities cf 
human emotion and of the human spirit must be more profound than 
explanations--such as natural-scientific ones--which do not" (119). 
Even a scientific world would still seem to require myth in order to 
have meaning: "the configurations within which human life can most 
fundamentally be understood as falling--the patterns in terms of 
which it can most satisfyingly be seen--may in the end need to be 
understood as a matter not of scientific order but of a poetic order 
which is inherently mythic" ( 119). 
Leonard Schlain in Art and Physics suggests that the poetry of 
visual art actually forecasts and prepares the culture for future 
discoveries of science. He claims that revolutionary art has always 
served the function of preparing the future: " ... the radical 
innovations of art embody the preverbal stages of new concepts that 
will eventually change a civilization" ( 17). Schlain says that "a new 
way to think about reality begins with the assimilation of unfamiliar 
images. This collation leads to abstract ideas that only later give rise 
to a descriptive language" ( 17). Schlain believes the artist creates 
the necessary visual images that precede the mental abstractions and 
descriptive language. Schlain describes clairvoyant art as a "Distant 
Early Warning system of the collective thinking of society. Visionary 
art alerts the other members that a conceptual shift is about to occur 
in 'a thought system used to perceive the world" ( 18). He finds in the 
revolutionary artist's vision "a peculiar prescience that precedes the 
physicist's equations. Artists have mysteriously incorporated into 
their works features of a physical description of the world that 
science later discovers" (18).6 
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The artist, with little or no awareness of what is going on in the 
field of physics, manages to conjure up images and metaphors 
that are strikingly appropriate when superimposed upon the 
conceptual framework of the physicist's later revisions of our 
ideas about physical reality. Repeatedly throughout history, 
the artist introduces symbols and icons that in retrospect prove 
to have been an avant-garde for the thought patterns of a 
scientific age not yet born. ( 19) 
Describing the imagination as "the faculty we use to grasp the nature 
of the 'out there,"' Schlain says that both "lr]evolutionary art and 
visionary physics attempt to speak about matters that do not yet 
have words" (20).7 
Schlain also describes how scientists and artists work 
unknowingly in tandem, making simultaneous discoveries in fields 
that both disciplines had before slighted or ignored. In the last half 
of the nineteenth century science and art both became obsessed with 
light and its constituent/product color. After Delacroix, Turner, and 
Friedrich opened the shutters to let light fall on what had been the 
"brown sauce" school of painting, the impressionists and post-
impressionists emancipated color, using it brilliantly in new and vital 
ways: 
Monet was the first to immerse the viewer in the delight of 
color for color's sake. Seurat created designs by juxtaposing 
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minute dots of pure color. Gauguin set the mood of a painting 
with color. Van Gogh imbued color with a reverberating 
vitality. Cezanne substituted color for the crucial elements of 
line, shading, and perspective. (176) 
Coincidently, physicists during the period from 1860 to the 1920's 
"stared in childlike wonder at the spectrum of colors" and made their 
own discoveries: "the composition of the stars; the fusion of 
magnetism, electricity, and light; the genesis of quantum mechanics; 
the structure of the atom; and the expansion of the universe" ( 179). 
Schlain describes this "apotheosis of light" in terms of art, science, 
and ret igion: 
Einstein's realization that light (which is color) is the 
quintessence of the universe paralleled the apotheosis of 1 ight 
by the artists. Before Einstein made his discovery, Claude 
Monet announced that 'the real subject of every painting is 
light.' Echoing this statement, Einstein later commented, 'For 
the rest of my life I want to reflect on what light is.' Both artist 
and physicist confirmed a great biblical truth. In Genesis, God's 
grand opening act was the creation of light. He did not say, 'Let 
there be space' or 'Let there be time.' He said, 'Let there be 
light.' (179) 
Schlain hopes for an integration of art and physics that would "kindle 
a more synthesized awareness which begins in wonder and ends 
with wisdom" (24). 
Science, like religion and poetry, adds not only to the 
knowledge of this world but also to its mystery. Albert Einstein in 
an essay published in Living Philosoghies wrote that "the most 
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beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious." He described 
the center of true religiousness to be the knowledge "that what is 
impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting itself as the highest 
wisdom and most radiant beauty which our dull faculties can 
comprehend only in the most primitive forms" (6). For Einstein, who 
could not imagine a judging God simply reflecting human frailty and 
who had no faith in an afterlife, it was enough "to contemplate the 
mystery of conscious life perpetuating itself through all eternity, to 
reflect upon the marvelous structure of the universe which we can 
dimly perceive, and to try humbly to comprehend even an 
infinitesimal part of the intelligence manifested in nature" ( 6-7). 
If as Sir Thomas Browne wrote, "Nature is the art of God," 
science is both critical exegesis and religious meditation. Stephen 
Hawking writes of the search for a complete unified theory which 
would reconcile the inconsistencies between the general theory of 
relativity and quantum mechanics: 
... there may well be only one, or a small number, of 
complete unified theories, such as the heterotic string theory, 
that are self-consistent and aHow the existence of structures as 
complicated as human beings who can investigate the laws of 
the universe and ask about the nature of God. 
(Brief Historxl74) 
Hawking says that if we do ever discover such a complete theory and 
it becomes accessible in broad priniciple to everyone, we will then be 
left to the discussion of "What is it that breathes fire into the 
equations and makes a universe for them to describe?" and 
"Why?"(174). Emily Dickinson observed that "the unknown is the 
greatest need of the intellect"; perhaps it is equally true that the 
searching intellect is the greatest need of the unknown. 
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Arthur G. Zajonc, a professor of physics at Amherst who 
specializes in the study of quantum optics, expresses a need for art to 
aid science in finding the images that will allow us to understand and 
be able to articulate the phenomena that quantum physics can 
formuiate mathematically. Zajonc says that new science requires 
new modes of understanding--new metaphors and images--and he 
calls on art to aid "the project of creating the requisite faculties 
adequate to the understanding of these newly emergent phenomena 
of science" ("Light and Cognition" 112). Zajonc explains that cultural 
paradigms both create possibilities for thought within traditional 
patterns but also hinder the development of new thinking modalities 
when the observer is faced with phenomena that cannot be 
explained by the old science, the old ways of understanding the 
world. Paradigms shape perceptions: 
The textures and patterns of thought in which we now live are 
the outcome of hard fought, spiritual battles that established a 
general mode of discourse, understanding, feeling, and action. 
While we may be unconscious of their history, these traditions 
are part of us and shape our habits of thought and 
understanding, our very seeing. In our own day, contemporary 
spiritual battles and new modes of knowledge are emerging. 
These will require fresh patterns of thought, unknown 
metaphors, and will also one day shape a future landscape. 
("Light and Cognition" 112) 
To a large extent our seeing is structured by our thinking: "Our 
manner of thinking I imits and even forms the very world we 
experience"("Light and Cognition" 125). 
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In his essay "Light and Cognition," Zajonc says that technology, 
in fact, became image after the invention of the mechanical clock 
around 1300. The mechanical clock then came "to shape the 
imagination and to provide a basis for understanding the natural 
world" (114). Galileo united "terrestrial and celestial mechanics" and 
thus provided the basis for the Deist concept of a clockwork universe 
superintended by God, the master clockmaker. Today, however, 
science can no longer explain newly observable phenomena in 
classical terms based on Newtonian mechanics. Zajonc says that 
"there !are] objects whose nature is so radically non-mechanical that 
they defy all honest attempts to include them in the catalog of 
machines" ( 117). Light itself is "unambiguously nonmechanical." 
Zajonc describes experiments which set out to test definitively the 
nature of light--whether it is a wave or particle--and which result in 
findings that are logically impossible from the viewpoint of classical 
physics. Discovering that a singl.e indivisible photon may act as a 
partie le or a wave depending on which result the experimenter is 
testing for, physicists conclude that during the experiment the light 
exists in "an ambiguous quantum 'superposition' state" ( 120). Zajonc 
recognizes that saying that the light is in a superposition state 
explains nothing: "Invoking such a phrase does not ... constitute an 
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explanation ... . Such language simply locates that which we do not 
understand" ( 120; emphasis added). Though the phrase "quantum 
position state" has a precise mathematical meaning, "[u]nderstanding 
appears to require an image ... " ( 121 ).8 Zajonc says that the 
phenomena that are unexplainable by the old mechanical paradigm 
are multiplying: "Many of the solid-state electronic devices common 
today, from television to calculator, operate because the mechanical 
paradigm fails" ( 121). 
Zajonc believes that science and the civilization at large need 
the cognitive capacities of artists to provide the images necessary for 
understanding the new science, and he presents an example of an 
artist with a unique and unifying concept of scientific methodology. 
Goethe, the poet/savant who considered his greatest work not to be 
Faust but his scientific study of the theory of color, saw the 
possibility for developing "new cognitive faculties ... whose 
emergence would bring with them the perception of novel and 
hitherto unseen coherences within nature" (Zajonc, "Light and 
Cognition .. 125). Goethe articulated a distinctive methodology and 
objective for science. His process of investigation passed through 
three stages--from empirical observation of a phenomenon to the 
analysis of the scientific phenomenon obtained through experiments 
under differing conditions and finally to the "pure phenomenon," a 
synthesis of the preceding observations and experiments. 
Emphasizing the "pure" or "archetypal phenomenon," Goethe's 
method avoided "abstract, mathematical representations of the 
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phenomenon under study" and questioned the conditions under 
which phenomena appear rather than their causes. For Goethe, the 
archetypal phenomenon was the culminating point of investigation, 
the moment in which "'the human mind can come closest to things in 
their general state, draw them near, and so to speak, form an 
amalgam with them'" (qtd. in Zajonc, "Light and Cognition" 124). 
According to Zajonc, Goethe's concept of theory says that "[t]o 
understand, one must see, envision, behold- in the mind as well as in 
the external world .... By 'making itsel.f utterly identical with the 
object' one's experience becomes true theory" ( 124). Goethe 
admonished, '"Let us not seek for something behind the phenomena 
--they themselves are the theory'" (qtd. in Zajonc 125). 
Strict attention to the phenomena as theory, Goethe believed, 
would lead to the development of new cognitive capacities making 
possible, after passionate inquiry, moments of understanding that 
would come as aesthetic experiences of "seeing into nature." Zajonc 
finds in Emerson a similar vision of the kinship between the 
aesthetic moments experienced both in science and poetry: 
For Emerson, the poet's task was nothing more than this: To 
walk within nature not as a spy, but as the transcendency of 
her own being, and so to articulate in words what she performs 
for and within us. Emerson realized the kinship between 
artistry and the exhilarating moment of scientific discovery 
when he wrote: 'And never did any science originate but by a 
poetic perception.' ("Light and Cognition" 126) 
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New theories in physics change our perceptions of the nature of 
reality when they are transformed by art into terms and images we 
can understand. Zajonc's plea for artists to aid science by supplying 
appropriate metaphors is partly answered in Tom Stoppard's 
Arcadia. In a play that zestily intermixes landscape theory, the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics, and the politics of academic 
publishing, Valentine joyfully explains to Hannah the wonder of 
living amid the chaos theory of late twentieth-century physics: 
.... The unpredictable and the predetermined unfold together 
to make everything the way it is. It's how nature creates itself, 
on every scale, the snowflake and the snowstorm. It makes me 
so happ_v. To be at the beginning again, knor~ring almost 
nothing. People were talking about the end of physics. 
Relativity and quantum looked as if they were going to clean 
out the whole problem between them. A theory of everything. 
But they only explained the very big and the very small. The 
universe, the elementary particles. The ordinary-sized stuff 
which is our Jives, the things people write poetry about--
clouds--daffodl1s--r~raterfalls--and rv!Jat happens in a cup of 
coffee when the cre.am goes in--these things are full of 
myster)'~ as m.vsterious to us as the heavens r~rere to the 
Gree.l."s. We're better at predicting events at the edge of the 
galaxy or inside the nucleus of an atom than whether it'll rain 
on auntie's garden party three Sundays from now. Because the 
problem turns out to be different. We can't even predict the 
next drip from a dripping tap when it gets irregular. Each drip 
sets up the conditions for the next, the smallest variation blows 
prediction apart, and the weather is unpredictable the same 
way, will always be unpredictable. When you push the 
numbers through the computer you can see it on the screen. 
The future is disorder. A door like this has cracked open five 
or six times since we got up on our hind legs. Its the best 
possible time to be alive, r~r!Jen almost ever:vt!Jing you thought 
_vou kner~r is wrong. (48; emphasis added) 
·----------
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According to chaos theory, "tiny differences in input [can] quickly 
become overwhelming differences in output--a phenomenon given 
the name 'sensitive dependence on initial conditions.·" The concept 
has been translated into a metaphor known "only half-jokingly" as 
the "Butterfly Effect"--"the notion that a butterfly stirring the air 
today in Peking can transform storm systems next month in New 
York" (Gleick 8). Chaos introduces creative chance into the process of 
entropy and order arises. james Gleick writes: 
Believers in chaos--and they sometimes call themselves 
believers, or converts, or evangelists--speculate about 
determinism and free will, about evolution, about the nature of 
conscious intelligence. They feel that they are turning back a 
trend in science toward reductionism, the analysis of systems 
in terms of their constituent parts: quarks, chromosomes, or 
neurons. They believe that they are looking for wholes. (5) 
Goethe and Emerson would be pleased: Science, through poetic 
perception has begun to see the phenomena as the theory and has 
fallen again into wonder. 
Loren Eiseley 
Loren Corey Eiseley was born in Lincoln, Nebraska, on 
September 3, 1907, the son of Daisy Corey Eiseley and Clyde Edwin 
Eiseley. Daisy had begun to lose her hearing as a child and by the 
time her only son was born, she was very nearly deaf. A 
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combination of circumstances and personality--including the 
isolation of her silent world, her difficulty communicating, the strains 
of poverty, her private frustrations as "an untaught prairie artist," a 
familial streak of madness, two unhappy marriages--produced a 
bizarre, paranoid woman of violent passions and illogical whims who 
became a lifelong curse on her only child's happiness. Clyde, Loren's 
father, was a hardware salesman who in an uncertain economy found 
it difficult to keep a job and support his family. A loving father 
idealized by his son, Clyde bore his wife's rampages as best he could 
and asked Loren to do the same. Clyde had a beautiful, rich baritone 
voice and enjoyed reciting long speeches from Shakespeare. Eiseley 
would r~member with pride and hope his father's letter saying the 
boy was "a genius but moody." Clyde's protracted and painful dying 
from abdominal cancer left his son bereft, spiritually homeless, and 
with a fear of death that expressed itself as a lifelong insomnia. 
From his mother Eiseley received an artist's eye for the beauty of 
nature; from his father he learned to love the sound of words. From 
their troubled family life, he acquired a profound pessimism, the 
sense of being an alienated outsider, and a guarded, highly sensitive 
nature. 
With help from an uncle, Eiseley attended the University of 
Nebraska, dropping out for periods because of illness or lack of 
money or academic woes. For brief stints, he rode the rails with 
other desperate, homeless men. During his eight undergraduate 
years, he wrote and published poems in traditional forms on 
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melancholy themes and acquired a local literary reputation. After 
finally graduating with a degree in anthropology and English, Eis~ley 
entered the University of Pennsylvania for graduate work in 
anthropology. In 1 9 38, he married Mabel Langdon, a reserved 
woman interested in art and literature and deeply devoted to 
nourishing her husband's spirit and writing. Seven years older than 
Loren, Mabel as student teacher had written encouraging notes on 
Eiseley's high school essays. They decided not to have children, in 
part, Eiseley claimed, because of a fear of transmitting the familial 
madness from his mother's side of the family. During his years of 
graduate study and later while he taught at the University of Kansas 
and then Oberlin, Eiseley's poetry writing dwindled under the 
pressure to produce professional articles like "Montagnais-Naskapi 
Bands and Family Hunting Districts of the Central and Southeastern 
Labrador Peninsula" and "A Neglected Anatomicai Feature of the 
Foxhall jaw." In 1947, Eiseley was appointed chairman and professor 
of anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania; in 1961, the 
University appointed him the first Benjamin Franklin Professor of 
Anthropology and the History of Science. 
During the late 1940's, Eiseley turned from writing scholarly 
articles to highly allusive and metaphorical essays in natural history. 
In 1957, a collection of these revised essays was published as The 
Immense journey, his lyrical speculations about the evolution of man 
and the complex interrelationships of all life. During the next twenty 
years, he published a number of essays and books, including 
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Darwin's Century, The Firmament of Time, The Mind as Nature, The 
Unexnected Universe, The lnvis ible Pyramid, and The Night Country. 
In his last years, Eiseley returned to writing poetry and published 
Notes of an Alchemist and The Innocent Assassins. Two other 
volumes of poetry, Another Kind of Autumn and All the Night Wing£ .. 
and two volumes of essays, The Star Thrower and Darwin and the 
Mysterious Mr. X were published posthumously. Two years before 
his death Eiseley published his autobiography, All the Strang~ 
Hours.9 
The Firmament of Time won both the John Burroughs Medal for 
the best publication in the field of nature writing, and the Lecomte 
du Nouy Foundation Award for "best work of particular interest for 
the spiritual life of our epoch and for the defense of human dignity" 
(Angyal 56). Angyal describes it as "the poetry of science": 
If Darwin's Century is essentially an historical treatment of 
evolution, then The Firmament of Time is lyrical and 
meditative. If the first study concentrates on the history of 
science, its sequel expresses the poetry of science: the beauty 
and elegance, as well as the explanatory power, of a master 
hypothesis that irrevocably altered our world view. (57) 
This lyrical and poetic treatment did not, however, sit well with John 
Buettner-Janusch, a physical anthropologist at Yale. In a sneering 
review published in American Anthronology, Buettner-Janusch 
refers to the "slim volume" which "purports to have something to do 
with the history of science" as "a highly poeticized metaphorical 
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account of the development of a natural view of the universe" in 
which the writing becomes "intensely lyrical and the thread of 
thought becomes unraveled amongst the verbal brambles" (693-
694). He describes the chapter "How Man Became Natural" as ··a very 
literary interpretation of the record of hominid fossils" in which the 
writing is "sentimental and trite" and the ideas unfocused. In a 
comment worthy of Mencken, Buettner- janusch blasts the chapter 
"How Human Is Man?" as "a series of moral parables on a somewhat 
higher level than those found in the repertory of a fundamentalist 
preacher. Their relevance to the discussion of an important part of 
the history of modern science eludes the reviewer" (694). Buettner-
janusch concluded that The Firmament of Time is "a work of 
obscurantism" and declared that "we need not inject mystery, 
fevered prose, overblown metaphors, and sentimental twaddle" into 
science which is inherently exciting and absorbing .. A friend of 
Eiseley's wrote a letter rebutting Buettner- janusch and expressing 
the hope that the same critic would never be asked to review the 
Song of Solomon (Christianson 353). 
Generally, the contemporary reception of Eiseley's work was 
effusively laudatory. Darwin's Century gave Eiseley credibility as a 
historian of science. Professor Marston Bates of the zoology 
department of the University of Michigan writing for Science said the 
book showed "complete mastery of materials and detailed 
scholarship," and the quality of the writing compared happily to 
Lovejoy's The Great Chain of Being, ( 1493). Edward S. Deevey called 
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The Firmament of Time "anything but slight" and described Eiseley 
as "a mature and subtle thinker" able to articulate lucidly "the 
dilemma created by the 'naturalness· of man" ( 122). Writing in 
American Anthronologist eight years after Buettner-janusch's 
scathing attack, Theodosius Dobzhansky declared "here is Proust 
miraculously turned into an evolutionary anthropologist"; he found 
The Unexpected Universe a "fascinating and inspiring book" (305). 
William D. Stahlman, professor of the hisory of science at the 
University of Wisconsin, described Eiseley as "a poet disguised as an 
anthropologist" and described The Unexpected Universe as "science 
in a humanistic language" (38). In a review of The Invisible 
.Eyramid, Rene Dubos, professor of environmental biomedicine at 
Rockefeller University, declared himself bewitched by Eiseley's style 
"which is often that of a seer and prophet" (70). The Night CountrY 
was generally perceived as Eiseley's best book after The Immense 
journey: (Christianson 414). William R. MacKaye wrote of it, "This is a 
wise, eloquent, noble book by a man whose learning and whose use 
of it is a gift to all of us" (B 1). 
Eiseley began and ended as a poet. He started writing poetry 
in high school and actually published three dozen poems during his 
undergraduate years. In the 1960's, Eiseley returned to poetry 
writing after a hiatus of twenty years during which he solidified his 
academic career in anthropology and began writing natural science 
essays. Carlisle believes that Eiseley's years as an anthropologist 
became an intrinsic part of his later poetic voice and vision: 
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Science is not simply the subject of his poetry, nor the 
underlying knowledge, ilor is the poetry merely about Eiseley's 
experience as a scientist .... science has become an essential 
and inseparable part of the whole unbroken movement of 
perception and expression of man/scientist/poet. 
("The Poetic Achievement of Loren Eiseley" 124) 
In an extremely generous assessment, Carlisle says that Eiseley 
brought "a unique sensibility, knowledge, and imagination--that 
could only develop through science" creating a "new idiom, fusing 
science and poetry into a seamless and· unanalyzable whole" ( 128). 
Others who have found it analyzable have also found that Eiseley, 
1 ike Thoreau, is a better poet in prose than in poetry. 
In a review of The Innocent Assassins, Ben Howard identifies 
strengths and weakness true of Eiseley's poetry generally. He says 
that Eiseley's most affecting poems are those set in the natural 
world but ultimately concerned with human arrogance and moral 
blindness. He calls Eiseley a "gentle misanthrope" (44). Howard 
finds Eiseley's strength, however, in his "historical imagination"--
"not in his moralizing but in his magnificent evocation of prehistoric 
life" (45). The poems fail when they lapse into sentimentality or 
when they rely on a rhapsodic but rigid syntax: "First-rate insights 
will be buried in an avalanche of clauses; or, conversely, suggestive 
metaphors ... will be laboriously extended" (45). Howard also finds 
banal phrasing, stilted locutions, and heroic postures. Nevertheless, 
he says the best poems "rise above their own discursiveness and 
didacticism" (45-46). Reed Whittemore found Eiseley to have "a 
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superficial rhetorical notion of what poetry is and does" and to have 
burdened himself with the outmoded notion of the poet as preacher. 
Writing of Notes of an Alchemist, Whittemore said that "the verse 
came out looking like prose but with more adjectives" (23). Angyal 
says that Eiseley's free verse and prose "differ in little more than the 
arrangement of lines. Too many of his poems say with less ease and 
originality what he said better in prose" ( 112). Gerber and 
McFadden concur; they describe Eiseley's later poetry as "essayistic 
free verse. Except for its typography, it is nearly indistinguishable 
fr'om his more lyrical prose" and seems to be "preliminary notes for 
actual prose pieces" (32). Eiseley's poetry, unlike Wilbur's, is not a 
poetry of discovery. Eiseley's is a poetry of premeditation; he starts 
out knowing what his message is. 
What Eiseley wrote of Thoreau is true of himself: "Neither 
science nor 1 iterature was his total concern. He was a fox at the 
wood's edge, regarding human preoccupations with doubt" (ST 2 24). 
In The Immense Journey Eiseley says that his mental travelings 
forward and backward in time had indeed been "an immense 
journey," and he warns those who would accompany him not to look 
for "science in the usual sense." Eisetey tells his readers that white 
he has tried scrupulously to avoid errors of fact, his essays offer not 
pure science but "the record of what one man thought as he pursued 
research and pressed his hands against the confining wall of 
scientific method in his time"; he admits that he offers not accounts 
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of discovery so much as confess ions of ignorance (U 13). Orville 
Prescott described The Immense Journey as "lyrically beautiful" 
prose which gave Darwin's theory of evolution an indefinable 
religious quality ( 17). Peter Heidtmann in "An Artist of Autumn" 
finds in all of Eisley's essays that "science, religion, and art are not 
compartmentalized" but instead seem to be "aspects of a single 
mental process" (47). Describing his art as the "primary instrument 
of Eiseley's lifelong quest," Heidtmann says that the essays become 
"the vehicle of the conveyance of !Eiseley's] religious and scientific 
outlook ... land] the means by which ... he lures us into 
participating in his vision" ("An Artist," Heidtman 47). Science, 
rather than narrowing his vision, fueled Eiseley's imagination: 
"scientific knowledge seems to have aroused in him a deeper pre-
rational apprehension, which sometimes flashes out in sudden, 
startling perceptions" ("An Artist," Heidtmann 48). Carlisle calls 
Eiseley's approach "science with a touch of Thoreauvian 
extravagance" ("Heretical Science" 360). 
Although Eiseley respected and participated in the search and 
the order-making of science, he also recognized science's 
shortcomings and potentials for misuse. Eiseley described two kinds 
of scientists--one an "educated man who still has a controlled sense 
of wonder before the universal mystery" and the other, "the extreme 
reductionist who is so busy stripping things apart that the 
tremendous mystery has been reduced to a trifle" (ST 190). Eiseley 
believed that Melville had symbolized on the "gigantic canvas" of 
47 
Moby Dick, in Ishmael and Ahab, "the struggle between two ways of 
looking at the universe: the magnification of the poet's mind 
attempting to see all, while disturbing as little as possible, as opposed 
to the plunging fury of Ahab with his cry, 'Strike, strike through the 
mask, whatever it may cost in lives and suffering"' (ST 200). Too 
often, Eiseley believed, the search of scientists and the governments 
supporting them became a search for power rather than 
understanding. Although science can be used by good men, Eiseley 
found no evidence that science can itself create good men. 
Eiseley also saw a correspondence between the negative sides 
of science and the darker aspects of religion--both were capable of 
constructing and then imposing self-serving myths. Optimistic 
nineteenth-century biologists had assumed that the evolutionary 
tracing of life to its simplest stages would lead inevitably to solving 
the mystery of how carbon became animate. However, the mystery 
only deepened, and Eiseley says that science was left in the 
"embarrassing position of having to postulate theories of living 
origins which it could not demonstrate": 
After having chided the theologian for his reliance on myths 
and miracle, science found itself in the unenviable position of 
having to create a mythology of its own: namely, the 
assumption that what, after long effort, could not be proved to 
take place today had, in truth, taken place in the primeval past. 
(lJ. 191) 
-- ~----- ~--~ 
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Gaie H. Carriihers, jr., in Mumford, Tate. Eiseley: Watchers in the 
Night defines myth in negative terms as "a systematizing, totalizing 
mental pattern for dealing with semiconscious assumptions, conflicts, 
desires, and fears and integrating problematical experience with 
them, a pattern for dealing that permits social action" (213). Myth, 
Carrithers says, succeeds in reducing existential anxieties "by 
reducing the meaningfulness that goes with undecidability." Eiseley 
saw that science as much as religion could be a myth-maker, 
naturalizing man "in the structure of predictable law and 
conformity," and he feared those in science who would substitute one 
dogmatism for another: 
To those who have substituted authoritarian science for 
authoritarian religion, individual thought is' worthless unless it 
is the symbol for a reality which can be seen, tasted, felt, or 
thought about by everyone else. Such men adhere to a dogma 
as rigidly as men of fanatical religiosity. They reject the world 
of the personal, the happy world of open, playful, or aspiring 
thought. (NC I 04-1 05) 
Science that becomes rigid becomes estranged from both life and 
from art. 
Eiseley recognized that a "basic division" between science and 
art had widened in modern times: " ... science seeks essentially to 
naturalize man in the structure of predictable law and conformity, 
whereas the artist is interested in man the individual" (NC 138). 
... man inhabits a realm half in and half out of nature, his 
mind reaching forever beyond the tool, the uniformity, the law, 
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into some realm which is that of mind alone. The pen and the 
brush represent that eternal search, that conscious recognition 
of the individual as the unique creature beyond the statistic. 
(~ 141). 
Eiseley believed it the responsibility of the artist to defend "the 
eternal flight" of the human mind from the imposition of 
institutionalized "laws, regularities, and certainties" (NC 14 t ). 
Despite this gulf that seemed to be widening between science and 
art, Eiseley also believed that "a man may be both a scientist and 
artist," that the scientist may also experience the "the esthetic joy of 
the true artist" (NC 138). Therefore, Eiseley defended naturalists 
(himself included) who would mix art with science from the "new 
class of highly skilled barbarians" whose "unappetizing puritianism 
... without grace or humor" has found salvation in "facts" alone (NC 
142). 
Eiseley celebrated the impact of literary naturalists whose 
origins he traced to the line of "parson naturalists" like Gilbert White, 
the author of The Natural History of Sel borne. 
Even though they were not discoverers in the objective sense, 
one feels at times that the great nature essayists had more 
individual perception than their scientific contemporaries. 
Theirs was a different contribution. They opened the minds of 
men by the sheer power of their thought. The world of nature, 
once seen through the eye of genius, is never seen in quite the 
same manner afterward. A dimension has been added, 
something that lies beyond the careful analysis of professional 
biology. (NC 143) 
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Remembering Richard Jefferies' "grim portrait of a starving lark 
cracking an empty snail shell," Eiseley found in the description not 
just sharp, accurate observation but also a sense of Jefferies' 
"poignant hunger--the hunger of a dying man--for the beauty of an 
earth insensible to human needs" (NC 142-143). He discovered 
something "uncapturab1e" in W. H. Hudson's landscapes-- "a strange 
nostalgia haunts his pages--the light of some lost star within his 
individual mind" (NC 143). Eise1ey believed that without the 
guidance of the "rare and exquisite sensitivity" of the literary 
naturalists, we would lack pity and tolerance for that which we had 
never learned to see or value: "It is within the power of great art to 
shed on nature a light which can be had from no other source than 
the mind itself" (NC 143). 
Enamored of the greater scope and possibility for meaning in a 
less rigid form, Eisetey himself became primarily a writer of personal 
essays in the tradition that began with Montaigne and was later 
taken up by the English parson-naturalists. In America, Thoreau had 
established the tradition of combining keen observations of the 
natural world with visionary romanticism and became the progenitor 
of a line that includes not only Eiseley but John Burroughs, John 
Muir, Edwin Way Teale, Sally Carrighar, Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, 
and Annie Dillard (Gerber and McFadden 22). Andrew J. Angyal 
describes the metamorphosis in Eiseley's writing from scholarly 
anthropology artie les to the natural history essay: 
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Dissatisfied with the restrictive, value-free orientation of 
modern science, Eiseley turned to the essay in the hope of 
finding a form through which he could articulate his sense of 
wonder. For some time he had been privately disillusioned 
with the 'religion of science'--with its rigid assumption that 
every natural event in the universe can be rationally explained 
by prior events. He found it increasingly difficult to reconcile 
his 'personal universe' of mystery and beauty with the rational 
universe of science, where everything is ultimately reducible to 
fact and measurement. (Loren Eiseley 33) 
Angyal says that modern natural history writing differs from the 
older pastoral tradition "by avoiding the sentimentality, the stock 
nature descriptions, and the 'pathetic fallacy' typical of literary 
pastoralism. Instead, the natural history essay gains vividness and 
accuracy from the influence of empirical science. It is both personal 
and facutal, balancing objectivity with delight" (34). The hallmarks 
of the natural history essay are, according to Angyal, the writer's 
aesthetic. rssponse to the natural world, "an affectionate sense of 
locale, an appreciation of a particular physical landscape," and the 
recognizable voice of a distinctive personality. (34-35). 
Annie Dillard, in her Introduction to The Best American Essays 
.1_988, writes that "it was Loren Eiseley--a scientist--who restored the 
essay's place in imaginative literature and who extended its symbolic 
capacity" (xv). Angyal believes that Eiseley, in fact, deserves credit 
for inventing a new genre, "one that enlarged the power and range of 
the personal essay" (39): "In his imaginative synthesis of literature 
and science, he combines narrative and hypothesis, fact and feeling, 
metaphor and exposition. The result is a new style of scientific 
literature and a new literary genre, an expansion of the personal 
essay for scientific purposes" (Angyal 42). 
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In his autobiography All the Strange Hours, Eiseley describes 
the evolution of the unique form he calls the "concealed essay." He 
says that it grew out of the rejection of one of his articles by a 
scientific periodical. Eiseley decided to rework the material into a 
more literary format designed to appeal to the nonscientist: 
"personal anecdote was allowed gently to bring under observation 
thoughts of a more purely scientific nature" (ASH 177). Eiseley 
believed that such a personalized style would heighten the reader's 
interest without doing any harm to the scientific data (ASH 178). 
Angyal describes the elements of Eiseley's form: 
The 'concealed essay' starts with a vivid anecdote or 
reminiscence and gradually expands it in a scientific or 
contemplative direction. The subject matter of the essay, 
whatever it may be, is framed or 'concealed' by the personal 
approach, which serves as a rhetorical device to engage the 
reader's attention. Thus the 'concealed essay' became for 
Eiseley a highly elaborate form, with frequent literary 
references and allusions, numerous quotations, multiple 
themes, and an interwoven structure of contemplative 
concerns. This casual and informal, though sophisticated, 
technique brings narrative and personal experience, essentially 
fictional and autobiographical tools, to bear on what is 
otherwise simply expository material--scientific fact and 
hypothesis. (39) 
The best of Eiseley's essays, Angyal says, display "a fine balance of 
autobiography, allusion, and exposition. The allusion often sets the 
theme, the exposition introduces the conceptual material, ususatly 
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scientific, and the autobiographical incidents provide tone, structure, 
and continuity" (Loren Eiseley 80 ). 
Carrithers, however, compares the style of Eiseley's essays to 
the anthropologist's description of himself desperately trying to 
teach sociology classes at Oberlin: "I began to feel like the proverbial 
Russian fleeing in a sleigh across the steppes before a wolf pack .... 
everything from anecdotes of fossil hunting to observations upon 
Victorian Darwinism were being hurled head long from the rear of 
the sleigh" (ASH 131 ). As a result of this method of compos it ion, 
Carrithers finds it difficult to descry a structure even in those essays 
where a chronology is discernible; he says that one reaction to 
Eiseley's writing "is likely to be the feeling that he is trying 
everything with the reader" ( 196). 
Carlisle's analysis of the "the fundamental rhythm, or 
movement of attention" in the opening chapter of The Immense 
journey is a succinct statement of the nonlinear, synthetic dynamic 
of most of Eiseley's essays: 
Besides moving variously from autobiography to science, to 
metaphor, and to speculation, the narrative also moves from 
the present into the past, back to the present, and into the 
future. If one were to trace both of these movements in detail, 
the result would be quite complex, because Eiseley frequently, 
and artfully, changes his focus. (Loren Eiseley 168) 
This strategy of weaving auto~iography with science, symbolism, and 
metaphysics allowed Eiseley to create multiple dimensions of 
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meaning. The various aspects interact and even transform so that, as 
Carlisle observes "one of Eiseley's scientific subjects may turn into a 
general theme with broad human and existential significance, or a 
physical site might function simultaneously as an occasion and a 
metaphor" (Loren Eiseley 168). Carrithers ·also sees in Eiseley's 
essays "widespread efforts to generalize, to move from the uniquely 
historical to the designedly emblematic" (201). 
Angyal says that in composing his essays, Eiseley would often 
begin "with the kernel of an actual field happening" and then 
selectively alter or ficitonalize it "to heighten a mood or tone, or else 
to emphasize some theme or motif": " ... as the incident unfolds 
natural history gradually becomes a metaphor for personal history as 
the author probes the recesses in his mind" (Angyal 14). The richest 
sources of experience for Eiseley's essays were his childhood and the 
summers spent digging in remote areas on the Western plains with 
the "South Party," small anthropological/paleontological expeditions 
sponsored by the University of Nebraska. Angyal believes that 
"]m]ore than any others, these were the events that fixed themselves 
in his memory to be transmitted by his imagination into the compact 
and powerful metaphoric descriptions that distinguish his style" ( t 6). 
In fact, the strongest unifying element and the dramatic force 
of the essays is the Eiseley persona. Writing of The Unexgected 
Universe, Angyal says that the autobiographical sections "comprise 
the most memorable passages in the book" and that "Eiseley makes 
science an intensely personal and often mystical experience," 
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recreating incidents from his career which "brought him face to face 
with a 'Mysterious Other'--miracles, one might almost say that forced 
him to contemplate the subjective and illusive dimensions of the 
natural world" (80). In his private encounters with his personal 
universe, Carlisle says that "Eiseley makes himself the center of each 
chapter, and he rarely includes other persons," and Eiseley, the 
inveterate solitary, portrays science as a lonely quest ("Heretical 
Science" 361). From the center of the experiencing self Eiseley builds 
his essays: "they begin with the self and move variously into the 
personal and evolutionary pasts or into the personal and scientHic 
presents, never losing touch with the self at the center, and normally 
returning at the end to Eiseley the man and scientist" (361). Carlisle 
finds that science "is simultaneously a pursuit of the self and an 
attempt to make increasingly closer and closer contact with reality. 
The personal and universal dimensions of science merge in Eiseley's 
books, :!.5 the quest for knowedge of reality and knowledge of oneself 
become one" ("Heretical Science" 374). 
Eiseley was plagued most of his life by an intense fear of the 
loss of the self. His vivid imagination combined with his fear of 
death to make him a hypochondriacal insomniac. He magnified and 
dramatized minor illnesses, and he found it easier to nap in the 
daylight with others near him than to fall asleep in the dark alone. 
His biographer Gate.E. Christianson describes Eiseley's autobiography 
as "among the longest chronicles of an individual death in literary 
history, spanning almost seventy years" (Fox at the Wood· s Edg~ 
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426). Carrithers compares Eiseley to "Heinrich Boll's artist, who 
'carries death within him like a good priest his breviary'" (Mumford .. 
Tate, Eiseley 243). Carrithers also recognizes in Eiseley an urgent 
need for control and sees his writings as strategies to control life 
through words ( 196). 
He who in his highly selective but multiple autobiographical 
writings recounted almost actualized deaths or symbolic deaths 
... would seem to have come, almost 1 ike Lazarus, to speak as 
if from the tomb or from a night journey, with a knowing and 
fascinated dread of death and a disdain for usual human 
boundaries and enclosures" (Carrithers 199). 
In Eiseley's case, death was the mother of essays. 
Eiseley had to find his comfort in words because he could not 
find it in religious faith. Eiseley had no religious training as as child, 
was never affiliated with any religious group as an adult, and 
professed no· religion; nevertheless, Heidtmann describes Eiseley's 
disposition as "unmistakably religious" (Loren Eiseley 73). Defamed 
as a mystic by some of his scientific colleagues for writing in the "no-
man's land between science and literature," Eiseley declared himself 
an agnostic but then described his life as a religious pilgrimage (ASH 
141). His essays suggest religious longing if not religious faith. They 
convey a profound sense of the mystery of life and an intense feeling 
of awe bordering on terror before the miracle and strangeness of the 
ordinary. His essays also convey an aching need for some larger 
context of meaning to give dignity to the brevity of human life and a 
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solitary, restless quest to discover that meaning. Perceptively, 
Gerber and McFadden conclude that "this scientist ranks as one of the 
arch-romantics of our time" (Loren Eiseley 52). 
j. Hillis Miller in The Disa(!Qearance of God writes that " ... 
modern literature betrays in its very form the absence of God. God 
has become a Deus absconditus, hidden somewhere behind the 
silence of infinite spaces, and our literary symbols can only make the 
most distant allusions to him, or to the natural world which used to 
be his abiding place and home" (6). According to Miller, "modern 
thought has been increasingly dominated by the presupposition that 
each man is locked in the prison of his consciousness" and that 
alienation from everything outside has produced "a radical sense of 
inner nothingness" (8). In modern literature, the "drama has all been 
moved within the minds of the characters, and the world as it is in 
itself is by implication unattainable or of no significance" ( 12). Miller 
defines romantics as those who still believe in God but who suffer 
the divine absence. He describes the "central assumption of 
romanticism" as "the idea that the isolated individual, through 
poetry, can ... create through his own efforts a marvelous harmony 
of words which will integrate man, nature, and God" ( 14). The 
romantic artist is one "who goes out into the empty space between 
man and God and takes the enormous risk of attempting to create in 
that vacancy a new fabric of connections" ( 13-14). Not all romantics 
are believers, however. There are romantics like Wallace Stevens 
who have felt the absence without ever having known the presence; 
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for them poetry becomes something that will suffice, that will help 
them live their lives. These romantics experience a profound sense 
of mystery and an insatiable longing without any conviction that 
there is something that will fill their void; for them poetry becomes 
their way of exploring the mystery and letting longing itself become 
meaning. Eiseley was such a romantic. 
jacques Maritain describes what he sees as the predicament of 
poets who, as human beings, have no metaphysical mythlO to sustain 
them in the mystery of being and to help in working out their own 
destinies: 
Those poets who have rejected faith in Transcendence, and 
entered into the spiritual experience of the void, are bound ... 
to turn toward a substitute for what they have rejected: a new 
god of their own, or a system of revolt against and hatred for 
the celestial Intruder, as Lautreamont put it, or that 
'Profundum, physical thunder, dimensions in which We believe 
without belief, beyond belief' of which Wallace Stevens spoke--
all this sought for in the place of God from whom they had 
parted. Hence their nostalgia for 'new myths.' 
(Creative Intuition 319) 
Eiseley's religious need and absence of faith did indeed inspire him 
to become a myth-maker. 
Ironically, given his rejection of the dogmatic myths of science 
and religion, what Eiseley did to fi 11 the abyss of his personal angst 
was to embrace the supple myth of evolution and make himself its 
protagonist. According to Carlisle, Eiseley so interiorized the theory 
of evolution that for him it functioned as "a major structure for 
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perceiving and comprehending experience": "He dwells in it, and 
through it he makes contact with reality. His research and travel, his 
scientific knowledge, and his belief in the modern theory of evolution 
give his work perspective, shape, and authority, as well as content" 
("Heretical Science" 365).11 Angyal writes that, for Eiseley, 
"!e]volution itself ... becomes 'transcendental' in that all forms of life 
constantly strain against their limits, their ecological niches--in the 
quest for survival" (Loren Eiseley 28). Evolution becomes the 
"controlling metaphor" in Eiseley's work, Angyal says, "because 
through it he implies that there is something mysterious, purposeful, 
even transcendent about ... apparently random events in the 
natural world" (32). As Eiseley portrays it, evolution is the unseen, 
inexorable, driving force whereby protean nature maintains a 
process of change, advancing life forms to greater and greater 
complexity in a fierce commitment to creation but a total 
indifference to the results and certainly no commitment to preserve 
any species. Angyal says that Eiseley the artist could see the 
dramatic potential in evolution: "Eiseley was ... gifted with a 
synthesizing, metaphoric mind that constantly sought connections 
between fact and imagination. He possessed the poetic vision to 
perceive the natural history of life's emergence as an epic event--a 
spectacle of prehistory ... " (Angyal 35). Gerber and McFadden note 
that "[u]nder Eiseley's guidance, objective knowledge about 
evolutionary history becomes the stuff of vision" (Loren Eiseley 152). 
Against this mythic background, Eiseley set his drama of being and 
cast his persona in the leading role. 
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Eiseley so personalized the myth of evolution that he came to 
feel that his real home was· back in a cave somewhere during one of 
the interglacial springs between ice ages and felt himself a shape-
shifting phantom, lingering briefly before changing to yet another 
form. The neolithic hunter had momentarily taken on the guise of a 
scientist mulling over old bones. Angyal compares Eiseley to 
Thoreau, who raised his sojourn near Walden Pond to mythic 
proportions: 
Like Thoreau, who confronted the cultural barrenness of 
nineteenth-century America and responded to the lack of 
available cultural myths by evoking the mythic dimensions of 
his own experience, Eiseley also became increasingly a personal 
mythmaker, forging a mythic personality (of the scientist as 
seeker) from the culmulative autobiographical material woven 
throughout his writing. (Angyal 82). 
Observing that the borderline between fiction and nonfiction is 
blurred in autobiographical writing, Heidtmann in his study Loren 
Eiseley:: A Modern Ishmael describes how Eiseley used the 
excavations of his past to create the myth of his literary persona. 
Heidtmann says that Eiseley was "first and foremost an artist, a 
writer in the imaginative sense of the term" but that in his essays 
Eiseley "is impelled primarily by the autobiographical impulse" (3-4); 
therefore, in his essays, Eiseley becomes "the protagonist of his own 
mythic story" ( 19). Eiseley' s voice, Heid tmann says, is "lyrical, often 
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melancholy, sometimes forlorn" (6), a voice that projects the writer's 
inward self--"his private, solitary experience," the pilgrim side rather 
than the public aspect of his life ( 16). 
Heidtmann shows how Eiseley presents his past in ways that 
weave a backdrop against which the Eiseley persona emerges as a 
mythic figure. He cites, for example, the dedication of The Night 
Country to Eiseley's grandmother Malvina McKee Corey, "who sleeps 
as all my people sleep by the ways of the westward crossing." The 
dedication connects Eiseley's ancestors with a great historical 
movement, and his description of his own origins-- "conceived in and 
part of the rolling yellow cloud that ... has been blowing in my part 
of the Middle West since the ice age" (NC 197)--places Eiseley 
himself "within a geological context that transcends history" (Loren 
Eiseley 28). Similarly, in The Invisible Pyramid he frames his life 
within the cyclical passage of "The Star Dragon," Halley's Comet, to lift 
it out of the ordinary and portray himself "from the very beginning 
as an actor on a cosmic stage" (31). Heidtmann says that the "almost 
unrelieved grimness" of Eiseley's childhood memories and his 
dominant view of himself "as a castaway, a fugitive, and a solitary 
wanderer" imply that powerful forces seem to be working toward his 
destruction (33), thereby associating himself with figures of mythic 
proportion like Odysseus, Robinson Crusoe, Ishmael. 
Paleontological fieldwork, combined with broad scientific 
learning and poetic insight, enabled him to find the larger 
context of signification for which his spirit yearned .... With it 
he established himself as the brooding hero of his personal 
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myth. And it is this figure--the wanderer or solitary seeker 
who, with Sisyphean perseverance, refuses to give up his 
struggle despite the threat of ultimate extinction--that captures 
our imagination. (Heidtmann, Loren Eiseley 41) 
Schwartz says that in The Night Country Eiseley, the scientist, accepts 
the role of the poet and, like Virgil leading Dante, conducts his reader 
"through a sacred night country of life and death, transcendence, and 
banality" (Schwartz 865). Attributing Eiseley"s religious disposition 
to the his study of ethnology and the beliefs and rituals of primitive 
people, Erleen J. Christensen says that Eiseley takes on the role of 
shaman, finding kinship with animals, struggling to transcend 
historical time, and finding vision in the wilderness. She calls All the 
Strange Hours "a shaman"s story." 
Describing in his autobiography his adoption of the style of the 
"concealed essay," Eiseley noted that every essayist from Montaigne 
to Emerson had dis covered that "the self and its minute adventures 
may be interesting ... but only if one is utterly, nakedly honest and 
does not pontificate" (ASH 178). This statement, however, is the ruse 
of a clever and wary fox skilled at hiding his tracks. Eiseley's essays 
are far more concealing than concealed. First, rather than using 
autobiographical material as frame and enchantment to draw the 
reader in so that he may then speak about science, Eiseley actually 
uses the elements of science to give order and credibility to his 
personal explorations of self and world. Secondly, the experiences of 
the Eiseley persona in the essays are much more fiction than fact. 
Eiseley's numinous encounters which "often involve strange and 
solitary figures, shamans perhaps, bearing oracular messages 
decipherable to a mind open to such preternatural events," 
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Angyal finds, have often been "heightened or altered to suit Eiseley's 
thematic purposes--and some may be largely invented to fit the 
context of a particular essay" (Loren Eiseley 81 ). Christianson, in his 
biography The Fox at the Wood's Edge, reveals that a number of the 
events which Eiseley recounts under the guise of personal experience 
either never happened or are highly fictionalized. For example, the 
dog Wolf told of movingly and sensitively in "The Angry Winter" is, 
in fact, a fiction. The dog became so real to Eisetey or so necessary to 
his persona that he dedicated The Unexnected Universe .. "To Wolf, 
who sleeps forever with an ice age bone across his heart, the last gift 
of one who loved him" (Christianson 393). 
Gerber and McFadden describe Eiseley's autobiography All the 
Strange Hours as "exceptionally well-wrought," bound by careful use 
of recurrent symbols, themes, and narrative patterns. They say that 
the work "betrays a fierce determination on Eiseley's part to control, 
shape, and frame his material": "This degree of literary 
intentionality and control is unusual in an autobiography" ( 140). 
Noting that a "novelistic quality suffuses the book," Gerber and 
McFadden say that "[a]lthough told in the first person, the tale is 
prepared for maximum effect, calculated and proportioned to imitate 
spontaneity." They conclude that "[a]t times Eiseley seems not so 
much to be presenting a life as creating a character" ( 141). Gerber 
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and McFadden attribute "Eiseley's preoccupation with presence, 
authorial control, and formal literary effect Ito be] intimately related 
to that struggle against loneliness around which the book revolves" 
( 141). Carrithers believes that Eiseley's selective and fictionalized 
autobiography arises partly from a desire for privacy and self-
protection. Carrithers finds in Eiseley "a conviction that there are 
privacies not to be externalized" (200-20 1) and sees Eiseley's 
reticence as a "courteous man's decorum and reluctance to be 
agressively exhibitionistic, a private man's distance, a scarred man's 
caution" (205). 
Christianson, Eiseley' s biographer, asks of A 11 the Strange 
Hours, "But what of the hours that were not so strange?" Eiseley 
leaves out of his autobiography the names and dates and people of 
his daily life in order to become "his own most memorable creation" 
( 426). Christianson says that Eiseley's autobiography and his other 
works "must be viewed primarily as literature rather than as a 
historical document." Through his writing, Eiseley transformed his 
life with all its inadequacies and loneliness into personal myth. 
Eiseley's pilgrimage ... constitutes a variation on the ancient 
myth of man's fall from grace--the quest of a scientist at odds 
with his catting. Fear, anger, sorrow, elation, and rejection are 
as much a part of his writing as the Darwinian revolution, the 
genetic code, or the sun-varnished bones of the early 
mammals. (427) 
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Eiseley--for whom time was a wound--created the myth of himself, a 
persona to outlast time. Chritianson calls Eiseley's "compulsion to 
fictionalize ... a means of scratching his initials more deeply than 
others" (•tl2). Yet, behind the fiction, there is deeper truth. 
Christianson concludes that while All the Strange Hours "is rife with 
distortions, fantasies, and illusions, it will forever be the most vivid 
and, in some essential sense, veracious evocation of its chimerical 
subject and author" (428). 
Eiseley's essays are a complex mixture of art and science and 
religious longing. Each of the elements informs and transforms the 
others, and none of the elements can be separated without 
destroying the compound. 
Richard Wilbur 
If his poems are "unfashionably favorable toward nature," 
Richard Wilbur says "this warp" must be blamed "on a rural, 
pleasant, and somewhat solitary boyhood" (qtd. in Sayre, "A Case for 
Richard Wilbur as Nature Poet" 154). Wilbur, born March 1, 1921, 
grew up "among woods, orchards, corn-fields, horses, hogs, cows, and 
hay-wagons" on a farm in North Caldwell, New jersey, where his 
family lived in a pre-Revolutionary stone house on a rich's man's 
country estate. If Eiseley's childhood was often a misery, Wilbur's 
was mostly an idyll. Wilbur describes life on the Farm as "what 
amounted to a spontaneous English colony: all was tea, bowls, tennis, 
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Epsicopalianism, gardening, music, and bridge, with agriculture and 
commerce in the middle distance and background" (qtd. in Dacey, 
"An Interview with Richard Wilbur" 116). His father, Lawrence 
Lazear Wilbur, was a portrait and landscape and seascape painter 
who had to do commercial art to support the family. Wilbur 
remembers playing with his father's paints and brushes and drawing 
cartoons; even when he was in college he still thought he might be a 
newspaper cartoonist. Wilbur says of his parents that he relished his 
father"s craftsmanship and invention as well as his mother"s gift for 
words (qtd. in Butts, "An Interview with Richard Wilbur" 255). The 
most devasting criticism Wilbur makes of his mother, Helen Ruth 
Purdy Wilbur, is that she "had too many roses, and too many flowers 
generally, and I was made to work amongst them and weed them, 
and do the back-breaking things that you have to do for a lady 
gardener who is always changing her mind about where she wants 
the beds to be" (qtd. in joan Hutton, "Richard Wilbur" 46). He says 
the childhood trauma convinced him he did not like flowers and 
made it impossible to remember their names. However, despite the 
early scars, he became an avid vegetable and herb gardener. 
Unlike Eiseley who spent eight erratic and interrupted in 
undergraduate study, Wilbur finished Amherst in the traditional four 
years. During two summer vacations from college, he rode the rai Is 
and hitchhiked all over America. His hoboing, unlike Eiseley's 
founded on desperation and poverty, was a "boyish adventure tinged 
with Depression radicalism and the poetry of others" (qtd. in Dacey, 
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"An Interview with Richard Wilbur" 117). Wilbur married Charlotte 
Ward, who brought as a dowry, through her newspaper-publishing 
family, a friendship with Robert Frost. Their marriage has lasted 
more than fifty years and produced four children and, it seems, 
considerable happiness. Wilbur joined the Enlisted Reserve Corps 
during World War II and studied cryptography. When it was 
discovered that he had leftist views, radical friends, and a volume of 
Marx in his footlocker, the Army classified Wilbur as an undesirable 
who could not be trusted as a cryptanalyst but was acceptable for 
commando training. He was sent along with other undesirables--
"amiable bookies or bootleggers for the most part"--to join the 
infantry in Italy. After three years with the 36th Infantry Division 
in Italy, France and Germany, Wilbur returned to study and then 
teach at Harvard. He also taught for two years at Wellesley and then 
for twenty years at Wesleyan; subsequently, he became writer-in-
residence at Smith. Like Eiseley, Wit bur has received numerous 
awards and honorary degrees; in 1987 he became the second Poet 
Laureate of the United States. 
In addition to his volumes of poetry--The Beautiful Changes 
and Other Poems ( 1947), Ceremony and Other Poems ( 1950), Thing.s_ 
of This World ( 1956), Advice to a ProP-het and Other Poems ( 1961), 
Walking to SleeP-: New Poems and Translations (1969), The Mind-
Reader: New Poems ( 1976), and New and Collected Poems ( 1987)--
Wilbur has translated from French four comedies by Moliere and two 
tragedies by Racine.l2 He has also published a book of collected 
essays called Resuonses: Prose Pieces,_l_9.5.7-l976. 
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Despite, or because of, his considerable recognition, Wilbur has 
been roundly criticized. In the fifties and the sixties when poetry 
was turning "beat" and "confessional," Wilbur continued to compose 
highly wrought, decorous, "impersonal" verse that, as he says, played 
"the whole instrument"--rhyme, meter, complex stanzaic forms, out-
of-the-ordinary diction, metaphor and imagery, puns, paradox, irony, 
ambiguity, assonance, alliteration, allusion. Some critics came to see 
him as a left-over Modernist, a stuffed-shirt academic poet in an age 
of free-verse confessors. Clive james in "As a Matter of Tact" draws 
telling comparisons: 
While his contemporaries held the mirror up to chaos, Wilbur 
took the opposite line: the more extreme the thing contained, 
the more finely wrought the container had to be. Berryman 
and Lowell went in for stringy hair, open-necked shirts, 
nonrhyming sonnets that multiplied like bacilli, and nervous 
breakdowns. Wilbur, on the other hand, looked like an 
advertisement for Ivy League tailoring and turned out poems 
bui It like Faberge toy trains. ( 145) 
Randall jarrell also found Wilbur's poetry too well-dressed. In his 
review of "Fifty Years of American Poetry, .. jarrell complains about 
Wilbur's Horatian "studied felicity"; he finds that Wilbur's 
"impersonal, exactly accomplished, faintly sententious skill" produced 
poems with "a little too regular a beauty--there is no eminent beauty 
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without a certain strangeness in the proportion." Ironically, having 
said that, Jarrell in the next sentence declares "A Baroque Wall-
Fountain in the Villa Sciarra"" to be "one of the most marvellously 
beautiful, one of the most nearly perfect poems any American has 
written" (""Fifty Years of American Poetry" 85). 
In his review of Advice to a Proghet, Theodore Holmes joins 
the chorus in taking Wilbur"s style to task. He describes Wilbur as a 
prophet without a prophecy and his poetry as a "diversion .. based on 
""style, manner, polish, wit, and decoration of vocabulary and 
learning"" ("Wilbur's New Book" 72). Holmes calls this "the despair of 
style" resulting from Wilbur"s distrust of human cognition but ironic 
attachment to the things of the world which can be known only 
through human cognition. Holmes also accuses Wilbur of taking 
patrician comfort unavailable to most of the world: "Holding up the 
things of this world in their own ultimate status in ontology as a 
solution to the dilemmas of human existence can only be satisfactory 
for the privileged and unthinking ... " (73). 
In his essay "A Kind of Solution: The Situation of Poetry Now" 
(written in 1963), Leslie Fiedler, a confessional critic in a time of 
confessional poets, described Wilbur as definitively the best of a 
group of poets descended from Poe "passed via the French 
sy-mbo/istes toT. S. Eliot and from him to certain quasi-official bards 
of the academy and the suburbs" (54-56). Fiedler traces their 
descent from the Modernist revolution which began before World 
War I down to the "almost unchallenged or.thodoxy" of "the Eliotic 
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New Poetry" cultivated in academia by the poet/critic/professors of 
New Criticism. The poets of this school, Fiedler says, are 
"characterized by a uniform anguish and joy, a uniform broad range 
of erudition, and a uniform high level of technical excellence--
impressive but somehow more than a little depressing" (54). Fielder 
says Wilbur's language is "never banal and never outrageous; his 
music never dull and never atrocious; what he can do he knows, and 
is never tempted to exceed it" (56). Writing specifically of Wilbur's 
"Museum Piece," Fiedler finds that the poem has wit and grace and a 
drive for excellence but bemoans that "there is no personal voice--
and there is no sex: the insistent T and the assertion of balls being 
considered apparently in equally bad taste" (58). It would be a 
crime against delight not to juxtapose to Fiedler's comments Anthony 
Hecht's assessment (written fourteen years later) of Wilbur against 
the background of the confessional school: 
... in this poetic era of arrogant solipsism and limp narcissism 
--when great, shaggy herds of poets write only about 
themselves, or about the casual workings of their rather 
tedious minds--it is essential to our sanity, salutary to our 
humility, and a minimal obesiance to the truth to acknowledge, 
with Wilbur ... the vast alterity, the 'otherness' of the world, 
that huge corrective to our self-sufficiency. ( 130) 
Frank McConnell says that though he himself finds Wilbur to be 
"our most readable serious poet," the fashion in the late 1970's was 
"to confess no more than an amused, minor enthusiasm for Wilbur" 
("Reconsiderations" 3 7 ). Assessing "Richard W i1 bur's Critical 
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Condition" inl977, Charles R. Woodard found that commentary on 
Wilbur had become stylized and predictable, "like bullfighting," with 
"the ritual praise of his technical virtuosity ... followed quickly by 
the disclaimers which establish [the critic's] awareness of its 
irrelevance to contemporary life." 13 The objections to Wilbur's 
poetry, Woodard discovered, came under two headings: First, 
violating William Carlos Williams dicta, Wilbur thinks too much and 
allows things into his mind where his imagination acts upon them. 
Second, in a world where a good poet is expected to suffer and 
precisely report his suffering, Wilbur does not suffer enough and 
does not report his suffering if he does (221 ).14 
Wilbur has also been perceived as irritatingly optimistic and 
affirming. Hyam Plutzik grumbled that the poet is "damnably good-
natured in an abominable world" ("Recent Poetry" 68). Randall 
jarrell complained that Wilbur "obsessively sees, and shows, the 
bright underside of every dark thing" (85). Wilbur, indeed, admits to 
a powerful sense of the world's beneficence. Despite evident evil and 
disorder, Wilbur feels that "the universe is full of glorious energy, 
that the energy tends to take pattern and shape, and that the 
ultimate character of things is comely and good." He believes that 
"when you discover order and goodness in the world, it is not · 
something you are imposing--it is something likely really to be there 
... " (qtd. in Stitt, High, & Ellison, "The Art of Poetry: Richard Wilbur" 
190). In place of the inexorable, indifferent force Eiseley perceived 
driving through nature, Wilbur has a sense of the inevitability of 
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good. One of the poems he has found most affecting "Magna est 
veritas" by Coventry Patmore concludes: "The truth is great, and 
shall prevail, I When none cares whether it prevail or not" (qtd. in 
Broughton, "An Interview" 133). Wilbur understands Patmore to be 
saying that "no matter what he does, no matter what anybody does 
or does not do, or wish, the truth is great and shall prevaiL The 
world is good and will turn out so" ( 134). 
Wilbur attributes his sanguinity to his disposition and his faith. 
Wilbur is a Christian, a life-long Episcopalian who once appalled his 
friend Elizabeth Bishop by mentioning that he had been to church. 
In response to Bishop's query as to whether he actually believed all 
that, Wilbur says that he responded, "Like most people, I have my 
days of believing nothing, and I have my days of believing much of 
it, and some days I believe it all" (qtd. in Fountain and Brazeau, 
Remembering Elizabeth Bishon 348). On another occasion, Wilbur 
wrote, "I have never doubted the existence of God and the radical 
goodness of the world" (qtd. in Cummins 40). 
Marjory Scheidt Payne finds that Wilbur's "spirituality is not 
rooted in theological concepts and speculations, but in fidelity to 
human experience" (Giver of Due Regard 23). Payne says the quality 
most basic to Wilbur as a religious poet is his willingness "to 'bind 
himself' ... to a reality outside the self" and his acceptance of the 
role of the poet as the redeemer of language, rescuing words from 
their fallen state of "multiplicity and imprecision" (3). Michelson, too, 
sees Wilbur's religious vision rooted in this world; he says that 
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"W i1 bur accepts man as a creature who may have a place of a 
meaning in other realities; yet only by understanding who and where 
the self is now--as an unstable brew of flesh and spirit--can one 
hope to understand anything more of one's place in this or any other 
dimension" (Wilbur's Poetry 42). Wilbur's poetry is religious in the 
broadest sense. He has been influenced by Augustine's theology of 
wonder and praise which finds the Creator in all of creation (Scheidt 
5). Augustine believed that God had made human beings by--
... coupling and connecting in some wonderful fashion the 
spiritual and corporeal natures .... And this work of his is so 
great and wonderful, that not only man, who is a rational 
animal, and consequently more excellent than all other animals 
of the earth, but even the most diminutive insect, cannot be 
considered attentively without astonishment and without 
praising the creator. (City of God 116) 
Embracing Augustine, Wilbur is, on the other hand, offended by St. 
Paul's distaste for the body and dislikes "all 'spirituality' which 
condemns the body or this world" (qtd. in Cummins, Richard Wilbur 
40). Virginia Levey declares that "lf]or Wilbur the spiritual only 
exists when clothed with flesh" ("World of Objects" 41). 
In "The Bottles Become New, Too" Wilbur describes the 
experience of reality outs ide the self as a "call to prophecy" and a 
"minimum devoutness": 
In a time of bad communications, when any self-transcendence 
is hard to come by, to perceive the existence of a reality 
beyond constructions of the consciousness is to experience a 
74 
kind of call to prophecy. To insist on the real existence of the 
four elements, of object, of animals, taking these things as 
isolable representatives of the ambient reality, is a kind of 
minimum devoutness in these days. It is a step toward 
believing in people." (218). 
Peter Harris believes it would be hard to find "a contemporary poet 
more evidently solicitous of the irreducible particularity of the 
natural world." Harris says that Wi 1 bur's "aesthetic appreciation of 
the visible world is suffused with wonder and a sense of kinship" 
("Forty Years" 413). He sees Wilbur as "first and last, a celebratory 
poet, most often of the transient epiphanic glories of the natural 
world. And whether the subject is natural or human, the central 
value in his work is love" (415). Wilbur's genius, according to 
William Heyen, has been "to invest the quotidian with holiness" and 
to conceive of reality as a "'sacramental economy,· a world of 
presence, possibility, beauty; a world shimmering with reciprocity, a 
world in which man, in the words of Wallace Stevens, could bear the 
burden and glory of recognizing his 'unique and solitary home'" ("On 
Richard Wilbur" 629). 
Raymond Benoit in "The New American Poetry" lists Wilbur 
among a group of poets whose poetry is "concerned with letting 
things be, with letting things reveal themselves" ( 164 ). Taking the 
same tack, Nathan Scott places Wilbur in the line of "cultural fit" with 
"the one truly great original theologian in the American tradition"--
jonathan Edwards.15 Scott describes "the organizing principle of 
Edwards' entire philosophic meditation [as] a doctrine of Being." He 
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says that Edwards (anticipating Hopkins and Heidegger) perceives 
Being-itself, which he calls God, as "constantly present in all the 
things of this world, enabling them to be whatever it is for which 
they are destined by their inner constitution" ("Poetry of Richard 
Wilbur" 9). Scott believes that Edwards rather than Emerson may be 
the real progenitor of the poetry of presence that leads from 
Whitman through Williams to Wilbur: 
Indeed, perhaps even more regularly than American poetry 
has followed the injunction of Emerson's Orphic poet to 'Build 
therefore your own world' it has decided, from the time of 
Whitman to that of William Carlos Williams, that, the world at 
hand being already refulgent with the plenitude of Being, it 
need not move elservbere for re.al life (in the manner of Poe) 
but need only take its recourse to the quotidian scene of the 
everyday hour. And it is to this Edwardsean line of thought 
and vision that Richard Wilbur is most deeply committed .... 
("Poetry of Richard Wilbur" 10). 
In Wilbur, who (as he writes in "Praise in Summer") is "[o]bscurely 
yet most surely called to praise," Scott sees a "reveling in the sheer 
ontological amplitude or tbe fl"orld" ( ll; emphasis added). Wilbur 
celebrates "the radical holiness and the indelible beauty that indwell 
the things of this world, imperfect as they may be" (28). Scott says a 
"sort of pi etas toward the richness of the created world" recurs 
constantly as a "leitmotif in the logic of Richard Wilbur's poetry" ( 12). 
In a similar vein, john P. Farrell finds in Wilbur's poetry a 
celebration of "the ineffaceable beauty which subsists in an 
imperfect universe, a beauty which is both created by imperfection 
and in adamant conflict with it" ("The Beautiful Changes in Richard 
Wilbur's Poetry" 188). 
Though Wilbur seldom uses a distinctively Christian idiom,16 
Scott describes "the whole emphasis" of Wilbur's thought as 
"incarnationalist" because it conveys the sense of its own being 
existing within Being: 
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... the sense that the fundamental norm of consciousness is 
located in a powerful Presence beyond the mind ... which, 
however much it may transcend the things of nature and 
history, is nevertheless pervasively immanent within the 
ordinary and the commonplace, in that dimension of their 
depth which forever eludes and withstands all the conceptual 
nets of our devising. ("Poetry of Richard Wilbur" 29-30) 
Scott says that this "sense of the human order ... ·is led· in a world 
that is radiant of mystery and wonder and glory" persists through 
blessing as well as defeat because "the Ineffable is equally to be 
encountered" in both (31 ). 
Though Wilbur reminds us that "the route toward the 
my--steriumtremendum leads through the quotidian realities of the 
everyday world," Scott insists that Wilbur does not fail to recognize 
"how fearful these realities may be" (22). McConnell also points out 
that "ltlo say that love calls us to the things of this world is not to 
say that love is easy, or that the things of this world are incapable of 
terror" (38). Anthony Hecht finds in Wilbur's poetry "an impressive 
capacity to confront the shocking, the appalling, the grotesque," 
mentioning in particular that "Walking to Sleep" and "The Mind-
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Reader" each deal with "terrors of different sorts" ("Master of 
Metaphor" 27-28). A recurrent image in Wilbur's poetry is the dark, 
threatening whirl which draws all things to its center but also creates 
by virtue of its vortex the peripheral spin that causes things to 
coalesce, to aggregate and take shape at the periphery. Poetry and 
life, to be vital, seem to need the threat of chaos--"the pitchy whirl at 
the mind's end." As an infantryman in Italy during World War II, 
Wilbur began writing poetry to assuage the boredom and fear he 
experienced between the terror of battles.l7 He says that he used 
poetry to give order to a disordered world: 
One does not use poetry for its major purposes, as a means of 
organizing oneself and the world, until one's world somehow 
gets out of hand. A general cataclysm is not required; the 
disorder must be personal and may be wholly so, but poetry, to 
be vital, does seem to need a periodic acquaintance with the 
threat of Chaos" (qtd. in Kunitz l 080). 
Michelson says that Wilbur, rather than the "abhored optimist" he is 
sometimes accused of being, is what Eiseley was--a '"midnight 
optimist'--for amid the shape shifting of experience, Wilbur's poems 
much like his friend Eisetey's brooding essays, can sometimes find 
grounds for a most-cautious hope that things and life somehow do 
make sense, perhaps even on their own" (Wilbur's Poetry 42). 
For Wilbur, poetry is a way of reaching for something, a way of 
distilling and preserving an intense consciousness of being: "A poem 
amounts to rendering an experience, and other ideas and experiences 
--- --------·--
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which you associate with it, as fully-stated as possible. Very seldom 
... do you accomplish in life that kind of fullness of consciousness. 
Life isn't that concentrated. Mostly it's 'splendid waste,· as Henry 
james said" (qtd. in Broughton, "An Interview with Richard Wilbur" 
145). Wilbur's poetry is filled with an intense longing and reaching 
after something elusive. Peter Stitt in The World's Hieroglyghic 
Beauty writes that "Wilbur is always reaching 'Beyong the faint sun, 
I Toward the hid pulse of things"' ( 14). William Heyen says that 
Wilbur's vision binds him to this world but hints at some 
transcendent through a recreation of "the numina of particulars" ("On 
Richard Wilbur" 631). Heyen senses in Wilbur's poetry "something 
always just past the threshold of realization, something elusive, 
something toward which his formal structures edge and with which 
they bump shoulders ... ";he finds "a whole spirit's agonizing for 
something that will suffice ... [and] that spirit's joy in finding that in 
its world there is something that sometimes will" (634). In an 
interview with Poetrv Miscellany, Wilbur said that "[l]anguage for 
the poet is surely always a language of desire .... of the Platonic 
Eros embodied somehow in the words of the poem. We create art 
because of what JJre can 't have and because of our insatiable desire to 
have it" (qtd. in jackson, Acts of Mind 141; emphasis added). He 
recalls Yeats· observation that "it is the business of the poet to 
remember Eden." 
Wilbur is one of five poets in whose work Peter Stitt sees "a 
quest through the physical world in search of an essence of meaning 
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that is felt but never quite seen, desired but never quite defined." 
Stitt believes that Wilbur along with Robert Penn Warren, Louis 
Simpson, William Stafford, and james Wright each "love the physical 
world to such a degree that they sense within it some transcendent 
meaning, some hovering aura of belief" and that each therefore 
undertakes a quest "to dis cover that hidden meaning by reading the 
'hieroglyphic' nature of the physical universe" (The World's 
Hieroglyghic Beauty 2). In Wilbur's poetry (as in the others studied), 
Stitt sees a movement "from the concrete toward the abstract, from 
the physical toward the spiritual, from the body toward the mind" 
(3). However, Stitt finds that Wilbur like the others is neither 
didactic nor doctrinaire and does not attempt to make the world 
more meaningful than it actually is. Stitt says that these poets 
"would not choose to impose, deductively, a preformulated set of 
truths upon a reality that achieves much of its beauty from its 
teasingly ambiguous nature." Instead, Stitt describes a method 
borrowed from the sciences: " ... they prefer ... to draw inductively 
from within the fabric of the real whatever meaning may be found" 
(3). 
Stitt finds in Wilbur's poetry a mimesis of the intricacy of 
creation. Refuting the critics who have found Wilbur's poems too 
exquisite, Stitt says that "Wilbur's poems are elaborate, elegant 
celebrations of the created world, art works as carefully and 
harmoniously constructed as the reality they praise." Although 
Wilbur recognizes "the existential primacy of. material reality," Stitt 
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says that Wilbur recognizes a spiritual reality as well and tries to 
bring both realms together in metaphor (The World's Hieroglyghic 
Beauty 3). Stitt points out Wilbur's definition of grace in his poem of 
that name: "flesh made word I Is grace's revenue" (Poems 384). As 
Stitt sees it, Wilbur reverses the standard Christian view that "grace 
is word made flesh": 
... it is the poet's function, in his attempt to read God· s mind 
... his attempt to match God's creative intelligence with his 
own pale version of the same thing, to change that manifest 
grace back into words. The principle of the beautiful--which in 
this context is the perceiving, the recording, the altering, the 
ordering creative imagination of the poet ... changes the raw 
materials of reality into a version of the ideal, while ever 
admitting the uncertainty, even the impossibility, of the task" 
(The World's Hieorg.lyghic Beauty 33). 
According to Stitt, Wilbur's "central thematic concern" is the 
"coexisting, comingling, interpenetrating" of the physical and spiritual 
realms ( 17). 
Obviously a number of critics have not fallen into the patterns 
of negative comment Woodard identified. Writing in 1977, the same 
year Woodard decried the predictable negativism of Wilbur's critics, 
Anthony Hecht in "The Motions of the Mind" ennumerated what he 
sees as Wilbur's virtues: 
a superb ear ... for stately measure, cadences of a slow, 
processional grandeur, and a rich, ceremonial orchestration. A 
philosophic bent and a religious temper .... Wit, polish, a 
formal elegance that is never haughty or condescending .... 
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an unfeigned gusto, a naturally happy and grateful response to 
the physical beauty of life, of women, of works of art, 
landscapes, weather, and the perceiving, constructing mind 
that tries to know them .... the most kinetic poetry ... a 
vision of action, of motion and performance. ( 123) 
In his notebooks which were published posthumously, Theodore 
Roethke expressed his admiration of Wilbur in terms of grace: 
Wilbur: can look at a thing, and talk about it beautifully, can 
turn it over in his mind, and draw truths from a scene, easily 
and effortlessly (it would seem)--though this kind of writing 
requires the hardest kind of discipline, it must be remembered. 
Not a graceful mind--that's a mistake--but a mind of grace, an 
altogether different and higher thing" (qtd. in Hecht, "The 
Motions of the Mind" 128; emphasis added). 
Among the admirers of Wilbur's poetry and as opinionated as his 
detractors, William Heyen declares that "Wilbur's poems are the right 
and inevitable outgrowth of a poetic morality whose integrity is 
beyond question" (625). 
In "The Bottles Become New, Too" Wilbur writes that "liln each 
art the difficulty of the form is a substitution for the difficulty of 
direct apprehension and expression of the object." He finds that 
"paradoxically it is a respect for reality that makes a necessity of 
artifice" (220}. Given that the formal aspects of poetry such as meter 
and rhyme are its most primitive elements and that the sound of a 
poem addresses the roots of our beings before we understand the 
sense, Robert Shaw asserts that "the poem whose formal effects are 
most conspicuous is ... the most radical in its aim and method" 
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( 176). Shaw points out that form allies poetry to both religion and 
nature: "Form in poetry takes its rise from form in primitive 
religious ritual, the aim of which is not to estrange men from nature, 
but to integrate them anew into the patterned fabric of the cosmos" 
("Richard Wilbur's World" 176). Shaw describes Wilbur's poetry as 
"sacramental" because "his intricately patterned poems reflect the 
discovery of patterns of natural beauty; and the poet's art thus 
strives to be an adequate analogy to the surrounding creation." 
Wilbur "continually contemplates, praises, and seeks to realize in his 
own writing" the creative energy he sees around him both in nature 
and in art and "[tlhrough an intensity of focus he suggests the 
informing spiritual energy present in the appearances that capture 
his attention" (Shaw 177). Wendy Salinger says that for Wilbur his 
"craft is his mantra, evoking the deity it embodies. Its properties are 
holy. To neglect any of the functions of language would be to lessen 
the efficacy of that mantra. Thus: the consummate craftsman, the 
master worshipper" (Introduction 17-18). 
Attracted by what he calls Wilbur's "dramatism, camouflaged 
by excellence of form," Russian-American Nobel Laureate joseph 
Brodsky finds that "a regular meter and exact rhymes shaping an 
uncomfortable thought are far more functional than any form of free 
verse" because formal verse "gets a sense of chaos being organized" 
while free verse gives "a sense of dependence on and being 
determined by chaos" ("On Richard Wilbur" 204). Brodsky says that 
"[flrom what one could call a moral point of view, the former is more 
important than the latter. Even in the event that it is not 
organization, but nothing more than a form of resistance to chaos. 
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For in the physical world only resistance is possible" (204). Insisting 
that "it is impossible to speak of life in an open text," Brodsky 
declares that the formal perfection of Wilbur's poems is "nothing 
more than a mask" and that "the idea is far away from the perfection 
of the text" (205). For Brodsky, "[t]he modern art of the mask is the 
art of creating a scale against which things can be measured" (205). 
Enjer j. Jensen affirms Brodsky assessment, thereby refuting Holmes 
and jarrell. jensen says that "Wilbur's poems create beautiful shapes 
for the experiences they record, but often the very beauty of the 
designs may conceal from us the struggle and anguish of the 
experiences themselves" ("Encounters with Experience" 245). john 
Byron Hougen finds that, in Wilbur's poetry, discipline is the path to 
ecstasy. Hougen believes Wilbur "remains dedicated to formal 
discipline precisely because it is capable of moving beyond order to 
evoke vitality, mystery, and transcendence" (The Poetry of Richard 
Wilbur 22) 
Bruce Michelson, the author of Wilbur's Poetrv: Music in a 
Scattering Time and one of Wilbur's staunchest admirers and most 
perceptive critics, defends the poet's "astonishing use of language, .. 
saying that it may be "as daring an experiment in poetry as we have 
seen in the past four decades." Michelson also calls it a mistake to 
think of Wilbur, often perceived as "a lone Chrisitan in an age which 
has forgone faith," as a poet "of safe creeds and certainties" (5). 
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Michelson finds one thing sure: 
Wilbur's experimentation with words is not some handsome 
machine for delivering safe messages or dressing up 
comfortable or commonplace observations, but rather a labor to 
recover the power of words as magical, incantatory, creative 
forces. His famous word-play seems to be the essence of his 
imaginative transcendence of the world, as well as his 
reconciliation, such as it is, with the world. (36) 
Michelson makes the case for reading Wilbur "as a rare kind of 
American artist, a poet who ... forces a widening of our sense of 
what it is to be, to think, to believe, and to dread, and who can meld 
much of the pain and the light of human experience into one rich 
utterance." Michelson also finds Wilbur to be "a 'darker,· more 
complex, passionate, and original poet" than generally thought; he 
calls Wilbur "a serious artist for an anxious century" and describes 
his poetry as "many-faceted, personal, and intense" (4). 
Wilbur once said that he considered himself "a little more 
Emersonian" than Frost because "I do think that we and the birds, we 
and the trees, are part of one scheme" (qtd. in Beacham, "Poetry as 
Performance" 218). Several critics have come to see Wilbur as a 
"nature poet." He meets what Robert F. Sayre defines as the two 
essentials of American nature poetry-- "affection for nature and the 
Transcendentalist sense of correspondence between it and man" ("A 
Case for Richard Wilbur as Nature Poet" 155). George Monteiro 
believes that Wilbur shares with Thoreau and Frost a vision of 
redemption through nature ("Redemption Through Nature" 804-806). 
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Robert Langbaum lists Wilbur among the poets who practice "The 
New Nature Poetry." 18 Michelson declares adamantly that Wilbur is 
"a superb nature poet, writing about a nature which changes and 
constantly recreates itself, awakening that wonder in which one 
seems to transcend, for moments here and there, separation from the 
general scheme of things" (Wilbur's Poetry 42). Michelson says that 
for Wilbur words "can be a regenerative force, catching not just 
diversity, but suggesting unity that might lie out beyond diversity" 
(43). Michelson even describes Wilbur's poetry in metaphors of 
science. He writes that in the poems "significations can move away 
from one another, range high and wide in opposite directions, then 
somehow reconverge, like rays of light traversing vast distances, 
following some Einsteinian principle, some secular mystery of the 
physical sciences" (42). Michelson sees in Wilbur's poems moments 
of "imaginative engagement with the world" which set off "a flash 
like a discovery in the world" (42). The basis of Wilbur's 
sacramental vision has always been intense, careful observation of 
the things of this world, a persistent fidelity to seeing and to saying 
what he sees. 
Donald Hill in Richard Wilbur, his careful reading of Wilbur's 
first four books of poetry, sees in Wilbur a mistrust of, in Poe's 
words, "'the scientific spirit and the universal prosaism which 
accompanies it.·" 
In "All These Birds," Wilbur gives some illustrations of the way 
in which, in the eye of creeping science, 'the monsters of the 
sky I Dwindle to habit, habitat, and song.· His dismay is ... 
very much in the spirit of Poe (as in that of most other poets 
from Blake to the present moment). (Hill 164) 
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Hill believes that a number of Wilbur's poems "exalt the imagination 
over mere fact. "19 While Hill is right that Wilbur would disdain a 
reductionist attitude in science that would try to comprise the world 
in facts and formulas alone, Wilbur himself--like Marianne Moore--
often finds in facts a place for the imagination to begin. For example, 
his poem "Cicadas" is built around the irony that the cicada "singing I 
all his life" cannot hear. The French entomologist Henri Fabre 
discovered that fact "by firing all the municipal cannon I under a 
piping tree" (Poems 337). Like Thoreau, Wilbur has a naturalist"s 
eye and loves the details of plant and animal, of earth, air, and water. 
His poem "Water Walker" grows around the life cycle of the caddis 
fly. Out of the facts of geology and evolution Wilbur builds "On the 
Marginal Way," and he discovers terror in the facts of astronomy and 
cosmology in his poem "In the Field." "A Grasshopper" anticipates 
chaos theory. "Children of Darkness" delightedly observes and names 
species of saprophytic fungi. The x-ray facts of "phlebolith I And 
calculus" become the nidus about which forms "To His Skeleton," a 
piece of memento mori both charming and terrifying. "Gnomons" 
expresses the curiosity about facts of natural world--light and 
shadow--shared by two religious men (Wilbur and Bede) across 
thirteen centuries. The poems "Seed Leaves" and "Alatus" have as 
their central images close observations of the seasonal cycles of plant 
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birth and death. "Trolling for Blues" dredges the depths of what 
evolution has changed and has not changed. Peter Harris remarked 
of Wilbur's poetry that "[w]hatever else he believes, Wilbur trusts 
that we lie in the lap of an immense intelligence" (417). and he 
delights in the sprezzatura of creation. 
Though Hill is right that neither Poe nor Wilbur would have the 
imagination bound by "mere fact," I think that both Wilbur and Poe 
discovered that science is much more than fact. Good science like 
good poetry requires imagination and hard work. Science shares 
with poetry and religion a sense of the mysteries of the world and a 
passionate desire to explore them. Wilbur honors the imaginative 
leaps of science which have changed the ways we see the world. 
Aristarchus, the first-recorded expositor of a heliocentric theory, 
brings his "I i ]ns ight and cal uc I at ion" to "lcari urn Mare." Euclid 
receives mention in "0" and Fabre in "Cicadas." "Lamarck Elaborated" 
takes as its starting point a statement ("The environment creates the 
organ") by jean Baptiste Lamarck, the eighteenth-century French 
pioneer of the theory of biological evolution. "A Hole in the Floor" 
reminds Wilbur of the German archaeologist Schtiemann's sucessful 
search for the nine-times buried city of ancient Troy. Wilbur's "The 
Fourth of july" is itself a plenitude of science and imagination: The 
Oxford mathematician and logician Charles Dodgson rows across the 
borders of logic into Wonderland. The Swedish naturalist Carolus 
Linnaeus, who--like the poet who writes of him--was possessed by a 
"love of all things made," struggles (1 ike a poet) with the terms of his 
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science in terms of his faith. Copernicus, the Polish clergyman 
whose study of the heavens subverted the Christian cosmos, does not 
hesitate "to risk I His dream-stuff in the fitting-rooms of fact" (he 
simply evaded publishing it). And in "Worlds," Isaac Newton, "who 
had grasped all space" in his calculus, felt "that he'd but played I 
With a few shells and pebbles on the shore I Of that profundity he 
had not made" (Poems 37). In his poetry Wilbur celebrates science 
in its careful attention ("due regard") to the things of this world and 
in its imaginative leaps toward understanding the processes that, like 
the poetic, religious imagination, bind all things together. 
Hill claims that Wilbur, unlike Poe, does not surrender "the 
Earth in despair to science and prose" ( 164), but Kenneth johnson 
believes that Wilbur does indeed do just that. In his essay "Virtues 
in Style, Defect in Content," johnson says that Wilbur is "a product of 
the scientific point of view" who finds "precious little in tangible 
reality other than 'what he sees.'" What little he does find is chaotic 
and terrifying, but mostly, johnson says, Wilbur finds nothing at all 
(213). It is amazing how truth can be strewn among absurdities. 
johnson is right: Wilbur is a product of the scientific point of view 
(also the religious and the poetic). and Wilbur does find chaos and 
terror in the world: He reports what he sees. Wilbur is also deeply 
religious in the best sense and finds in the world joy, beauty, delight, 
and inexorable goodness. 
CHAPTER I 
MYSTERY, ALLURE, AND DREAD 
0 Lord my God, how deep are your mysteries! 
--Augustine 
I require of you only to look. 
The power of the visible 
is the invisible. 
--Teresa of A vi Ia 
--Marianne Moore 
The darkness held a presence that was all the more felt 
because it was not seen. 
--William james 
... It would be enough 
If we were ever, just once, at the middle, fixed 
In This Beautiful World of Ours and not as now, 
Helplessly at the edge, enough to be 
Complete, because at the middle, if only in sense, 
And in that enormous sense, merely enjoy. 
--Wallace Stevens 
What terrible questions we are learning to ask. 
--Emerson 
In Science and the Modern World, the philosopher and 
mathematician Alfred North Whitehead defines religion as a 
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romantic quest in pursuit of a pervasive mystery that is as alluring 
and powerful as it is elusive: 
Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, 
behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; 
something which is real, and yet waiting to be realised; 
something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of 
present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, 
and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is 
the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is 
the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest. ( 191-192) 
Whitehead describes religion as revelation within individual 
experience rather than traditionally received truth. It is religion 
stripped of dogma but saturated with longing, religion pared down to 
the sense of mystery and meaning human beings either find or 
project on the cosmos. It is an unattainable ideal, an unreachable 
good that makes possibility eternal. 
Robert Rosthal in the introduction to his translation of Gabriel 
Marcel's Creative Fidelity describes Marcel's concept that a mystery 
"is not a lacuna in our knowledge or a void to be filled," nor is it a 
problem susceptible to linguistic analysis or technical investigation: 
A m.vsterr is something r~rbicb rrrbile insoluble in principle is 
not senseless. It is an aspect of our experience which is 
inexpressible, hence inaccessible to communicable knowledge. 
But it still can be spoken of in a suggestiJre if not an 
informative way. (xxv) 
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What is left over when cognitive knowledge does not exhaust reality 
we call mystery. It is discovered only by extra-linguistic thought 
and therefore cannot be spoken of directly but only by indirection--
what R. Hepburn called "an appearance of meaning ... showing the 
direction in which we are to look for the meaning which will finally 
elude us" (qtd. in Rosthal xxii). 
Wordsworth defined mystery as "the heavy weight of all this 
unintelligible world," but he found in that heavy weight joy and 
consolation and endless matter for the developing mind. In Book II 
of The Prelude, he says that even though he could not think or say it 
because of the "sad incompetence of human speech," he felt " ... the 
sentiment of Being spread"--
0 · er all that moves and all that seemeth still; 
O'er all that, lost beyond the reach of thought 
And human knowledge, to the human eye 
Invisible, yet liveth to the heart; 
O'er all that leaps and runs, and shouts and sings, 
Or beats the gladsome air; o'er all that glides 
Beneath the wave, yea, in the wave itself, 
And mighty depth of waters. (Prelude 2:4 01-409) 
Implicitly in these lines and explicitly in the following from "Tintern 
Abbey," Wordsworth describes his experience of the mystery of 
Being as joy: 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man. (210) 
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Einstein described this feeling of mysterious Being as "the center of 
true religiousness," the recognition "that what is impenetrable to us 
really exists, manifesting itself as the highest wisdom and most 
radiant beauty which our dull faculties can comprehend only in the 
most primitive forms." Einstein considered this impenetrable 
existent to be the source of science, art, and religion: "The most 
beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source 
of all true art and science .... This insight into the mystery of life, 
coupled though it be with fear, has also given rise to religion" (Living 
Philosophies 6). 
Blessed with an extraordinary gift for wonder, Einstein found 
mystery not only in the impenetrability of nature; paradoxically, he 
found the "eternal mystery of the world" in its "comprebensi!Jili(v" 
as well (Later Years 61; emphasis added). Einstein found the fact 
that the world is "comprehensible ... a miracle." Amazingly, the 
human mind is capable of discovering and understanding some of the 
processes of nature. Like Einstein, julian Huxley found that 
knowledge led to mystery. He writes in Knowledg!L Morality and 
Destiny that "[m]an inevitably discovers that existence involves 
mystery," and Huxley suggests that the scientific discovery of the 
unexpected unity of all nature is "[p ]erhaps the latest revelation of 
inherent mystery." For Huxley mystery did not require God: "All the 
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realities which were taken out of nature and put together in the 
supernatural concept of God can now be put back into the natural 
process." If their relation to the whole natural process can be 
"properly grasped," Huxley believes that the realities once deposited 
in the divine "can exert at least as much and perhaps more force 
than they did under the old dispensation" (248). In Science and 
Religion: A Critical Survey, Holmes Rolston, II I, observes that "[t]hat 
the magic stays even when God is banished" (253): 
The world can be penetrated by thought, but we are left in awe 
both that the world is so built and that we are so built, that 
nature is comprehensible and that we, the evolutionary 
product of nature, are up to its comprehension--only in part, 
but nevertheless far beyond anything that we can claim any 
right to know, far beyond what our ancestors ever dreamed of 
knowing, far beyond what evolutionary theory predicts that we 
shout d know. ( 245) 
The very knowing which would seem to erase mystery is itself 
mysterious and leads to even greater mysteries. Victor Weisskopf, a 
theoretical physicist, observed that "[w]hen we know more, we have 
more questions to ask. Our knowledge is an island in the infinite 
ocean of the unknown, and the larger the island grows, the more 
extended are its boundaries toward the unknown" (Weiskopff 1 01). 
Rolston declares that "[o]ur beams probe farther out, only to confront 
more dark sky. There is an explosion of knowledge but it excites an 
explosion of mystery. Science removes the small mysteries to replace 
them with bigger ones" (245). 
In religion and art, mystery, that which is sensed but which 
cannot be said, has been gestured at in myth anct ritual, in poetry 
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and symbol. Trying to understand the nature of mystery as it is 
expressed in religions, Rudolph Otto in The Idea of the HolY.. describes 
common perceptions and experiences that transcend differences in 
belief. Otto recognizes two aspects of religion, the rational and the 
non-rational. Rational, theistic religion describes attributes of God in 
terms of intellectual concepts which are definable in words-- "spirit, 
reason, purpose, good will, supreme power, unity, selfhood" ( l ). 
Although Otto considers rational conceptions about God to affirm "a 
religion's high rank and superior value," he denies that "the essence 
of the deity can be given completely and exhaustively in such 
'rational' attributions" (2). The very language that conveys these 
concepts, "the traditional language of edification," tends to limit 
religion to the rational: "All language, in so far as it consists of 
words, purports to convey ideas or concepts .... And hence 
expositions of religious truth in language inevitably tend to stress the 
'rational' attributes of God" (2). 
Otto believed that not only do these rational attributes not 
exhaust the idea of deity but "that they in fact imply a non-rational 
or supra-rational Subject of which they are predicates" (2). Otto 
describes the "Subject" itself as a deeper essence which cannot be 
comprehended in strictly rational terms. Otto says that "the holy" 
contains "a quite specific element or 'moment"' which cannot be 
thought about conceptually (i.e., rationally) and cannot be expressed 
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in words. Like the beautiful, the holy "completely eludes 
apprehension in terms of concepts" (5). Because the !'holy" had also 
come to have a connotation of the ethical, Otto coined a new term, the 
"numinous," to describe "that aspect of the deity which transcends or 
eludes comprehension in rational or ethical terms" (Harvey xvi). 
With the numinous, Otto concentrates on that aspect of the holy 
which he calls the "real innermost core" of every religion and which 
in its "unique original feeling-response" means something "quite 
other than 'the good"' (6). Otto says that the numinous state of mind 
is "irreducible to any other" and "admits of being discussed," but 
"cannot be strictly defined" (7). The numinous cannot be taught: "it 
can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes 
'of the spirit' must be awakened" (7). 
Numinous consciousness is the feeling of being in the presence 
of the numen, the "my-sterium tremendum." Otto says that this 
feeling of being in "the presence of that which is a mystery 
inexpressible and above all creatures" is "the deepest and most 
fundamental element in all strong and sincerely felt religious 
emotion" (12-13). The m.vsterium tremendum escapes rational 
conceptualization: 
Conceptually m..vsterium denotes merely that which is hidden 
and esoteric, that which is beyond conception or understanding, 
extraordinary and unfamiliar. The term does not define the 
object more positively in its qualitative character. But though 
what is enunciated in the world is negative, what is meant is 
something absolutely and intensely positive. ( 13) 
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Although the UJJ'·sterium tremendum cannot be enclosed in the 
words that speak human concepts, Otto is able to identify three 
qualities which are suggP-sted in the adjective tremendum--l) awe 
or "absolute unapproachability," 2) majestas or "absolute 
overpoweringness," and 3) the "urgency" or "energy" of the numinous 
object. 
The first of these qualities, absolute unapproachability, began 
in religious history with a peculiar feeling of dread, a sense of the 
uncanny or weird. This daemonic dread is expressed in the Old 
Testament as "a terror fraught with an inward shuddering such as 
not even the most menacing and overpowering created thing can 
instil. It has something spectral in it" ( 14). Though its primitive 
beginnings were in "daemonic dread," the experience of religious 
awe, according to Otto, has nothing to do with intensity; rather, it is 
based entirely of a feeling of uncanniness. As religion evolves and is 
purified of the daemonic, the sense of the dread and awfulness is not 
lost but civilized; losing its primitive craziness, the "'shudder"' 
appears "in a form ennobled beyond measure where the soul, held 
speechless, trembles inwardly to the farthest fibre of its being" ( 16-
17). The dread becomes "a mystical awe"--" the ineffable something 
that holds the mind" ( 17 ). The second element contained in 
tremendum, the sense of being in the presence of "absolute 
overpoweringness," occurs along with the sense of dread. Felt as 
"objective and outside the self," the numinous excites in the 
perceiver a feeling of "creature consciousness," the experience of 
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being "submerged into nothingness before an overpowering, absolute 
might of some kind," which cannot be itself described except 
"indirectly through the tone and content of a man's feeling-response 
to it" ( 1 0). The third quality inherent in tremendum, the sense of 
the urgency or energy of the numinous object, directly challenges the 
rational concept of a '"philosophic'" God who can be defined. This 
nonrational urgency or energy reduced to sayable human analogues 
has been described as "wrath" or "vitality, passion emotional temper, 
will, force, movement, excitement, activity, impetus" (23). Numinous 
energy is "a force that knows not stint nor stay, which is urgent, 
active, compelling, and alive" (24). 
Having struggled to say the ineffable merely alluded to in the 
adjective tremendum, Otto tries, "by hint and suggestion," to say 
what the substantive my·sterium means. He says that "in the 
religious sense, that which is 'mysterious' is ... the 'wholly other' ... 
that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligble 
and familiar" and fills the mind with "Stupor," the feeling of "blank 
wonder, an astonishment that strikes us dumb, amazement absolute" 
(26). Attempts to systematize in myth or dogma such a religious 
experience of holy terror, Otto says, inevitably destroy the 
experience itself: "They are the source from which springs, not 
rei igion, but the rationalization of religion, which often ends by 
constructing such a massive structure of theory and such a plausible 
fabric of interpretation, that the 'mystery' is frankly excluded" (27). 
-- -----··--· 
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The feeling or consciousness of the "wholly other," according to Otto 
will "attach itself to, or sometimes be indirectly aroused by means of, 
objects which are already puzzling upon the 'natural' plane, or are of 
a surprising or astounding character; such as extraordinary 
phenomena or astonishing occurence or things in inanimate nature, 
in the animal world, or among men" (27). 
The mysterious remains "absolutely and invariably" beyond 
human understanding not just because of "irremovable" 
limits to our knowledge but also because the "wholly other" has a 
nature inherently incommensurable with the human. It belongs to a 
separate reality that is not contained within ours: " ... it is a thing 
that 'doesn't really exist at all' ... [but I at the same time arouses an 
irrepressible interest in the mind" (28-29). Mysticism, contrasting 
the numinous with the natural, calls the former "'that which is 
nothing'"-- "opposite of everything that is and can be thought" (29). 
Otto says that the "'void'" of eastern mysticism is like the "'nothing'" 
of the western mystic, a "numinous ideogram of 'the wholly other ·" 
(30). The words transcendent and supernatural designate the 
unique reality and quality of the "wholly other" which can be felt 
but cannot be thought in clear conceptual terms (30). 
Though the numinous inspires dread, Otto says it provokes an 
equivalent fascination and becomes the object of human "search and 
desire and yearning": "Possession of and by the numen becomes an 
end in itself; it begins to be sought for its own sake," and, Otto says, 
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sometimes "the wildest and most artificial methods of asceticism are 
put into practice to attain it" (32-33) . 
. . . the m..vsterium is experienced in its essential, positive, and 
specific character, as something that bestows upon man a 
beatitude beyond compare, but one whose real nature he can 
neither proclaim in speech nor conceive in thought, but may 
know only by a direct and living experience." (33) 
Otto says that the "moment of fascination" is felt "as a strange and 
mighty propulsion towards an ideal good" which is "fundamentally 
non-rational" and known only to religion; in its "yearning and 
presentiment," the mind recognizes the numinous "behind the 
obscure and inadequate symbols which are its only expression" (36). 
Words fail because "our language has no term that can isolate 
distinctly and gather into one word the total numinous impression a 
thing may make of the mind" (40). Otto considers the mystical 
experience of the numinous proof that "above and beyond our 
rational being lies hidden the ultimate and highest part of our 
nature, which can find no satisfaction in the mere allaying of the 
needs of our sensuous, psychical, or intellectual impulses and 
cravings" (36). 
The sublime and the numinous share the same paradoxical 
characteristics and effects. They are both daunting and attracting, 
arousing both fear and joy; they both humble yet exalt; both 
circumscribe us but extend us beyond ourselves. Otto says the 
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sublime and the numinuous may excite one another or one may pass 
over into the other (42). 
Whatever has loomed upon the world of his ordinary concerns 
as something terrifying and baffling to the intellect: whatever 
among natural occurrences or events in the human, animal, or 
vegetable kingdoms has set him astare in wonder and 
astonishment--such things have ever aroused in man, and 
become endued with, the 'daemonic dread' and numinous 
feeling, so as to become 'portents', 'prodigies', and 'marvels.· 
(64) 
Otto says that in the arts "the most effective means of representing 
the numinous is 'the sublime"' (65). 
Unlike Otto who concentrated on the irrational aspect of 
religion in The Idea of the Holy, Mircea Eliade in The Sacred and the 
Profane attempts to present the sacred "in all its complexity." Eliade 
focuses on human efforts to achieve transcendence through contact 
with the sacred in the profane world. According to Eliade, the 
hallmarks of "homo religiosus" are a belief in "an absolute reality, 
the sacred, which transcends this world but manifests itself in this 
world, thereby sanctifying it and making it real" and a conviction 
that human existence realizes its potentialities through participation 
in reality (202). Eliade defines a hieropban.v as the "act of 
manifestion of the sacred," an occasion in which "something sacred 
shows itself to us" (It). A hierophany is a discrete, mysterious act in 
which "something of a wholly different order, a reality that does not 
belong to our world" manifests itself "in objects that are an integral 
----- ------------
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part of our natural 'profane' world" (II). Eliade says that the object 
which manifests the sacred "becomes something else, yet it continues 
to participate in its surrounding cosmic milieu" ( 12). According to 
Eliade, all of nature can reveal itself as a "cosmic sacrality" to a 
religious person who is open to experiencing the sacred: "The cosmos 
in its entirety can become a hierophany" ( 12). Symbols become the 
means whereby the rei igious person binds the actual and the sacred 
and creates a mnemonic for the hierophanic experience: " ... 
through symbols ... man finds his way out of his particular situation 
and 'opens himself' to the general and the universal. Symbols 
awaken individual experience and transmute it into a spiritual act, 
into metaphysical comprehension of the world" (211 ). 
Eliade describes the sacred and the profane as "two modes of 
being in the world, two existential situations assumed by man in the 
course of his history" (14). The religious man in "archaic societies" 
attempted to live in the sacred or near to consecrated objects 
because the primitive equated sacredness with power: "The sacred is 
saturated with being Sacred power means reality and at the same 
time enduringness and efficacity. The polarity sacred-profane is 
often expressed as an oppositon between re.al and unreal or 
pseudoreal" ( 12-13). Eiiade says that " ... the completely- profane 
world, the wholly desacralized cosmos, is a recent discovery in the 
history of the human spirit" (13). 
Space is not homogeneous for the religious man but is broken 
into sacred space which is a strong, significant space and profane 
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space which is "without structure or consistency, amorphous" (20). 
Eliade says that " ... the religious experience of the nonhomogeneity 
of space is a primordial experience" corresponding to a founding of 
the world (2 0-21). When sacred space is manifested in a 
hierophany, a "break is effected in space that allows the world to be 
constituted" and a fixed point, the central axis of all future 
orientation is revealed. An area of absolute reality opposes the 
nonreality of surrounding space (21 ). "Every sacred space implies a 
hierophany, an irruption of the sacred that results in detaching a 
territory from the surrounding cosmic milieu and making it 
qualitatively different" (26). A theophany consecrates the place 
where it occurs, making it an opening to what is above, a place where 
communication with heaven can occur (26). "Religious man's desire 
to live in the sacred is in fact equivalent to his desire to take up his 
abode in objective reality, not to let himself be paralyzed by the 
never-ceasing relativity of purely subjective experiences, to live in a 
real and effective world, and not in an illusion" (28). 
Eliade says that the efficaciousness of the ritual means by 
which a sacred space is constructed depends upon how well and in 
what measure the effort "reproduces the work of the gods" (29). 
Eliade declares that "for religious man every world is a sacred world" 
(29). Creating a sacred space reproduces on the microcosmic scale 
the original act of creation--a repetition of the primordial act that 
transformed chaos into cosmos: " ... the religious moment implies 
the cosmogonic moment" (30). Eliade says that creation inevitably 
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implies "a superabundance of reality ... an irruption of the sacred 
into the world" (45). Therefore, in broadest terms, Eliade declares 
that " ever:v construction or fabrication bas the cosmogony· as 
paradigmatic modeL The creation of the world becomes the 
archetype of every creative human gesture, whatever its plane of 
reference may be" (45). Building a house, primitive man created for 
himself a universe " b.v imitating the paradigmatic creation of the 
gods, the cosmogon.v" (56). According to Eliade, religious man 
possesses "an unquenchable ontological thirst"--a thirst for being--
and a "profound nostalgia" to inhabit a divine world (64-65). By 
creating the world he inhabits, the religious man "not only cosmicizes 
chaos but also sanctifies his little cosmos by making it like the world 
of the gods" (65). Eliade's description of the drive to create a sacred 
space by imitating the cosmogonic paradigm recalls Coleridge's 
description of the primary imagination which he defined as "the 
living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, as a 
repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the 
infinite I AM" (Ri.Qgranhia Literaria 167). Like a sacred mythological 
pole planted at the center of the world and communicating with 
heaven, the imagination organizes chaos into the world of a poem 
and opens an avenue to the transcendent. A poem or other work of 
art may, therefore, be considered an existential construct that mimics 
that paradigmatic creation; it creates a sacred space where the 
transcendent becomes the immanent. 
----------
104 
just as he covets sacred space which puts him in contact with 
the transcendent, religious man, according to Eliade, desires sacred 
time, time which is "indefinitely recoverable, indefinitely 
repeatable"; sacred time is "a primordia/mythical time made 
present N (68-69). The cosmogony, the creation of the world, was 
"the supreme divine manifestation, the paradigmatic act of strength, 
superabundance, and creativity" (80). Religious man seeks to 
"reactualize" the strong, sacred " time of origins, the stupendous 
instant in which a reality was created, was for the first time fully 
manifested ... " (81 ). For religious man, sacred time makes possible 
ordinary time, "the profane duration in which every human life takes 
its course" (89). Describing the religious man's desire to recapture 
the paradisal situation at the beginning of time, Eliade admits that 
the myth of the eternal return can be seen to be an evasion of the 
new and a failure to take responsibility "for a genuine historical 
existence" (93). Eliade, however, sees primitive religious man as 
taking "a responsibilit}'·· on the cosmic plane, in contradistinction to 
the moral, social, or historical responsibilities that are alone regarded 
as valid in modern civilizations" (93). 
Eliade says that for religious man, " ... nature is never only 
·natural' .... the world is impregnated with sacredness" and it has a 
transparency that "spontaneously reveals the many aspects of the 
sacred" ( 116-117 ). Religious man apprehends "supernature" through 
nature. Cosmic symbolism adds new value to an object or action but 
without affecting its "peculiar and immediate values" ( 167). 
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Disagreeing with Hegel's assertion that primitive man is '"buried in 
nature,'" Eliade says that an existence open to the world is not an 
unconscious existence: "Openness to the world enables religious man 
to know himself in knowing the world ... " ( 167). 
Writing in the mid twentieth century, Eliade describes the 
modern industrial era as a process of the gradual desacrali:zation of 
the cosmos which has been accomplished by scientific thought, 
especially the "sensational discoveries of physics and chemistry" 
(51). He says that "for the nonreligious men of the modern age, the 
cosmos has become opaque, inert, mute; it transmits no message, it 
holds no cipher" ( 178). But Eliade also finds that the desacralization 
of nature is not limited to "nonreligious men"; the Christianity of 
industrial society, especially among intellectuals, "has long since lost 
the cosmic values that it still possessed in the Middle Ages," thereby 
greatly impoverishing its religious sense: 
The cosmic liturgy, the mystery of nature's participation in the 
Christological drama, have become inaccessible to Christians 
living in a modern city. Their religious experience is no longer 
open to the cosmos .... it is a strictly private experience; 
salvation is a problem that concerns man and his god; at most 
man recognizes that he is responsible not only to God but also 
to history. But in these man-God-history relationships there is 
no place for the cosmos. From this it would appear that, even 
for a genuine Christian, the world is no longer felt as the work 
of God. ( 178-179) 
Twentieth century man, according to Eliade, lives alone within his 
own soul in a cosmos from which he is estranged. 
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The German philosopher Martin Heidegger demythologized and 
intellectualized the Judea-Christian myth into the lone individual's 
private attempts in a fallen world to understand the mystery of 
Being and to live a redeemed, what he calls an "authentic," existence 
in the ever-present knowledge of death. Heidegger describes Being 
as "that which determines entities as entities," but says that Being 
itself is not an entity. Rather, Being is the light that illuminates 
beings, the primal energy that holds things together as identifiable, 
separate beings. In Mirrors of Man in Existentialism, Nathan A. Scott, 
Jr., interprets Heidegger's concepts of being and Being: 
Whereas a being is simply that-which-is-present, that-which-
is-in-the-open, Being-itself is that Openness ( 0/fenbeit) which 
lights up and shows forth the things of earth--that luminous 
Pi 8Sr;nce, that primal Power of "letting-be," which allows things 
to stand out before the gaze of the mind. ( 1 08) 
Being is generous; it lets be, investing form in a multiplicity of 
beings. Scott in The Poetics of Belief describes the generosity of 
Heidegger's concept of Being: "Being does not hoard up its plenitude 
within itself ... but rather, with an infinite liberality, takes as its 
mission the bestowal of itself upon the world of time and finitude 
and contingency" ( 157). Heidegger says that Being "hails" us by 
allowing things to "come to presence" so that we can recognize the 
Presence of Being in them. The presence of beings "is the hail, the 
salutation, which Being addresses to us" (Poetics 156). Since beings 
are present to us only because Being has given itself to them, 
allowing them to stand out in Openness, Scott says that "any truly 
meditative thinking must, in effect, be an act of thanksgiving": 
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For thinking of the most fundamental kind involves our 
'hailing' Being; which is to say that we respond to its primary 
hail by receiving and accepting the plenitude which it bestows 
upon us. And since we know this plenitude to be not of our 
own creation, since we recognize it in no way to be a part of 
ourselves, since it is the sheer otherness of Being itself and of 
its self-giving, genuinely meditative thinking becomes, 
inevitably, an affair of thanksgiving for the incalculable 
munificence with which Being lets things be. (Poetics 156-15 7) 
Thus, acts of attention to the things of this world imply for Heidegger 
a recognition of and gratitude toward Being which makes possible all 
being. 
Heidegger declares that "the central problematic o/ all ontology 
is rooted in the phenomenon o/ time" (Being and Time 40). Time, 
Heidegger says, is the horizon of Being and is necessary for 
understanding and interpreting it. "Time ... functions as a criterion 
for distinguishing realms of Being" (Being and Time 39). Being itself 
is "made visible in its 'temporal' character" (40). In order to discover 
Being, one must, according to Heidegger, interrogate entitites--
beings-in-time. That entity which has priority in working out the 
question of Being is Oasein 1 ("Being-there"). the human mode of 
being; "/u/nderstanding o/ Being is itself a de.finite characteristic o.f 
Oasein s Being" (Being and Time 32). Dasein possesses both "a pre-
ontological understanding of Being" and "an understanding of the 
Being of all entities of a character other than its own" (Being and 
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Time 33-34). Heidegger says that Dasein alone responds to Being. 
According toW. T. Jones, Heidegger's opus magnus Being and Time 
suggests that the history of humankind is "the history of being 
amazed by Being, of forgetting and then recalling our wonder." For 
Heidegger, to be a human is to be open to Being and "the mark of 
one's openness to Being is one's amazement" (Jones, A History of 
Western PhilosoQhY 5:290). Amazement before being is inevitable to 
the attentive because, as Heidegger writes, "[alt bottom, the ordinary 
is not ordinary; it is extra-ordinary, uncanny" (Poetry, Languag!i,. 
Thought 54). 
"Thrownness," according to Heidegger, is also one of the 
attributes of Dasein. Dasein has been "thrown" into existence and "lilt 
exists as an entity which has to be as it is and as it can be" (Existence 
and Being 305). Human beings are thrown into the world, into an 
incomprehensible existence which is not susceptible to logical, 
rational, teleological, or scientific explanation. Because we are 
ignorant about both our origins and our destination and have been 
hurled by birth into a world from which we will be removed by the 
abruptness of death, we have the sense of being orphans and 
homeless. Heidegger describes Dasein's awareness of the 
inevitability of death, the final potentiality for its being, as the 
knowledge that makes Dasein whole but unfinished and makes 
possible the living of an authentic existence.2 
As long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still 
outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be .... The 'end' of 
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Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which belongs to the 
potentiality-fc:--Being--that is to say, to existence--limits and 
determines in every case whatever totality is possible for 
Dasein. (Being and Time 276-277) 
Heidegger defines "existence" as "ltlhat kind of Being toward which 
Dasein can comport itself" and says that "lolnly the particular Dasein 
dec ides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or neglecting. 
The question of existence never gets straightened out except through 
existing itself" (Being and Time 32-33). 
Heidegger says that the "world as world" is disclosed first and 
foremost by anxiety. Anxiety is not fear caused by any specific 
threatening entity or situation, rather "lt]hat in the face of which one 
has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is 
no~rJJere" (Being and Time 231 ). Anxiety is anxious about Being-in-
the-world and being confronted with the choices for and against an 
authentic existence. Inauthenticity seduces us from the anxiety of 
being- in-the-world, of making the choices that determine our being 
and living in the present knowledge of death by offering Dasein the 
security of the self decreed for it by the "levelling down" effect of the 
anonymous social "they." They· "disburden" Dasein by setting low 
average standards of being. "In this averageness with which it 
prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over 
everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of 
priority gets noiselessly suppressed" (Being and Time 165 ). 
Retreating into the self prescribed by they· relieves us of the burden 
of being free and distracts us from our mortality. "The profound 
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problem of what to be is put aside, replaced by a series of trivial 
questions about what to do" (Jones 5:312), and these what-to-do 
questions are immediately answered by t!J~v. Heidegger describes 
Dasein's inauthentic mode of being as "fallenness." He says that the 
deceptive surface tranquility that Dasein is leading "a full and 
genuine· life"' actually alienates Dasein from its own potential for 
being and from the understanding that "a potentiality-for-Being ... 
must be made free in one's OrJ?nmost Dasein alone" (Being and Time 
222). Heidegger speaks of "uncanniness" as "not-being-at-home," 
and says that "[iln anxiety one feels 'uncanny'" (Being and Time 233). 
Anxiety, however, is the necessary state of an authentic existence. 
Heidegger says that "anxiety individualizes" bringing Dasein "back 
from its fall" and making "manifest to it that authenticity and 
inauthenticity are possibilities of its being" (Being and Time 235). 
Heidegger uses the word Ge/assen!Jeit to denominate the 
quality which Dasein's alone seems to possess--openness to the 
mystery of being. He expresses the complexity of the hiddenness of 
Being, the god who remains unknown, and of the human effort to 
approach the mystery: "God's appearance ... consists in a disclosing 
that lets us see what conceals itself, but lets us see it not by seeking 
to wrest what is concealed out of its concealedness, but only by 
guarding the concealed in its self-concealment" (Poeta., Languag~. 
Thought 223). Heidegger defines Dasein, "man's Being," as "that 
living thing whose Being is essentially determined by the potentiality 
for discourse" (Being and Time 47). Language, by setting us enough 
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apart from Being to be amazed by it, makes it possible for humans 
to stand "in the openness of the existent" (Existence and Being 299). 
Language both hides and reveals: "Language alone brings what is, as 
something that is, into the Open for the first time" (Poetry, Languag~ .. 
Thought 73); it brings forth "the unconcealedness of what is" (71 ). 
Language also intimates what cannot be known; it gestures toward 
the unsayable: "Projective saying is saying which, in preparing the 
sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into a world" 
(Poetry_, Language, Thought 74). In On the Way to Languag~ 
Heidegger writes that "lt]he untouchable is veiled for us by the 
mystery of Saying" (qtd. in jones 5:329). 
Scott says that, according to Heidegger, "lm]an dwells upon the 
earth--in a really human way--only in so far as he transforms 'earth' 
into 'world,' and he can have a world only if he has language, only if 
he has a way of being open to Being and of naming the things of 
earth in which Being resides." In other words, man can have a world 
"only as he manges in some manner to be a 'poet"" (Scott, Poetics of 
Belief 160). Art, including poetry, awakens us to the mystery, the 
vital otherness and shared Being of the things of this world. As 
Heidegger puts it, "lt]he art work opens up in its own way the Being 
of beings" (PoetLY., Langua@.. Thought 39). Heidegger says the job of 
the poet, therefore, is to pay heed to being, and he defines poetry as 
"the establishing of being by means of the word" (Existence and 
Being_ 304). "In the work of art something other is brought together 
with the thing that is made .... The work is a symbol" (PoetrY. .. 
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Language, Thought 20). For Heidegger, poetry is not "otherworldly"; 
poetry leads man to live on the earth and make a world of it: 
"Poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape 
it and hover over it. Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, 
making him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling" (Poetry,_ 
Language, Thought 218). 
In his essay "What Are Poets For?," Heidegger cites the source 
of his query in the question Holderlin asks in his elegy "Bread and 
Wine": " ... and what are poets for in a destitute time?" (qtd. in 
Poetrv, Language, Thought 91; Holderlin 43). For Heidegger the 
"destitute time" is the "world's night" when "the divine radiance has 
been extinguished in the world's history" --the gods have decamped 
(Poet(Y, Language, Thought 91 ). What Holderlin called "the gods," 
Heidegger called "Being" (Jones 5:327), but both words are names for 
the unnamable. Holderlin answers the question about the role of 
poets in the destitute time by suggesting that they are "like the 
wine-god's.holy priests I Who fared from land to land in holy night." 
Heidegger says the role of the poet in the time of the default of the 
gods is to sing of what is missing, to utter the holy: "Poets are the 
mortals who, singing earnestly of the wine-god, sense the trace of the 
fugitive gods, stay on the gods' tracks, and so trace for their kindred 
mortals the way toward the turning" (Poetry, Language, Thought 
94).3 The turning which mortals seek occurs when they "find the 
way to their true nature" (93). 
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Poetry becomes for Heidegger the path to Being. Poetry 
discloses the things of the world; it "hails" Being as Being manifests 
itself in beings. Scott describes how the poet becomes a prism to 
focus our attention on the light of Being as it shines through being: 
The artist seeks to bring us into a relationship of intense 
intimacy with a given event, with some quite specific 
phenomenon. What he invites is an attitude of enthrallment 
before the sheer singularity of whatever may be the object 
which he is holding up for attention .... he wants to 
reconstitute our perceptual habits in a way that will restore to 
us the innocence which is simply enthralled by the bright 
actuality of the things of earth. (Poetics of Belief 158-159) 
Poetry itself is sacramental when it "bespeaks a profound kind of 
piety toward all the wondrous works of creation," recognizing that 
each of the concrete particularities of the world's body shows forth 
the Mystery of Being (Scott 159). In Poetry. Language, Thought, 
Heidegger writes that truth happens in a work of art when the work 
discloses the particular being of a being (38). 
Whereas Heidegger emphasizes the existential position of the 
lone human being who must bear the burden of his/her interior self-
making, Martin Buber stresses that the self is made and Being 
discovered only through relationship. Walter Kauffman, himself a 
philosopher and the English translator of Buber's I and Thou, says 
that Buber's treatise "appeals to that religiousness which finds no 
home in organized religion" (Kauffman 38). In I and Thou, Buber 
describes the b~.sic word pairs that he says define the two kinds of 
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relationships possible between self and world. The basic words 
"spoken with one's being" are l-It and 1-You. 1-You is spoken with 
one's rv!Jo/e being, but l-It can never be spoken with one's whole 
being. Buber says that the I alone does not exist; the I exists only as 
the partner in one or the other of two basic word pairs. l-It 
experiences something and implies borders separating self and 
world. The experience is in the self and not reciprocal between I and 
world. 1-You implies a relationship without borders between I and 
nature, I and men, and/or I and spiritual beings. The I-You 
relationship enhances the self by acknowledging the You: "I require 
a You to become; becoming I, I say You" (62). The I is itself 
diminished by the 1-It relationship, but through I-You relationships, 
the I comes to know the eternal You: "In every sphere, through 
everything that becomes present to us, we gaze toward the train of 
the eternal You; in each we perceive a breath of it; in every you we 
address the eternal You, in every sphere according to its manner" 
(57). Buber says that "[o]nly as the You becomes present does 
presence come into being" (63). He defines "presence". as "not what is 
evanescent and passes but confronts us waiting and enduring" (64). 
In 1-You encounters, the world appears unreliable, always new: "It 
does not help you survive; it only helps you have intimations of 
eternity" (84). Like Heidegger, Buber emphasizes the centrality of 
language to relationship. He describes the I's relationship with 
nature, men, and spirtual beings in levels of language. With 
creatures the relation "vibrates in the dark and remains below 
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language" (56-57). With other men, "the relation is manifest and 
enters language,·· but with spiritual beings the relation "lacks but 
creates language" (57). 
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Eliade saw a shift from the transcendent to the immanent--
God as source, guide, and end of human life being submerged into 
God-as-process (Buckley 58). Some religious thinkers have turned 
away from what seem to them untenable myths and archaic ideas of 
God and have incorporated the concepts of evolution in descriptions 
of the process of becoming. In Process Theology: An Introductory 
ExQosition, john B. Cobb, Jr., and David Ray Griffin present their 
interpretation of the theological movement influenced by the process 
philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. Cobb 
and Griffin define the history of religion as "the inner development 
of human beings that supervenes upon the completion of the 
biological evolutionary process" (85). Process theology, unlike 
existentialism, does not sharply distinguish human life from 
everything else but instead considers it a "high-level exemplification 
of reality in general"' (l3). Process theology assumes that the 
evolutionary development of the world is rooted in divine creative 
activity and that all possible values subsist in God4 as potentials for 
finite realization but that they must be actualized in order to be 
enjoyed. "To be, to actualize oneself, to act upon others, to share in a 
wider community, is to enjoy being an experiencing subject quite 
apart from any accompanying pain or pleasure" ( 16-17). To be 
"actual" means to be a process. The temporal process is a moment by 
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moment transition from one actual entity to another, and "[plersonal 
human existence is a 'serially ordered society' of occasions of 
experience" ( 15). Whitehead uses the word "concresence" for the 
process of becoming through a bit of time. Consciousness, because it 
is a selective activity that "gives special importance to a few of the 
indefinite number of factors in experience," can increase the 
enjoyment of experience (17). 
Echoing Eliade's description of the impulse toward the sacred, 
Cobb and Griffin say that human beings share a religious drive "to 
correspond with the really real and to accentuate those dimensions 
of our existence which we perceive as connecting us with the depths 
of reality" (21 ). Unfortunately, when the actual or fully real is 
believed to be timeless or beyond change, temporal life in the world 
is devalued ( 14). Process theology, however, affirms change as the 
response to a divine being which itself risks change. According to 
process theology, God is not absolute and unchanging, but is, in fact, 
the basic source of unrest in the universe, the goad toward novelty 
stimulating us "to realize new possibilities after the old ones are no 
longer sufficient to give zest to our enjoyment of being actual" (59). 
The aim at enjoyment unifies an entity, and God is the source of the 
attractive possibility, the lure which provokes the act of self-
determination: "God is the divine Eros urging the world to new 
heights of enjoyment" (26). The divine lover operates not by 
imperative but by persuasion, luring "each occasion toward that 
possibility for its own existence that would be best for it" (53). 
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Because God gives up control of the finite occasions of self-
actualization in order to increase the possibilities for enjoyment, the 
divine creative activity involves risk (53). The increased complexity 
that makes greater enjoyment possible also makes greater suffering 
possible: 
... the development of beings with the capacity to enjoy 
significant values, and to contribute significant values to those 
beyond themselves, necessarily meant the development of 
beings with the capacity to undergo significant suffering, and to 
contribute significantly to the suffering of others beyond 
themselves. (73) 
According to process theology, only ever-lasting chaos, free of 
entities capable of experience, could reduce suffering to a minimum. 
By stimulating the world to more and more complex 
development with greater capacity for intrinsic value, God also 
allowed the development of creatures with more freedom to reject 
the divine aims. According to process theology, God took the risk to 
increase the chance of greatness. This model of divine risk-taking 
has relevance for the human choice of a mode of existence: 
Should we risk suffering, in order to have a shot at intense 
enjoyment? Or should we sacrifice intensity, in order to 
minimize possible grief? The divine reality, who not only 
enjoys all enjoyments but also suffers all sufferings, is an 
Adventurer, choosing the former mode, risking discord in the 
quest for the various types of perfection that are possible. (75) 
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Like existentialism, process theology describes a future that is 
radically open; in each unique situation, we make the choices that 
create our existence. "Our existence is a being-in-the-world. There 
is no self apart form the world or world apart from the self .... Our 
existence is not simply located in our bodies or our heads. The world 
belongs to it as it belongs to the world" (81 ). Unlike existentialism's 
emphasis on the lone individual, process theology emphasizes that 
"the more we participate with others in community, the more we can 
become individuals and the more we become individuals, the more 
richly we participate in community" (82). 
Because each occasion is '"a selective incarnation of the whole 
past universe," our actions have an influence on the future. The past 
is defined as '"the totality of that which influences the present," and 
the future is "the totality of that which will be influenced by the 
present'" (23). Since processes of enjoyment are partially self-
creative and the individual creates itself out of the material given to 
it by the past, the past has real influence but the individual has real 
freedom. Therefore, our individual activities have moral significance 
because they will make good or bad use of the past and they will 
become part of the substance out of which the future is made. '"To be 
moral is to actualize oneself in such a way as to maximize the 
enjoyments of future actualities, in so far as these future enjoyments 
can be conditioned by one's present condition'" (57). 
Process theology seeks the meaning of human existence and 
action in the context of the space-time scale suggested by scientific 
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cosmology and evolution. It recognizes that "real value and 
enjoyment" existed in the universe before higher forms of life but 
believes that the level and importance of enjoyment increased with 
the development of life forms with greater capacity for enjoyment 
( 146). Though, process theology considers human beings to have 
value and worth that is probably unequalled by other species on this 
planet, it nevertheless recognizes the intrinsic worth of other species 
and believes their free development should be supported even if it 
involves some cost to the human species ( 148). Process theology 
seeks "a form of human-historical progress that simultaneously 
allows for the meeting of real human needs and for the renewed 
development of a rich complex biosphere" ( 149). It believes that 
science "guided by imaginative vision" can find ways to sustain a 
large but limited human population in "new and finer forms of 
enjoyment that are compatible with sharing the earth with many 
other species" ( 149 ). Process theology calls for an ecological 
sensibility which recognizes that "[e!very occurence grows out of its 
whole environment and becomes part of the environment out of 
which all future events come into being" ( 154). 
As Otto recognized that the numinous could not be thought 
about conceptually or expressed in words, process theology 
recognizes that prereflective experience means that we apprehend 
more than can be expressed in language (36). When we hear the 
verbal expression of "a universally experienced fact," we respond. 
with belief because we had already apprehended that fact at a 
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preconscious level. "The expression in verbal form simply helps us 
raise this apprehension to the clarity of consciousness, and hence to 
make it possible for this apprehended element to become more 
important in our lives" ( 37). However, language cannot perfectly 
reproduce the preconscious experience because "lwlords and phrases 
do not have a one-to-one correlation with aspects of prereflective 
experience." Language inevitably introduces a note of interpretation 
which is "shaped by the history of the language, including the 
speculative thought, that belongs to that history" (38). 
One of the ways language interprets experience is playfully. 
Only the intensity of joy equals the intensity of terror for the 
religious spirit. Augustine expressed the ground of joy in his 
conviction of the goodness of the world. Looking about him, he 
exclaimed, "Thanks be to you, 0 Lord, for all that we see!" Rejecting 
his earlier Manicheanism, Augustine said of all that he saw--heaven, 
earth, water, animals, man-- "Taken singly, each thing is good; but 
collectively they are very good" (Confessions 343-345). One 
expression of such joy in the creation is the will to play. Plato, in 
fact, said that life should be lived as play consecrated to the gods. He 
asserted that '"man is made God's plaything, and that is the best part 
of him,·" and that therefore '"every man and woman should live life 
accordingly, and play the noblest games ... ·" (qtd. in Huizinga 19). 
Although play can be used as a diversion,S distracting one from the 
problems of authentic being, play can also be a way of being 
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intensely, a celebration of mystery, an act of worship, in itself. j. 
Huizinga in Homo ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture 
points out the primacy and inclusiveness of play: " ... seriousness 
seeks to exclude play, whereas play can very well include 
seriousness" (45). Huizinga says that abstractions like justice, 
beauty, truth, etc. can be denied but that play cannot be denied. By 
acknowledging play, we also acknowledge mind-- "for whatever else 
play is, it is not matter." Huizinga describes play as an affirmation of 
the nonlogical aspect of the cosmos: 
Play only becomes possible, thinkable and understandable 
when an influx of mind breaks down the absolute determinism 
of the cosmos. The very existence of play continually confirms 
the supra-logical nature of the human situation. Animals play, 
so they must be more than merely mechanical things. We play 
and know that we play, so we must be more than merely 
rational beings, for play is irrational." (Huizinga 3-4) 
Language is one of the most common vehicles for play: "Behind 
every abstract expression there lies the boldest of metaphors, and 
every metaphor is a play upon words" ( 4). Huizinga says that 
naming things raises them "to the domain of the spirit" and that "[i]n 
the making of speech and language, the spirit is continually 
'sparking' between mind and matter ... playing with this wonderful 
nominative faculty." Playfulness in language gives expression to life 
and creates "a second, poetic world alongside the world of nature" 
(4). 
--- - -------· 
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Otto and Eliade describe feelings and experiences shared by 
religious people without regard to allegiance to specific doctrine or 
myth. Heidegger and Buber describe ways of being in time which 
emphasize the actual process of earthly becoming rather than 
prescribing mythic belief or codes. Heidegger analyzes the nature of 
being and describes as the peculiar characteristic of Dasein the 
ability to recognize and respond to the hail of Being. Eliade describes 
"an unquenchable ontological thirst," a craving for contact with the 
sacred that causes human beings to create in the profane world 
structures that have the cosmogony as their paradigmatic model. 
Otto names that which is wholly other, inspiring both dread and 
fascination, the m..vsterium tremendum. Buber says that in every 
y"'u we address the eternal You, and that only by speaking You do 
we each become an I. Process theology says that human beings 
share a religious drive to correspond with the "really real" and to 
concentrate on those aspects of our existence which we perceive as 
connecting us with the depths of reality. 
Each of these approaches to the mystery of Being emphasizes 
the use of language. Otto says that the mind recognizes the 
numinous for which language can offer only "obscure and 
inadequate" symbols because language has no term that can isolate 
and gather in a single word the total impression of the numinous. 
Heidegger says that Dasein can only have a world if it has language 
as a way of being open to Being and naming the things of this world 
in which Being resides. For Heidegger, poetry brings Dasrein into 
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dwelling on the Earth. For Buber, self is created only through 
relationship, and relationship comes through language. Process 
theology recognizes that language serves to raise to clarity of 
consciousness apprehensions that have occurred preverbally but that 
language itself cannot perfectly reproduce the preconscious 
experience. Thus, the "something which stands beyond, behind, and 
within" forever escapes our conscious minds but remains hauntingly 
present to our nonverbal awareness. Huizinga describes the 
playfulness of language which celebrates the world by giving 
experession to it. 
Despite its being an era of "deconvers ion," Vincent Buck ley 
finds in the twentieth century an "extraordinary persistence" of the 
conception of poetry as a sacred or religious act in which poems exist 
as "sacred spaces" (Poetrv and the Sacred 9). Buckley defines the 
ret igious interest or impulse as--
... the impulse to establish the sense of man's life and his 
human relationships as being connected with, or, better, 
bonded with forces in the universe, which have their 
correlations in his own psychic life and so in at least some of 
his chief relationships, but which cannot be acounted for in 
terms of his psychic life, are in some sense superior to him, in 
some sense govern him, are manifest to him in terms of power 
and presence, and in some sense require of him adoration, 
worship, and celebration. 
Though the religious impulse does incite to "attitudes of personal 
submission and responsibility," Buckley finds that religious poetry 
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"may or may not involve the further concepts of a communal fall, 
personal sin, personal or communal salvation, and an eternal life ... " 
and, therefore, "may or may not incite to attitudes of personal 
devotion of the sort which lie behind or with the 'religious' poetry 
characteristic of centuries up to and including the eighteenth but 
which have seldom been resorted to with any poetic force since the 
Romantic movement" ( 11). Instead, religious forces in this century's 
poetry have "a present relevance to questions of personal identity, 
meaningful action, and the inner structures of feeling," but do not 
necessarily contain any traditional dogma or symbols. Buckley 
believes that "the works of many poets particularly since the height 
of the Romantic movement not only allow for but positively invite or 
demand analysis in terms which point to their religious quality but 
avert theological or doctrinal treatment" ( l 6). 
Poetry has an inherently sacralizing quality because it tends to 
heighten "imagined or observed particulars to the condition where 
they have a force as symbols," and this "sacralizing act" operates "to 
set aside certain experiences or places or people or memories as 
representatively revealing ones-- in however attenuated a form, 
sacred ones" (20-21 ). Buckley describes religious poetry as 
"observing the religious world ... in its secular seeming" (52). The 
divine speaks through the natural world. Writing specifically of 
Auden's "In Praise of Limestone," Buckley says that "the loves of 'the 
natural man' are inescapably the matrix for a sense of 'the blessed,' it 
is through 'the murmur I Of underground streams' and the 
-----------
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'limestone landscape' that God draws the soul and becomes 
established there" (52-53). Similarly, Buckley finds Whitman's 
poetry to be religious because Whitman does not just catalogue but 
conveys "things in a continuum of the created" and responds to "the 
sliding shine of 'the other' on things." He says that "Whitman with 
his famous lack of discrimination but his innocent sense of the world 
as present and demanding sacralizes everything" (54). Buckley finds 
that throughout English poetry, religious imaginative life has been 
expressed in forms which exhibit a co-existence of sacred and 
profane. For example, he considers both Wyatt and Spenser most 
religious when they are least concerned with being devout (30). 
Since Wordsworth, religious issues, according to Buckley have 
for most poets "been raised outside the terms of Christianity 
entirely": "The modern non-affiliated religious poets who derive 
ultimately from Wordsworth do not believe in any wholes 
[complexes of meaning in nature and history like those of Christian 
doctrine! except that of unending process, and so do not believe in 
any interpretive frame at all" ( 65). Religious feeling survives in the 
twentieth century, but it is often attached to nonreligious objects 
(57). For the modern religious poet, "hierophanies may provide an 
opening toward the 'transcendent', but they do not indicate a God 
who is to be worshipped" (65). And, instead of looking back to a 
Golden age, romantic and post-romantic poets (like Whitman, 
Hopkins, Roethke, Lawrence) seek "the golden depth of the ordinary" 
(63). What Buber refers to as an 1-Thou relationship and what 
·-- --~-·---
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Heidegger calls responding to the hail of Being, Buckley describes as 
"selving" self by awareness of other selves, feeling in the nervous 
system the stress regarded as being from God and gathering the 
nervous system "to respond by naming God" (51). 
In Irrational Man, William Barrett says that "lp]oets are 
witnesses to Being before the philosophers are able to bring it into 
thought" (119). Nathan A. Scott, Jr., in The Poetics of Belief 
recognizes that much of what Heidegger articulated philosophically 
can be found as p:-er.upposition or exposition in the writings of 
Coleridge, Arnold, Pater, Santayana, and Wallace Stevens. Similarly, 
a number of the issues raised by Otto, Eliade, Heidegger, Buber, and 
process theology appear in the writings of Wilbur and Eiseley--not 
necessarily because of direct influence but because they share an 
evolving zeitgiest. Both Wilbur and Eiseley convey a sense of 
pervasive, alluring mystery behind existence--what Otto called the 
"ineffable something that holds the mind," something which is 
intensely present but which eludes apprehension. For Eisetey, 
mystery is "that vast thing sleeping in the swamps of time," and for 
Wilbur, it is "the buried strangeness that nourishes the known." 
They participate in what Whitehead describes as a hopeless but life-
affirming quest for the thing that persists through the passing flux, 
that which is "really real." Both Wilbur and Eiseley express wonder 
and amazement before the natural world, and both believe that 
nature is the route to supernature, that the invisible is seen in the 
visible. Like the process theologians, both Wilbur and Eiseley 
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acknowledge the vast space-time scale of scientific cosmology and 
species evolution. Both writers experience mystical awe as well as 
dread before the otherness of the universe; they experience the 
numinous as Otto describes it, both terribly daunting and immensely 
attractive. 
The creation of art mimics what Eliade calls the cosmogonic 
paradigm. Art and poetry are also able to create what Marcel terms 
"a region of fructif.ving obscurity transcending the closed systems in 
which thought imprisons us, where beings may communicate" 
(Creative Fidelity 35; emphasis added). Both Wilbur and Eiseley 
perceive a kind of knowing which cannot be expressed in language 
directly but which can, through symbol and metaphor, be hinted at 
and suggested. For both Wilbur and Eiseley, art is an avenue to 
Being that can, as Heidegger suggests, awaken us to the sacred and 
teach us to dwell on the earth. Wilbur lives in an incarnate world to 
which he owes the poetic duty of being a giver of due regard, of 
recognizing the hail of Being. Eiseley writes of the lone wanderer 
thrown into existence, facing the anxiety and the challenge of making 
the choices for or against an authentic existence while burdened by 
the ever-present awareness of awaiting death. Like Suber, Wilbur 
recognizes the importance of relationship to self-making. He sees the 
self made through relationship and known through knowing the 
world. Both Wilbur and Eiseley write of accepting the risk of 
suffering that is part of the adventure of becoming. They recognize 
128 
what Eliade called the desacralization of the cosmos and the need for 
us to reawaken to a reverence for all of life. 
According to Falck, "the play of our imagination makes possible 
the disclosure of reality or truth" and is in fact "the only opening on 
to reality that we can hope to have" ( 138). Play is one of the aspects 
of religion which appears constantly in Wilbur and modified as 
allegory, in Eiseley. Play in its purest forms worships the creation, 
expressing absolute delight in self and world and concocting 
situations in which the two interact with intense texuberance. Wilbur 
plays with words in puns, paradoxes, riddles, and metaphors--
sometimes committing egregious stunts as in the lines from "'A 
Problem from Milton": "Poor Adam, deviled by your energy, I What 
power egged you on to feed your brains?" (Poems 311: emphasis 
added). Often his poems (e.g., "Love Calls Us to the Things of This 
World," "'The Catch,"' "A Baroque Wall-Fountain in the Villa Sciarra,"' 
"'The Children of Darkness," "'Running," etc.) express the joy of being 
in the world, seeing it and talking about it playfully. Eiseley most 
often remembers episodes of childhood play and transforms them 
into allegory. He traces the origins of his adult psyche to the play of 
the child who fathered the man--pretending to be a caveman in the 
rain sewers of Lincloln, Nebraska, riding on a tea wagon with golden 
wheels, finding the sea in a shell. His child's game of rolling dice in 
an abandoned house became a metaphor for the human condition--
an isolated, frightened individual gambling against the stacked-house 
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of the universe. For Eiseley, play also takes the form of the play--a 
religious mystery play in which his persona takes the lead. 
Eiseley: The Mystery of "that vast thing sleeping in the swamps of 
time" 
Primitive and classical myths had the virtue of being complete 
in themselves; they explained both the borl" and the wh.v of 
creation. With the tremendous advances in knowledge which have 
occurred since the scientific revolution, science has assumed the right 
and the responsibility of explaining to us how the world works. 
Science feeds our intellect but also tantalizes us with the desire for 
larger, more complete, more complex understandings. Often the 
discoveries of science lead to yet more unknowns. Religious hunger 
begins with the question that science cannot answer, the w!Jr of 
creation. Eliade wrote that "If lor the religious man, the appearance of 
life is the central mystery of the world" (Eliade 147). Heidegger 
considered creation to be the ultimate metaphysical puzzle, 
producing "the question of questions": "Why is there any Being at 
all--why not far rather Nothing?" (Existence and Being 380). 
Kierkegaard realized that eventually '"the point becomes to 
understand more and more that there is something which cannot be 
understood'" (qtd. in FOT 177). 
Surveying the course of his life in his autobiography All the 
Strange Hours, Eiseley wrote: 
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Ironically, I who profess no religion find the whole of my life a 
reiigious pilgrimage. The origins of this hunger are as 
mysterious as the reasons why we, who are last year's dust and 
rain, have risen from the dust to look about with the devised 
crystal of a raindrop. (ASH 141) 
The scientist found himself on a religious pilgrimage because, though 
he might speculate on how dust and rain over eons transformed 
themselves into parrot and squid and human, he could not 
understand what impulse should prompt these seemingly 
unnecessary metamorphoses. Especially he could not understand 
why a creature composed of inert elements should evolve to ask 
"Why?" In The Night Country he writes: "There is no life in the 
carbon in my body .... no life in the iron ... no life in the 
phosphorus, the nitrogen does not contain me, the water that soaks 
my tissues is not I." The man is made of dead constituents: "Carbon 
does not speak, calcium does not remember, iron does not weep" (NC 
51). Though the chemical ingredients are known, the secret of life--
" that unkown organization of an unstable chemistry which makes up 
the life processes"--is "as inscrutably remote as ever" (U 44-45). 
Nothing to explain the necessity of life, nothing to explain the 
hunger of the elements to become life, nothing to explain why 
the stolid realm of rock and soil and mineral should diversify 
itself into beauty, terror, and uncertainty. To bring organic 
novelty into existence, to create pain, injustice, joy, demands 
more than we can discern in the nature that we analyze so 
completely. (ASH 242) 
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Thus Eiseley confronted the fundamental conundrum, and a lifetime 
of close observation led him to conclude that "in the world there is 
nothing to explain the world." 
Although Eiseley believed that matter and energy and the 
struggle for existence molded the shape of life, behind it all he 
sensed something elusive.6 The mysterious principle of 
"organization" seemed "not strictly the product of life, nor of 
selection." This principle of organization "[l]ike some dark and 
passing shadow within matter ... cups out the eyes' small windows 
or spaces the notes of a meadow lark's song in the interior of a 
mottled egg" (IJ. 26). Eiseley suspected that this patterning principle 
"was there before the living in the deeps of water" (26). Awed by 
the totally unnecessary beauty and symmetry of a snow flake, 
Eiseley speculated that the explanation came from a world beyond 
and behind nature: 
No utilitarian philosophy explains a snow crystal, no doctrine of 
use or disuse. Water has merely leapt out of vapor and thin 
nothingness in the night sky to array itself in form. There is no 
logical reason for the existence of a snowflake any more than 
there is for evolution. It is an apparition from that mysterious 
shadow world beyond nature, that final world which contains--
if anything contains--the explanation of men and catfish and 
green leaves. (U 27) 
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A scientist, an avowed evolutionist, Eiseley found in the world more 
mysteries than answers. He sensed behind the world something of a 
wholly different order of reality manifesting itself in the things of an 
ordinary day. For Eiseley, all of nature became what Eliade called a 
"cosmic sacral ity." 
Ironically, Eiseley found a strange comfort in the 
impenetrability of creation; its opacity allowed him to believe that 
something did exist beyond his capacity to know. In his poem "That 
Vast Thing Sleeping" Eiseley recounts how paleontologists and 
anthropologists "wring meaning" from the past using 
"paleomagnetism in I shards of ceramic vessels, thermoluminescence, 
I radioactive counters" ticking off "dissipating isotopes" (lA 65). He 
says study of the past teaches us that in some future we too "will be 
raveled into amino acid chains I recoverable from rocks, a few words 
etched on stone I pounded by breakers in oblivion." The evidence of 
the past convinces those who study it that "time's stairway ends 
upon a rail-tess balcony I for all of life." Suprisingly, the poet finds 
both meaning and solace in this bleak news, even though he suspects 
that the comfort is simply "the life force in you I luring you on" (66). 
His discovery teaches him what he cannot know: 
Because I know all this and if I know, 
something within the universe knows more. 
I am a pale reflection of that mind, 
shaped by its mere potential when it wallowed in 
algae and ooze and was, no doubt of it, 
the Gunflint flora that we study now. (lA 66) 
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Eiseley calls himself a mere reflection of that something within the 
universe that knows the past and dreams the future; yet, as a 
reflection he believes that his own thoughts "must run I in similar 
directions" with the thoughts of "that vast thing sleeping in the 
swamps of time" (66). He and Wilbur share an assurance that here 
in this world is the place "[w]here something may be understood" 
(Poems 20). 
For Eiseley, nature is the only accessible exposition of the 
mystery of being. Mystically, nature is the multiform manifestations 
of that vast thing sleeping and dreaming in the swamps of time. As 
an intellectual concept, nature represents man's attempt "to define 
and delimit his world, whether seen or unseen" (S1. 225). and nature 
"implies all, absolutely all, that man knows or can know" (ST 226). 
Recognizing that he springs from nature and not nature from him, 
man also knows that nature existed before and will continue after 
him. Nature remains a giant otherness that contains both man and 
all the secrets he instinctively feels are denied to him. Therefore, 
both theologian and scientist, "each in his way" according to Eiseley, 
pursue the quest for some transcendent order behind nature (ST 
217). Eiseley believed that "[blehind all religions lurks the concept of 
nature," and "[b]ehind nature is hidden the chaos as well as the 
regularities of the world. And behind all that is evident to our 
senses is veiled the insubstantial deity that only man, of all earth's 
creatures, has had the power to perceive or to project into nature" 
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(ST 225). As best we know, only man has concerned himself with 
nature as an abstraction and looked ceaselessly "outside of nature 
toward something invisible to any eye but his own and indeed not 
surely to be glimpsed by him" (ST 226). 
Eiseley writes in his poem "Five Men from the Great Sciences" 
of the need to escape "a perpetually narrowing corner" and look "for 
something beyond human cognizance, instruments and guidance I to 
a place outside" (1A 71 ). The "something beyond" has not been found 
in the laboratory or in light years or in the spectroscope, nor has it 
been found "in death I or in the life about us." Nevertheless, the 
poet believes "it exists and lies truly outside or beyond nature, I 
conceived I in some intangible way by her." The mystery "will never 
be found I save in single heads I and by them unrecognized." Like 
small garnets locked in impenetrable stone, Eiseley finds--
something as unseen and precious 
though finite 
locked in my mind 
but outside, 
do you understand, 
outside this inside of nature 
we are forced to inhabit. (lA 72) 
A momentary revelation is possible, "lb]ut the getting through is 
individual." Eiseley believes that "[nlothing lies outs ide of nature 
unless she herself will it, but she does"; he feels himself allowed 
"outside for just a moment": 
beyond time, 
beyond hearing, 
beyond sight, 
beyond thought 
There, in the place where he can, like a red garnet in plain rock, 
gleam briefly but never go back, he discovers 
It is 
not in the stars the planets nor the leaf-fall 
but it is in them 
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and by them, and rarely, as now, 
that the door is opened. (lA 72) 
The epigraph from Heraclitus Eiseley chose for The UnexQected 
Universe-- "If you do not expect it, you will not find the unexpected, 
for it is hard to find and difficult"--speaks the necessity of being 
open to wonder in order to be able to see it. 
Eiseley believed that the mystery without could only be 
understood by the mystery within: "Each man deciphers from the 
ancient alphabet of nature only those secrets that his own deeps 
possess the power to endow with meaning" (UU 146). Exploring the 
central mystery--the origin of being--led Eiseley to write The 
Immense journey. He said that he made his reconstruction of human 
evolution of those four elements recognized by the ancient Greeks: 
"mud and the fire within it we call life, vast waters, and something--
space, air, the intangible substance of hope which at the last proves 
unanalyzable by science, yet out of which the human dream is made" 
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( 13). Eiseley chose as his epigraph for The Immense Journev.. William 
Temple's assertion that '"lu]nless all existence is a medium of 
revelation, no particular revelation is possible.'" Because he finds 
(like Heidegger) "nothing very normal in nature," all the elements 
and their multiform mixings are, for Eiseley, possible sources of 
revelation. 
Eiseley "sought to explore, to understand, and to enjoy the 
miracles of this world, both in and out of science" and that he tried to 
write of "such miracles as can be evoked from common earth" (U. 12). 
He called the moment of his initial awareness of the otherness of 
nature his "first miracle." When he was a child visiting relatives, 
Eiseley's aunt and uncle had placed to his ear a large, beautiful, 
iridescent shell and told the boy to listen carefully so that he could 
hear the sound of the sea inside the shell. Whether what he heard 
was "the whispered sibilance, the sigh of waves upon the beach, the 
little murmurs of moving water, the confused mewing of gulls in the 
sun-bright air" or just the vastly magnified whispers of his own 
blood and the house around him, Eiseley says either was "marvel 
enough" (ST 217). The experience caused him to fall suddenly out of 
the nature he had inhabited obliviously and to turn to survey her 
with surprise and wonder. For the child who had never seen the sea, 
the miracle was that "a shell shaped in the seas' depths, should, 
without intent, so concentrate the essence of the world as to bring its 
absent images before me" (ST 217). 
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With this falling out of nature into awareness, Eiseley became 
ensorcelled; he entered into the confused and endless exploration, a 
transcendental search for order that Emerson once indicated 
ensnares all those who become consciously aware of nature. 
Emerson described the entrance of nature into the human mind as 
the birth of man and described man as '"nature's finer success in 
self-explication'" (qtd. in SI 219). Others have perceived the sense of 
human separation from nature and the ensuing longing to recross the 
dividing gulf in the same terms Eiseley used to describe the 
awakening of his own childish awareness--as a fall. Eiseley finds 
implicit in Darwin's title for his study of human evolution, The 
Descent of Man, a substantial if unconscious orthodoxy: " ... man did 
fall; even to an unbeliever and an evolutionist like Darwin. Man fell 
from the grace of instinct into a confused and troubled cultural realm 
beyond nature, much as in the old theology man fell from a state of 
innocence into carnal knowledge" (UU 136). Eiseley calls Santayana's 
statement that ""lt]he universe is the true Adam, the creation the 
true fall"' a profound and succinct analogy. He says the philosopher 
saw "that in the instant when the universe was brought out of the 
void of non-being its particles, achieving such powers as are present 
in man, would yearn for understanding of their destiny" (ST 218). If 
the creation was indeed "the true fall," man fell even further--out of 
creation into Bfl'are.ness of creation. As "higher" consciousness 
separated human from animal awareness and behavior, Eiseley says 
that man fell "out of the secure world of instinct into a place of 
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wonder" (ST 221). The ensuing combination of fascination and terror 
has caused human beings to search for place, power, and meaning 
amid so much otherness, for a sacred space that is real, effective, and 
non-illusory. Eisetey writes, "In the old house of nature there are 
monsters in every cupboard. That is why, as nature's children, we 
are inveterate romantics and go visiting" (ST 221 ). 
Eiseley says that because man has fallen out of nature and has 
become "[b]ereft of instinct, he must search constantly for meanings" 
(ll.U.. 144). Man looks for those meanings in nature because he senses 
that "[slomething, some law of a greater civilization, sustains nature 
from moment to moment within and above the void of non being" (ST 
240). In his essay "Walden: Thoreau's Unfinished Business," Eiseley 
writes of how Thoreau described each Indian arrowhead he found as 
a "'mindprint,"' a '"fossil thought'" that reminded him of the mind 
that shaped it, the mind whose trail he pursued (ST 239). As 
humans leave the artifacts (arrowheads, pottery) of their 
civilizations, nature--which Thoreau called "'another civilization"'--
leaves daily its prints and artifacts-- "the mysterious hieroglyphs left 
by a deermouse, or the preternatural winter concealment of a moth's 
cocoon in which leaves are made to cooperate" (ST 240). Eiseley says 
that "[Thoreau] saw in the dancing of a fox on snow-whipped Walden 
ice 'the fluctuations of some mind'" (ST 240). 
Eiseley himself found artifacts left lying about by that other 
civilization, nature. If we would learn to look, he said that we could 
see in "a spider's wheel a universe, or [in] a swarm of midges a 
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galaxy, or [inl a canyon a backward glance into time" (UU 106). 
Puzzling over a Conus shell etched with strange markings like "the 
letters of a golden alphabet I untraced, unreadable," Eiseley 
speculates that--
the golden hieroglyphs encircling, 
line above line, the contours of the shell 
all seem to speak what is unsaid, all seem to be 
thoughts: 
something that nature would not record by chance 
under the kelp and tumult of the sea. (lA 45) 
Though the poet is sure that the golden alphabet will not be read by 
"any man of this barbaric age," he feels convinced that "this 
symmetry is not the play of chance; I something beyond the stars 
was writing here I a book that molecules have set in place" (47). His 
conviction is bolstered by the evidence that "even we I bring out of 
darkness thoughts and rhythms I that ring the mind with music." On 
cave walls and in ancient Greece, form anticipated substance.- The 
poet reads this message in the cryptic shell: 
Beneath the golden shell with written characters 
admit that all is dark 
but, in.the mind as well, 
is a great void from whence form emanates. 
Admit that, too. 
This is the message on the golden shell. 
(JA 47) 
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Form materializes out of the fathomless darkness of the human mind, 
and form arises out of the greater void of nature. The parallel 
suggests a greater mind behind the greater void. To Eiseley and 
Thoreau all of nature seems a mindprint, and it is that mind behind 
the veil of nature, the numinous, the wholy other, the maker and 
lawgiver of some greater civilization, that both naturalists seek. 
Eiseley writes that "[t]he whole story of humanity is basically that of 
a journey toward the Emerald City, and of an effort to learn the 
nature of Oz, who, perhaps wisely, keeps himself concealed" (UU 
124). 
For Eiseley, science mixes the rational with the suprarational; in 
fact, he sees faith and a sense of the numinous underlying science. 
In his essay "Science and the Sense of the Holy" included in The Star 
Thrower, Eiseley quotes Einstein's assertion that "'a conviction akin to 
religious feeling of the rationality or intelligibility of the world lies 
behind all scientific work of a high order'" (qtd. SI 191 ). As an 
example, Eiseley cites the religious feeling he perceives in the work 
of Charles Darwin. In a time when animals were generally perceived 
as automatons or creatures destined for human exploitation, Darwin 
speculated that humans and animals might actually be netted 
together in one interdependent web: "·If we choose to let conjecture 
run wild, then animals, our fellow brethren in pain, disease , 
suffering and famine--ours laves in the most laborious works, our 
companions in our amusements--they may partake of our origin in 
one common ancestor--we may be all netted together'" (ST 187). In 
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spite of Darwin's agnosticism and his being '"in thick mud"' in regard 
to metaphysics, Eiseley finds in Darwin's statement "an intuitive 
sensitivity to the life of other creatures" and "that feeling of awe, of 
dread of the holy playing upon nature, which characterizes the work 
of a number of our naturalists and physicists down even to the 
present day" (ST 187). Eiseley describes Darwin's feeling of creation 
being netted together as a "mystic sense" that we are "one single 
diffuse animal, subject to joy and suffering beyond what we endure 
as individuals" (ST 187). 
Pointing out that "some of the world's scientists and artists 
have been deeply affected by the great mystery," the awe before the 
created universe which Otto called the m.vsterium tremendum, 
Eiseley describes the primordial beginnings of such feelings: "Ever 
since man first painted animals in the dark of caves he has been 
responding to the hoiy, to the numinous, to the mystery of being and 
becoming, to what Goethe very aptly called 'the weird portentous"' 
( 189). Eiseley describes this as a feeling that something 
inexpressible is lying behind nature and says that this is felt most 
acutely in human relations to animals: 
... a sanctified, reverent experience ... extends from the 
beautiful rock paintings of South Africa to the men of the 
Labradorean forests or the Plains Indian seeking by starvation 
and isolation to bring the sacred spirits to his assistance. All 
this is part of the human inheritance, the wonder of the world, 
and nowhere does that wonder press closer to us than in the 
guise of animals which, whether supernaturally as in the caves 
of our origins or, as in Darwin's sudden illumination, perceived 
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to be, at heart, one form, one awe-inspiring mystery, seemingly 
diverse and apart but derived from the same genetic source" 
(ST 189). 
W. H. Auden, who described Eiseley as "a solitary who feels more 
easily at home with animals than with his fellow human beings" 
(Introduction 19 ), observed that Eiseley's own numinous encounters 
are almost always with "nonhuman objects--a spider, the eye of a 
dead octopus, his own shepherd dog, a starving jackrabbit, a young 
fox" (20). In his writing at least, for Eiseley it was easiest to speak 1-
Thou in relationships with animals 
Eiseley the anthropologist identified himself as a member of an 
old and suspect cult; the "alchemists of the heart," magicians who 
surround themselves with "worm-eaten books ... shark's teeth and 
stuffed mermaids" (IA 39). In this century, these alchemists "wear a 
disguise best fitted for the times" because "the peaked cap with the 
stars [is] no longer suitable" (lA 41 ). Some, like Eiseley, "practice 
science, like me are not scientists." 
we sit 
before a microscope, or watch the Pleiades, but we 
belong to an old craft, wizards who loved 
the living world, loved mystery, kept talking birds 
close to their shoulders, never solved a thing 
but lived lives close to where solutions were 
and did not want them, 
preferred mystery. (IA 41) 
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As an alchemist, the poet says he knows "only the mystery of 
objects" and saves "what I can keep from being ground to dust" (42). 
Perhaps because they "see in the dark, wait for the ice," the 
alchemists of the heart "suffer the ostracism of the seeming learned" 
and "are not entirely welcome among men" (42). Though it would 
remain for him an impenetrable mystery and though being came 
with terrible dread, Eiseley found the "life within us, a magnificent, 
irrecoverable good," and his love of its endless manifestations was a 
kind of "submerged worship" (ASH 239). 
Alluring, Terrifying Otherness: "Something that did not love the sun" 
Intense awareness of life can bring with it not only holy awe 
and reverence but also a shuddering dread of that which is 
invincibly other. The feeling of uncanniness can come, as Otto says, 
with whatever looms up in the world of the ordinary "as something 
terrifying and baffling to the intellect" (64). Any event in the 
human, animal, or vegetable world which sets the perceiver "astare 
in wonder and astonishment" may arouse daemonic dread and 
numinous feeling. Eiseley remembers such an experience when as a 
child he uncovered an old well. A shaft of sunlight revealed "a 
spidery thing of hair and many legs" crawling across a rusty pipe 
twenty feet above the water level. The slowly moving, sure-footed 
creature which loved the dark was as "secretive as the very 
underground" whose mystery had lured the boy to uncover the well. 
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Eiseley says that he must have realized then for the first time "the 
frightening diversity of the living": " ... something that did not love 
the sun was down there, something that could walk through total 
darkness upon slender footholds over evil waters, something that 
had come down there by preference from above" (lJ 38). 
On occasion, Eiseley witnessed a spectacle so appalling that he 
even came to doubt "the naturalness of nature" (ASH 237). He 
experienced one of those occasions of doubt as he watched "[b Jeauty 
and evil ... course together over the autumn grass" with the invasion 
of giant, tiger-faced Sphex wasps (ASH 238). Eiseley watched as 
indefatigable female wasps built burrow after burrow in the soil, 
depositing in each a carefully wrapped pupa and a paralyzed but 
living cicada to feed the insect that would emerge from its pupal 
casing. Remembering the details of Sphex life cycle as described by 
nineteenth-century entomologist Henri Fabre, Eisetey was both awed 
and appalled. Not only are the wasps guided on return flights to 
their burrows by complex, unerring, and unexplained navigational 
guidance systems, but the wasps possess a "deadly perfection" of 
surgical precision that allows them to incise nerve centers in their 
prey, paralyzing but not killing the cicada. The Sphex larva, in turn, 
possess "an instinctive knowledge of how to eat in order to prolong 
the life of the paralyzed body which they devour" (ASH 241). Even 
more appalling is the fact that the cicada victims, according to 
entomologist Fabre, seem to have foreknowledge of their 
helplessness, and the agile Sphex wasps take "absolute confident 
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advantage" of the cicada's fear. Each new female wasp who emerges 
in the spring, perhaps over the dead body of her own unrecognized 
mother, carries "not alone the surgical instrument, but the map of 
operations yet to be performed on an ~nsect she has never seen" 
(ASH 243). Herself a nectar feeder, the adult wasp will use her 
instrument and skill to feed her own carnivorous grubs--the last of 
whom may crawl out of its underground nursery over her dead 
body. In The Unexpected Universe Eiseley quotes Darwin's 
exclamation on the savagery of the life force that drives evolution: 
'"What a book ... a devil's chaplain might write on the clumsy, 
wasteful blundering and horrible cruel works of Nature'" (qtd. in UU 
135). 
Musing over the Sphex wasp burrows as the year wound 
toward winter and his own life moved toward its close, Eiseley 
pm~:zl ed over the beautiful and terrifying phenomenon: 
Here beneath the leaves on the autumn grass slept nature, or a 
part of nature, so beautifully, so exquisitely contrived that it 
was hard to imagine error, hard to conceive of all the pieces of 
that intricate puzzle being put together from the blind play of 
natural selection alone. Looked at from one point of view, 
nature had created monstrous evil, the tormenting of helpless, 
paralyzed flesh. Looked at in another way, the eternal storm 
maintained its balance. (ASH 244) 
Eiseley came to acknowledge being "simply baffled": "I know these 
creatures have been shaped in the celtars of time. It is the method 
that troubles me" (ASH 246). Earlier in his life, during his graduate 
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student days at the University of Pennsylvania, Eiseley had visited 
the Philadelphia Zoo with his mentor and friend, anthropologist 
Frank Speck. Watching a beautifully patterned wood duck paddling 
in a pond, Speck asked Eiseley if he believed unaided natural 
selection had produced the pattern. Eiseley's response was unsure 
and tentative. Although he had no doubt about both his and the 
bird's evolutionary heritages, he was troubled by nature's methods 
of achieving its outcomes. He felt nature too vast for human scope 
and ingenuity and could not "believe in simplicity." He found the 
universe "too frighteningly queer to be understood by minds like 
ours" (ASH 90). 
Referring to the thirty-ninth chapter of Job, Otto in The Idea of 
the Holy points out that when God challenges Job with an 
ennumeration of his feats of creation--including eagle, ostrich, wild 
ass, unicorn, etc.--the emphasis is not on "teleological wisdom that 
'prepares all cunningly and well'" but on the "strangeness and 
marrrel" of the creatures which express the wondrousness of their 
creator. Otto says of these creatures that "their mysterious instincts 
and their inexplicable behaviour, [their\ very negation of purpose 
becomes a thing of baffling significance ... " (79). 
Assuredly these beasts would be the most unfortunate 
examples that one could hit upon if searching for evidences of 
the purposefulness of the divine 'wisdom·. But they no less 
than all the previous examples and the whole context, tenor, 
and sense of the entire passage [of Job!, do express in masterly 
fashion the downright stupendousness, the wellnigh daemonic 
and wholly incomprehensible character of the eternal creative 
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power; how incalculable and 'wholly other', it mocks at all 
conceiving but can yet stir. the mind to its depths, fascinate and 
overbrim the heart. (Otto 80) 
In the virgin forest of North America, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of 
experiencing a manifestation of terrifying otherness; de Tocqueville 
describes "'a stillness so complete that the soul feels penetrated by a 
sort of religious terror'" (qtd. in IP 13). 
In his poem "Wounded Knee: In Memoriam, 1890, .. Eiseley 
looks over a high mountain pass through which the cold wind blows 
down from Canadian prairies and "here in the high grey twilight I 
consider I what tiny particles are men intruding I sentience and will 
into the streaming curtain of the night" (lA 55). He senses how 
unique is this living planet in a vast, unmindful universe. He calls 
an Explorer space probe sent the two hundred million miles from 
Earth to Mars "the eye I detached from the eye" (AKA 58). The 
Explorer's mechanical/electronic eye discovers absolute dead 
otherness: 
0 Martian day lit by the black light of no eyes, 
blind craters, blinkless sockets gazing 
where no rain falls, here 
nothing has died, been born, since yesterday's 
four billion years. (AKA 58) 
The message for the eyes that detached the exploring eye is that vast 
space holds invincible otherness not susceptible to human will or 
making. 
The universe 
is not for man, it is 
itself, out there the star stuff is wrenched free 
it does not seed 
reproduce, devour, it is and is only. 
Absolute blankness can inspire even more dread than the dark 
things that hide in wells 
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Not only is the vast universe full of mystifying, terrifying 
otherness, but even the human body itself can seem part of that 
other. Eiseley finds in a passage from Thoreau's The Maine Woods a 
"penetrating expression of the spirit's horror of the substance it lies 
trapped within" (NC 146). For Thoreau, who "revered and loved true 
science," a mountain journey of observation and measurement 
becomes a "spiritual ascent" in which "pure observation gives way to 
awe, the obscure sense of the holy" (NC 144). Eiseley says that the 
effect of the passage comes from "a style so appropriate to the 
occasion that it evokes the shape of earth before man's hand had 
fallen upon it" and from "a terrible and original question posed on 
the mountain's summit" (NC 144). In the passage, Thoreau describes 
a place of mists like a "'cloud factory,'" of vast, titanic nature in which 
he feels the presence of a force '"not bound to be kind to man."' 
Alone with that vast, inhuman presence, Thoreau feels some vital 
essence escaping '"through the loose grating of his ribs'" and feels 
pilfered '"of some of his divine faculty"' (NC 144-145). Eiseley 
describes Thoreau's sense of himself as a spirit and his astonishment 
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and terror at the recognition of the power of the hard substance of 
matter which he perceives as so alien to the self he understands as 
spirit: "'I stand in awe of my body, this matter to which I am bound 
has become so strange to me. I fear not spirits, ghosts, of which I am 
one-- that my body might--but I fear bodies, I tremble to meet 
them'" (qtd. in NC 145). Thoreau then asks what Eiseley 
characterizes as "a terrible and original question": "'What is this 
Titan that has possession of me? Talk of mysteries!--think of our life 
in nature--daily to be shown matter, to come in contact with it--
rocks, trees, wind on our cheeks! the solid earth, the actual world'" 
(qtd. in~ 145). Thoreau is overcome with the mysteries of self and 
world: '" U'l.Jo are we? Where are we?'" (qtd. in NC 145). Eiseley 
finds tremendous power in Thoreau's retelling of his experience of 
the mountain's over-awing presence. He says that we have had the 
opportunity to move briefly in a titanic world and to have "hurled at 
stone titanic questions" because " ... a slight, gray-eyed man walked 
up a small mountain which, by some indefinable magic, he 
transformed into a platform for something, as he put it 'not kind to 
man"' (NC 146). 
Eiseley recounts his own tale of an encounter with terrifying 
yet alluring matter. For Eiseley, the extremity of nature is not a 
mountain's frightening mass and solidity or a distant, inert planet, 
but the sinister whispering, pull of moving underground water. For 
Eiseley, water is always as dangerous as it is mesmerizing, and it is 
out of water he creates the myth of the birth of his own imagination. 
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In one of his essays from The Night Country, water, subterranean 
water, is the alluring threat that rises in the darkness, "The Places 
Below," and calls those who hear its burbling to some unreachable 
depths from which there is no return. He warns those who cannot 
"bear the silence and the darkness," those who "dislike black night 
and yawning chasms," to seek the sunshine and avoid the darkness: 
"If you fear the sound of water hurrying through crevices toward 
unknown and mysterious destinations, do not consider it" (NC l 5). 
But Eiseley knows that humankind will not follow his prescription 
but will "turn immediately to the dark ..... drawn to it by cords of 
fear and of longing." He knows that "ly]ou will imagine that you are 
tired of the sunlight ... you will end by going down" (NC15). 
In "The Places Below," Eiseley recounts episodes from his life 
all connected by the presence of water and death or the terrifying 
possiblitity of death. First, he describes an old farmhouse to which 
he has been a frequent visitor, drawn by the lure of what waits in 
the cellar. On the edge of a rolling plain, the "old warm farmhouse 
where people rock on the porch in the starry evenings" has no 
shadow on it, "lb]ut it has a cellar, and that cellar has a monster in it" 
(NC 16). The cellar "seems ordinary at first glance," but it has been 
cut out of rock leading to "some accidental tremendous fissure torn in 
the bowels of the earth .... This is the country of Charon and 
Cerberus; from this the pleasant fields draw sustenance"--just as 
Eiseley's imagination draws sustenance from the dark abysses of his 
own psyche (NC 17). 
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Deep in this nature-made cellar, below the one dug by men, 
amid towering rocks and the smell of sulphur, Eiseley finds the thing 
that draws him back, visit after visit: It is a "great pool of cold blue 
water" contained within the splendor of a "vast, blue chamber that 
glistens and invites ... from below" (NC 17). He describes the 
chamber as a place never to be entered in the flesh, a place that 
seems to speak faintly of faces that will never be seen. "It invites ... 
as arsenical springs invite the thirsty" (NC 17). Hearing tales of the 
fall and rise (sometimes a hundred feet in three hours) of the water 
that protects the "Blue Room" from would-be explorers, Eiseley feels 
"the creep of some uneasy power in the rocks" (NC 17). And he 
recognizes (and shares) the farmer's obsession with the Blue Room, 
this place forever unreachable. What Eiseley says of the farmer is 
true of himself: "A comer of his brain lis] eerie with stalactites and 
that wavering world of distance and promises" (NC 18). The watery 
Blue Room becomes an emblem of what cannot be known and cannot 
be reached but forever allures. It exists in the human imagination as 
much as in the bowels of the earth. What is outs ide mirrors what is 
inside: 
We will never see that chamber as it really is. There is nothing 
like it in the fields or in the sunlight. It is a part of the places 
below. And whether the places below lie in the dark of an old 
cellar or in the crypts and recesses of the mind, or whether 
they are a glimmering reflection of both together, the old 
farmer does not know any longer. (N.C 18) 
The old farmer's perplexity and enthrallment are Eiseley's own. 
Having described his adult fascination with the Blue Room, 
Eiseley turns back to his childhood for an explanation of his 
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obsession with the murmur of subterranean water. One of Eiseley's 
most vivid childhood memories centers around a personality and 
adventure that led him to make choices "far backward in the 
innocence of childhood" that would forever draw him to the Blue 
Room and the other "places below." Though a middle-aged man, he 
can remember every maze of the sewer labyrinths of Lincoln, the 
city in which he lived when he was ten: " ... lying on my bed at 
midnight, waiting for sleep, I find myself retracing in memory each 
twist and turn of the storm drains underneath the sunlit streets that 
other men remember" (NC 19). His comrade, his "lord and master," in 
the boyhood adventures of living vivid!y and imaginatively as 
cavemen in the storm drains was "the Rat," a slightly built boy with 
the "terrible intensity of a coiled spring." Eiseley's life was marked 
forever after he accepted the Rat's invitation to join his gang of 
cavemen and enter the world beneath a world, down a drain pipe 
that emptied "twenty square miles of sky when the rains blew up" 
and was as "dark as a vanished geological era." Always in the 
background of their lives in the sewers was the threat that sudden 
heavy rains could fill the pipes with torrents of water that 
"thundered like Niagara," creating maelstroms and irresistible 
suctions that would sweep incautious wanderers to drowning in 
underground drains. 
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Eiseley's underworld adventures as a caveman with the Rat 
ended abruptly. He writes that "[i]t dawned a clear day on the 
morning the world ended" (NC 21). Eiseley and the Rat were 
crawling six hundred feet into a side tunnel already partially filled 
by sand and water when they heard "a very little sound .... a little 
murmuring in the water, a little whisper, a little complaint as though 
the water were growing restless and wanted to go somewhere" (NC 
22). Believing this sound indicated an unforseen rain beginning to 
deluge the drain system, the boys struggled frantically to crawl 
toward a larger chamber that might lead to an exit. When, 
exhausted, they did mange to 1 ift a manhole cover and escape, they 
discovered that there was no torrential storm, only a city worker 
testing a fire hydrant nearby. However, the boys with torn clothes, 
raw knees, and bruised hands were discovered by Eiseley's furious 
father, and they were forbidden to enter the sewer system again. 
Despite parental admonitions, Eiseley says the original choice to 
follow the Rat and become a boy-caveman made him forever 
susceptible to the siren call of "water hurrying towar:d unknown and 
mysterious destinations": "The urge returns. The same voices speak 
to you" (NC 24). In "The Places Below" Eiseley recounts two more 
episodes in which he is drawn by water murmuring in subterranean 
darkness. While still a ten-year-old boy, he found an old brick drain 
high enough for standing upright; its entrance and the bricks inside 
were covered by green moss. He and the Rat traveled over "moss 
like velvet, .. through air that "kept blowing cool and clean." In the 
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chill air a hundred yards inside, they could hear again the vibration 
of falling water. Eiseley says at that moment, "I didn't want to see it, 
where that water was going, I mean, or why it was in this hill. I had 
had enough of the green door" (NC 25). Yet, he "would follow the Rat 
anywhere." His companion declared they would keep this place 
secret from the gang, keep its exploring just for themselves. Death 
intervened, however. A few weeks later the Rat was "dead of some 
casual childhood illness": "All that consuming energy and passionate 
intellectual hunger had come to nothing" (NC 25). 
Though he would spend his adult life in high-powered 
academia, Eiseley writes that "I never met a mind like his again" (NC 
25). He returned once to the "green door" but could not enter 
without his friend. Eiseley was left longing for a place he had lived 
in the imagination, a place twice vanished: 
If there is any truth to the story that at death men return to 
the period they have loved best in life, I know well where I 
will awake. It will be somewhere on the cold, bleak uplands of 
the ice-age world, by the fire in the cave, and the watching 
eyes without. It was the Rat who left me there. (NC 26) 
What Eliade calls a "profound nostalgia" to inhabit a divine world of 
sacred, primordial, mythical time haunts Eiseley's writing. In 
particular, he longed ro recapture what he casts as the "paradisal 
situation" of humanity's beginnings. Eiseley's imagination had been 
captured in childhood; as an adult, he was left longing for a vanished 
ice age era which he and the Rat had temporarily revivified in their 
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youth. For him, the sound of moving, underground water aroused a 
plaintive longing for the lost times when ice ruled the planet, the 
world he and the Rat had recreated as cavemen in the sewers of 
Lincoln. 
Finally, Eiseley describes in "The Places Below" another 
underground adventure which occurred many years later when he 
was "an archaeologist--not a foo.l." He says that "something drew me" 
into the Hall of Shadows, a cave he had "no business to be in." 
Uncertain of exactly how he got in or how he would get out, Eiseley 
lay on his back in an enormous rock chamber meant for a king's 
burial. He could move only by crawling because the forces that had 
opened the chamber were slowly closing it: 
... that great hall was hung with vast tapestries and heavy 
curtains over which my lantern played. And those tapestries 
were iridescent stone. The powers that had built that chamber 
in the depths of the mountain were closing it again. I had come 
as the curtains lingered above the floor. If I stayed they would 
descend. (Nb 26). 
There Eiseley discovered that he "loved the darkness .... feared it, 
yet returned to it. It was the mother out of which I came" (NC 27). 
He was one of those "in the world of light" who "desire the darkness." 
He recognized that "ltlhe whole infinite ladder of life was filled with 
this backward yearning" (NC 26). From far off under the darkness of 
those stony curtains, Eiseley heard "a faint sound of water ... 
menacing, and sweet"; the sound reminded him of the Rat standing, 
156 
listening at the green door to the falling water far off in a similar 
darkness. Eiseley waited again at a green door longing for someone 
like the Rat to help him but realizing that "[o]ne entered by oneself, 
or not at all" (NC 27). With "agonizing reluctance" Eiseley began to 
crawl back toward the daylight but not before recognizing that the 
"far-off murmur that might have come through remote distances of 
stone" actually whispered in his brain and not in the Hall of Shadows. 
The pull toward the darkness of the alluring unknown came from 
inside. 
Eiseley possessed an awed sense of worlds existing within 
worlds--each as unaware of what it contained as it was of the larger 
context which contained it. One occasion when he himself became 
intensely conscious of the existence of parallel or concentric but 
uncomprehending universes occurred when he and "a poet friend" 
attended "a great opera performed in a tent under arc lights." The 
poet pointed out to Eisel ey a giant Cecropia moth which had 
blundered in out of the night and was flying "from light to light over 
the posturings of the actors" (UU 175). Eiseley's friend observed 
what the moth did not know: "'He's passing through an alien 
universe brightly lit but invisible to him. He's in another play; he 
doesn't see us. He doesn't know·" (UU 175-176). Then the poet 
turned his observations from the obtuseness of the moth to their 
human situation: "'Maybe it's happening right now to us. Where are 
we? Whose is the real play?'" (UU 176). 
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Pursuing the question, "What is it we are part of that we do not 
see ... ?," Eiseley compares our limited awareness to the clever but 
constrained vision of a spider. He muses that an orb spider, a world-
maker among tall spears of buffalo grass, must recognize the 
expected intrusions into her web world-- "the tug of the wind, the fall 
of a raindrop, the flutter of a trapped moth's w:ng" -- but he 
presumes that she must have no precedent for understanding the 
curious man's pencil point tweaking a strand of web and setting the 
woven gossamer vibrating: "Spider was circumscribed by spider 
ideas; its universe was a spider universe" (UU 50). Ever-ything 
outside her web must seem--in the human terms with which we 
interpret a spider's world--" irrational, extraneous, at best, raw 
material for spider" (UU 50). Passing "like a vast impossible 
shadow," Eiseley realizes that "in the world of spider" he does not 
exist. 
Like the orb spider, humankind too lives in a web; our vast 
world net spun of the twined silk of intellect and imagination 
extends "through the starry reaches of sidereal space, as well as 
backward into the dark realm of prehistory" (UU 53). Yet, like the 
orb spider, we live within the web we have spun and have no 
awareness of what may exist outside it, no sense of the vast fields of 
buffalo grass among whose few spears we have hung our own world 
web. In the very largest context, the very perception of "otherness" 
may be itself a manifestation of a limited vision. 
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In a smaller context, Eiseley considers, the otherness within, 
the world inside his own body, especially the white blood cells that 
are part of his "inner galaxy." The conscious"/" which to him seems 
the only sure reality has no significance to the rudimentary 
intelligence of the amoeboid phagocytes which live within his own 
blood vessels. To these white blood cells, the man who contains them 
must seem only "a kind of chemical web" which, like the spider's 
web, brings useful messages: " ... a natural environment seemingly 
immortal if they could have thought about it, since generations of 
them had lived and perished, and would continue to so live and die, 
in that odd fabric which contained my intelligence" (UU 50). Eiseley 
considers that to his essential phagocytes he is a vast, amorphous 
matrix of being whose end in space or time no short-lived white 
blood cell can imagine. Speculating thus, he begins to seem to 
himself as "a misty light ... floating and tenuous" as the Milky Way. 
Eiseley realizes that all creatures live in a universe fixed by their 
conceptual limits, but he also sees that we are all creatures "of many 
different dimensions passing through each other's lives like ghosts 
through doors" (UU 50. 
In the chapter of The Unexpected Universe called "The Inner 
Galaxy," Eiseley recalls a fall which caused a gash on his forehead. As 
he had watched the blood stream from the wound and puddle in a 
bright pool on the sidewalk, he felt a tremendous sorrow and 
contrition for his clumsiness because he realized that the red blood 
cells, phagocytes, and platlets, "all the crawling, living, independe-nt 
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wonder" that had been part of him "were dying like beached fish on 
the hot pavement" (UU 178). He says that he felt "a sensation of love 
on a cosmic scale" for these living cells and realized that the event 
was a catastrophe comparable to a sidereal galaxy "consciously 
suffering through the loss of its solar systems" (UU 178). 
Eiseley describes an episode when he and part of "the other" 
outs ide him became one, the boundaries between self and world 
dissolving. In his essay "The Flow of the River" from The Immense 
journey, Eiseley tells of his once in a lifetime escape of "the actual 
confines of the flesh"--his merging with time and space in a float 
down the prairie beginnings of the Platte River. Lying on his back in 
the Platte's shallow erratic streamlets which flow over channels that 
are partly the sand and gravel remains of "a mightier Ice Age stream 
bed," Eiseley experienced a "sort of curious absorption by water--the 
extension of shape by osmosis ... " (U 16). Drawn by "a great desire 
to stretch out and go with this gently insistent water," Eiseley 
overcame his traumatic memory of a near-drowning in childhood, his 
non-swimmer's fear, and his anxiety that the shallow river was 
"treacherous with holes and quicksand" and flowed through a lonely 
land that would offer no help to a man in trouble. Lying supine in 
the water with sky wheeling overhead, Eiseley drifted into the main 
channel with "the sensation of sliding down the vast tilted face of the 
continent" ( 19). His awareness heightened by the danger, Eiseley 
experienced a transcendent sense of oneness: 
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It was then that I felt the cold needles of the alpine springs at 
my fingertips, and the warmth of the Gulf pulling me 
southward. Moving with me, leaving its taste upon my mouth 
and spouting under me in dancing springs of sand, was the 
immense body of the continent itself, flowing like the river was 
flowing, grain by grain, mountain by mountain, down to the 
sea. I was streaming over ancient sea beds thrust aloit where 
giant reptiles had once sported; I was wearing down the face of 
time and trundling cloud-wreathed ranges into oblivion. I 
touched my margins with the delicacy of a crayfish's antennae, 
and felt great fishes glide about their work. (19) 
Mesmerized by the flow, Eiseley expresses a Whitmanesque sense of 
unity with the primal element, that '"indescribable and liquid brew'": 
I was streaming alive through the hot and working ferment of 
the sun, or oozing secretively through shady thickets. It was 
water and the unspeakable alchemies that gestate and take 
shape in water, the slimy jellies that under the enormous 
magnification of the sun writhe and whip upward as great 
barbeled fish mouths, or sink indistinctly back into the murk 
out of which they arose. (20). 
Eiseley recalls that Thoreau "in one of his moments of strange 
insight .. referred to an emerald pickerel in Walden Pond as 
""animalized water'"" (20). The mystical, oceanic sense of oneness 
could not last. When finally rising out of the water, Eiseley says that 
he felt ""the body's revolt against emergence ... its reluctance to 
break contact with the mother element.. ( 2 0). 
The Night Country: ""a shifting and unmapped domain of terrors"" 
Pascal believed that all men seek happiness but that we are 
"incapable of attaining the good by our own efforts." He also 
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believed that our craving and helplessness proclaim "that there was 
once in man a true happiness, of which all that now remains is the 
empty print and trace" (Pensees 75). With the sense of the happy 
place ever behind, human beings become travelers, wanderers 
looking for the lost Eden, or searchers, picking through the ruins of 
joy for the cause of its loss and a means of reconstituting a vaguely 
remembered happiness. Eiseley says that "[clontent is a word 
unknown to life; it also a word unknown to man" (lJ. 44). Life is 
characterized by a "magnificent and agelong groping ... among 
stones and the indifference of the entire inanimate universe" (lJ. 43). 
The compulsion to search, to move on, to become something new 
seems to be part of the nature of life itself: " ... one of life"s strangest 
qualities lis! its eternal dissatisfaction with what is, its persistent 
habit of reaching out into new environments and, by degrees, 
adapting itself to the most fantastic circumstances (lJ 37). 
Eliade believed that all of nature possesses an "unquenchable 
ontological thirst," a thirst for being, and that the hidden numinous 
becomes the object of "human search and desire and yearning." 
Eiseley describes the journey as embedded in our very flesh and 
bones, and he himself shares the restlessness of creation. He says 
that he is "at heart a voyager who, in this modern time, still yearns 
for the lost country of his birth" (1£ I). Eiseley chose for himself 
professions--anthropologist and essayist--that would allow him to 
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follow his natural inclination to be a seeker--to stir among the debris 
and fragments of past civilizations "irretrievably lost" and among the 
orts and shards of his own psyche, exploring what it means to be 
human. Watching his own hand carefully digging out the fossil skull 
of a long extinct cat, the paleontologist sees the human hand--itself 
evolved from "fin and scaly reptile foot and furry paw"--as an apt 
symbol of the long wandering happenstance of evolution that 
produced humans. Regarding that journey, he writes: 
Perhaps there is no meaning in it at all ... save that of 
journey itself, so far as men can see. It has altered with the 
chances of life, and the chances brought us here; but it was a 
good journey--long, perhaps-- but a good journey under a 
pleasant sun. Do not look for the purpose. Think of the way 
we came and be a little proud. Think of this hand--the utter 
pain of its first venture on the pebbly shore. 
Or consider its later wanderings. (lJ. 6-7) 
Though he has the sense that man is "slowly achieving powers over a 
new dimension" containing a wisdom he has barely begun to discern, 
Eisetey believes the journey to "the final secret" will continue to be 
"difficult, immense, at times impossible" and that no one in one 
lifetime can "see all that we would like to see or learn all that we 
hunger to know" (lJ. 12). 
Along with an abiding sense of mystery and the feeling of joy 
lost somewhere in the past, the themes of flight, evasion, and fear 
bordering on terror permeate Eiseley's writing. Eiseley always 
speaks of himself and his solitary adventures in autumnal light or in 
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the "night country." In his foreword to the volume of essays he 
entitled The Night Country, Eisetey says the material comes from "the 
wilderness of a single life" and that his "thoughts are all of night, of 
outer cold and inner darkness" (NC xi). Eiseley describes himself as a 
fugitive--" ... I am a fugitive. I was born one .... It is in the mind 
that the flight commences" --and calls his writing "the annals of a 
long and uncompleted running" (NC 4-5. xi). As a mythic wanderer, 
he claims to wear "the protective coloration of sedate citizenship" but 
insists that the "facts of my inner life are quite otherwise" and that 
his appearance of ordinariness is the "ruse of the fox" (NC 4). In the 
long course of time, he knows himself to be a transient: "There is a 
shadow on the wall before me. It is my own: the hour is late. I write 
in a hotel room at midnight. Tomorrow the shadow on the wall will 
be that of another" (NC xi). 
Eiseley confesses to be "a man with night fear." With age he 
came to realize that "the night tide," invisible and imperceptible, is 
"always there, swirling like a vapor just beyond the edge of the lamp 
at evening and similarly out to the ends of the universe" and inspires 
"a need to huddle in somewhere with a tight" (NC 32). With night, 
Eiseley says, a difference comes over things and creates terrifying 
possibilities--like discovering in the brief flare of a just-struck match 
the "pink, demoniac eyes" of a sewer rat. Yet, darkness also creates 
the possibility of marvelous illuminations, insights into the nature of 
things. Ever after witnessing as a young man his father's protracted 
and painful death, Eiseley suffered from insomnia-- "sporadic, 
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wearing, violent, and melancholic" --but he learned to make the best 
of what would have been otherwise an unbearable affliction. As an 
insomniac, a night-stalker, he searched for the "small things 
important to our lives !that] have no reporter except as he who does 
not sleep may observe them" (NC 172). He found it to be the 
occasional privilege of the unencumbered night-dweller to witness 
"some single episode !that! may turn the whole world for a moment 
into the place of marvel that it is, but that we grow too day-worn to 
accept" (NC 172). 
Eiseley remembers just such an illuminating experience--
conveniently accompanied by lightning, as his night-time gothic 
adventures often are. He had been walking in rolling hills and came 
to an escarpment overlooking a deep valley and town: 
... a flash of lightning off to the south ... lit for one blue, 
glistening instant a hundred miles of churning, shifting 
landscape. I have thought since that each stone, each tree, each 
ravine and crevice echoing and re-echoing with thunder tells 
us more at such an instant that any daytime vision of the road 
we travel. The flash hangs like an immortal magnification in 
the brain, and suddenly you know the kind of country you pass 
over, and the powers abroad in it. (NC 41-42) 
After his rehearsal of a night of eventful wandering in the dark of 
open country, Eiseley describes his attraction to the lights of a town 
lying in the valley below him: "They were the world I knew. The 
mind inside us is vaster than the world outside and I had been 
wrestling with its terrors for a long time now" (NC 42). A prophet 
come back from his time in the wilderness, Eiseley has a message: 
"Having journeyed once along the dark side of the planet, I am 
willing to testify that it is a shifting and unmapped domain of 
terrors" (NC 44). 
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Eiseley recalls an encounter with another illuminating night 
terror in an essay called "Strangeness in the Proportion." Against the 
background violence of an approaching thunderstorm in an area 
known for its bizzareness of fauna--human and insect--Eiseley says 
that he experienced a rare moment of night vision which came to 
him with a sear of lightning. Traveling alone and on foot, the young 
traveler had come to "a rural and obscure corner" putatively to 
search for "certain curious and rare insects that the place afforded--
beetles with armored excrescences, stick insects which changed their 
coloration like autumn grass" (NC 146). The place was known for 
human proportion as strange as that of the insects: "It was a country 
which, for equally odd and inbred reasons, was the domain of people 
of similar exuberance of character, as though nature, either 
physically or mentally, had prepared them for odd niches in a misfit 
world" (NC 146). 
Overtaken by the rain splatter and dark sky of an approaching 
storm, the "impressionable youth" stopped along a backwoods track 
to ask directions of the driver of a haywagon rumbling across a plank 
bridge toward him. Eiseley writes that "[tlhere happened then, in a 
single instant, one of those flamelit revelations which destroy the 
natural world forever and replace it with some searing inner vision 
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which accompanies us to the end of our lives" (NC 147). As the 
horses galloped toward him and the dark figure of the farmer 
"swayed high above them in some limbo of lightning and storm," 
everything seemed to pause, even the rain, as a bolt of lightning lit 
the scene. Horror-filled, the young Eiseley sees in the momentary 
flash "within the heart of the lightning, haloed, in fact, by its wet 
shine ... a human face of so incredible a nature as still to amaze and 
mystify me as to its origin": 
It was--by some fantastic biological exaggeration--two faces 
welded vertically together along the midline, like the riveted 
iron toys of my childhood. One side was lumpish with swollen 
and malign excrescences: the other shone in the blue light, pale, 
ethereal, and remote--a face marked by suffering, yet serene 
and alien to that visage with which it shared this dreadful 
mortal frame. (NC 147) 
Eiseley shrank back in horror from the visage half demon, half angel, 
but, just before the hayrick disappeared phantom-like into the dark, 
Eiseley saw the driver raise a hand to shield his disfigured face. 
Earlier in this essay, "Strangeness in the Proportion," in a 
paragraph that also begins with lightning flashes, Eiseley had alluded 
to Robert Louis Stevenson's assertion that each person contains "a 
group of incongruous and ofttimes conflicting citizenry"; Eiseley's 
subsequent description of the farmer's jekyll and Hyde physiognomy 
sounds like Stevenson's portrayal of the good Doctor jekyll whose 
science turns him into the brutish predator Hyde.7 The apparition 
symbolizes Eiseley's sense of the biform, if not multiform, nature of 
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human nature and the necessity to make the choices that will decide 
which aspect will dominate. Eiseley attributes to humans 
frightening possibilities and equally terrifying responsibilities. He 
says that we have learned to our sorrow that there is "more than one 
world to be drawn out of nature" (,N£ 134). Eiseley believes we 
must relearn the aesthetic precept articulated by Francis Bacon and 
later taken up Edgar Allan Poe: ""There is no Excellent Beauty that 
hath not some strangeness in the Proportion·" (qtd. in NC 148). 
Discerning a·strangeness equal to the beauty of human 
proportions, Eiseley believed man must confront "his otherness, the 
multiplicity of other possible men who dwell or might have dwelt in 
him" so that he can then realize "the full terror and responsibility of 
existence" (NC 148). Only then will we experience the anxiety that 
Heidegger describes as fear based on the fact that what threatens us 
is nowhere, the anxiety through which are manifest the possibilities 
of either an authentic or inauthentic existence. The grotesque figure 
driving the hayrick becomes symbolic of the human condition: 
Across that midnight landscape he rides with his toppling 
burden of despair and hope, bearing with him the beast"s face 
and the dream, but unable to cast off either or to believe in 
either. For he is man, the changeling, in whom the sense of 
goodness has not perished, nor an eye for some supernatural 
guidepost in the night" (N C 149). 
As Eiseley describes it, the human journey is a flight from a terror 
that cannot be escaped--the awareness that each of us contains 
within us one or more versions of both jekyll and Hyde. 
- ·-- -------
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For Eisetey, man himself is part of the universal and evolving 
mystery: "We must consider the possibility that we do not know the 
real nature of our kind" (IP 54). Heidegger said that Dasein is 
thrown into the world feeling orphaned and homeless, set apart by 
language to discover Being. Eiseley sees man as "[ulnlike the 
creatures who move within visible nature," more akin to "the 
changeling of medieval fairy tales" (NC 128). Estranged from "his 
earlier instinctive self," man has become "susceptible ... to unnatural 
desires" and "subject to indefinite departure" though his destination 
remains indecipherable (NC 129). "IM!arred, transitory, and 
imperfect," man is isolated in a terrifying aloneness, cut off from 
communication with other life forms. Eiseley finds "something 
unutterably secretive involved in man's intrusion into his second 
world, into the mutable domain of thought" (IP 150). The human 
journey has led man "part way into an intangible realm determined 
by his own dreams," and he lives in the presence of terrifying 
possibility: "He knows that every step he takes can lead him into 
some unexplored region from which he may never return" (NC 129-
t 30). 
Destabilized by too much flux and terrifying possibility, our 
order-seeking minds may try to find or create boundaries or impose 
patterns where they can, but Eiseley finds this human order to be "at 
least partially an illusion": "Ours, in reality, is the order of a time, 
and of an insignificant fraction of the cosmos, seen by the limited 
senses of a finite creature. Behind the appearances ... lurks being 
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unmanifest, whose range and number exceed the real" (.llil. 46). In a 
"farther stretch of the imagination," Eiseley wonders if somewhere 
"predictablility ceases and the unimaginable begins," and then he 
entertains the "heretical suspicion" that perhaps "our own little 
planetary fragment of the cosmos has all along concealed a mocking 
refusal to comply totally with human conceptions of order and secure 
prediction" (UU 31 ). The vast potential that hides behind the facade 
of creation exceeds our imaginations and is not susceptible to our 
control. 
Eliade describes the need of homo religiosus to create sacred 
space which gives access to the transcendent. Eiseley describes a 
complementary need for nontranscendent, nonterrifying space--a 
place of anchor in this world, a place where what-is can be known 
by the senses--touched, seen, smelled, heard, and tasted. In 
response to the dread or threat of otherness arises the need, a 
characteristic common to living things, to declare holy ground, a 
marked-off territory, a place of at-homeness: "We cling to a time 
and a plac~ because without them; man is lost, not only man but life" 
(NC 229). Like the field mouse which moved into Eiseley's apartment 
and tried to reconstruct under the fronds of a potted fern the 
"remembered field" of its original home (an empty lot become a 
building site), human beings need to set off in space/time a place of 
sanctuary which obscures our sense of the vastitude and 
impermanence of space and time. To Eiseley it seems that " ... all 
living creatures, and particularly the more intelligent, can survive 
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only by fixing or transforming a bit of time into space or by securing 
a bit of space with its objects immortalized and made permanent in 
time" (NC 229). 
Eiseley says that his own life was "passed in the shade of a 
nonexistent tree" (NC 234). As a boy, he had helped his father plant 
a cottonwood sapling behind a house in a little Nebraska town that 
was to be their permanent home; his father had promised the boy 
that their itinerant days were over and that they would care for the 
tree and grow old together sitting in its shade. The promise could 
not be kept, and Eiseley remembers his last watering of the tree the 
day they moved yet again. As a man, Eiseley returned to find the 
cottonwood tree that had grown in his imagination and had become a 
symbol for his father and the love they shared. He discovered that 
the tree had not survived though in his mind it had been part of his 
orientation in the universe. Eiseley says his attachment to the tree 
had been more than an animal's attachment to a place: "There was 
something else, the attachment of the spirit to a grouping of events 
in time; it was part of our mortality" (NC 235). 
Trying to create a place of symbolic permanence is a defensive 
strategy for dealing with the dread occasioned by a world of flux and 
uncertain meaning. A more agressive tactic is to undertake an active 
search for meaning or order, to assault mystery head on. Eiseley 
recounted his "first miracle" listening to a seashell as a kind of 
mythic occasion for his childhood fall out of nature into awareness of 
nature, and he told of his early seduction by "the places below" as 
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the mystical origin for his sense of an alluring yet terrifying mystery 
beneath the surface of life--in time as well as space. He also gives 
mythical, childhood beginnings to his lifelong, solitary attempts to 
probe mystery and understand the nature of things. One 
remini sence of a childhood adventure, the first of many journeys, 
takes on the tone of a parable, a fabulous paradigm in miniature of 
the subsequent searches of a lifetime. Eiseley remembers his 
childish fascination with the golden yellow wheels of the tea wagon 
which visited his neighborhood.8 Captivated by the idea of escaping 
the ordinary on this magical conveyence, the boy climbed 
surreptitiously on to the back step of the wagon and traveled for 
miles undetected by the driver. The journey--Eiseley calls it "the 
most marvelous I shall ever make in this life"--is magical and full of 
wonderment: "There was no flaw in my escape. The horse trotted 
with increasing speed over the cobbles, the wheels spun on either 
side of me in the sunshine .... Horseshoes rang and the whole bright 
world was one glitter of revolving gold" (N.C 8). Eiseley recalls "the 
pounding echo of the horse's hoofs over wooden bridges" and shafts 
of light on the green meadows as the sky grew cloudier. 
As the black clouds began "to boil and billow," the young boy 
realized that the tea wagon's destination was the bishop's house, a 
red granite edifice spoken of with awe by his elders; supposedly, 
only the baptised might pass inside of the black iron fence which 
surrounded the dwelling. The storm broke just as the wagon entered 
the grounds, and the boy darted off the back of the wagon and into a 
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hedge to hide: "The thunder from the clouds mingled with the 
hollow rolling of the wheels and the crash of the closing gates before 
me echoed through my frightened head with a kind of dreadful 
finality" (NC I 0). In the intermittent flashes of lightning Eiseley 
realized he was not alone. Unknowingly, he had joined hundreds of 
silent brown birds who, exhausted in their migration, had also sought 
shelter in the bishop's hedge. Eiseley says of the creatures with 
whom he shared the sanctuary, " ... they were immersed in a kind 
of waiting silence so secret and immense that I was much too 
overawed to disturb them" (NC I 0). Gradually the storm moved on, 
and since the tea wagon had "unaccountably vanished," Eiseley crept 
out of the hedge and began the long walk home accompanied by an 
"obscure sense of loss": "It was as though I had been on the verge of 
a great adventure into another world that had eluded me; the green 
light had passed away from the fields" (NC 1 O). 
Riding the fabulous tea wagon with golden wheels, Eiseley 
seemed to have come to the edge of a revelation, nearly to have 
stepped on holy ground, but then reality--the storm and his fear of 
being detected in a place he did not belong--intruded and the 
moment of possibility was lost. Or had he in fact participated in a 
kind of earthly holiness that went unrecognized? In the bishop's 
hedge, the boy and the birds, travelers bound by exhaustion and 
fear, shared for a time an Edenic harmony. In Notes of an Alchemist 
Eiseley includes a poem that pleads that God return all things to that 
bliss before creation where each may find the part of self that is 
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missing. He writes of "The Bats" that fly like human thoughts, "these 
are, and we ourselves may be, I fragments of the original creation" 
(lA 86). Shattered into being, the multiform fragments "fly I by 
shapes of thought or upon leathern wings to find I what's lost in each 
of us. "9 
A 11, all are part 
of a fractured theology that God implants 
within such brains as ours and leaves 
the question open how to salvage 
these bits and pieces of 
the natural world that is not natural 
but a queer event created 
in minds still queerer. (NOAA 87) 
The poet asks God to bring all things "back to what reigned before 
creation was": "Bring us then to where the heart of man may rest I 
before the torrent of the universal fall diverged its particles" (NOAA 
88). He pleads for the deathless unity of Eden: 
bring us to 
the uncreated Adam; 
bring us back 
beyond the light-years 
into the light that was 
before this curving light that never ceases 
upon itself to run, but above all 
bring us 
to where bats, leaves, and men no longer know themselves 
the solitary occupants of night 
but rather 
the tenants of a Garden that must be because 
minds of His mind conceived of it at though 
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they choose to call it universal myth, 
thus naming on the night what was 
before inception. (NOAA 88) 
Eiseley takes as evidence of the possibility of an Edenic, peacable 
kingdom the very fact that "minds of His mind conceived of it." In 
myth we tell ourselves that the thing we long for once was and that 
it may be yet again. We name "on the night what was before 
inception"--before the fall into being. As a man, Eiseley pleaded for 
what he had found briefly when a boy hiding in a hedge. 
Earlier in his reminisence of "The Gold Wheel," Eiseley had told 
of finding in the rubbish of a rich family's incinerator a small gold 
wheel--a toy cast-off from a child's construction set: "To me it 
represented all those things--perhaps in a dim way life itself--that 
are denied by poverty" (NC 7). Never able to find the second to 
make a pair, the boy kept the single gold wheel as a fetish, a 
reminder of his self-promise to run away one day on a pair of gold 
wheels. Later, when he was a young man, the gold wheel reappeared 
for a third time. He and two other young men in a stripped-down 
car were pursuing a buck through open country. Eiseley had the rifle 
but delayed shooting, hoping the buck would leap a ravine and 
disappear into safety. Suddenly, the buck did just that, but the 
pursuing car, its occupants unaware of the gulch till the last moment, 
slammed into the far side of the narrow ravine and wedged 
precariously in place. As his head snapped back and then flew 
forward to hit the dash, Eiseley saw a golden wheel rolling on the 
175 
prairie grass and heard again the rumble of the tea wagon over the 
cobbles and the clang of the bishop's iron gate as the storm 
thundered. He remembered hiding from the storm with the silent 
brown birds. Glad the buck had escaped, Eiseley identified with the 
fugitive pursuing some dream of life, driven to seek shelter and a 
hiding place from human and natural vicissitudes. Eiseley says that 
he realized that there are invisible lines, invisible walls separating 
life and death, and ·he perceived the ominous threat known to 
fugitives: " ... the lines were everywhere--a net running through 
one's brain as well as the outside world. Someday I would pass 
through the leaves into the open when I should have stayed under 
the hedge with the birds" (NC 12). Although he sensed that his safety 
was linked with that of other creatures, before his companions 
Eiseley maintained the pretense,' the ruse, and looked "all around the 
horizon like a hunter" (NC 12). 
One of the mysteries Eiseley uncovered in childhood was the 
presence of unexplainable evil. His boyhood memory of this 
discovery joins water and darkness and the cruel death of a giant 
turtle. The scene takes place at sunset with Eisetey "like a child 
following goblins home to their hill at nightfall" (NC 5). The goblins 
were older boys in rough clothes and sty worldly eyes, boys who. 
"knew where they came from and how to get back" (NC 5). They led 
the young Eiseley to Green Gulch-- "a huge pool in a sandstone basin, 
green and dark with the evening over it and the trees leaning 
secretly inward above the water" (NC 5). The boys played innocently 
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until one of them discovered "the spirit of the place, a huge old turtle 
asleep in the ferns" (NC 6). Then the horrified child watched as "'the 
last lord of the green water"' was pounded to death with stones. The 
goblins then turned their pack ferocity on the child who had 
witnessed their viciousness. When he was finally turned loose to 
follow the street lamps home, the young Eiseley moved "slowly from 
one spot of light to another, .. thinking the things a child thinks who 
has just discovered evil. Eiseley writes as a middle-aged man, "'I 
never forgot that moment .... I had discovered .... a monstrous and 
corroding knowledge" (NC 6). Thereafter, a much darker, terrified 
Alice, the boy Eiseley began "seeking for the loophole in the fern 
where the leaves swing shut behind [the fugitive]" (NC 5). This 
brutal, terrifying example of the human capacity for blind, 
destructive evil retells the mythical fall and becomes for Eiseley a 
harbinger of what our marauding species might inflict on the natural 
world. 
The Open-Ended Universe: "A ticket to wherever it is" 
Eiseley describes man as a mystery-- "an indecipherable 
palimpsest, a walking document initialed and obscured by the 
scrawled testimony of a hundred ages" (NC 59). His past, present, 
and future are "half-effaced signatures written across his features 
and into the very texture of his bones" (NC 59-60). Eiseley likened 
himself to an ancient Greek chresmologue, a dealer "in crumbling 
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parchments and uncertain prophecies." Such a one, says Eiseley, 
must be "alert to signs and portents in both the natural and human 
world" (NC 62). Seemingly trivial overheard conversations may be 
spoken by those unconscious of the significance of what they say. 
Such portentous words "may be spoken upon journeys, for it is then 
that man in the role of the stranger must constantly confront reality 
and decide his pathway" (NL 62). 
Eiseley claims to have overheard just such a cryptic message 
spoken by a ragged, emaciated derelict sleeping on a night train 
traveling between New York and Philadelphia. When awakened by 
the conductor demanding a ticket, the derelict with "a dead man's 
eyes" brought out a roll of bills and in a voice that "held the croak of 
a raven in a churchyard" asked, "'Give me ... a ticket to wherever it 
is'" (NC 63). Eiseley hears epitomized in the reply of "that 
cadaverous individual" the difference between modern time and 
Christian time and hears pronounced in the croaked request "the 
destination of the modern world .... In a single poignant expression 
this shabby creature on a midnight express train had personalized 
the terror of an open-ended universe" (NC 63). Asserting that he 
was "professionally qualified" to recognize an oracle and believing 
that "[g]ood propher,y is always given in riddles," Eiseley hears in the 
phrase "a ticket to wherever it is" a moral judgment: "No civilization 
professes openly to be unable to declare its destination. In an age 
like our own, however, there comes a time when individuals in 
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increasing numbers unconsciously seek direction and taste despair" 
(NC 64). 
In The Invisible Pyramid, Eiseley describes the human 
compulsion to escape various enclosures. The cosmic prison--vast 
sidereal space which shuts us in our own solar system with light-
year distances to anything beyond-- is subdivided into "an infinite 
number of unduplicable smaller prisons, the prisons of form" (IP 45). 
Man becomes a roamer looking for the way out of an endless series 
of Chinese boxes--language, genetics, senses, culture, cosmos. While 
form makes being possible, form also limits the possibilities of being. 
The mystery of life is locked inside individual skins: "To the day of 
our deaths we exist in an inner solitude that is linked to the nature 
of life itself" (IP 48). Despite loving attachments, Eiseley says that 
"loneliness ... is the price of all individual consciousness--the price 
of living" (1£ 48). In human beings, consciousness perceives itself as 
isolated even from the body it inhabits. The mind like a giant 
inhabits "the true cosmic prison," the body. But, Eiseley says, 
"li]nside has conquered outside": 
The giant confined in the body's prison roams at will among the 
stars. More rarely and more beautifully, perhaps, the profound 
mind in the close prison projects infinite love in a finite room. 
This is a crossing beside which light-years are meaningless. It 
is the solitary key to the prison that is man. (IP 49) 
The mind's eye, the imagination, can reach out and bind self 
and object through an enhanced, inclusive vision of the world. In 
Eiseley' s poem "Fly Falcon," the mind becomes--
the ever widening eye 
of the living world, the eye that someday 
will see all as one, the eye of the hurricane, 
the eye 
at the heart of the galaxy with the spinning 
arms of the suns about it. (AKA 40) 
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In "Fly Falcon" Eiseley says that his mind travels with the f:.k~n. !he 
Monarch butterfly, the gull, the night-tiger, and the albatross. 
Together, their staring, I iving eyes make the world real: 
We are all 
the terrible eye that sees the galaxy, 
we make it real. 
Without us multiplied, what really exists? 
Fly falcon, stare tiger in the night grass, 
stare that the universe may find itself living 
beyond the immortal fires.· (AKA 41) 
It is possible for consciousness to become the living witness 
testifying to creation, to become the bond that sees "all as one." 
However, contrasting the primitive with the modern view of 
. nature, Eiseley concludes that the experimental methods of science 
seem to have merely widened "the area of man's homelessness" (UU 
48). Eiseley describes in The Invisible Pvramid what Eliade called 
the desacralization of the cosmos. Primitive man had "projected a 
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friendly image upon animals," presuming that they talked among 
themselves, thought rationally, and even had souls. In some cases, 
totemic animals were even thought to have fathered man. Of that 
primitive relationship with nature, Eiseley says, "Man was still 
existing in close interdependence with his first world, though already 
he had developed a philosophy, a kind of oracular 'reading' of its 
nature" (IP 143). Primitive man was still "inside that world; he had 
not turned it into an instrument or a mere source of materials" 
(143). 
With Christianity's interest in the destiny of the individual soul 
arid the increase of urbanization, "man drew back from too great 
intimacy with the natural ... " (1£_143). The intellectual gain of "a 
monotheistic reign of law" prepared the way for the rise of modern 
science, but it destroyed the spirits of the natural world and made 
animals soulless and mute. Detached science began to view nature 
"as might a curious stranger": "Man, too, would be subject to what he 
had evoked; he, too, in a new fashion, would be relegated soulless to 
the wood with all his lurking irrationalities exposed. He would know 
in a new and more relentless fashion his relationship to the rest of 
life" (IP 144). In earlier cultures the entire environment occupied 
human attention; if parts of nature were not of practical use, they 
often became part of patterns that had magical efficacy. In the 
technological age, however, those aspects of nature which are not 
useful are simply thrust aside. In the primitive world, "[n]ature was 
sacred and contained powers which demanded careful propitiation. 
181 
Modern man, on the other hand, has come to look upon nature as a 
thing outside himself--an object to be manipulated or discarded at 
will" (IP 59). Eiseley believed that technology and its vocabulary 
have become the primary world, "the sacred center," for modern 
man. But he also believed we deceive ourselves. Human beings are 
not outside of nature; we are within nature and nature is within us. 
Carrithers, who describes Eiseley as a prophet speaking his jeremiad 
against the idol worship of scientific technology, notes that "lwlhen 
man affects to triumph over 'nature,' the vanquished must include 
himself, for good or ill" (Mumford, Tate .. Eiseley 203). 
Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington in his 1929 Swarthmore Lecture 
to the yearly meeting of the Society of Friends said that we can 
"understand the true spirit of neither science nor religion unless 
seeking is placed in the forefront" (Science and the Unseen World 
88). In human beings the compulsive reaching out characteristic of 
all life has had a peculiarly human manifestation--the desire for self-
transcendence. In The UnexP-ected Universe, Eiseley writes that man 
is a seeker, "at heart a listener and a searcher for some transcendent 
realm beyond himself" (illl. 55): "Stimulated by his own uncompleted 
nature, man seeks a greater role, restructured beyond nature like so 
much in his aspiring mind" (IP 146). Eiseley attributes this restless 
search foi completion to a feeling that man's life is "unreal and 
sterile" and speculates that alienatinn from his world is perhaps the 
inevitable fate of "a creature of so much ingenuity and deep 
memory" (IP 147). The only remedy Eiseley sees is an 
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"enlightenment of spirit" which would include "some ability to have a 
perceptive rather than an exploitive relationship with his fellow 
creatures" (IP 147)--to have what Buber called an 1-Thou rather than 
an 1- It relationship with the cosmos and all it contains. 
One such an enlightenment of spirit had occurred in the first 
millennium B.C. with the mysterious intellectual transformation that 
the philosopher Karl jaspers called the "axial age" because all history 
seems to revolve around it as on an axis (Barnes, In the Presence of 
Mystery 46). This axial period saw the great centers of civilization 
(China, India, judea, Greece) abandon the old, inherited gods and 
purely tribal loyalties. Under the influence of transcendent thinkers 
(Christ, Buddha, Lao-tse, Confucius) these civilizations developed 
transcendent values and "created the world of universal thought that 
is our most precious human heritage" (I£ 147). The emphases of the 
axial age were on respect for the dignity of the common man, on 
rejection of material goals and earthly power, and on a transcendent 
divinity or force that enfolded all of creation. The nearly 
simultaneous origins and the power of the axial religions remains 
mysterious: "No one can clearly determine why these prophets had 
such profound effects within the time at their disposal. Nor can we 
solve the mystery of how they came into existence across the Euro-
Asiatic land mass in diverse cultures at roughly the same time" (IP 
148). Eiseley says that "the human ethic of the individual prophets 
and thinkers has outlasted empires" and that tormented man still 
pursues their dreams of charity and humility and nobleness today 
(IP 148). He describes the axial thinkers as the discoverers, if not 
the creators, of the soul (IP 155).10 
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However, Eiseley believed that the scientific age has replaced 
the axial religions as the dominant power in the human imagination 
and that we are in the process of substituting science for the old 
gods. Although we still live in "the inspirational light" of the axial 
transformation of thought, for human beings the emphasis has 
changed: "The axial religions had sought to persuade man to 
transcend his own nature; they had pictured to him limitless 
perspectives of self-mastery. By contrast, science in our time seems 
to offer to man the prospect of limitless power over exterior nature" 
(IP 152). This will to dominance over the natural world has le·d us to 
take for granted the earth-- "an incredibly precious planetary jewel" 
(IP 152). Eiseley says that we must come to recognize that we share 
a common journey in space with all of life: "'We are all of us--man, 
beast, and growing plant--aboard a space ship of limited dimensions 
whose journey began so long ago ... " (IP 15 3). 
The lnvisib le Pyramid: "to understand life man must learn to 
shudder" 
Given our multiform, mysterious, sometimes nefarious natures, 
Eiseley feared that even some of our scientific searches may be 
prompted by motives we ourselves do not understand. Darkly, he 
speculates that man may be driven to bursting forth into space 
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exploration by an impulsion similar to that which motivates slime 
molds to disseminate spores--by "some incalculable and ancient urge 
... hidden beneath the seeming rationality of institutionali2ed 
science " (IP 54). Among the things we do not know are our own 
possibilities. Eiseley says that the "whole of time and history" attest 
that we do not know what is possible or what is impossible. Eiseley 
considers the possibility that humans may be one of a number of 
"diabolically ingenious" parasites--instruments "for the transference, 
ultimately, of a more invulnerable and heartless version" of 
ourselves (IP 55). Speculating on his own motive for rescuing a lone 
milkweed seed from a concrete city that offered it no possibility of 
life, Eiseley says that he may have simply felt empathy for a fellow-
traveler or that he wished for something green to survive the world-
eating metropolis. Whatever his motivation, the gesture allows him 
to believe that "something is still undetermined in the human 
psyche" and that our choices will contribute to determining what 
human nature is to be (~56). 
Eiseley's awed celebration in The Immense jour:ney of the 
bursting forth of angiosperms, the seed-bearing plants that one 
hundred million years ago changed the coloration and the floral and 
faunal life of the planet, is a paean to the life force driving 
evolutionary change. In The Invisible Pyramid the hidden but 
insistent urge of life to reach out takes on a sinister tone. Reflecting 
on the human urge to travel and explore as it was being manifested 
in the early enthusiasm for space probes, Eiseley describes a 
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botanical an tic ipation of human rocketry-- Pilo!Jolus, a spore-
shooting fungus (IP 75). Growing upon cattle dung, Pilo!Jo/us fulfills 
its life cycle by firing a spore-containing capsule several feet away 
where, with luck, the spore will land on vegetation that will then be 
eaten by grazing animals. Eiseley says that the spore tower which 
launches the capsule is one of nature's remarkable evolutionary 
adaptations. A light-sensitive "eye" cell beneath the spore capsule 
directs its growth toward the area of greatest light, and, after 
chemically building sufficient launch pressure, fires the capsule in 
the direction that offers it the best chance to adhere itself to 
vegetation and be eaten by herbivores, thereby perpetuating its 
species. 
Eiseley finds a parallel between the Pilo!Jo/us · space launch 
and "man's latest adventure": "Man, too, is a spore bearer. The labor 
of mill ions and the consumption of vast stores of energy are 
necessary to hurl just a few individuals ... on the road toward 
another planet" (IP 76). Eiseley observes that both Pi/o!Jo/us and 
Homo sapiens have evolved out of the same process: "Somehow in 
the my·sterium behind genetics, the tiny pigmented eye and the 
rocket capsule were evolved together" (76). Eiseley grimly 
speculates that there may be growing within the collective human 
psyche an unconscious contingency plan for launching rockets 
bearing human spores toward potential life-giving homes in space, 
when we as a "planet virus" have defiled and exhausted the earth so 
that it can no longer sustain our species. Eiseley finds--
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... a certain grandeur ... in the thought of man in some far 
future hour battling aga!nst oblivion by launching a final spore 
flight of cyborgs through the galaxy--a haven-seeking flight 
projected by those doomed never to know its success or failure, 
a flight such as life itself has always engaged in since it arose 
from the primeval waters. (.1£ 81) 
Man has been from the beginning part of "that torrential living river, 
which ... has instinctively known the value of dispersion" and "will 
yearn to spread beyond the planet he now threatens to devour" (81). 
But, despite the "certain grandeur" in an attempt by a desperate 
species trying to avoid its earned destruction, Eiseley says that man 
will find no peace in "cyborgs and exosomatic evolution." Eiseley 
says that the only road to human transcendence is to make "in one· s 
soul a road to the future" and he warns that " ... the spaces within 
stretch as far as those without" (.If 82). 
Eiseley, who had greatly admired the voyages of discovery by 
Odysseus, Captain Cook, and Darwin, came to see space flight as a 
futile and wasteful act of hubris that encouraged contempt for earth. 
Writing of what Oswald Spengler in The Decline of the West called 
"the Faustian culture," Eiseley suggests over-reaching human 
aspirations may have had their beginning "as early as the eleventh 
century with the growing addiction to great unfillable cathedrals, 
with huge nave and misty recesses where space seemed to hover 
without limits" (IP 84). He saw hidden within the tensions of the 
Gothic arch "the upward surge of the space rocket" (84). For people 
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tormented by the "infinite solitude" of the individual soul and 
hungering for forbidden knowledge, the Faust legend came to 
epitomize Western culture. In Christian symbology, the search 
became the Quest for the Holy Grail (IP 85). Eiseley speculates that 
roots of science began in the Gothic zeitgeist: 
It well may be that the new world, which began amidst time-
tolling bells and the stained glass and dim interiors of Gothic 
cathedrals, laid an enchantment upon the people of Western 
Europe that provided at least a portion of the seed bed for the 
later rise of science .... In its highest moments, science could 
also be said, not irreverently, to be a search for the Holy Grail. 
(IP 85) 
In fact, science demands "great sacrifice, persistence of purpose 
across the generations, and an almost religious devotion" (IP 87; 
emphasis added). Eiseley describes the enormous investment of 
resources and intellectual energy in the pursuit of space exploration 
as "a public sacrifice equivalent in terms of relative wealth to the 
building of the Great Pyramid at Giza almost five thousand years ago" 
(IP 87). He says that modern science is instead constructing an 
invisible P}'Tamid Eiseley concludes that man's attempts to journey 
into space may simply be another manifestation of "life engaged once 
more on an old journey" with the "supreme objective" hidden from 
the partie ipants by secretive nature. Eiseley speculates that " ... an 
invisible pyramid lies at the heart of every civilization man has 
created, that for every visible brick or corbeled vault or upthrust 
skyscraper or giant rocket we bear a burden in the mind to excess, 
that we have a biological urge to comp tete what is actually 
uncompletable" (IP 132). 
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Looking back on other civilizations of great technical or 
scientific accomplishment (like the pyramid-building Egyptian or the 
time-calculating Mayan), Eiseley sees a common flaw: "Too often 
they grow like a malignancy, in one direction only" (IP 132). In a 
clearing slashed in the 1i ttle remaining woodland near his suburban 
home, Eiseley saw reality unmasked behind the thin stand of trees 
which had hidden the depradation of the "green world." With the 
revelation, he has a presentiment of the self-inflicted demise of a 
civilization of "world-eaters": 
The clearing was artificial, a swath slashed by instruments of 
war through the center of the wood. Shorn trees toppled by 
bulldozers lay beneath the snow. Piles of rusted machinery 
were cast indiscriminately among the fallen trees. I came 
forward, groping like the last man out of a shell hole in some 
giant, unseen conflict. Iron, rust timbers--the place was like 
the graveyard of an unseen, incessant war. (IP 130) 
Eiseley sees in "the midnight clearing and its hidden refuse of fallen 
trunks and cogwheels .... the pyramid that our particular culture 
was in the process of creating" (IP 133). Like a slime mold, we are 
feeding on a world of finite resources, consuming voraciously what 
never can be duplicated. Eiseley believes that our invisible pyramid 
wi 11 destroy us because the planet cannot "long sustain this tottering 
pyramid thrust upward from what had once been the soil of a 
consumed forest" (IP 133). Remembering the words from 
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Christopher Marlowe's retelling of the Faust legend-- "Thou art still 
but Faustus I and a man" --Eiseley fears that our humanity, driving 
us to be world eaters and knowledge seekers may be "a well-nigh 
fatal flaw" (IP 134). 
Eiseley prophesied against this dark side of science. For many 
people science had replaced "primitive magic as the solution for all 
human problems" (IP 90). Unfortunately, science shares a flaw 
which is part of the nature of the universe: Science can solve 
problems, but it also creates problems. Science has solved many 
mysteries and discovered many others. Science has the potential for 
changing the world as we perceive it: "The skills expended now upon 
space may in the end alter our philosophies and rewrite out dreams, 
even our very concepts of the nature of life--if there is life--beyond 
us in the void" (.1£ 93). Science also has the potential for providing 
us with the means of destroying life on our own planet. Eiseley 
remembers that the zero was "invented twice in the mists of 
prehistory," once by an unknown Hindu mathematical genius and 
once by a unknown Mayan mathematical genius. The zero which ties 
at the root of all complicated math "is not a 'thing. Rather, it is a 'no 
thing,· a 'nothing"' (IP 86). Yet this nothing is essential to the 
computer circuitry which guides a rocket on its path to Mars. Eiseley 
notes the ironic duality of the discovery of the concept of zero by "an 
unknown mathematical genius seeking pure abstract understanding" 
(IP 86). Each of the time-lost discoverers of the zero was "a 
necessary prehistoric prelude to the success of the computer" and 
190 
"the possible indirect creator of world disaster in the shape of atomic 
war" (IP 86-87). Humanity, like the farmer with the face of an angel 
and a demon, has a dual (or multiform) nature and has unleashed 
forces over which we have only tenuous control. 
Human history contains the remnants of the Faustian 
aspirations of other civilizations long lost along with their dreams: 
Around the globe, more than one such society of clever artisans 
has arisen and placed its stamp, the order of its style, upon 
surrounding objects, only to lapse again into the night of time. 
Each was self-contained. Each, with the limited amount of 
wealth and energy at its disposal, placed its greatest emphasis 
upon some human dream, some lost philosophy, some inner 
drive beyond the satisfaction of the needs of the body. Each, in 
turn, vanished. (IP 91) 
Remembering that "an old tale" teaches that "to understand life man 
must learn to shudder," Eiseley oberves that "lt]his century seems 
doomed to master the lesson" (IP 9 2). 
The "intensely aggressive" personality of Western civilization 
has evolved a scientific society whose "constant expectations" are 
future-directed, away from an unsatisfactory present toward 
"progress" and an elusive Utopia. Unfortunately, Eiseley finds that 
"li]n the endless pursuit of the future we have ended by engaging to 
destroy the present" (JP 105). We have invested more in moon 
voyages that in solving "the moral problems of a distraught, 
unenlightened, and confused humanity" and are therefore left 
"wandering in the infinitude of space and time" while at the same 
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time "trapped in a world of darkening shadows ... " (IP 1 07). 
Eiseley warns that man "has yet to prove that he can master the 
powers he has summoned up" ( 1 09). Eiseley saw the inventions of 
science as examples of the continuing search for transcendence: 
Man's urge toward transcendence manifests itself even in his 
outward inventions. However crudely conceived, his rockets, 
his cyborgs, are intended to leap some void, some recently 
discovered chasm before him, even as long ago he cunningly 
devised language to reach across the light-year distances 
between individual minds. (IP 125) 
Eiseley feared, however, that man may forget the message of 
curiosity and hope that started him on his journey toward 
transcendence and may fail to sanctify his own being (IP 127). In 
The Firmament of Time he wrote: ''Man's quest for certainty is, in 
the last analysis, a quest for meaning. But the meaning lies buried 
within himself rather than in the void he has vainly searched for 
portents since antiquity" (FOT 179). 
The Paradox of Return: "the spell of a greater and a green 
enchantment" 
Eiseley offers an apocalyptic view of the human mind. He finds 
"'something unutterably secretive involved in man's intrusion ... into 
the mutable domain of thought," and he sees in the collective human 
brain a "'unique and spreading force" which will either "'precipitate 
the last miracle, or ... wreak the last disaster" (IP 150, 137). He 
says the nature of that potential "last disaster" has become all too 
evident: "man has become a spreading blight which threatens to 
efface the green world that created him" (IP 137). To avoid 
destroying the natural world that has made him, Eiseley believes 
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that man must journey back to the green world of his beginning. The 
"last miracle" requires that man, "the relatively unthinking and 
proud creator of the second world--the world of culture," must 
"revivify and restore the first world which cherished and brought 
him into being"; he must reenter nature (IP 137). Whatever the 
magic powers of his mind, man "lies under the spell of a greater and 
a green enchantment ... the spell of the natural world from which he 
sprang" (IP 140). 
What is increasingly required, Eiseley believes, is that man 
"pursue the paradox of return"; he must find his way back to a 
harmony with the natural world. Eiseley establishes the motif of 
eternal return, of homing, with a short and probably apocryphal 
vignette at the very outset of The Invisible Pvramid.ll In the first 
chapter, called "The Star Dragon," Eiseley tells of what he calls one of 
his earliest and most cherished memories--being taken as a four-
year-old child out "under the cottonwoods of a cold and leafless 
spring to see the hurling emissary of the void," the 1910 passing of 
Halley's comet. His father asks the small boy's promise that he will 
remember the midnight spectacle and look for it again in seventy-
. five years when the father himself "will be gone": '"I will be gone, 
but you will see it. All that time it will be traveling in the dark, but 
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somewhere, far out there'--he swept a hand toward the blue horizon 
of the plains--· it will turn back. It is running glittering through 
millions of miles'" (IP 7). Years later, recalling his childish promise 
given "out of love for a sad man who clung to me as I to him" (IP 8), 
Eiseley anticipates the comet's return. Man is like the comet-- "both 
bound and free. Throughout the human generations the star has 
always turned homeward" (IP 155-156). Now, Eiseley believes, man 
himself must turn homeward and honor the green world from which 
he came. He must find some accommodation and make out of the 
first world of nature and the second world of culture a third world 
which honors both his need for transcendence and the imperative to 
preserve the world which grew a creature that could seek self-
transcendence. 
He must now incorporate from the wisdom of the axial thinkers 
an ethic not alone directed toward his fellows, but extended to 
the living world around him. He must make, by way of his 
cultural world, an actual conscious reentry into the sunflower 
forest he had thought merely to exploit or abandon. (IP 155). 
Eiseley says man must perfor·m one last magic: "He must seek his 
own way home" (IP 155). 
Yet Eiseley also perceives in man an "inner flight syndrome," a 
fear of and resistance to return. His desperate emergence from fen 
and thicket by the magical act of thought makes man uneasy, 
questioning his right to have left the world of nature for the world of 
mind. Eiseley describes a vague, spirit-demon from our prehistoric 
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past haunting our subconscious: out of the marshes "ls!omething 
unseen has come along with each of us" and is the price we pay for 
"bringing almost the same body through two worlds." Auden, who 
was an admirer of Eiseley and dedicated a poem to him, made a 
"slight criticism" of his style, complaining that occasionally Eiseley 
would write a '"woozy"' sentence, "too dependent upon some private 
symbolism of his own to be altogether comprehensible to others" 
("Concerning the Unpredictable" 118). Waxing mystical, Eiseley also 
gets woozy and vague, declaring that "lwlritten deep in the human 
subconscious is a simple terror of what has come with us from the 
forest and sometimes haunts our dreams" (IP 15 0 ). Man, therefore, 
fears retracing his steps "down to the margin of the reeds," the 
garden world of nature from which he came, because he may be "by 
some magic ... permanently recaptured" (IP 150 ). Eiseley says that 
the "curious sorcery of sound symbols and written hieroglyphs in 
man's new brain had to be made to lure him farther and farther 
from the swaying reeds" (IP 151). The crossing from the world of 
nature into the world of mind condemns man to be a wanderer: "A 
creature who has once passed from visible nature into the ghostly 
insubstantial world evolved and projected from his own mind will 
never cease to pursue thereafter the worlds beyond this world" (IP 
151 ). Even so, the aspirations of space travel compel man to 
"contemplate with renewed intensity" the ancient world of the body 
he is "doomed to inhabit, the body that completes his cosmic prison" 
(IP 151). 
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For Eiseley, life is a search conducted under both skies, the 
inner as well as the outer: "Every man contains within himself a 
ghost continent" that awaits his wary exploration and each man, like 
Odysseus, seeks his spiritual home but is denied it (UU 3-4). The 
"shape-shifting immortal monsters" told of by Homer in the Odyssey 
assume "more sophisticated guises" in later time, but "they survive 
because man himself remains and man has called them forth" (UU 4). 
As the Odyssey is a journey of outward adventure and inward 
reflection, Eisley sees--
[in] the epic journey of modern science ... a story at once of 
tremendous achievement, loneliness, and terror. Odysseus' 
passage throught the haunted waters of the eastern 
Mediterranean symbolizes, at the start of the Western 
intellectual tradition, the sufferings that the universe and his 
own nature impose upon homeward-yearning man. (UU 4) 
Twentieth century man has a "thirst for illimitable knowledge" which 
conflicts with his "search for serenity obtainable nowhere upon 
earth" (UU 5). The thirst for knowledge and the insatiable hunger for 
power have become the Sirens' songs of the modern era. Eiseley 
finds in Circe's observation to Odysseus that "'There is a mind in you 
no magic will work on'" both a compliment on the dawning of 
scientific intelligence among the Greeks and the enchantress' veiled 
warning that hubris is its own spell and can des troy man on the 
rocks of his own over-reaching and misguided imagination. 
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In Darwin's voyage to the Encantadas, Eiseley saw a renactment 
of Circe's transformation of Odysseus' crew to pigs. Darwin's journey 
"into the bottomless sea of time" led him to discover "a power hidden 
in time and isolation that alone could transmute, not just men, but all 
things living into wavering shadows" (UU 15). The myth of Circe 
anticipated the science of evolution: "The Encantadas are the means 
by which the whole Circean labyrinth of organic change was 
precipitated upon the mind of man. What had appeared to Odysseus 
as the trick of a goddess was, in actuality, the shape shifting of the 
incomprehensible universe itself" (UU 15). Eiseley lamented that 
"we are destined to know the dark beyond the stars before we 
comprehend the nature of our journey," and he knew that the way to 
wisdom was past the reef of Sirens who sang only of knowledge (UU 
25). 
Eiseley feared the barren knowledge that comes without 
sympathetic perception, and dreaded that the "scientific priesthood" 
might become a dark force like the peripatetic earth goddess of 
primitive Scandinavia whose worship required, in each village 
visited by her oxen-drawn tabernacle, a human sacrifice drowned in 
the bog. He feared " ... that behind the concealing drapery, hooded 
in a faceless cowl, there is caught only the swirling vapor of an 
untamed void whose vassals we are--we who fancy ourselves as the 
priesthood of powers safely contained and to be exhibited as 
evidences of our own usurping godhood" (UU 20 ). 
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Eiseley's writing is a mixture of awe and reverence-- love for 
"the queer I twist of a narwhal's tusk, stag beetles' horns, I a white 
owl from some tundra flown away" (lA 39)--and a piercing sadness 
for all this beauty and wonder that cannot last, compounded by a 
growing dread of humankind's participation in the accelerated 
destruction of the natural world. In "Beau," his elegy for a huge 
black poodle, Eiseley sums up what he has learned of life: "I am no 
philosopher. I merely know I everything good has an end" (AKA 
43). His essays and poems are imbued with the sense of a world 
eternally in process and of humans as a precocious species, gifted 
with extraordinary capacities but Hawed by our one great strength. 
We humans, "a tough ill-mannered beast, outthinking all the rest" 
managed to survive the ice that eliminated so many other species, 
but "ltlhere's just one thing: whatever made us never taught I how 
to outthink ourselves" (AKA. "Why Does the Cold So Haunt Us?" 78). 
Like the saber-toothed tiger, we are flawed by our special gift, 
our uniqueness. In his poem "The Innocent Assassins," Eiseley 
remembers the discovery "in the sun-fierce badlands" of the remains 
of one of those ancient cats "far down in all those cellars of dead 
time." Forty million years before, the cat had died "no ordinary 
death": 
Deep-driven to the root a fractured scapula 
hung on the mighty saber undetached; two beasts 
had died in mortal combat, for the bone 
had never been released .... (!A. 79) 
----------
An attentive, "little silent group" of diggers had squatted over the 
f ass i 1 ized evidence of prehistoric violence. 
What was it made the mystery there? We dug 
until the full length of the striking saber showed 
beautiful as Toledo steel, the fine serrations still 
present along the blade, a masterpiece of murderous art 
conceived 
by those same forces that heaved mountains up 
from the flat bottoms of Cretaceous seas. (lA 79) 
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"[P]erfect as yesterday," the eat's "marvelous weapon" had been its 
cause of death--"the eat's sheer leap wrenched with his killing skill/ 
his very self from life" (81 ). The cat had died with its saber tooth 
trapped in the shoulder blade of its victim. Thousands of years later, 
a creature of awe would find the remains and memorialize the 
violent irony of its death. In another poem Eiseley mourns that 
"when we vanish I no one will tell stories about our cleverness." He 
fears a planetary destruction so complete that no creature of 
curiosity and memory and the skill to perfect those traits would 
survive to discover and understand our remains. He fears that "In 
the Tales to Come," we, the "[l]lovers of form ... will be formless" 
.(AKA 38). 
In The Night Country:, Eiseley declared in plaintive hope, 
"Amidst so many journeys somebody is bound to come out all right. 
Somebody" (228). Later, in his autobiography All the Strange Hours, 
Eiseley stated flatly, "Life is a journey and eventually a death" (50). 
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Lawrence I. Berkove, in his essay "Refuge in the Valley of Dry Bones: 
Loren Eiseley's Accommodation to Death," finds Eiseley's writing 
moving from a celebratory affirmation of the Life Force to a 
profound melancholy expressed in "a steady drift toward pessimism," 
sentimentality, and, finally, nihilism. From the celebration of The 
Immense journey, to the ambivalence of The Night Country, to the 
search fo hope in The Man Who Saw Through Time, to the slide 
toward pessimism in "Thoreau's Vision of the Natural World," to the 
bleakness in his autobiography All the Strange Hours and the dark 
sentimentality of his novel fragment "The Snow Wolf"--Berkove says 
that Eiseley eventually "lost most of his hope for the human race" 
and, in the end, "extinction was the only escape he could ultimately 
find from the merciless process of evolution at work" (87-88) and 
what Emerson called "'the virulence that still remains uncured in the 
universe"' (ST 214). Berkove finds Eiseley "emotionally oppressed" 
and finally dominated by his melancholy: "His literary talents never 
diminished, but his ability to balance the scientific and imaginative 
parts of his mind did" (95). He says that the "sad truth" of Eiseley is 
that "nature lost its mystery for him and he abandoned hope and 
became thanatocentric" (95). Toward the end of his life, when 
Eiseley became detached from direct involvement in science and 
from close contact with the natural world, he turned even more to 
the melancholy that had always haunted him. The aging prophet, 
who had legitimate criticisms to make of the uses of science and 
reasonable questions to ask about the expenditure of public 
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resources on space flight, spoke in generalities about the green world 
and the paradox of return, but his vision had lost its hope. 
Wilbur: "By rooted hunger wrung" 
Wilbur considers all poetry to be "essentially religious in its 
direction": 
... I think that all poets are sending religious messages 
because poetry is, in such great part, the comparison of one 
thing to another; or the saying, as in metaphor, the one thing is 
another. And to insist, as all poets do, that all things are 
related to each other, comparable to each other, is to go toward 
making an assertion of the unity of all things." 
(qtd. in Pate. "An Interview" 66) 
According to Wilbur, poetry, even poetry written by poets not 
consciously religious, "makes order and asserts relations (sometimes 
of a surprising kind), out of a confidence in ultimate order and 
relatedness" (qtd. in Pate, "An Interview" 67). In his essay 
"Sumptuous Destitution," he says of Emily Dickinson that even though 
she made it impossible for herself to share the religious life of her 
community, "hers was a species of religious personality" and she 
became "an unsteady congregation of one" (6). In "The Present State 
of Whitman," Wilbur sees Whitman not simply as the poet of 
democracy and the common man but also as a religious poet: "His 
political and social attitudes are not primary, but are based on a 
mystic sense of the divinity of the individual soul" ( 1 SO). He 
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attributes Whitman's power as a religious poet to his mystical 
inclusiveness: "He will not scorn the material, the physical, the 
urban, the vernacular, the particular and everyday. He leaves 
nothing out" ( 150). Referring to Robert Frost's "The Gum-Gatherer" 
and the poems which precede and follow it in the Selected Poems 
("After Apple Picking," "Birches," and "The Mountain"), Wilbur writes 
that "all the poems in question are concerned with spiritual activity 
(religion, the bestowal of love, the writing of poems), and with 
balancing the claims of earth and heaven" ("On Robert Frost's 'The 
Gum-Gatherer"' 186). In his own poem "Walking to Sleep," Wilbur 
has the speaker warn his insomniac listener, "Try to remember this: 
what you project I Is what you witt perceive" (Poems 158). What 
Wilbur has perceived as religious in the poetry of Dickinson, 
Whitman, and Frost is what he has projected in his own. 
In his poem "Water Walker," Wilbur finds in the lifecycle of 
caddis flies a metaphor for the human predicament of being pulled 
between this sensory world and the intuition of some world beyond 
the senses. Treading "on spring-surface," the small, moth-like flies 
are, in their adult stage, "water walkers who breathe I Air and know 
water ... " (Poems 338). The larvae grow from eggs laid after the 
adults spend "lightly some hours in air," then drop to the "water-top . 
. . I Floating their heirs and dying" (Poems 338). These "[l]ives that 
the caddis fly lays I Twixt air and water, must lie I Long under 
water" (Poems 340-341). The larva live immersed in the element, 
--- "" _____ "_ 
each hermiting itself inside a cave of silk plastered on the outside 
with fine gravel or bits of wood or straw: 
Armored the larva rests 
Dreaming the streambottom tides, 
Writhing at times to respire, and 
Sealing to him flat stones, 
He closely abides, abides .... (Poems 339) 
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Of the mature caddis fly, the poet writes "There is something they 
mean I By breaking from water and flying ... " (Poems 338). For the 
brief time of its mating flight, the caddis fly lives between worlds: 
Still pear led with water, to be 
Ravished by air makes him grow 
Stranger to both, and dis cover 
Heaven and hell in the poise 
Betwixt 'inhabit' and 'know' ... 
(Poems 340) 
With minds that allow us to fly beyond our native element in time 
and space, we human beings also "discover I Heaven and hell in the 
poise I Betwixt 'inhabit' and 'know."' We, too, become strangers and 
wanderers caught between wort ds. 
In the last two verses of "Waterwalker," the poet turns to ask 
himself if he can find the holy among the flotsam of life, if he can 
walk to "the point where air I Mists into water" and know "Both, 
with his breath, to be real" (Poems 338). Holding in his head 
-~ - --~--~----
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"Maine's bit speech, lithe laughter of Mobile blacks, I Opinions of 
salesmen, ripe tones of priests, I Plaints of the bought and sold," the 
poet wonders if he, like the caddisworm, can "rest and observe 
unfold" all the happenstance and spectacle of life--
. . . watch and wait 
And praise 
The spirit and not the cause, and neatly precipitate 
What is not doctrine, what is not bound 
To enclosured ground; what stays? (Poems 340) 
He longs to discover-- "to neatly precipitate" the solute out of its 
watery solvent--the spiritual substance that cannot be contained in 
solidified doctrine and cannot be bound to holy ground but instead 
makes all ground holy. He seeks the numinous--what Otto called the 
real innermost core of religion. He longs for "what stays." 
But he who lives between two worlds learns "lh]ow hid the 
trick is of justice." Like the adult caddis fly which cannot return to 
the water once it quits the larval form nor escape life on the surface 
of its mother element, the poet "cannot go home, nor can leave" 
(Poems 341 ). He can neither live entirely in the world of solid 
objects nor escape into the imagination or spirit; he lives on the edge, 
on the surface tension between the immanent and the transcendent, 
longing for both. 
But the dilemma, cherished, tyrannical, 
While he despairs and burns 
-------------
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Da capo da capo returns. (Poems 341) 
Water-walking, ~kimming between two worlds, is a cherished 
dilemma because the waterwalker burns with not just despair, but 
with delight and desire as well. His longing teaches him that there is 
perhaps something to be longed for, something not bound to 
enclosured ground; his longing teaches him of the possiblity of 
something that is not kept but something that sta.vs. 
Wilbur recognizes, however, the danger in the spirit's pull 
between the immanent and the transcendent. He perceives that the 
"unquenchable ontological thirst" described by Eliade can become 
perverted, leading him away from the munificence of Being to the 
arid images of the mind, detached from this world. Wilbur describes 
in "Grasse: The Olive Trees" a South where "luxury's the common lot" 
and the soil around "rain-pocked rocks" is "rusty bright I From too 
much wealth of water" and "all is full/ Of heat and juice and a heavy 
jammed excess." This "whole South swells I To a soft rigor" except 
for one element in the landscape: "Only the olive contradicts." The 
poet's eye "arrests I And rests from plenitude where olives lie I Like 
clouds of doubt ... " (Poems 304 ). The sunlight which elsewhere lies 
"like yellow wool" is divested of "its color and its sway" by the olives: 
Not that the olive spurns the sun; its leaves 
Scatter and point to every part of the sky, 
Like famished fingers waving. Brilliance weaves 
And sombers down among them, and among 
The anxious silver branches, down to the dry 
And twisted trunk, by rooted hunger wrung. 
(Poems 304) 
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The poet says that "'Even when seen from near, the olive shows I A 
hue of far away"' (305). The olive is --
... a tree which grows 
Unearthly pale, which ever dims and dries, 
And whose great thirst, exceeding all excess, 
Teaches the South it is not paradise. (Poems 305) 
The poet sees in the olive a symbol of unquenchable human thirst. 
Like man, the olive "'contradicts, .. exists in "'clouds of doubt, .. and 
p~ints and waves skyward with "famished fingers... The olive 
weaves brilliance among its "anxious" branches and is wrung "by 
rooted hunger."' Like the human dissatisfaction with the immanent 
and longing for the transcendent, the olive's thirst exceeds all excess. 
Man and olive share an unslakable longing that keeps the South, the 
earth, from being paradise and that never finds this world's splendid 
excess to be enough. In his Confessions, Augustine refers to "men, 
who, for their punishment, are sick of a disease which makes them 
thirst for more than they can drink"' 279). The "Enrroi" of Wilbur's 
"'Ballade for the Duke of Orleans" laments 
All men are born distraught, 
And will not for the world be satisfied. 
Whether we live in fact, or but in thought, 
U.~ die of thirst, here at the fountain-side. (Poems 212) 
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In "'A World without Objects Is a Sensible Emptiness"' Wilbur 
pictures the soul as desert-wandering camels, "connoisseurs of 
thirst," who seek satiation in mirage rather than the water oases loud 
with the life of this world. The poem takes its title from a phrase in 
Centuries, meditations written by Thomas Traherne for a friend's 
instruction in the way to Christian felicity (Margolioth v-vi).12 
Traherne saw the whole world "as the Gift and Token" of God's love 
and believed that "nothing can please or serve Him more, than the 
Soul that enjoys !His gift!" (Traherne 6). Traherne called "Love 
... the true means by which the world is enjoyed" and "the root and 
foundation of nature ... the Soul of Life ... " (85). In Meditation 65 
of the second series, Traherne wrote: 
You are prone to love as the sun is to shine .... The whole 
world ministers to you as the theatre of your Love. It sustains 
you and all objects that you may continue to love them. 
Without which it were better for you to have no being. Life 
without objects is a sensible emptiness, and that is a greater 
misery than Death or Nothing. (Traherne 86; emphasis added) 
Thus, Traherne anticipated the sentiment expressed by agnostic 
Wallace Stevens, who three centuries later wrote in "Esthetique du 
Mal" that "The greatest poverty is not to live I In a physical world 
... " (Stevens 325). For both Stevens and Traherne, loss of the 
sensible world was a spiritual loss, but Traherne had a religious 
superstructure to explain the deprivation. For Traherne, to be cut off 
from the world of objects was to be cut off from the manifestation of 
God's love and the opportunity to augment divine pleasure by 
enjoying God's gift. 
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In his poetic tribute to Traherne, Wilbur observes the "tall 
camels of the spirit" drawn toward the alluring mirage of "sensible 
emptiness." They pull away from the world of substance toward the 
world of image: 
The tall camels of the spirit 
Sheer for their deserts, passing the last groves aloud 
With the sawmill shrill of the locust, to the whole honey of the 
arid 
Sun. They are slow, proud, 
And move with a stilted stride 
To the land of sheer horizon, hunting Traherne's 
Sensible emptiness, there where the brain's lantern slide 
Revels in vast returns. (Poems 283) 
The tall camels of spirit ignore the call of the world heard in the 
shrill of locust from the last oasis loud with life. They steer instead 
for their own parched images and the illusive honey of the arid sun--
a dry imagination that would sustain itself on abstractions rather 
than on "the true, I The mortal flower." In a world of absence, of 
"sheer horizon," these proud spirits long to slake their thirst with the 
honey of their own delusions--repetitively changing lantern-slide 
images of their own making, images divorced from the mutable 
world. 
~-- --- ~ ~~--------
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The poet addresses directly these beasts of his soul, first 
warning them of the danger of choosing the aridity of thinking the 
world only what they see: 
0 connoisseurs of thirst, 
Beasts of my soul who long to learn to drink 
Of pure mirage, those prosperous islands are accurst 
That shimmer on the brink 
Of absence .... (Poems 283) 
He warns the tall camels of his spirit, these "connoisseurs of thirst," 
that the assuagement they crave can be found only in the forms of 
this world, not in abstract and substanceless fancies: " ... auras, 
lustres, I And all shinings need to be shaped and borne" (Poems 
283). Visions must be made of the stuff of this world. The poet 
reminds the camel spirits of those saints who wear their halos 
shaped and styled of this world"s light : 
Think of those painted saints, capped by the early masters 
With bright, jauntily-worn 
Aureate plates, or even 
Merry-go round rings. 
Fervently, the poet calls his soul beasts to the things of this world: 
... Turn, 0 turn 
From the fine sleights of the sand, from the long empty oven 
Where flames in flam ings burn 
Back to the trees arrayed 
In bursts of glare, to the halo-dialing run 
Of the country creeks, and the hill's bracken tiaras made 
Gold in the sunken sun (Poems 283) 
From deceptive mirages and flame fed on flame, the poet calls his 
attention and bids it see instead the trees and creeks and hills 
framed in this world's aureate light. 
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Then, in one word-- "Wisely"--Wilbur connects the camels of his 
spirit to those camel-riding wanderers who, according to legend, 
searched two thousand years ago for something to worship. He tells 
his spirit camels: 
Wisely watch for the sight 
Of the supernova burgeoning over the barn, 
Lampshine blurred in the steam of beasts, the spirit's right 
Oasis, light incarnate. (Poems 284) 
In the last two lines, Wilbur repeats Traherne's teaching of the way 
to felicity and reiterates his own insistence that "all shinings need to 
be shaped and borne" --i.e, spiritual rapture comes amid the things of 
this world like the epiphany that falls with the snow at the end of 
joyce's "The Dead." Shinings must take on form to have being. The 
"honey of the arid I Sun" or the burgeoning supernova, must become 
"light incarnate," humbled to the steam of beasts and blurred into 
lampshine--the world of sensible objects, things to be loved and 
endured. 
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Wilbur affirms again the incarnate goodness of this world in 
term~ of sunlight in his poem "Icarium Mare." The poem begins with 
a seeming acceptance of the traditional wisdom ("We have heard") 
that this Earth is a fallen, lesser world than some hyperion above. 
"lcarium Mare," the sea of Icarus, beomes a metaphor for "here," not 
the Platonic "True Earth above," but "our sea-/il.-e atmosphere" 
where "lwle grope like muddled fish." The True Earth above is, by 
contrast, a place of "undimmed air" and "fierce lucidity." From that 
fierce lucidity, the poet suggests "Came Icarus' body tumbling." The 
Greeks expressed in the myth of Icarus their sense of overreaching 
human aspiration, the longing to fly beyond the bourne, to break 
with waxen wings the trammels of earth-bound limitations. Icarus 
became the symbol of the tragical failure of such aspirations--the 
beautiful boy, his wax wings melted by coming too near the sun, lost 
in the sea of his ambition: " ... Icarus' body tumbling flayed and 
trenched I By waxen runnels, to be quenched" in the sea near Samos. 
Yet, subtly, immediately, Wilbur contradicts the implied 
argument of the myth--that there exist rigid, preordained barriers 
set against the prying of human intellect and imagination. Without 
interupting the flow of Icarus' fall, Wilbur uses the· sun, the island, 
and the sea of Samos to connect the youth of the Greek legend with 
two other denizens of the area who also flew very near the sun: 
Came Icarus' body tumbling, flayed and trenched 
By waxen runnels, to be quenched 
Near Samos riding in the actual sea, 
Where Aristarchus first 
Rounded the sun in thought; near Patmos, too, 
Where John's bejeweled inward view 
Descried an angel in the solar burst. 
(Poems 20) 
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Aristarchus of Samos, a Greek astronomer who lived in the third 
century B. C., is the first celestial observer recorded to have 
maintained that the Earth revolves around the Sun.l3 Thus, Icarus, 
the boy who flew too near the sun, is linked by the sea of Samos into 
which he fell to Aristarchus of the island of Samos, another Greek 
who "lrlounded the sun in thought." Barren Patmos, a Greek island of 
the Duodecanese, lies south and slightly west of Samos; Patmos wa~. 
during Roman times, a place of exile. According to tradition, the 
disciple john, who wrote the Fourth Gospel and the Book of 
Revelation, was exiled to Patmos in 95 A.D. There he had his 
apocalyptic visons--" ... Patmos ... I Where John's bejeweled 
inward view I Descried an angel in the solar burst." Thus, Wilbur 
uses their mutual geographical connection to the sea near Samos and 
to the sun's "fierce lucidity" to link together these three explorers--
Icarus, Aristarchus, and john. Heroic and perhaps foolhardy like the 
sky-ch~Hsnging lcaru5, Aristzrchus and john, the "reckoner" and the 
saint, through "Insight and calculation brave I Black distances 
exorbitant to sense." 
Though he celebrates the sky challengers, the poet does not 
disparage the humble, earthy vision "lwlhich in its little shed I Of 
broken light knows wonders all the same": 
Where else do lifting wings proclaim 
The advent of the fire-gapped thunderhead, 
Which swells the streams to grind 
What oak and olive grip their roots into, 
Shading us as we name anew 
Creatures without which vision would be blind? 
(Poems 20) 
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The images of these lines--rising birds seeking shelter before a 
storm, lightning flashing from thunder-clouds, swollen streams 
gnawing at tree roots--connect to the mythic images of Icarus' 
flapping wings, celestial fire, and engulfing sea, thereby suggesting 
that the more "ordinary" world is made of the same elements as the 
imagined hyperion of the sky-challengers. The phrase "We name 
anew" suggests a recurrent Eden where we are forever engaged in 
Adam's task of naming the creation as we continually discover it. 
Having begun with the simple nouns naming sheep and goat and 
tree, we have moved on to mumeson and mitochondria and binary 
pulsars as our vision has grown more acute. The line "Creatures 
without which vision would be blind" reiterates the recurrent theme 
in Wilbur's poetry that says that the eye is not the prime composer 
and asks "What should we be without I The dolphin's arc, the dove's 
return, I These things in which we have seen ourselves and spoken?" 
(Poems 182-183). Vision comes not just with seeing but with seeing 
with an awareness that acknowledges that we ourselves are made by 
what we see. 
The poet ends "Icarium Mare" with a humble affirmation of 
this Earth to place against the ideal of an undimmed "True Earth": 
This is no outer dark 
But a small province haunted by the good, 
Where something may be understood 
And where, within the sun's coronal arc, 
We keep our proper range, 
Aspiring, with this lesser globe of sight, 
To gather tokens of the light 
Not in the bullion, but in the loose change. 
(Poems 20-21) 
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Wilbur celebrates the winged-boy--a Pegaus-like symbol for art--as 
well as the saint and the scientist-reckoner whose insight and 
calculation challenge "[bllack distances" that stretch out into the solar 
system and deep into the soul, but he also cherishes the shorter 
distances that are not "exorbitant to sense." The saint's "geodic skull" 
offers a "bejeweled inward view," but the "little shed" of the senses 
with its "broken light" knows wonders of its own. The "True Earth" is 
the one on which we stand; this is "[w]here something may be 
understood." Within the "proper range" of an earthbound but 
aspiring vision, the "lesser globe of sight" finds its treasures in the 
"loose change" of the sun's bullion--the coinage and the mutability.l4 
For Wilbur, this earth is "no outer dark I But a small province 
haunted by the good." In this place of mystery, "something may be 
understood" because not everything is known. 
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joy's Trick: "an ache I Nothing can satisfy" 
Writing of the "greatest of spirit-nature pairs," Don Quixote and 
Sancho Panza, W. H. Auden in his essay "Balaam and His Ass" 
describes Sancho as a "'holy' realist" motivated to follow his master 
through insane adventures by his love of Quixote and by his "love of 
adventure, a poetic love of fun" ( 13 7). A uden defines a "holy realist" 
as one who "enjoys the actual and immediate for its own sake, not for 
any material satisfaction it provides" ( 137). Wilbur is such a holy 
realist. He is called to love the things of the world because they 
simply astonish him with their being; his experience of their 
otherness is joy. He delights in poetic fun and in repeating the act of 
creation with new creation. And, in spite of the world's supplying 
much evidence to the contrary, Wilbur has an abiding sense of a 
deep, unbounded good at the heart of creation: 
I feel that the universe is full of glorious energy, that the 
energy tends to take pattern and shape, and that the ultimate 
character of things is comely and good .... My feeling is that 
when you discover order and goodness in the world, it is not 
something you are imposing--it is something which is likely 
really to be there, whatever crumminess and evil and dis order 
there may also be. (qtd. in Stitt, High, and Ellison 190) 
Many of Wilbur's poems celebrate the "glorious energy," pattern, and 
goodness he sees in the universe, and they struggle to balance "the 
claims of earth and heaven." Peter Harris calls Wilbur "first and last, 
a celebratory poet, most often of the transient epiphanic glories of 
the natural world." Harris says whether the subject is natural or 
human, the "central value" of Wilbur's work is love ("Forty Years" 
415).15 
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Heidegger said that poetry hails Being by disclosing the things 
of the world in which Being is concealed and that poetry "brings man 
onto the earth, making him belong to it" (PLT 218). None of Wilbur's 
poems does this better than "Love Calls Us to the Things of This 
World." Wilbur might have chosen the following precept from 
Traherne's Centuries as its epigraph: "Your enjoyment of the world is 
never right till every morning you awake in Heaven ... as if you 
were among the angels" ( 14). In "Love CaHs Us," the unwilling soul 
being pulled back to earth-bound vision by the waking body "shrinks 
I From all that it is about to remember, I From the punctual rape of 
every blessed day" (Poems 233). As the body's eyes open to the 
creak and squeal of clothesline pulleys, the "astounded soul," stunned 
with bewildered wonder, is "spirited from sleep"--abducted by 
returning consciousness from its ethereal, bodiless simplicity.J6 For 
the shimmering moment when the soul remains in one world but 
sucked toward another, it sees "Outside the open window I The 
morning air . . . all awash with angels": 
Some are in bed-sheets, some are in blouses, 
Some are in s·mocks: but truly there they are. 
Now they are rising together in calm swells 
Of halcyon feeling, filling whatever they wear 
With the deep joy of their impersonal breathing; 
-----------
Now they are flying in place, conveying 
The terrible speed of their omnipresence, moving 
And staying like white water; and now of a sudden 
They swoon down into so rapt a quiet 
That nobody seems to be there. (Poems 233) 
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In this wonderful moment of vision, the holy becomes visible in the 
mundane. Angels are as true as laundry. The peace and joy of 
heaven breathe in the calm swell that fills a bedsheet. Omnipresence 
manifests itself in laundry "flying in place," both moving and staying 
"like white water," and "rapt quiet" becomes evidence of things not 
seen.l7 Michelson says that "'ltlhe angels on the wash line are 'truly' 
there only to someone whose muddle-headedness has got the better 
of him," but then asks, "'or is it that they are 'truly' there, in some 
dimension to which the waking mind cannot find its way?" (Wilbur's 
Poetry 51). Wilbur himself has said that "Love Calls Us" asks whether 
it is possible "to speak intelligibly of angels in the modern world" and 
if the psyche of the modern reader will consent to be called a soul 
("On My Own Work"' 126). 
Spirited from sleep by the daily wakening, "the punctual rape" 
of returning consciousness when the alarm clock goes off or the 
neighbor's clothesline sounds, the soul pleads for an impossible 
simplicity. The cry of the pulleys that opens the poem becomes the 
cry of the soul: 
'Oh, let there be nothing on earth but laundry, 
Nothing but rosy hands in the rising steam 
And clear dances done in the sight of heaven.· (Poems 233) 
217 
In the very images with which it pleads, the soul is overpowered and 
seduced by the body, by the things of this world that it has learned 
to love. 
Yet, as the sun acknowledges 
With a warm look the world's hunks and colors, 
The soul descends once more in bitter love 
To accept the waking body . . . . (Poems 233) 
Wilbur has said that "Plato, St. Teresa, and the rest of us in our 
degree have known that it is painful to return to the cave, to the 
earth, to the quotidian: Augustine says that it is love that brings us 
back" ("On Love Calls Us" 18).18 
As the man yawns and rises, the soul speaks "liln a changed 
voice" and offers a blessing for this world, a blessing spoken ln terms 
of laundry: 
'Bring them down from their ruddy gallows; 
Let there be clean linen for the backs of thieves; 
Let lovers go fresh and sweet to be undone, 
And the heaviest nuns walk in a pure floating 
Of dark habits, 
keeping their difficult balance.· 
(Poems 234) 
Rather than leaving the laundry hung between worlds to do only 
"clear dances ... in the sight of heaven," the embodied soul unhangs 
the angel wash and brings it down to earth to clothe with clean linen 
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and indiscriminate love the backs of thieves, lovers, and nuns. Done 
up in garments blown "fresh and sweet" by the rosy air of true dawn, 
the lovers will be "undone" in many ways--lovingly seduced and 
undressed by one another, loosed from the bounds of self in 
passionate surrender, made forever unfinished by perpetual 
becoming, and undone by death which will hang them out for the 
final drying. Wilbur leaves us with the image of "the heaviest nuns" 
walking "in a pure floating I Of dark habits, I keeping their difficult 
balance" between this world and the dreamed-of transcendent. 
These lines themselves display a dazzling equilibrium of paired 
contraries--heaviest/floating, pure/dark, pure floating/difficult 
balance. Wilbur has said that many of his poems are "arguments 
against a thingless, an earthless kind of imagination, or spirituality" 
(qtd. in Hutton 50). He specifically describes "Love Call Us to the 
Things of This World" as "a poem against abstracted and dissociated 
spirituality": "I can believe in angels by way of and in the laundry .. 
. . I don't really want to have much truck with angels who aren't in 
the laundry, who aren't involved in the everyday world" (qtd. in 
Frank and Mitchell 25). For Wilbur, waking on earth is heaven and 
heavenly visions must be of this earth. 
Michelson calls this poem "at once perfect seriousness and 
perfect festivity, its language-founded ironies being play much as 
Huizinga defines it in its highest state, play as the exuberant 
celebration of mystery." Michelson believes that "[t]he gaiety of the 
play heightens the reverence; it does not profane the ceremony." In 
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his rich language Wilbur displays "a grace which shows that he has 
reconciled the play of words with that spontaneity and excitement 
which sacred play, ceremony, ought to have." The critic concludes 
that in "Love Calls Us to the Things of This World "ltlhe energy and 
music ... are as well suited to holy festivity as their spreads of 
meaning are to the analytical mind" (Witbur"s Poetry 51). 
How can one know if the vision is real--if there are really 
angels in the laundry? In "Teresa," a poetic tribute to Saint Teresa of 
Avila, Wilbur describes how the Spanish Carmelite came to know 
that vis ion heavenly in which "It !he brighter ange 1 and the spear ... 
drew I A bridal cry from her open lips" (Poems 70). After the vision 
had come uncertainty: 
She could not prove it true, 
Nor think at first of any means to test 
By what she had been wedded or possessed. (Poems 79) 
Teresa discovered that the test and proof of heavenly visions comes 
in this world: 
The proof came soon and plain: 
Visions were true which quickened her to run 
God's barefoot errands in the rocks of Spain 
Beneath its beating sun, 
And lock the 0 of ecstasy within 
The tempered consonants of discipline. (Poems 79) 
For Wilbur, the holy exists in the objects and moments of the 
common day; holy things are "harder than nails" and "more warmly 
constant than the sun." In "A Plain Song for Comadre" he asks 
questions that discover the extraordinary in the ordinary: 
What evening, when the slow and forced expense 
Of sweat is done 
Does not the dark come flooding the straight furrow 
Or filling the well-made bowl? 
What night will not the whole 
Sky with its clear studs and steady spheres 
Turn on a sound chimney? (Poems 244) 
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These questions imply that human beings can, through their labor, 
actually make vessels to hold the transcendent--the straight furrow 
and the well-made bowl contain the holy dark; the night sky of "clear 
studs and steady spheres" centers itself and turns around the axis of 
"a sound chimney." Holy things are of this world and are not 
frightened off "By a fly's buzz, or itches, or a cough" (Poems 244). 
Wilbur sees the "unseen" in the daily labor of Bruna Sandoval, 
comadre, the domestic worker who tends the church of San Ysidro: 
It is seventeen years 
Come tomorrow 
That Bruna Sandoval has kept the church 
Of San Ysidro, sweeping 
And scrubbing the aisles, keeping 
The candlesticks and the plaster faces bright, 
And seen no visions but the thing done right 
From the clay porch 
To the white altar. (Poems 244) 
Uniike Teresa's ecstasy, Bruna Sandoval's vision is always earth 
bound: 
For love and in all weathers 
This is what she has done. 
Sometimes the early sun 
Shines as she f1 ings the scrubwater out, with a crash 
Of grimy rainbows, and the stained suds flash 
Uke angel-feathers. (Poems 244) 
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The "unseen vanishes" and "insight fails" unless we are able to see 
"grimy rainbows" in the splash of scrubwater or the flash of angel 
feathers among stained suds. For Wilbur the holy image is not 
transfixed in stained glass; the evanescent holy flashes in the 
marvelous stain of the ordinary or· expresses itself in the "green 
excellence" of a vine "dimly prompted" to upbraid itself by a warmly 
constant sun. 
In a poem that in itself gorgeously affirms the beauty of 
sensible objects, Wilbur represents two versions of possible aesthetic 
and spiritual response to the human craving for something more, the 
unquenchable ontological thirst. In "A Baroque Wall-Fountain in the 
Villa Sciarra," he expresses the possibilities in terms of two Italian 
fountains of very different character: The first is the baroque wall-
fountain in a park, the Villa Sciarra, in Rome. In verses of exquisite 
sensual imagery, Wilbur replicates the sight and sound of water and 
sunlight tumbling gorgeously over a faunal family at undisciplined 
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and delighting play. Following the flow of the water as it brims and 
flows and sprays, we discover the shape and figures of the fountain: 
Under the bronze crown 
Too big for the head of the stone cherub whose feet 
A serpent has begun to eat, 
Sweet water brims a cockle and braids down 
Past spattered mosses, breaks 
On the tipped edge of a second shell, and fills 
The massive third below. It spills 
In threads then from the scalloped rim, and makes 
A scrim or summery tent 
For a faun-menage and their familiar goose. 
Happy in all that ragged, loose 
Collapse of water, its effortless descent 
And flatteries of spray, 
The stocky god upholds the shell with ease, 
Watching, about his shaggy knees, 
The goatish innocence of his babes at play; 
His fauness all the while 
Leans forward, slightly, into a clambering mesh 
Of water-lights, her sparkling flesh 
In a saecular ecstasy, her blinded smile 
Bent on the sand floor 
Of the trefoil pool, where ripple-shadows come 
And go in swift reticulum, 
More addling to the eye than wine, and more 
Interminable to thought 
Than pleasure's calculus. (Poems 271-272) 
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Wilbur has said that his subject in this poem is pleasure and what 
place it has in life ("Explaining the Obvious" 143), and so, 
unsurprisingly, a nagging Puritan conscience interrupts the sensual 
frolic of light and water and fauns to ask about the validity of so 
much enjoyment: "Yet since this all I Is pleasure, flash, and 
waterfall, I Must it not be too simple?" 
Immediately, the poet turns from the sensual to consider the 
spiritual and asks if another set of Roman fountains does not more 
accurately represent human nature and longing: "Are we not I more 
intricately expressed I In the plain fountains that Maderna set I 
Before St. Peter's ... ? " (272). Turning from the simplicity of the 
baroque to the intricacy of the austere, Wilbur describes, in language 
that conveys struggle for transcendence, the alternative: 
... the main jet 
Struggling aloft until it seems at rest 
In the act of rising, until 
The very wish of water is reversed, 
That heaviness borne up to burst 
In a clear, high, cavorting head, to fill 
With blaze, and then in gauze 
Delays, in a goatlike shimmering, in a fine 
Iflumined version of itself, decline, 
And patter on the stones its own applause? 
(Poems 272) 
If the Maderna fountains represent "what men are I Or should be," if 
these aspiring "water-saints" represent "[tlhe pattern of our arete" 
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(virtue), Wilbur asks what to make then "of these showered fauns in 
their bizarre, I Spangled, and plunging house?" (272). He discovers 
that their virtue is "humble insatiety"--joy and unending delight in 
what is given rather than longing for something beyond, something 
not given: 
They are at rest in fulness of desire 
For what is given, they do not tire 
Of the smart of the sun, the pleasant water-douse 
And riddled pool below, 
Reproving our disgust and our ennui 
With humble insatiety. (Poems 272) 
Cummins sees the conflict between saecular ecstasy and 
transcendence reconciled in the person of St. Francis: "Francis in his 
selfless love and piety, would have seen that the spirit embodied in 
St. Peter's fountain was really aspiring to the state expressed by the 
baroque fountain .... Francis would have seen in the baroque 
fountain the consummate joy for which imperfect man hungers" (29). 
Saint Francis, "who lay in sister snow I ... I Freezing and praising" 
would see the frolic of fauns in a baroque wall-fountain as "No trifle, 
but a shade of bliss"--the shade of bliss of this world: 
That land of tolerable flowers, that state 
As near and far as grass 
Where eyes become the sunlight, and the hand 
Is worthy of water: the dreamt land 
Toward which all hungers leap, all pleasures pass. 
(Poems 273) 
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Eyes in joyful seeing add to the beauty of sunlight; the hand that 
takes pleasure in it is worthy of water. Earth is the land we dream 
of, where hungers grow on what they feed and pleasures can be 
found, and all is as near and far as grass. At the end of the poem 
"Hamlen Brook," Wilbur says that it is not dearth that makes thirst, 
but abundance: 
Joy's trick is to supply 
Dry lips with what can cool and slake, 
Leaving them dumbstruck also with an ache 
Nothing can satisfy. (Poems 41) 
The Mystery of Things That Are 
Perceptively, Wilbur notes that the baroque fountain offers a 
"shade of bliss." In a mutable world, sunlight comes with shadows. 
Wilbur's poem "Lot's Wife" counts the cost of loving this world of 
sensible objects. This translation of a poem by Anna Akhmatova 
recounts the Genesis story of Lot and his family following the angel 
out of the doomed city of Sodom. While the "just man" unswervingly 
follows his angel guide, a "wild grief in his wife's bosom" speaks to 
her and persuades the unhappy woman to--
Look bac.A:, it is not too late /or a last sight 
Of the red towers of rour native Sodom, the square 
Where once ~vou sang. the garden ~vou shaf/ mourn, 
And the tall boose with empt..v windows rvhere 
You loved ~vour husband and _vour babes were born. 
(Poems 167) 
The internal, italicized voice might be Satan whispering to a later 
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Eve, tempting her with one last look at all she has known and loved. 
Indeed, according to the Biblical version Lot's wife was turned to a 
pillar of salt: when she looked back, the unhappy wife's "eyes were 
welded shut by mortal pain; I Into transparent sat t her body grew," 
a pillar of her unshed tears. Akhmatova and Wilbur, pass judgment 
on her. First they ask: "Who would waste tears upon her? Is she 
not I The least of our losses, this unhappy wife?" Their answer to 
their questions express not disdain but deep sympathy and fellow-
feeling for this woman who would die for one last look at the world 
she loved: "Yet in my heart she will not be forgot I Who, for a single 
glance, gave up her life" (Poems 167). Lot's wife's response seems 
most holy--an act of devotion in the sense described by the 
seventeenth-century theologian Malebranche, who said that " ... 
rigorous attention is 'natural piety of the soul"' (qtd. in Steiner 156). 
Or her look back might be considered an act of prayer in the sense 
spoken of by Badeau in Grant at Windsor: "And what is prayer, after 
all, but paying perfect attention to something?" (Lefevre). Love 
called Lot's wife for one look back at the things of her world of 
Sodom; the pain of loss made her attention rigorous and perfect. 
For Wilbur, the first act of reverence is to see the world in its 
incarnate holiness, and the second is to acknowledge the limits of 
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seeing. R~peatedly, throughout his poetry, Wilbur asks that his 
vision be corrected by humility. In "Poplar, Sycamore" from his first 
volume of verse, the poet asks Sycamore to save him from thinking 
that his vision defines the world, that the world is limited to what he 
sees: 
Sycamore, trawled by the tilt sun, 
Still scrawl your trunk with tattered lights, and keep 
The spotted toad upon your patchy bark, 
Baffle the sight to sleep, 
Be such a deep 
Rapids of lacing light and dark, 
My eye wi It never know the dry disease 
Of thinking things no more than what he sees. 
(Poems 381) 
In "The Eye," published almost thirty years after "Poplar, Sycamore," 
Wilbur prays to Saint Lucy, the patron saint of eyesight, to renew the 
same blessing: 
Forbid my vis ion 
To take itself for a curious angel. 
Remind me that I am here in body 
A passenger, and rumpled. 
Correct my view 
That the far mountain is much diminished 
That the fovea20 is prime composer, 
That the lid's closure frees me. (Poems 57) 
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The poet pleads that Saint Lucy preserve him from "the e.ves 
nonsense" and asks that he "be touched I By the alien hands of love 
forever" so that his eye will not be "folly's loophole I But giver of due 
regard" (Poems 57). For Wilbur," ... the world's fullness is not made 
but found" (Poems 61 ). 
In "Altitudes" Wilbur imagines Emily Dickinson climbing the 
spiral stair to the cupola of her father's house in Amherst. There, in 
a small room "furnished only with the sun," she sees "a wild shining 
of the pure unknown I On Amherst." Unlike Eiseley, Wilbur finds the 
world's mystery in the daylight ordinary, not in darkness and the 
lightning-lit surreal. For Wilbur the quotidian of nature is a book of 
revelation of things seen and things not seen; he says that "the 
imagination ... when in best health neither slights the world of fact 
nor stops with it, but seeks the invisible through the visible" 
(ResP-onses 159 ). In "Sunlight Is Imagination," Wilbur writes that in 
this world "[mJy hand I Can touch but mysteries, and each of a 
special shadow" (Poems 375 ). Giving "due regard" means uncovering 
.. the lllJ'"slefJ··· of things t!Jat are" (Poems 128; emphasis added). 
Seeing what is there means discovering rvbat is not there--the 
mystery at the center of being. In "A Hole in the Floor," Wilbur asks, 
"For God's sake, what am I after?" and then answers--" ... the buried 
strangeness I Which nourishes the known" (Poems 19 0 ). 
Among the Walking to SleeP-. poems, Wilbur includes three 
translations of sonnets by jorge Luis Borges. "Compass" contains 
lines which articulate the sense of a mysterious power, an unknown 
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force--what Heidegger called Being and Otto, the m..vsterium 
tremendum--behind creation. The undiscoverable, indifferent force 
"writes" in a baffling cipher all things that are: 
All things are words of some strange tongue, in thrall 
To Someone, Something, who both day and night 
Proceeds in endless gibberish to write 
The history of the world. (Poems 164) 
"All things" of nature are part of a coded message from "Someone" or 
"Something." The words of that "dark scrawl" inc tude Rome, 
Carthage, I, and you. The poet speaker's anguished life-- "this my 
being which escapes me quite"--is itself part of the "cryptic, 
recondite, and garbled" message. Behind all that is visible and 
named ties the force that has no name but draws all things 
homeward to itself as the magnetic north draws the compass needle. 
Beyond the name there lies what has no name; 
Today I have felt its shadow stir the aim 
Of this blue needle, tight and keen, whose sweep 
Homes to the utmost of the sea its love .... 
(Poems 164) 
The compass, stirred by this vast, mysterious. motive force, moves 
with a calm, unknowing, "Suggestive of a watch in dreams, or of I 
Some bird, perhaps, who shifts a bit in sleep" ( 164). Human beings 
also seem to have within them such a pointer, its keen blue edge 
trembling in search, lured by the magnetic north of Being, the 
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unknown behind the known. And that compass needle homing to the 
utmost of the sea makes travelers and seekers of us. 
Mystery creates thirst, precipitates search. For Wilbur, all the 
world is a siren song luring him on to something yet unknown. In 
his poem "The Sirens," he writes that "I never knew the road I From 
which the world didn't call away" (Poems 30 1). Intense attention to 
the manifold beauties and mysteries of the world inevitably breeds 
regret for what cannot be seen or loved or known: 
Lands I have never seen 
And shall not see, loves I wilt not forget, 
All I have missed, or slighted, or forgone 
Call to me now. And weaken me. And yet 
I would not walk a road without a scene. 
I lis ten going on, 
The richer for regret. (Poems 3 0 l ) 
Paradoxically, what he cannot have adds to his riches with the 
promise that he can never exhaust this world's plenitude. In an 
interview, Wilbur said that he finds "a certain relish" in 
acknowledging that even in the very moment when he is tying up a 
poem's argument, "all the possibilities have not been exhausted" 
("Mystery of Things" 145). 
Wilbur values the mystery he finds in creation. The mystery 
at the heart of being adds zest and piquancy to life; it invites the 
imagination to complete or to make something of the things of the 
world. According to his "Advice from the Muse," the storyteller/poet 
should model art on reality by making sure to "have all be plain, but 
-- -----·-
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only to a point." In any tale, " ... something should escape us, 
something like I A question one had meant to ask the dead." The 
unknown has great value for the imagination; mystery may be as 
"Rich as our ignorance of the Celebes" (Poems 31)--full of titillation 
and possibility. Therefore, the Muse advises the writer: 
Of motives for some act, propose a few, 
Confessing that you can't yourself decide; 
Or interpose a witness to provide, 
Despite his inclination to be true, 
Some fadings of the signal, as it were, 
A breath which, drawing closer, may obscure 
Mirror or window with a token blur--
That slight uncertainty which makes us sure. 
What is completely understood loses its allure and can no longer hold 
the attention. Wilbur says that Wallace Stevens was right in 
asserting that "the imagination is happiest with 'the half color of 
quarter things'--with the completion of what is partial or partially 
apprehended" (qtd. in Dacey, "An Interview" 120-121). Mystery 
pulls the attention like a magnet. "Some fadings of the signal" or " a 
token blur" offer a place and work: for the imagination. Mystery also 
creates the possibility for an adventure of faith--"That slight 
uncertainty that makes us sure." 
Though mystery adds allure and excitement to life, it also 
creates intractable problems of knowing. Wilbur conf;onts 
Berkeley's epistemological assertion that "esse est pe.rcijJI;" to be is to 
be perceived, in his poem "A Chronic Condit ion." The poet shrouds 
232 
the world in fog to explore the philosopher's dicta that there is no 
material substance and that seemingly solid objects such as tables 
and stones are, in fact, collections of ideas or sensations which exist 
only in mind and only for as long as they are perceived. 
Berkeley did not forsee such misty weather, 
Nor centuries of light 
Intend so dim a day. Swaddled together 
In separateness, the trees 
Persist or not beyond the gray-white 
Palings of the air. Gone 
Are whatever wings bothered the lighted leaves 
When leaves there were. (Poems 275) 
Asking, "Are all I The sparrows fallen?," Wilbur turns to the effects 
on the mind of the world lost in mist, actual and philosophic: 
I can hardly hear 
My memory of those bees 
Which only lately mesmerized the lawn. 
Now something blaze! A fear 
Swadd 1 es me now that Hylas' tree w i 11 fall 
Where no eye lights and grieves, 
Will fall to nothing and without a sound. 
I sway and lean above the vanished ground. 
(Poems 275) 
The poet's memory of the sound of bees fades when he can no longer 
see and hear them. He cannot sustain the concept of bee buzz 
without the presence of bees; the concept itself fades when the actual 
disappears. Idea seems to depend upon reality, not reality on idea. 
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In another twist on Berkeley, the poet, swaddled in fear as the trees 
are swaddled in mist, dreads that Hylas' tree will fall unseen, 
unheard, and unlamented.2l Though the poet can think of the tree, 
his thought cannot make it present or pull it out of the real fog. His 
mind pleads for the blaze of something as he "sways and leans above 
the vanished ground": he loses his balance, mental and physical, 
when his eyes lose the world his mind cannot make. Yet, his swaying 
and leaning above what has vanished and his forgetfulness of bee 
buzz imply the very reality of these things outside his groping 
mind.22 
In a set of epigrammatic couplets he calls "Epistemology," 
Wilbur exposes the questionable assurance of both materialist and 
idealist philosophies. The first couplet alludes to the story of how 
the wit and lexicographer Samuel Johnson refuted George Berkeley's 
concept of the nonexistence of matter, i.e., his belief that things exist 
only as the ideas or sensations in the mind of a perceiver. When 
Boswell observed that the Irish philosopher's assertions about the 
immateriality of matter were untrue but difficult to refute, Johnson 
challenged Berkeley's immaterialism with his own realism by kicking 
a stone and declaring "I refute it t!Jus." Wilbur writes: 
Kick at the rock, Sam Johnson, break your bones: 
But cloudy, cloudy is the stuff of stones. (Poems 288) 
Succinctly, Wilbur suggests how twentieth-century physics has 
subverted the concept of matter, finding that indeed all things, even 
-----------
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obdurate stones, are masses of swirling electron clouds. Mind has 
discovered solidity to be an illusion and stones to be cloudy swirl of 
energy particles. Yet, that cloudy stuff can indeed break bones. 
In the second couplet, Wilbur illustrates the irony of idealist 
presumption: 
We milk the cow of the world, and as we do 
We whisper in her ear, 'You are not true.' (Poems 288) 
This couplet exposes the terrible egocentrism of human beings who 
think the world exists because we see it or need it. Depending 
wholly on the world for sustenance, we insist that the cow which 
makes our existence possible exists only because we are milking it, 
that it has no true being outside our perceptions and needs.23 In his 
"Epistemology" Wilbur recognizes the world to be far more 
mysterious than our ordinary concepts of the real and far more 
substantial than our ideas of it. Though it is the province of the 
poem--and philosophy and religion and science-- "to make some 
order in the world," Wilbur writes that "poets can't afford to forget 
that there is a reality of things which sur·vives all orders great and 
small. Things are. The cow is there. No poetry [nor philosophy nor 
religion nor science] can have any strength unless it continually 
bashes itself against the reality of things" ("The Bottles Become New, 
Too" 217). 
In an interview, Wilbur described "The Beacon" as "all one 
metaphor," a poem "thinking about how much we can know of the 
···- ----------
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world, what the kingdom or province of human thought is" and doing 
that thinking "in terms of a lighthouse, and the sea, and the night" 
(qtd, in "Craft Interview" 94). He also said the poem contains "a lot 
of lesser but connected figures ... mostly having to do with ideas of 
empire, province, kingdom, domain" (94). The beacon light of "The 
Beacon" symbolizes human imaginative perception--the faculty that 
not only sees the world but adds its creative shaping to the scene, 
imposing some pattern of coherence on what presents itself to view, 
some organizing fable on the dynamic flux which otherwise exists 
outside human control: 
Founded on rock and facing the night-fouled sea 
A beacon blinks at its own brilliance, 
Over and over with cutlass gaze 
Solving the Gordian waters, 
Making the sea-roads out, and the lounge of the weedy 
Meadows, flinging the blown hair 
As it always has, and the buxom, lavish 
Romp of the ocean-daughters. (Poems 249) 
The beacon "solves" the Gordian waters with slashes of light--much 
the same way that Alexander the Great is said to have solved the 
Gordian knot. According to legend, an oracle had declared that the 
knot tied by King Gordius of Phrygia would be undone only by the 
future master of Asia. When Alexander could not untie the knot, he 
simply cut it with his sword--the kind of chutzpah that indeed made 
him the master of Asia (Dibbley 91-92). Facing the "night-fouled 
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sea," the imagination triumphs over the darkness; it lights the waters 
with myth--finding/making in the waves "sea-roads" and "weed-
meadows" where "the ocean-daughters" engage in "buxom, lavish I 
Romp" (249). 
But when the imagination blinks off, the world no longer 
coheres in myth or cartography: "Then in flashes of darkness it is all 
gone, I The flung arms and the hips, meads I And meridians, all" 
(249). When the mind cannot dominate the sea with an imposed 
mythic or cartographic order, the mind itself is dominated and 
terrified by the wholly and invincible other: 
... the dark of the eye 
Dives for the black pearl 
Of the sea-in-itself. Watching the blinded waves 
Compounding their eclipse, we hear their 
Booms, rumors and guttural sucks 
Warn of the pitchy whirl 
At the mind's end. (Poems 249) 
Without the beacon's tight, the eclipse of the "blinded waves" is 
"compounded "--intensified, accentuated, and magnified--by the 
warning, threatening, but unseen sounds out of their blackness--
"Booms, rumors, and guttural sucks." The sounds of this line become 
the aural equivalent of Pascal's abyss and Poe's maelstrom, the terror 
that warns of "the pitchy whirl I At the mind's end." In the flash of 
darkness and the threat of sound, "All of the sense of the sea I Is 
veiled as voices nearly heard I In morning sleep" (emphasis added). 
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Without the imaginative light which finds or creates order, the sea 
makes no sense; it has no meaning for human beings even though its 
sounds and blackness are most acutely sensed. We cannot dominate 
it by myth or cartography; we can make no comforting tale of waking 
"[a It the sea's heart." 
Lost in the dark swirl without the power to encompass the sea 
imaginatively or solve its Gordian waters with "cutlass gaze," we are 
left with only the option of wail and weeping: 
Rail 
At the deaf unbeatable sea, my soul, and weep 
Your Alexandrine tears. . . . (Poems 249) 
Ironically and paradoxically, these lines which seem to suggest the 
only option left when the light of imagination fails to organize the 
world are themselves a powerful, evocative construction of form 
against chaos. The line "At the deaf unbeatable sea, my soul, and 
weep" is a twelve-syllable, five-stress Alexandrine. The first lines of 
each of the preceding stanzas are also Alexandrines or Alexandrine-
like, having eleven, twelve, or thirteen syllables. According to 
Holman and Harmon, the twelve-syllable line may have gotten its 
name from its regular use in Old French romances describing the 
exploits of Alexander the Great, the conqueror tacitly alluded to in 
Wilbur's "Gordian waters" (I 0).24 "Alexandrine tears" also recalls the 
story that Alexander the Great wept bitterly when he heard of his 
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father Phillip II's conquests because the son feared that there would 
be no worlds left for him to conquer. 
At this point of despair with the soul weeping Alexandrine 
tears, the lighthouse beacon blinks again across the waters; the light-
blaze like a sword cuts through the dark: 
... but look: 
The beacon- blaze unsheathing turns 
The face of darkness pale 
And now with one grand chop gives clearance to 
Our human visions, which assume 
The waves again, fresh and the same. (Poems 249) 
The pitchy whirl pales with light; the sinister sounds of the sea fade 
when vision returns. The "one grand chop" lops the first lines of the 
last two stanzas down to ten-syllable pentameter--no more 
Alexandrine tears. However, the vision that light makes possible 
contains a hint of qualification: 
Let us suppose that we 
See most of darkness by our plainest light. 
It is the Nereid's kick endears 
The tossing spray; a sighted ship 
Assembles all the sea. (Poems 250) 
It is a consolation--but perhaps not a truth--to suppose that we "See 
most of darkness by our plainest light." Wallace Steven addresses 
·--- ------------
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the problem of seeing things "as they are" in his short play "Bowl, Cat 
and Broomstick": 
Bowl: What an extraordinary effect one gets from seeing things 
as they are, that is to say: from looking at ordinary things 
intensely. 
Broomstick: But to look at ordinary things intensely is not to 
see things as they are. However, go on. (Selected Poems 30) 
To look at things intensely, by our "plainest light," is to add 
imagination to reality. The imagination manages "[t]he deaf 
unbeatable sea" when seaspray can be made into playful nymphs or 
the ocean can be organized around a human artifact--in the same 
that way a jar placed on a hill in Tennessee takes dominion, making 
"[t]he wilderness ... I ... no longer wild" (Stevens 46).25 This 
aesthetic taming of wild indifference diverts the mind's eye from 
"the black pearl I Of the sea-in-itself" which the mind cannot know 
and also from the "[blooms, rumors, and guttural sucks" that "[w]arn 
of the pitchy whirl at the mind's end." But when the light fails, the 
blackness becomes all the more intense, suggesting that the world as 
managed by the imagination is not the re.ol world at alt--ar not the 
onl,v real world. In a sense, we do indeed discover darkness with 
the mind's light. 
Hearing in the darkness the sound of the "pitchy whirl at the 
mind's end," we discover terror at the center of mystery. Wilbur 
writes in "The Waters" that " ... only the dull are safe, only the dead 
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I Are safe from the limitless swell and bitter seethe" of the sea, and, 
therefore, even "the damnedest lovers of water dread the waves." A 
recurring image in Wilbur's poems is that of a whirlpool or whirling 
mass of energy--a sucking, pulling dark center that is terrifying yet 
painfully attractive and alluring. Not only does it draw things 
toward its center with centripetal spin, but the force of the 
centrifugal whirl flings loose floaters away to gather or coalesce at 
the edges of its swirling energy. 
In "Marginalia" the swirling force of the central vortex causes 
life to accrete at the periphery of its whirl: "Things concentrate at 
the edges" and "Our riches are centrifugal"; " ... the pond-surface I 
Is bourne to fish and man." Bourne means both the domain and a 
limit or boundary. The pond-surface is the limit to the fish's water 
world and the boundary of man's air world, but the concepts of limits 
or boundaries and of domain necessarily imply that something exists 
beyond the imposed barriers. At the edges, the place where two 
worlds interface, things happen. On the pond-surface, the interface 
between air and water, the detritus of both worlds accumulate. The 
surface is "spread I In textile scum and damask 1 ight, on which/ The 
lily-pads are set," and is inlaid with a beautiful mosaic of cast-offs--
"ruddy twigs, becalmed pine needles, I Air-baubles, and the chain 
mail of froth" (Poems 266). 
In a similar way the margins of consciousness collect the cast-
off images of separate worlds that seem to touch at its edges. 
Descending into sleep (as when the night-lift 
Falls past a brilliant floor), we glimpse a sublime 
Decor and hear, perhaps, a complete music, 
But this evades us .... (Poems 266) 
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This "complete music" faintly heard continually evades us just as the 
crickets' song pursued across a meadow silences as we approach it 
but continues alluringly in the distance: "The crickets' million 
round song dies away I From all advances, rising in every distance." 
Wilbur speculates that we ourselves sing the siren songs we pursue, 
that we create the mystery that evades us: 
Our riches are centrifugal; men compose 
Daily unwittingly, their final dreams, 
And those are our own voices whose remote 
Consummate chorus rides on the whirlpool's rim, 
Past which we flog our sails, toward which we drift, 
Plying our trades, in hopes of a good drowning. 
(Poems 266) 
The song we pursue is the one we sing, the one that allures us to the 
whirlpool's rim, the swirling vortex that leads to some dark, 
mysterious center. Daily but unknowingly, we compose the siren 
song that will lead us inevitably to the maelstrom. The words 
"toward which we drift" (despite flogging our sails) and "in hopes of a 
good drowning" imply that the drowning is inevitable; the hope is not 
to escape but to draw out the time and attention "on the whirlpool's 
rim" and make a good job of the final plunge. The central pull may 
be terrifying and, finally, overpowering, sucking all into its dark, 
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annihilating center, but the vortex is also immensely creative, its 
whirl causing things to "concentrate at the edges" and making "[o]ur 
riches ... centrifugal." 
'tove and Dread 
In Wilbur's poetry, the female frequently becomes an 
embodiment of the universal mystery, something longed for but 
never understood. She is also the "dear attachment" whose loss is 
inevitable and feared. In "She," the poet asks of the Eve-figure, 
"What was her beauty in our first estate I When Adam's will was 
whole ... ? " (Poems 193). He cannot answer this question because in 
the Eden before the Fall, no metaphors, no likenings were possible--
"Resemb lance had to wait I For separation .... " Eve was one with 
the elements: "She so partook of water, light, and trees I As not to 
look like any one of these" ( 193). In this poem, Wilbur buries the 
central drama and great upheaval of the Eden myth, unmentioned, in 
the white space between the last line of the second stanza and the 
first line of the third: 
He woke and gazed into her naked face. 
But then she changed . . . . (Poems 19 3) 
In that space, unspoken, lies the temptation, the Fall, and the curse. 
The Fall brings with it the paradox of separation and resemblance. 
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When "[s]he partook of water, light, and trees," Eve could not be 
compared to these; undifferentiated unity dissolved likeness. 
Comparison, finding the likeness, had to wait for the separateness of 
a fallen world. 
But then she changed, and coming down amid 
The flocks of Abel and the fields of Cain, 
Clothed in their wish, her Eden graces hid, 
A shape· of plenty with a mop of grain, 
She broke upon the world, in time took on 
The look of every labor and its fruits. (Poems 193) 
"[I!n time," both over time and in time rather than in an Edenic 
eternity, Eve "broke upon the world"·-- i.e, she suddenly dawned 
upon the world, was suddenly seen as something other than water, 
light, and trees. She also "broke upon the world" in the sense of 
being shattered against the hard substance of the world into many 
seemings. 
Taking on the "look of every labor and its fruits," She became 
symbol and metaphor, the emblem of something lost and something 
sought, something to be worshipped and something to be possessed 
like a trophy: 
Columnar in a robe of pleated lawn 
She cupped her patient hand for attributes, 
Was radiant captive of the farthest tower 
And shed her honor on the fields of war, 
Walked in her garden at the evening hour, 
-- ------- ··-
Her shadow like a dark ogival door, 
Breasted the seas for all the westward ships 
And, come to virgin country, changed again--
A moonlike being truest in eclipse, 
And subject goddess of the dreams of men. 
(Poems 193) 
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Her shadow cast in the voluptuous curves of "a dark ogival door," She 
becomes alluring and elusive, tantalizing and terrifying.26 She who 
in Eden could not be named or likened, who could barely be 
discerned from water, light, and air, becomes "More named and 
nameless than the morning star, I Lovely in every shape, in all 
unseen. The poet concludes that "We dare not wish to find you as 
you are." She is no longer just Eve, first woman, wife, and mother; 
She represents all that is wholly other--woman, nature, muse, the 
divine. The phantom She, the She concocted in men's minds, is so 
powerful, the reality might have the force of a terribly beautiful 
Medusa. "[B]iding time until/ Desire decay and bring the latter age," 
the apparition of She "Shall flourish in the ruins of our will/ And 
deck the broken stones like saxifrage" (Poems 194). These last lines 
refer back to the first-- "What was her beauty ... I When Adam's 
will was whole." Now her beauty is to "flourish in the ruins of our 
will." Sa .. J:ifrage, also called "breakstone," comes from Latin roots 
which literally mean "rock-breaking herb." Like the tiny-blossomed 
saxifrage that grows in rocky crevices, She decorates the shambles 
She has made. The fallen world is made beautiful by this 
mysierious, elusive, alluring force that provokes creative response. 
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Trying to master the phantom, men embody the mystery in She as 
earth mother, towered prize, siren, ship's figurehead, or the "subject 
goddess of the dreams of men."27 
Often in Wilbur's love poems, an ominous sense of dread 
shadows the joy of loving. "Someone Talking to Himself" begins and 
ends with a face. The face which opens the poem is "her face"--
"Younger than any spring I 0 lder than Pharaoh's grain I And fresh as 
Phoenix ashes" (Poems 208). These brief lines of description of she 
who remains as anonymous as the he, the "someone" who is talking 
to himself, convey implicitly the passage of time (spring, the autumn 
harvest of "Pharaoh's grain") and death and resurrection in "fresh as 
Phoenix -ashes." The speaker has known "her" from her beginning 
and, in a flash of pain, had recognized "even when first her face I ... 
. I Shadowed under its lashes I Every earthly thing" that "There was 
another place": 
Off in the fathomless dark 
Beyond the verge of love 
I saw blind fishes move, 
And under a stone shelf 
Rode the recusant shark--
Cold, waiting, himself. 
(Poems 208) 
The shadow of the woman's glance with which she takes in all of 
creation widens and deepens into the "fathomless dark" where fish, 
blind as love, move. Among them, "cold, waiting, himself," is the 
"recusant shark "--threatening, merciless, intent on his sinister 
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purpose. Historically recusant referred to anyone, especially a 
Roman Catholic, who refused to attend services of the Church of 
England (OED). In current usage, recusant refers to anyone refusing 
to submit to authority. The shark is the reptilian Satan of Eden 
evolved to elasmobranch fish; the modifiers and intensive "cold, 
waiting, himself" suggest the common perception of the shark as 
voracious, rapacious, and dangerous to man. 
The blind fish and the shark wait "in the fathomless dark I 
Beyond the verge of love." Verge (a favorite word for Wilbur) has 
the sense both of a point marking the beginning of a new state or 
condition or action and also of a brink or threshold or precipice. 
Love is a beginning on the edge of a precipice. The two--he and she-
-fall both into love and from "the verge of love" like a mountain 
cataract: 
... we fell 
Clean as a mountain source 
And barely able to tell 
Such ecstasy from grace 
(Poems 208) 
Paradoxically, the two fall "clean," and the fall into love leaves them 
in a ecstasy that can be barely discerned from grace. Like a 
mountain torrent, he and she fall "Into the primal bed I And current 
of our race." The speaker who is talking to himself admits that 
"even when we fell I .... I We knew yet must deny I To what we 
gathered head." What follows is a description of the loving fall, 
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roaring confluence, and eventual attrition of a stream that began as a 
clear, full mountain source: 
That music growing harsh, 
Trees blotting the sky 
Above the roaring course 
That in the summer's drought 
Slowly would peter out 
Into a dry marsh. (Poems 208) 
Harshness, roaring, and then drying from a trickle into nothingness; 
the pair knew they were falling into mortality and inevitable 
attentuation and loss. 
Despite the consequences--perhaps because of them--the 
speaker declares that "Love is the greatest mercy." Reprising the 
words and the imagery of the first ''erse, the speaker describes love, 
this "greatest mercy," as "volley of the sun I That lashes all with 
shade, I That the first day be mended." The lines echo, but with a 
difference, the diction of the first stanza, " ... when first her face, I .. 
. I Shadowed under its lashes I Every earthly thing." . The word 
lashes takes on the power of all its meanings. The lashes of her eyes 
seduce and hold all they look upon. The sunlight lashes all with 
shade--binding and lacing all together with the shadow that 
inevitably comes with light but also lashing everything with a whip-
like sting. Love comes as a "voltey"--a flight of missiles or a burst of 
many things at once. All life is bound by the shadow of death, and 
love, "the greatest mercy," is also the "lover's curse" because all that 
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is loved is "so soon undone." Love will be curse as well as mercy "till 
time be comprehended I And the flawed heart unmade" (Poems 
209). The "Someone Talking" asks rhetorically: 
What can I do but move 
From folly to defeat, 
And call that sorrow sweet 
That teaches us to see 
The final face of love 
In what we cannot be? 
(Poems 209) 
And what is it that "we cannot be" --immortal, perfect, safe? How 
does Wilbur manage to see the "final face of love" in such an 
imperfect and mutable world? Perhaps only in such a world is love 
possible, and perhaps only such a world can hold the attention of 
Lot's wife and all those who cannot help but look back at what they 
are losing. 
In his discussion of Poetrv and the Sacred, Buckley says that 
religious poetry in the twentieth century observes "the religious 
world ... in its secular seeming" and that "the loves of 'the natural 
man' are inescapably the matrix for a sense of 'the blessed'" (52). 
Wilbur's poem "In the Field" expresses the terror faced by two 
people who love one another who unexpectedly confront not a 
swirling vortex but the vastitude of the universes above their heads 
and around their knees. These two, the animated ash of burned out 
stars evolved to consciousness, try to organize through myth or 
science or poetry the terrifying otherness of spatial infinity. They 
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discover, however, that only one thing they know can compare to the 
"nip of fear" that bites when the mind confronts the abyssal universe 
and all their attempts at dominion fail. 
"In the Field" opens with the poet's next-day, daylight 
reassessment of the star-gazing walk taken the night before. He and 
his beloved companion (presumably his wife--he refers to "our 
bedlamp") repeat the same walk in the sunlit present of the poem, 
and she is the silent partner of meditations on the nature of things. 
The poet remembers that--
This field-grass brushed our legs 
Last night, when out we stumbled looking up, 
Wading as through the cloudy dregs, 
Of a wide sparkling cup, 
Our thrown back heads aswim 
In the grand, kept appointments of the air, 
Save where a pine at the sky's rim 
Took something from the Bear. (Poems 131) 
The mention of the constellation lfrsa Major introduces the attempt 
to organize the universe mythologically. With casual ease the poet 
associates star clusters with the stories generations of human beings 
have told about them: 
Black in her glinting chains, 
Andromeda feared nothing from the seas, 
Preserved by no hero's pains, 
Or hushed Euripides', 
And there the dolphin glowed, 
Stilt flailing through a diamond froth of stars, 
Flawless as when Arion rode 
One of its avatars. ( 1 31) 
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The constellations mentioned bear the names of mythological figures 
who suff~red great terrors. The beautiful young maiden Andromeda 
was chained to rocks by the sea to await being devoured by a sea 
serpent. According to Greek myth, an oracle had prophesied that 
only her sacrifice would save her people from being consumed by 
the monster. Perseus, the heroic slayer of Medusa, rescued 
Andromeda and killed the monster (Hamilton 146-48). Held in the 
night sky by chains of stars, Andromeda no longer fears the sea nor 
waits for Perseus--or Euripides--to save her. In a note Wilbur 
explains that the Greek tragedian supposedly retold the story of 
Andromeda in a play. However, Euripides is twice dead, his voice 
"hushed" because no manuscript of his Andromeda survives. The 
other constellation mentioned, that of Arion, recalls the legend of the 
ancient Greek poet who was threatened by sailors who intended to 
rob him of a recently won prize and then throw him overboard. 
Arion asked that before dying he be allowed to sing and play his lyre 
one last time. After doing so, the poet/singer leaped into the sea, 
only to be saved by dolphins who had appeared enchanted by his 
music (Hamilton 289). 
Having just rehung Andromeda "!bllack in her glinting chains," 
and set the dolphin again "flailing through a diamond froth of stars," 
Wilbur abruptly blows apart his creation by asserting that "none of 
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that was true." The constellations no longer offer the surety of grand 
appointments kept. Over several millennia, they too have come 
apart: 
What shapes that Greece or Babylon discerned 
Had time not slowly drawn askew 
Or like a eat's cradle turned? (Poems 131) 
The ancient Egyptians' north, their polestar, had been in the 
constellation of the Dragon's tail, but "[tlhe heavens jumped away I 
Bursting the cincture of the zodiac .. and now the North Star is Polaris 
in the constellation llrsa .Minor (White 131 ). As the earth's 
rotational axis changes its direction over 26,000-year cycles, the star 
that we name North Star changes; twelve thousand years from now, 
the earth's northern axis will point to a spot near Vega in the 
constellation Lyra and another ten thousand years after that, Thuban 
in the constellation Draco will become the North Star (White 40 l). 
Unless the stars, like dice, can be "gathered for another cast," the old 
star patterns change, and ancient myths lose the form that once 
preserved them in the night sky. Not only do the stars themselves 
change positions over many years but the earth's yearly revolution 
about the sun changes the portion of the sky visible at night. The 
sky changes in the way the symmetrical string patterns constantly 
change in the child's game of eat's cradle as the string cradle is 
transferred from hand to hand. "As if a form of type should fall I 
And dash itself like hail," the heavens had broken their bounds and 
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"jumped away." The myths faded in sky and in memory, and the 
poet"s words were lost. John Gery in "The Sensible Emptiness in 
Three Poems by Richard Wilbur" writes that in the image of the 
spilled type "[tlhe idea of language as our hold or access to 
experience ... falls away" and "[a]ll schemes are broken, or at least 
breakable" just as the heavens burst out of the zodiac our 
imaginations had imposed on them ( 120). 
Lost in the uncertainty of fading myth and fleeing galaxies, the 
two companions wandering in a field beneath the night sky then 
sought the consolation of certainty to be found in fact, in science. Of 
whether the errant stars could be reassembled into the old figures--
We could not say, but trued 
Our talk to words of the real sky, 
Chatting of class or magnitude, 
Star-clusters, nebulae, 
And how Antares, huge 
As Mars' big roundhouse swing, and more, was fled 
As in some rimless centrifuge 
Into a blink of red. (Poems 132) 
The verb "trued" connects by seeming contrast this section on science 
with the earlier musings on the mythology of the heavens, about 
which the poet had to conclude "But none of that was true." What 
follows makes the use of "trued" truly ironic. The poet remembers 
that his and his companion's attention got snagged on "[tlhe 
schoolbook thoughts we thought," and the comfort they had sought in 
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facts succumbed to "the nip of fear" when their imaginations actually 
got caught on "ltlhe feel of what we said" (Poems 132; emphasis 
added). A giant red star of the first magnitude of brightness, 
Antares is the largest star (330 times larger than the sun) in the part 
of the universe that contains our solar system; however, red giants 
are dying stars expanding to a crimson glow in the process of their 
self-annihilation. As the couple observed Antares fled to the horizon 
of the universe "!a Is in some rimless centrifuge," their imaginations 
shivered at the vastness of the universe and the power of creation to 
explode itself. With the passage of time, myth could not hold the 
constellations together, and science can only try to measure the 
speed at which the galaxies fly apart. 
Stunned by the incredible vastitude of space and terrified by 
the "feel" of the facts of the universe, the companions were led to 
imagine ("faked") "a scan of space I Blown black and hollow" ( 132). 
If all is flux and change and a great star can seem to fly off to the 
world's rim, anything, everything, can be lost. Fearfully the "spent 
grenade" of imagination conceives the possibility of "All worlds 
dashed out without a trace, I The very light unmade" ( 132). The 
verb "dashed" echos the form of type which dashed itself like hail 
when the zodiac ruptured. With such troubled thoughts, the field 
walkers turn "in the late-night chill" and pick their way over stone 
outcrop under "faint starlight" toward the human comfort "where our 
bed-lamp shone." jensen says that in this poem Wilbur shows us 
"the struggle of a man who knows too much, whose learning and wit 
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conspire to multiply both nature's horrors and its wonders." Jensen 
also points out that Wilbur's expression of his apocalyptic vision in 
regular meter (as in "without a trace I The very light unmade"), 
carefully patterned quatrains, and sophisticated allusion suggests 
that chaos is kept at bay "only through a great effort of intellect and 
will." "The minor things are under control. Beyond us, and testing us 
always, is a world that baffles our perceptions: 'we remain I On the 
shore of what we know."' (Jensen 249-250). 
In the fourteenth stanza and after, the verbs become present 
tense; the speaker no longer talks of recollection, and the time is 
"Today in the same field" where the night before "lt]his field grass 
brushed our legs" ( 131-132). The universe "[bltown black and 
hollow" the night before is patched and papered over with sunlight: 
The sun takes all, and what could lie beyond? 
Those holes in heaven have been sealed 
Like rain-drills in a pond. (Poems 132) 
"We," the same two, are now "beheld in gold" and "[s]ee nothing 
starry but these galaxies I Of flowers, dense and manifold, I Which 
lift about our knees" (Poems 133). The poet watches as his beloved 
"sinks down" to pick an armload from the "lw]hite daisy-drifts." The 
diction the poet uses to describe the scene of his beloved among the 
wild flowers conveys both splendor in the grass and mutab it i ty. 28 
They walk in a field of--
White daisy-drifts where you 
--------------
Sink down to pick an armload as we pass, 
Sighting the heal-all's minor blue 
In chasms of the grass, 
And strew of hawkweed where, 
Amongst the reds or yellows as they burn, 
A few dead polls commit to air 
The seeds of their return. (Poems 133) 
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The daisies drift like snow in winter. The poet watches his beloved 
"Sin.A: dOJI"fl • .. as we pass," and "chasms of grass" make grave threats 
(emphasis added). Strewn as over a casket, the reds and yellows of 
hawkweed "burn," and the "few dead polls commit to air I The seeds 
of their retun1." Dried seed pods signal death for one generation if 
they promise life for another. The sounds of memento mori 
continue in "the heal-all's minor blue": The plant's name is itself a 
therapeutic lie but an aesthetic truth; its blue is "minor" --both small 
and sad-toned. No American poet, and certainly not Wilbur for 
whom Robert Frost was both mentor and friend, can mention the 
heal-all without conjuring up Frost's bitter, terrifying "Design" in 
which the anomalous white heal-all becomes with moth and spider 
an unholy trinity that makes the God of a divine plan either 
malicious or slipshod or untenable. 
The ominous diction of the verses describing the field of wild 
flowers subverts the assumed assurance of the rhetorical question 
asked in the golden dayshine of stanza fourteen: "Today, in the same 
field, I The sun takes all, and what could lie beyond?" ( 132). The 
sense of mutability in the verses that follow suggests that what lies 
256 
beyond daylight is the return of darkness and the black, hollowed 
night sky peppered with fading, fleeing stars. or the field of daisy 
and hawkweed and heal-all, the poet warns--
We could no doubt mistake 
These flowers for some answer to that fright 
We felt for all creation's sake 
In our dark talk last night. (Poems 133) 
Wilbur offers no flowery consolation for the sky evidence--in myth 
and in science--of star-worlds rushing toward the edge of our 
knowledge and over into oblivion. The flower galaxies cannot 
ressolve the terror of the night sky because they themselves are also 
stars adrift in a mutable world. 
Only one force can match the power of fear when the 
imagination gets caught not just by fact and myth but by the feel of 
what it knows and is made to stare into Pascal's abyss: 
Taking to heart what came 
Of the heart's wish for life, which, staking here 
In the least field an endless claim, 
Beats on from sphere to sphere 
And pounds beyond the sun, 
Where nothing less peremptory can go, 
And is ourselves, and is the one 
Unbounded thing we know. (Poems 133) 
In his notes to this poem, Wilbur cites a source for his idea of 
boundlessness; he quotes from A New Catechism: ...... beyond the 
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limits we know, there is something boundless for our hearts'" (qtd. in 
Poems 177). In his sunlit meditation on the previous night's terror, 
the poet uncovers "something boundless for our hearts": 
... the heart's wish for life 
... is ourselves, and is the one 
Unbounded thing we know. 
(Poems 133) 
Anchored on earth in a field of daisy-drifts, the heart's wish for life 
"pounds beyond the sun," and, like Antares, it glows with brightness 
of the first magnitude. What the poet has discovered is not 
assuagement for the "nip of fear" but its source. Desperately we 
hope that our unbounded longing implies that there is indeed 
"something bound less for our hearts." jensen says that what "In the 
Field" finally asserts is "the heroism of being human, the heroism of 
facing up to the inadequacy of the answers we can discover with all 
our powers of thought and imagination" ("Encounters with 
Experience" 249). 
For Wilbur, love and death are the greatest mysteries, and he 
celebrates life in the presence of its shadow. The speaker of the 
poem "Sunlight Is Imagination" comes to see shadows as a 
manifestation of sunlight and to choose to love in the teeth of death. 
As in "In the Field," the poet and his beloved are in a meadow; the 
speaker addresses the woman who is caught in a play of light and 
shadow: 
Each shift you make in the sunlight somewhere 
Cleaves you away into dark. Now 
You are clarion hair, bright brow, 
Lightcaped shoulder and armside here and there 
Gone into meadow shadow. (Poems 374) 
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The woman, mermaid-like, becomes a creature of two elements; the 
light which makes her bright also creates, where it is obstructed, the 
shadow which cleaves her away into darkness. The poet asks, 
"Where I Are my eyes to run?" What is he to make of her? Shall he 
say simply and truly that "you are fair I In the sun"? Or shall he 
make of her a symbol or fiction, something more than a woman 
dazzling in sunlight and partially hidden in shade: "Shall I .... 
mermaid you in the grass waving away?" (374). The speaker is torn 
between the real and the image that will preserve the real. 
The imagery of mermaid and grass waving leads into the 
second stanza where the poet/lover compares himself to juan Ponce 
de Leon, who "climbing to light I On a morning of the Feast of the 
Resurrection," saw from "the ocean shelf" the allure of Florida: 
The sunlight shining on the land left the shaded interior dim and 
mysterious, a place that might hold the longed for fountain: 
... parrots prophesied; 
Vines ciphered; to each waterside 
Paths pitched in hopes to the fair and noble ~ell 
Of sweetest savor and reflaire 
Whose ghostly taste 
And cleanse repair 
All waste, 
And where was ageless power from the first. 
(Poems 374) 
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Seeing his beloved bright in the sunlight and then lost in the shadow 
makes the poet aware of the omnipresent mortality that could cleave 
her away in some final darkness. This unspoken anxiety leads his 
thoughts to the Spanish explorer who sought the Fountain of Youth in 
sunny Florida. On the Feast of the Resurrection, Juan Ponce reached 
the land where he hoped to find the "fair and noble well" whose 
sweet smell and savor and "ghostly taste" would repair the wastes of 
time, an "ageless power," both ancient and rejuvenating. 
But the poet is not seduced by his own longing or the promise 
of eternal and unchanging youth and beauty. He recognizes that 
trying to make time-bound things last destroys them. 
Yet thirst 
Makes deserts, barrens to a sign 
Deckled and delicate arbors, bleeds 
The rose, parches the prodigal seeds 
That spring toward time in air, and breaks the spine 
Of the rock. No; I shall resign 
That power, and crave 
Kindly to pine 
And to save 
The sprout and the ponderation of the land. 
(Poems 375) 
The poet recognizes the paradox that things must die in order to live. 
As Donald Hill observes, "yearning for the eternal wastes the 
temporary" (35). The poet gives up the power to make time stand 
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sti 11 and craves instead to save not only the sprout--the new growth 
that shoots from a branch or root or stump, an emblem of life--but 
also the "ponderation of the land "--the weight or gravitation that 
pulls all things down, draws all things back to the earth. 
The poet knows that he is in love with dying things: 
My hand 
Can touch but mysteries, and each 
Of a special shadow. I shall spare 
The larch its shattering ghost, the pear 
Its dark awaiter too, for shades beseech 
Originals: they running reach 
On windy days 
To touch, to teach 
What stays 
Is changed, and shadows die into dying things. 
(Poems 375) 
"Spare" means "spare to," not "spare from." The "shattering ghost," 
the shadow of the larch, and the "dark awaiter," the shadow of the 
pear, are among the special shades which "beseech I Originals." 
These shadow ghosts manifest the essential nature of their originals; 
the originals cannot exist without them. That which is ephemeral is 
created by its temporality; it cannot become part of eternity and 
maintain its uniqueness, part of which is the continual capacity to 
change. The dancing shadows of the larch and the pear teach that 
"What stays I Is changed. "29 
In the last stanza, the poet reaffirms his judgment that life is 
worth dying for and that love is worth suffering: 
Now swings 
The sky to noon, and mysteries run 
To cover; let our love not b I ight 
The various world, but trust the flight 
Of love that falls again where it begun. 
A 11 creatures are, and are undone. 
Then lose them, lose 
With love each one, 
And choose 
To welcome love in the lively wasting sun. 
(Poems 375) 
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The paradox of the "lively wasting sun" and the tone of the last 
stanza are reminsicent of Wallace Stevens' "Sunday Morning" in 
which "Death is the mother of beauty" and in which "We live in an 
old chaos of the sun, I Or old dependency of day and night" (Palm 7-
8). On "our perishing earth," men who chant "on a summer morn I 
Their boisterous devotion to the sun" shall "know well the heavenly 
fellowship I Of men that perish and of summer morn" (7-8). 
Trusting "the flight I Of love that falls again where it begun" is like 
watching "casual flocks of pigeons make I Ambiguous undulations as 
they sink, I Downward to darkness on extended wings" (Palm 8). 
Both poets find "comforts of the sun I ... I In any balm or beauty of 
the earth, I Things to be cherished I ike the thought of heaven." 
All love comes at the price of inevitable pain and loss. In "For 
Dudley," his elegy for his friend Dudley Fitts, Wilbur writes of 
visiting his friend's home just after Fitts' death: "Even when death 
has taken I An exceptional man, I It is common things which touch 
us .... " He is moved when he finds lying on his friend's desk "ltlhe 
half of a sentence I Not to be finished by us, who lack I His gaiety, 
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his Greek." The never-to-be-finished sentence epitomizes the 
irrevocable, unique loss. As Wilbur watches, the "quick sun" picks 
out of the shadows "a chair, a vase of flowers." He recognizes the 
sunlight as "the light of which I Achilles spoke, Himself a shadow 
then, recalling I The splendor of mere being" (Poems 135).30 The 
intense "splendor of mere being" is matched and balanced by the 
exquisite sense of pure loss as the mourners, "[a] small knot of island 
folk, I The Light-Dwellers" pour "[a] life to the dark sea." 
Wilbur's poem "Lament" opens with an allusion to Thomas 
Nashe's poem "A Litany in Time of Plague," which contains the line, 
"Queens have died young and fair" (Nashe 666). Wilbur begins his 
"Lament" with "Nashe's old queens who bartered young and fair I 
Their light tiaras for such ponderous stones"--the "ponderous stones" 
being tombstones. Observing the mutable world, Wilbur declares 
that "Kept spirit is corporate." Spirit is "kept" only through 
incorporation; body is the form and matter of spirit. The word 
corporate, derived from the Latin past participle of corporare 
meaning "to make into a body," is haunted by another derivative 
from the Latin root corpus-- corpse. "Kept spirit" incorporated into 
flesh cannot be J.·ept: 
Water and air: such unclenched stuff can last, 
But rarest things are visible and firm. (Poems 324). 
Wilbur puns on the word rarest. The rarest things are the most 
excellent and distinctive, the most uncommon, the most extreme; but 
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rarest also describes gases-- "unclenched stuff" like air--which have 
their atoms or molecules most widely separated. For Wilbur, the 
"rarest things" are paradoxically "visible and firm," the solid stuff 
that cannot last. One of these rarest things, beauty, a sublime 
abstraction, can be known only through material manifestations. 
Beauty exists in the beautiful; therefore, the death of beauty is "a 
most material loss." In this poem in which he addresses "you," his 
beloved, the poet's regrets "grace's early term" as expressed in the 
"casual dances that your body knows, I Whose spirit only sense can 
understand." The energy, grace, rhythm, and pattern of the dance 
can be known only through the body. The spirit of the dance can 
only be experienced through the senses. Body and spirit make one 
another and are inextricably mixed. 31 But incorporation means 
death. The poet, addressing his beloved with his "Lament," says that 
his thought of her grew out of "my wishes and your being." He 
laments for what he loves and delights in: "For times when spirit, 
doomed and single, flows I Into the speeches of your eye and hand" 
(Poems 324). He sees her spirit poured out in the body--both 
manifest and lost. 
In "La Rose des Vents" the Poet warns the Lady that this 
friable world is too easily worn away-- "The hardest headlands I 
Gravel down I The seas abrade I What coasts we know"; he says that 
to escape this mutability they must "dwell I On the rose of the 
winds" (Poem~ 287). The Lady, however, sees another danger: 
When beauty seeks safety as image "in the floods I Of farthest 
-------.. -
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thought," that beauty "[dlissolves in other I and is not." She tells the 
Poet that they can find a bit of headland sufficient for their mortal 
time: 
There are some shores 
Sti llleft to find 
Whose broken rocks 
Will last the hour; 
Forsake those roses of the mind 
And tend the true, 
The mortal flower. (Poems 287) 
The mind and heart feel constantly the seduction to flee the danger 
and anxiety of this mutable world into a safe, concocted world of 
fancy where things can be kept. The Lady, however, like Lot's wife, 
would not give up "the true, the mortal flower" for the safety of 
"those roses of the mind." The only honest comfort for mutability is 
the austere economy of the universe in which what rvas inevitably 
becomes part of what is. That consolation is spoken in Wilbur's 
translation of two poems by Borges. The sonnet "Everness" asserts 
that "One thing does not exist: Oblivion"; everything that was is as 
"part of that diverse I Crystalline memory, the universe" ( 165). In 
"Ewigkeit" (eternity in German), the poets declare that "havened in 
eternity ... I My many precious losses burn and stay" ( 166). The 
precious cannot be J:ept but it will sta.v, becoming part of the past 
that makes the present. In "Flumen Tenebrarum" Wilbur 
deliberately chooses not to make a Grecian Urn of his love: 
As if to kiss were someway to embark: 
As if to love were partly to be spent, 
And send of us a hostage to the dark. 
If so, I am content, 
And would not have my lively longing freeze, 
Nor your delays in figures of the sky, 
Since none outlasts the stream, and even these 
Must come to life and die. (Poems 325) 
"We are this man unspeakably alone" 
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In The Creative Loon., Erich Harth writes that what 
distinguishes human beings more than anything else is "our acute 
awareness of Self, and a mental preoccupation with our being that 
goes far beyond the self-preserving behavior that all animals 
exhibit." He says that this strong sensation of selfhood "often gives 
rise to a feeling of ineffable solitude, an existential angst engendered 
by an outside ~"orfrf, the it that surrounds the lone /" (Harth xviii). 
The solid masses of the world as well as the infinitude of space may 
inflict on us the knowledge of our smallness, weakness, and 
inconsequence, or they may become symbols of Being, vehicles to 
access the transcendent. 
Eliade explains how stones can come to have religious value as 
a manifestation of the sacred. In a hierophany stone reveals its 
being as power, hardness, permanence--an invulnerability to time 
that escapes man: 
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The hierophany of a stone is pre-eminently an ontophany; 
above all, the stone is, it always remains itself, it does not 
change--and it strikes man by what it possesses of 
irreducibility and absoluteness and, in so doing, reveals to him 
by analogy the irreducibility and absoluteness of being. 
Perceived by virtue of a religious experience, the specific mode 
of existence of the stone reveals to man the nature of an 
absolute e.-tistence, beyond time, invulnerable to becoming. 
(Eliade 155-156) 
In a profane world, however, the stone becomes a painful, taunting 
reminder of the soft and ephemeral nature of human flesh. Striking 
the perceiver with its solid permanence, the stone, rather than 
revealing an absolute, transcendent existence, highlights human 
impermanence. 
Faced with the insult of such adamant otherness, man retaliates 
by cutting rock down to human size. 
Rock insults us, hard and so boldly browed 
Its scorn needs not to focus, and with fists 
Which still unstirring strike: 
Collected it resists 
Until its buried glare begets a like 
Anger in us, and finds our hardness. Proud, 
Then, and armed, and with a patient rage 
We carve cliff, shear stone to blocks, 
And down to the image of man 
Batter and shape the rock's 
Fierce composure, closing its veins within 
That outside man, itself its captive cage. 
(Poems 330) 
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The unrelenting hard resistance of rock "insults" and "angers" us " 
and "finds our hardness" so that we turn on it "with patient rage" to 
cut stone down into the image of man. In a stone sculpture the 
rock's very hardness, its solid structure, becomes "its captive cage," 
used to imprison it in the outside form of man. 
Man can thus triumph over rock, turning its resistance into his 
own image, but what happens when man's image of self changes--
when we ourselves become "strange I To what we were"? The 
death of God meant the attentuation of man. ihus, the scuipied rock 
that had locked in human wi 11 and image when we thought ourselves 
made in the divine pattern now confronts us with what we once 
were and shows us how little we have become. 
So we can baffle rock, and in our wilt 
Can clothe and keep it. But if our will, though locked 
In stone it clutches, change, 
Then are we much worse mocked 
Than cliffs can do: then we ourselves are strange 
To what we were, which lowers on us still. 
High in the air those habitants of stone 
Look heavenward, lean to a thought, or stride 
Toward some concluded war, 
While we on every side, 
Random as shells, the sea drops down ashore, 
Are walking, walking, many and alone. (Poems 330) 
Our victories over hard matter come to taunt us. The sculpted 
sublime in Bernini's The Ecstasy of Saint Teresa mocks the aridity of 
twentieth century spirituality; the intensity of Rodin's The Thinker 
-- - --------
makes our musings seem paltry. Heroic figures 1 ike Nelson on his 
column make the ordinary commuter seem shabby and pointless. 
Reduced to random, anonymous, meaningless automatons, we are 
taunted by the forms of the past which were defined and made 
singular by their passion and intent--on heaven or philosophy or 
conquest. Now, many, we are atone; directionless, we walk 
obsessively--substituting momentum for purpose. 
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In a universe unimaginably vast, on a planet four billion years 
old, a single human being has become "a diminished thing," left to 
ask the question framed "in all but words" at the end of Robert 
Frost's poem "The Oven Bird": " ... what to make of a diminished 
thing"? (Frost 150). The poet asks of man, "What stony shape could 
hold us now ... ?" Then he invites the reader to follow "along this 
street I (Where rock recovers carven eye and hand)" and look 
"where Giacometti in a room I Dim as a cave of the sea, has built the 
man I We are, and made him walk" (Poems 331). Each of the 
sculptor's walking figures towers "like a thin I Coral, out of a reef of 
plaster chalk" and takes "the single form we can assume." 
Giacometti's figures are man reduced to the minimum 
--"unspeakably atone," "stripped of the singular," and "pruned of 
every gesture": 
We are this man unspeakably alone 
Yet stripped of the singular utterly, shaved and scraped 
Of all but being there, 
Whose fullness is escaped 
Like a burst baloon's: no nakedness so bare 
As flesh gone in inquiring of the bone. 
He is pruned of every gesture, saving only 
The habit of coming and going. Every pace 
Shuffles a million feet. 
The faces in this face 
Are all forgotten faces of the street 
Gathered to one anonymous and lonely. 
No prince and no Leviathan, he is made 
Of infinite farewells. Oh never more 
Diminished, nonetheless 
Embodied here, we are 
This starless walker, one who cannot guess 
His will, his keel his nose's bony blade. 
(Poems 331) 
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"Volumes"--all the vacancy outside that presses upon the starless 
walker--take up the space left by the withered flesh "gone in 
inquiring of the bone"--sucked in by the vacuum inside. The future 
portends nothingness for "ltlhis least of man" whom we follow to 
make our own "grim departures." 
Insulted by the adamantine otherness of rock, man responded 
by shaping stone into his own images only to be taunted by those 
heroic figures when he later feii away from their surety and 
direction. Now "shaved and scraped I Of all but being there," man 
strides puposelessly, habitually, " ... walking to find I What 
railleries or rock, what palisades?" (331 ). The rock has the final 
laugh. Confronted a..nd obstructed by cliffs of weathered stone and 
mocked by the bitten, attentuated image of himself in Giacometti's 
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figures, man is left with only momentum, a directionless urge; he is a 
wanderer who has no purpose for his wandering and therefore 
follows narcissistically the keel-blade of his own nose. The 
revelation of stone's adamantine otherness confronts man not only 
with his ephemeral nature but also with the flimsiness of his being 
while it lasts in time. In a time of greater faith, stone's impregnable 
being might have served as a symbol for an absolute existence 
beyond time and invulnerable to becoming, but in a world without a 
God, stone becomes simply a hard object to shatter or to be shattered 
by. 
"Walking to Sleep" lets us ins ide the imagination of one of 
Giacometti's nameless walkers. The poem, a dramatic monologue in 
blank verse, presents alternative ways of getting through life. 
"Walking to Sleep" is, in the end, a poem about humility--letting go of 
control and letting be--and the courageous leap of faith that makes 
life "risk-hallowed." Living consciously in the presence of Being 
requires acts of attention that will necessarily entail both love and 
terror. At the outset, however, the poem is about just getting by. 
The wary speaker of the poem is a voice of experience and caution, 
attenuated by practicing his own advice. The "you" to whom he 
speaks may be either the reader or an aspect of his own mind or a 
silent insomniac come to the speaker for an effective soporific--or all 
of these. The speaker counsels his insomniac 1 is tener about how to 
achieve most easily and safely the goal of the title. Initially, 
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"Walking to Sleep" suggests the image of one of Giacometti's bitten 
figures striding anonymously through life toward the rest of the final 
anonymity of death--" ... unspeakably alone I Yet stripped of the 
singular utterly, shaved and scraped I Of all but being there" (330). 
The title upends the normal idioms -- falling asleep and 
sleepwalking. "Walking to Sleep" implies an active, intentional 
pursuit of the momentum and the suspended consciousness of sleep-
walk in g. Walking to sleep is a metaphor for the mind traveling 
purposively through interior landscapes seeking the solace of either 
oblivion or dream vision, deliberately courting the sacrifice of 
awareness which Wilbur calls "a spiritual loss" ("Sumptuous 
Destitution" 9 ). 
or the two strategies he offers for walking to sleep, the speaker 
seems, initially at least, to prefer the first. It entails fewer risks. 
The walker may actually get to sleep without feeling pain. Exercising 
sufficient paranoid watchfulness over the imagination might allow 
him to get to death without seeing it coming, without making any 
attachments that give him something to lose. The monologist advises 
that, generally, "a numb and grudging circumspection" serves best 
and offers these guidelines: 
Try to remember this: what you project 
Is what you will perceive; what you perceive 
With any passion, be it love or terror, 
May take on whims and powers of its own. 
(Poems 158) 
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The guide advises that the world is a screen for what the mind 
projects, and the sleeper's imagination writes the script. He also 
cautions that passionate attention to things of this world--whether 
they inspire love or terror--will give those "sensible objects" power 
over the perceiver. For this walk, the speaker counsels not faith but 
the assumed assurance of safe expectations. Step off into the blank 
of your mind with the confidence of a queen who sits "knowing that 
a chair will be there" or of a general who "raises his hand and is 
given the field glasses." The speaker promises, "Something will come 
to you" through the fog. Images will begin to accrete on the margins 
of the imagination. 
!n his earlier poem "Marginalia," Wilbur wrote that "Things 
concentrate at the edges," and he described the margins of the pond 
which collect "inlaid ruddy twigs, becalmed pine-leaves, I Air-
baubles, and the chain mail of froth" (266). The speaker in "Walking 
to Sleep" encourages no such distinct and brillant images enamelled 
with life. Instead, he offers gray, amorphous, tentative shapes--
undistinguished and undefined: 
Gravel wi II breed in the margins of your ga:ze, 
Perhaps with tussocks or a dusty flower, 
And, humped like dolphins playing in the bow-wave, 
Hills will suggest themselves. (Poems 158) 
Sensing danger--too much delight in the dolphin simile, the speaker 
acknowledges that all suggestions such as the humped hills make-
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"la]re yours to take or leave" but admonishes his hearer to "hear this 
warning": 
Let them not be too velvet green, the fields 
Which the deft needle of your eye appoints, 
Nor the old farm past which you make your way 
Too shady-linteled, too instinct with home. 
(Poems 158) 
The speaker recognizes the hazard that the imagination may get 
snagged, hung up on the images of its own making. It may linger 
over its embroidery of velvet fields or try to find home comfort in 
the shady doorway of an imaginary farmhouse. 
The speaker himself demonstrates the danger. He creates a 
barn out of which an emblem of death can walk: 
It is precisely from Potemkin barns 
With their fresh-painted hex signs on the gables, 
Their sparking gloom within, their stanchion-rattle 
And sweet breath of silage, that there comes 
The trotting cat whose head is but a skull. (Poems 158) 
A Potemkin barn is a piece of decor like one of the villages created 
by the Russian statesman Grigori A. Potemkin to impress his 
sometime lover Catherine the Great. The villages were marvelous 
fakes, facades to decorate the empress' route of travel. Specific 
sensual images--the color and complication of the hex sign, the 
perception of the sparkling gloom of the barn's interior seen from the 
sunlit exterior, the sound of stanchion rattle with the implication of 
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warm-bodied cattle, the smell of green fodder--bring imaginatively 
alive the things of this world to which the mind becomes attached 
and which will keep it awake, resisting the final sleep. The speaker 
warns that it is precisely from these barns of the imagination "that 
there comes I The trotting cat whose head is but a skull." In the 
midst of delight comes the dread of death. 
What must be avoided is any passion, love or terror. Even 
"numb and grudging circumspection" can be overdone. To shrink 
"your purview I To a tight vision of your inching shoes" may, "as 
soon as you come to think," have you crossing "[aln unseen gorge 
upon a rotten trestle." For the mind the only safe landscape is one 
not worth iooking at--"its grass I As dry as lichen, and its lichen 
grey," a "glumly simple country" that an occasional glance of "flat 
indifference" will stabilize. Wilbur enhances the effect of the bleak 
imagery of these lines by regularizing the meter to a steady iambic 
pentameter and by repeating words and sounds. The repetition of 
words--lichen, lichens and "time to time" --and sounds--the 
recurrent g's of grass, grey, glumly, glance, and the near 
homophones, lifeless and leafless--contribute aurally and visually to 
the sense of sameness. 
Paradoxicallly, the lifeless view, the speaker assures, "should 
set at rest all thoughts of ambush." Nevertheless, to further ensure 
his safety, the monologist urges the listener to control his image-
making and disallow any shelter for a would-be assassin: 
... permit no roadside thickets 
Which, as you pass, might shake with worse than wind; 
Revoke all trees and other cover; blast 
The upstart boulder which a flickering shape 
Has stepped behind; above all, put a stop 
To the known stranger .... (Poems 159) 
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Here in the poem Wilbur makes a wonderfully smooth transition 
from images of the outside world to interior scenes by having the 
speaker interrupt himself to describe how the drowsy mind can 
jump abruptly like an old film from one setting to another, omitting 
transition at frames: 
Here let me interject that steady trudging 
Can make you drowsy, so that without transition, 
As when an old film jumps in the projector, 
You will be wading a dun hallway, rounding 
A newel post, and starting up the stairs. 
(Poems 159) 
The three-in-a-row accents on "old film jumps" coming right in the 
middle of that line aurally perform the hitch and lurch of the film in 
the projector.32 The progressive forms of the three future tense 
verbs--wading, rounding, starting--gets the film of the imagination 
moving again. The trochaic "rounding" coming at the end of the line 
makes us stop and turn the corner to get past the newe 1 post at the 
beginning of the next I ine. 
The speaker advises that should such a sudden change of scene 
occur, the listener must "adjust to circumstances I And carry on .... " 
He adds further precautions so that the insomniac can protect 
himself from the interior hazards: 
Detach some portion of your thought to guard 
The outside of the building; as you wind 
From room to room, leave nothing at your back, 
But slough all memories at·every threshold; 
Nor must you dream of opening any door 
Until you have forseen what lies beyond it. 
(Poems 159) 
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The feel of these lines is of a soldier cautiously and tentatively 
moving through the dangerous--possibly sniper-infested, booby-
trapped--buildings arid terrain of a captured enemy town. He must 
guard himself against the danger awaiting outside and the danger 
awaiting within--the lapse of attention from the narrowly focused 
present into distracting memories or hopes. 
There ensue~ a surreal journey through this house, "the abrupt 
structure" of the imagination, which improvises like vapor assuming 
various forms. The walker passes down into a gritty cellar past fuse 
box and sheeted lawn chairs to emerge into "some cathedral's 
pillared crypt." The burial place becomes a mine shaft of "drifts and 
rubbly tunnels." Lines describing a mine elevator cage create a fast-
changing, dream-like quality: 
Promptly the hoist, ascending toward the pit-head, 
Rolls downward past your gaze ad in ted rock-face 
Peppered with hacks and drill-holes, which acquire 
Insensibly the took of hieroglyphics. (Poems 159) 
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The reversal of accent in trochaic "promptly" at the beginning of the 
line gives the feel of abruptness. The combination of "ascending 
toward" and "[r]olls downward past" offers a confused sense of 
direction; up and down occur at once. The solid rock face seems to 
move past like a sheet of scenery turned on rollers. Nothing is 
steady or lasting. Hacking and drill holes on the surface of the rock 
take on "the look of hieroglyphics" as the open lift moves past them. 
The protean imagery offers the would-be sleeper a choice: 
Whether to surface now within the vast 
Stone tent where Cheops lay secure, or take 
The proffered shed of corrugated iron 
Which gives at once upon a vacant barracks, 
Is up to you. (Poems 160) 
He can choose as his destination the Great Pyramid at Gizeh, the 
"stone tent" burial place of the ancient Egyptian king Cheops, or he 
can choose the corrugated iron shed covering the head of a mine 
shaft. 
Rhetorically, the speaker-guide asks a warning question: "Need 
I at this point, tell you I What to avoid?" Thus he again reminds the 
walker-to-sleep not to let his imagination be seduced by an arresting 
scene--by a smiling woman in a pleasant room arranging a bowl of 
freesias. This cautionary image--like the Potemkin barn--stands out 
in bold contrast to the vague, gray background details the speaker 
has been suggesting to fill his insomniac's traveling mind. This scene 
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is filled with sunlight and allure. A graceful woman is dressed in 
yellow and is as sleek as lemonwood. She has arranged a bowl of 
freesias--exotic, fragrant yellow blossoms of an iris-like plant. The 
walker must not let the thought of her--
... mislead you where the curtains, 
Romping like spinnakers which taste the wind, 
Bellying out and lifting till the sill 
Has shipped a drench of sunlight, then subsiding, 
Both warm and cool the love-bed. (Poems 160) 
The diction is implicitly full of sexual delight. Like spinnaker sails 
running before the wind--thin, light curtains dance and tease; they 
swell ("bellying out") and lift erotically until, having shipped "a 
drench of sunlight," they subs ide. The romp of the curtains warms 
the "love-bed" with sunlight and coots it with the breeze. 
However, the speaker reminds his listener cf the earlier 
mentioned danger of any passion--either love or terror: " ... Your 
concern I ls not to be detained by dread, or by I Such dear 
acceptances as would entail it" ( 160). As hazardous as a 
preoccupation with an individual fear itself would be to the business 
of falling quietly into oblivion, the more insidious threat to the 
imagination is to get caught in the net of the things of this world. 
The "dear acceptances"--love of another, delight in beauty, a shared 
joy--make the walker-to-sleep especially vulnerable because they 
multiply the opportunities for worry, for painful awareness. It is one 
thing to guard his own back; to extend attachments to others makes 
279 
the seclusion of his attention impossible. The only safety is to pursue 
""an ever-dimming course I Of pure transition""--to keep walking but 
not to think. If he can successfully mope ""[llike a drugged fire-
inspector .. past porous, crumb 1 ing limestone, down the sewer-like 
halls of boarded-up hotels, and through attics filled with ""glassy 
taxidermy,"" the speaker tells the listener what he may hope for ""at 
some point of the pointless journey."' The wonderful illogic of a 
""point"" to the ""pointless"" heralds what follows. If closely guarded 
enough, the imagination may look forward to being blown away 
without ever noticing it. 
.... What you hope for 
Is that at some point of the pointless journey, 
Indoors or out, and when you least expect it, 
Right in the middle of your stride, like that, 
So neatly that you never feel a thing, 
The kind assasin Sleep will draw a bead 
And blow your brains out. 
(Poems 160) 
Strategic pauses and irregularities in the meter are a significant part 
of the shock and effectiveness of this passage. The syntactically 
engineered breaks indicated by commas after ""out,"" ""it,"" and ""stride"" 
and the added stress on ""it"' give a lurching quality to what is 
otherwise iambic pentameter. ""Like that, .. set of by punctuation and 
syntax, cracks like the pistol shot it represents. The last line has only 
two-and-a-half feet and ends on an unstressed syllable, rhythmically 
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producing the abruptness of the kind assasin's interruption, of the 
death-like blow the words describe. 
After a significant pause represented by blankness at the end 
of the last line of the first part and at the beginning of the first line 
of the second part of the monologue, the disconcerted speaker asks, 
"What, are you still awake?" Obviously his first tactic for "walking to 
sleep" has not worked and he must suggest another. The speaker 
now counsels the walker to "lflorget what I have said" and face the 
risk of "another tack and footing": 
Open your eyes 
To the good blackness not of your room alone 
But of the sky you trust is over it, 
Whose stars, though foundering in the time to come, 
Bequeath us constantly a jetsam beauty. (Poems 160) 
The tone and message are entirely changed. Instead of urging self-
protective blinders to guard against sensual stimulation, the speaker 
demands that the listener open his eyes to not only the world that he 
can see but to the world he can imagine--" the sky you trust." 
Instead of the paranoia of his earlier monologue, the speaker's advice 
now has a religious sense of ihe beneficence and oneness of the 
universe-- "the good blackness." The image of the dying gift of the 
stars is exquisite. The beautiful changes, and the light we see from 
distant stars was generated eons ago. Though they may have failed 
light years past--in what for us is the time yet to come--we still 
receive the brillance discharged in their dying, the bequest of their 
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"jetsam beauty." As the poet writes in "Icarium Mare": "This is no 
outer dark I But a small province haunted by the good" (20). 
With just brief allusions, Wilbur creates an aura of expectant 
trust. The speaker tells the walker, "Now with your knuckles rub 
your eyelids, seeing I The phosphenes caper like St. Elmo's fire." By 
comparing the shimmerings elicited through stimulating the retina 
by pressure on the eyeball to the glow over church steeples or ship 
masts caused by the the discharges of atmospheric electricity during 
stormy weather, the poet freights the line with subtle meaning. 
Mediterranean sailors considered Saint Elmo's fire to be a visible sign 
of the saint's (actually Erasmus, Elmo is a derivation) guardianship 
over them (Attwater 116). The walker's ability to elicit a similar 
phenomenon at anytime suggests the omnipresence of that sign and 
its susceptibility to human need. The lines "And let your head heel 
over on the pillow I Like a flung skiff on wild Gennesaret" are also 
allusively comforting. Gennesaret is another name for the Sea of 
Galilee, and the image of sleeping in a small boat on that stormy sea 
recalls the Gospel story of jesus "asleep on a pillow" white winds 
rocked and waves filled the little fishing vessel in which he sailed. 
When the frightened disciples awakened him, jesus stilled the waves 
and then asked, "Why are ye so fearful? How is it that ye have no 
faith?" (Mark 4:40). Here in "Walking to Sleep" the speaker counsels 
the walker to let his head roll on the pillow, to let his imagination be 
tossed by whatever comes: 
Let all things storm your thought with the moiled flocking 
Of startled rookeries, or flak in air, 
Or blossom-fall, and out of that come striding 
In the strong dream by which you have been chosen. 
(Poems 161) 
Instead of being isolated and furtive, the walker must become a 
purposeful actor in the imaginative reality through which he is 
himself included. 
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The speaker's question "Are you upon the roads again?" recalls 
the walker's earlier stepping out. Then his guide had suggested that 
the best landscape was one not worth looking at; now the walker-to-
sleep is encouraged to let himself be led past "honeyed meadows 
which might tempt I a wolf to graze." The speaker calls the walker 
to delight in difference, in life other than his own, to be led past: 
... groves which are not you 
But answer to your suppler self, that nature 
Able to bear the thrush's quirky glee 
In stands of chuted 1 ight, yet praise as well, 
All leaves aside, the barren bark of winter. 
(Poems 161) 
The "suppler self" is the imagination able to endure the joy of the 
songbird, cavorting in the chutes of light that stream through the leaf 
gaps in groves of trees and also able to praise the stark winter 
landscape. Wilbur's playfulness with language here mimics the 
experience to which the speaker calls the listener. The poet reverses 
the expected use of verbs. The walker is able to "bear" glee and to 
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"praise" bareness. The "stands" are not of trees but of "chuted light." 
Wilbur revitalizes the hackneyed "all kidding aside" or "all jokes 
aside"; winter becomes "all leaves aside." In this verbal play, the 
unfettered imagination frolics in gaiety, transfiguring all the dread of 
the earlier landscape which revoked all trees and preferred its "grass 
I As dry as lichen, and its lichens grey." 
But the speaker does not call his listener just to delight in 
beauty. Before he had proscribed both love and terror; now he 
insists on both: 
When, as you may, you find yourself approaching 
A crossroads and its laden gallows tree, 
Do not with hooded eyes allow the shadow 
Of a man moored in air to bruise your forehead, 
But lift your gaze and stare your brother down, 
Though the swart crows have pecked his sockets hollow. 
(Poems 161) 
No matter how gruesome the sight, the traveler cannot with averted, 
half-closed eyes look away from his dead brother hanging on the 
gallows. The shadow of the thing not seen would bruise his forehead, 
leaving the stain of cowardice on his imagination. The walker must 
"stare down" his eyeless brother. By looking full in the ravaged face, 
by not refusing to perform the only acknowledgment he can, the 
walker symbolically and imaginatively brings the "man moored in 
air," the suffering Christ-figure, back down to brotherhood. 
Like the adventurer God of process theology, the monologist 
cannot foresee what this new, risky tack of openness to all life will 
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mean for his listener: "As for what turn your travels then wi 11 take, 
I I cannot guess." He can offer no guarantees but suggests some 
possibilities: 
... Long errantry perhaps 
Will arm you to be gentle, or the claws 
Of nightmare flap you pathless God knows where, 
As the crow flies, to meet your dearest horror. 
(Poems 161) 
Again Wilbur uses words in paradoxical and unexpected ways. The 
superficial contradiction in being "armed" to be "gentle" tells a 
deeper truth: There is no strength without gentleness, no gentleness 
without strength. If the traveler practices a life of chivalric deeds, 
arming his strength with gentleness, he may be rewarded not with 
lance and spurs but with the desire to comfort, not to injure or 
conquer. On the other hand, the choosing of a vocation may not be 
his. He may be seized in the talons of a Poesque nightmare bird. "As 
the crow flies" reminds the reader of "the swart crows" that pecked 
out the eyes of the man on the gallows tree. The clawed nightmare 
may flap the walker to meet his "dearest horror." Speaking of a 
horror as "dear" is contradictory outside of Edgar Allan Poe's poetry, 
but Poe has been a fascination of Wilbur's for forty years. And 
"dear" harkens back to the warning in the first part of the the 
monologue about "dear attachments" that entail a concomitant dread. 
The dearest horror may be the most costly, may involve the loss of 
------------ --------
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the thing most loved. But the common epithet "God knows where" 
takes on a new assurance: God l.·now·s where. 
Earlier in the monologue, the speaker had said that if the 
walker-to-sleep carefuly guarded his awareness from love and 
terror, all he could offer him was the hope that the kind assassin 
Sleep might blow his brains out without the walker ever feeling a 
thing. Now, the speaker suggests that with luck and a willingness to 
be receptive to whatever comes, the walker might experience a 
moment as fragile, unexpected, and wonderful as when "inland, one 
can sometimes smell the sea." 
... you may be granted, 
A moment's perfect carelessness, in which 
To stumble a few steps and sink to sleep 
In the same clearing where, in the old story, 
A holy man discovered Vishnu sleeping, 
Wrapped in his maya, dreaming by a pool 
On whose calm face all images whatever 
Lay clear, unfathomed, taken as they came. 
(Poems 161) 
The final scene is one of perfect serenity. If the walker is lucky he 
may stumble to sleep in the same clearing where the Hindu god 
Vishnu, the Preserver, fell to sleep and dreams. "Maya" refers to the 
illusion-making power of a god, to the powerful force that creates the 
cosmic illusion that the phenomenal world is real. As Vishnu lay 
swaddled in his maya, a pool, the mirror of the world, reflected back 
the images of whatever came. The suggestion is, I think, that the 
walker, if he is ready to take whatever images come, can practice 
this illusion-making power and can make his world through the 
interaction of his imagination and phenomenal reality. 
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Another poem included in the collection Walking to Steeg helps 
elucidate this dynamic balance between the "formative mind and a 
reality which that mind insists on recognizing." In "'Thyme Flowering 
among Rocks,"' Wilbur tries to avoid symbolism, to keep the thyme 
from representing--as it would "'if Japanese"-- "grey boulders I 
Walloped by rough seas"' and its flowers· spikes from becoming "'the 
balked water"' tossed to froth: "Here, where things are what I They 
are, it is thyme blooming, I Rocks, and nothing but"' (Poems 142). 
Exploring the plant and seeing nothing but what is there, "' ... you I 
Are lost now in dense I Fact." Blinking at the detail of the small 
plant which becomes an engulfing jungle world to his close vision, 
the poet loses proportion the way a bathysphere in a school of fish 
forgets the ocean in the motion of striped fins. He marvels: 
It makes the craned head 
Spin. Unfathomed thyme! The world"s 
A dream, Basho said, 
Not because that dream·s 
A falsehood, but becaue it's 
Truer than it seems. (Poems 143) 
Of course, it is time--and all the world of time--that is unfathomed. 
The world is a dream, and the poem is an illusion, but neither is a 
falsehood; each is truer than it seems. The opening line, "'This, if 
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japanese" refers to the thyme garden and to the poem itself and 
implies that neither is japanese. However, the poem is written in the 
seventeen syllable form of the English version of japanese haiku. 
The thyme pI ant seems very much 1 ike a bans ai garden. And Bash a 
is both a figure in Japanese legend and a Japanese poet, the 
acknowledged master of haiku. In legend, Basho is the fairy of the 
banana leaf who sings and dances to these words: "Whether sentient 
or devoid of sense, I Whether a blade of grass or a tree, I Life is 
nothing but a manifestation I Of the ultimate reality, which is 
without any distinctive marks ... " (Anesaki 3.344). 
Speaking about "Thyme Flowering among Rocks," Wilbur 
describes the fierce attention and careful description that produced 
the poem: 
"Thyme Flowering among Rocks" is a poem where I simply look 
at the thyme in flower as long as I can and as closely as I can, 
seeing whatever botanical things make it be what it is .... I 
think one effect of that kind of exhaustive description is to take 
you beyond the object you usually perceive. You go away from 
the object as you do in a metaphor, but you do so by going into 
it. You reveal a world t!Jat ordinarii}'·· lies beyvnd !Juman 
perception and .vou impf.·v a further !Je.,vond. 
("Mystery of Things" 141; emphasis added) 
All being reveals Being. Yet, Being itself has no identifying 
characteristics and can be intuited only as the force that makes 
possible all the uniquely individual beings. The artist must resort to 
obliqueness because reality and Being cannot be known directly. 
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Attempts to perceive become projections of self onto the 
environment, but at the same time what one perceives passionately 
exerts a reality of its own and resists the impress of imagination. 
The vision, a fierce calm, comes through the struggle to know what 
escapes our knowing. 
Wilbur lives in a world where he sees Cheshire smiles in 
tangible trees. Any ordinary day is magical with being and fading 
and lost being. His celebration of the world's grandeur echos Hopkins 
who also loved the "pied beauty" of an impermanent world: In 
"Objects" Wilbur writes: 
For is there any end to true textures, to true 
Integuments; do they ever desist from tacit tragic 
Fading away? Oh maculate, cracked, askew, 
Gay-pocked and potsherd world 
I voyage, where in every tangible tree 
I see afloat among the leaves, all calm and curled, 
The Cheshire smile which sets me fearfully free. 
(Poems 361) 
When words fail the vision, the thing missed glows briefly and fades 
slowly like the smile of a Cheshire cat. The fading smile is the only 
proof of the eat's existence. Julian Huxley in Religion without 
Revelation refers to "the last fading smile of a cosmic Cheshire cat" 
(Huxley 58). For Wilbur, each of the things of this world is the sly 
grin of Being which we see only as it disappears. 
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Eiseley was skeptical that science would ever succeed in 
subduing mystery. At the end of The Immense journey he writes: 
I would say that if 'dead' matter has reared up this curious 
landscape of fiddling crickets, song sparrows, and wondering 
men, it must be plain even to the most devoted materialist that 
the matter of which he speaks contains amazing, if not dreadful 
powers, and may not impossibly be, as Hardy has suggested, 
'but one mask of many worn by the Great Face behind.·" 
(lj 210) 
One of the greatest mysteries evolved during the last ice age, "the 
angry winter" as Eiseley called it: While "a mantle of blue ice stolen 
from the shrinking seas" covered one-third of the earth's land mass, 
the human brain also put on a layer of "crystalline thought 
substance" over the "forgetful pathways of the animal brain" (UU 
1 04). With that mental ice, man discovered first time and death and 
then consoling fables and eventually the abstraction of space-time so 
~ 
that now he shivers "inwardly before the endless abysses of space as 
he once shivered unclothed and unlighted before the earthly frost" 
(UU l 04). Out of nature came the multiform and troubling mystery 
of the human mind. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MIND AS NATURE, THE NATURE OF MIND 
This relation between the mind and matter is not fancied by 
some poet, but stands in the will of God, and so is free to be 
known by all men. --Emerson 
The mind does not understand its own reason for being. 
--Rene Magritte 
We are confronted ... not with the universe, which remains an 
eternal riddle, but with whatever model of the universe we can 
build within the mind. Every thinking creature in the universe 
shares this predicament; for all, the ultimate subject of inquiry 
is not the outer universe but the nature of its dance with the 
mind. 
--Timothy Ferris 
The resources of the mind are not commensurate with its 
ambition. --Santayana 
"In nature there's no blemish but the mind." 
--Antonio Twelfth Night 
Hidden from us because it is so near and constant, mind is the 
most alluring, evasive mystery--and the mystery with the greatest 
potential for terror. Mind is what we know--perhaps all that we 
know--and is our only agent of knowing. Yet, paradoxically, we 
cannot know our own minds without what Emerson called Nature--
"all that is not me." In "Advice to a Prophet" Wilbur calls this Nature 
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that calls forth our natures the "live tongue" and asks, "What should 
we be without I .... I These things in which we have seen ourselves 
and spoken?" (Poems 182-183). The mind which discovers the world 
is itself discovered through the world. Eiseley saw around him a 
"natural history of souls"' which can be learned "only from the 
symbolism inherent in the world": 
It is the natural history that led Hudson to glimpse eternity in 
some old men's faces at Land"s End, that led Thoreau to see 
human civilizations as toadstools sprung up in the night by 
solitary roads, or that provoked Melville to experience in the 
sight of the sperm whale some colossal alien existence without 
which man himse 1f would be incomp tete. (FOT 115) 
The mind needs that which is "outside" to make itself. As Martin 
Buber observed, a person becomes conscious of participating in being 
only through relationship: only "being-with" reveals being. William 
Barrett in The Death of the Soul declares that we cannot "understand 
mind unless we are able to grasp it as part of the total Being within 
which the human person exists and functions" ( 112 ). 
In the twentieth century, however, the cosmos as we 
understand it, this "total Being," has undergone a change as radical as 
the transformation from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican universe. 
The stable, clock-work world of Newtonian physics has been 
shattered into a space-time continuum of Einsteinian relativity and a 
quantum world of Heisenbergian uncertainty swirling in the winds of 
chaos theory. As joseph Wood Krutch described the situation, we 
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have had thrust upon us a scientific world view that has more in 
common with the mysteries and metaphors of the Middle Ages than 
it has with the mechanical sureties of the Newtonian paradigm. 
Krutch points out that "at the center of Dante's conception of the 
visible world there was accepted mystery" and that the "visible 
world was held together by something called 'Love'" ( 175). Krutch 
says that Newton, in his explanation of the universe, "substituted the 
technical word 'gravity' for the frankly mysterious word ·love'" and 
offered mechanical models to replace mystery: "What he told us was 
that in the whole vast extent of the visible universe there is nothing 
which is not essentially like our own backyard" ( 175-176). 
Modern physics, however, has returned us to the 
incomprehensible and mysterious and has added the uncertain: 
... we are being told by at least certain of Newton's successors 
that instead of living in an infinitely extended back yard, even 
the back yard is not at all what it seems; that so far as the 
universe as a whole is concerned we do not know how it is 
operating or where it is going; that common sense is wholly 
inadequate to comprehend it, and that, in so far _as one can 
guess, we are actually somewhere in a sort of soap bubble 
which is expanding at an inconceivable but ever increasing rate 
and, for all we know, may burst. (Krutch 177) 
The post-modern scientific world has subverted the common-sense 
views of Bacon and Newton: "Once more we live in a universe which 
is f10t at all what it seems, either to the senses or the common sense . 
. . . even the world of matter as we think we perceive it is as illusory 
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as it was ever said by the mystics to be" (Krutch i78). Mystics once 
saw the world as Spirit; physicists now describe the world as Energy. 
Krutch says that the concept of gravity is itself no more 
comprehensible than Dante's Love but it can be "mathematically 
formulated." 
Annie Dillard in Pilgrim at Tinker's Creek writes that when 
Werner Heisenberg in 1927 "pulled out the rug ... our whole 
understanding of the universe toppled and collapsed" (202) and since 
then some physicists have themselves become "a bunch of wild-eyed, 
raving mystics," getting to their mysticism via the "experimental 
method and a few wild leaps such as Einstein made" (204). Dillard 
quotes Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington, the astronomer, physicist, and 
mathematician who, with his observations made during a solar 
eclipse in 1919, provided the first independent confirmation of 
Einstein's theory that gravity will bend the path of light when the 
light passes near a giant star. Eddington said that after Heisenberg's 
Principle of lndeterminancy we are left in a universe composed of 
'"mind -stuff'" and that '"the physical world is entirely abstract and 
without ·actuality' apart from its linkage to consciousness.'" After the 
Principle of Indeterminancy eroded the concept of causality, 
Eddington said we are left "'with no clear distinction between the 
Natural and Supernatural"' (qtd. in Dillard 203- 204). In the 
twentieth century " ... the whole universe has again become a 
paradox" (Krutch 182). 
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Indeed, Krutch finds the mind of the twentieth century as 
mysterious as the physical world it inhabits: "the internal world as it 
is described by the 'new psychology' is as contrary to our own 
conscious experience as is the external world described by 
physicists" (178). The forces which the Middle Ages called spiritual 
we refer to--with no more understanding--as the unconscious. 
Though Freud and his followers dismissed with contempt concepts of 
God, Soul, and Sin, Krutch considers "the unconsciousness ... as 
purely hypothetical as the Soul," and he considers certain other key 
Freudian concepts (e.g, the "Censor") to be "metaphors serving to 
recognize the existence of something whose nature and mode of 
operations are both uncomprehended" ( 181 ). According to Krutch, 
what Freud actually did was to reintroduce the concept of the Soul 
but call it by its Greek name--the Psyche ( 181 ). Brooke says that 
what had once been the state of the soul became in the twentieth 
century the state of the mind (Science and Religion 324) 
In the twentieth century, as psychology has blurred soul into 
mind, physics has erased the distinction between mind and matter. 
Einstein's formula E=MC2 has caused past common-sense certainties 
about the differences between matter and energy to vanish: "What 
[the formula] says is that the only two supposedly primary, 
discontinuous, fundamentally different realities of the physical 
universe are not discontinuous or fundamentally different at all, that 
instead of being qualitatively different they are actually 
quantitatively convertible" (Krutch 185). Einstein's assertion--
··-- ---------
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proven in atomic explosions--that "matter can be turned into energy 
equal to that mass multiplied by (of all things!) the square of the 
speed of light, [flies] in the face of all ordinary experience" ( 188). 
What was once considered to be ultimate is no longer ultimate; the 
ultimate is replaced by temporary, interchangable manifestations--
manifestations entirely relative to the place of the observer in four-
dimensional space-time. Einstein and other modern physicists have 
made the universe mysterious again, and that mystery has its 
parallel in the human brain: 
If Matter can become Energy, there seems no great difficulty in 
believing that the physical stuff of the brain may become 
Mind--in some sense as different from the protoplasm of a cell 
as the energy released over japan was different from the 
matter which disappeared when that energy came into being. 
(Krutch 196) 
Thought itself seems no more than one of many transformations 
along the energy/matter continuum. Through the magic of 
photosynthesis sunlight becomes substance in green plants. 
Consuming those plants (directly or indirectly), human beings 
become engines for turning substance into, among other things, 
mental energy. Every thought in the human mind--Keats' odes, 
Godel's theorems, Hitler's final solution--began as sunlight. With 
such revelations over the last century-and-a-half, a profound change 
has occurred in the perception of the relationship between nature 
and man. In the last century, nature was outside, the visible world; 
-- -- -~-------
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in the twentieth century, humankind has become part of nature, one 
of its various manifestations. Now nature is inside, too; the mind is 
nature. 
Some of the most renowned scientists and philosophers of the 
twentieth century have turned their attention to exploring this 
nature inside our heads by trying to understand how the material 
substance of the brain makes what seems to us the nonmaterial 
mind. To a large extent, mind has replaced the concept of soul as the 
subject of concern for those who would understand the nature of our 
being and our relationship to all that our individual minds tell us is 
something else. The individual, subjective consciousness may be 
suspect as an honest and capable perceiver, but, as Krutch says, 
""consciousness is the only thing of which we have direct evidence"" 
( 122). Yet, even that evidence has become doubtful. The Cartesian 
dualism which has invited us to believe that mind is some unified, 
superior essence which inhabits and animates physical selves and 
acts as the audience for ail the theatrics inside our heads and out has 
been challenged. Instead of a single, unified censor-- the seeming I 
--scientists and philosophers like Gerald Edelman, Erich Harth, and 
Daniel C. Dennett have suggested a process of neurochemical 
interchange within the brain during which consciousness is 
constantly made and remade in a dynamic process that guarantees 
flux as much as stability. They describe consciousness as the process 
of various parts of the brain talking to one another. 
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Dr. Gerald Edelman, who won the Nobel prize in immunology, 
offers a biological explanation for how the mind emerges from the 
brain. Edelman bases his theory of brain development and function 
on infinite variation within patterns. In Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, 
Edelman suggests that cerebral neurons migrate about during fetal 
life until cell-adhesion molecules glue them together into synaptic 
patterns that are only partly determined by genetic instructions. 
After birth, those synaptic connections which are most useful in 
interpreting and categorizing sensory input are preferred and 
strengthened, thereby creating in the brain a flexible mechanism 
that can constantly adapt to changing stimuli. Edelman believes that 
a process called "'reentry"' allows the brain"s maps, synapses, and 
circuitry to work together to categorize and integrate either external 
sensory stimuli or internal stimuli arising when one part of the 
brain's circuitry signals another. Edelman describes a dynamic 
process of constant intrabrain exchange of symbols among millions of 
neural connections. According to Edelman, there is no guiding, over-
riding "'syntax, no algorithm, no homunculus,"' only a matrix of neural 
maps signaling "'to each other in varieties of ways in a vast parallel 
scheme"' (qtd. in Levy 69). 
In Consciousness Exglained, philosopher Daniel C. Dennett 
trades in one set of metaphors based on mind/body dualism ("the 
Cartesian Theater, the Witness, the Central Meaner, the Figment"') for 
another set of metaphors ("'Software, Virtual Machines, Multiple 
Drafts, a Pandemonium of Homunculi"') based on mind/body as a 
---------
298 
unitary materialism. Denying (like Edelman) that there is any 
anatomical center of consciousness or any governing homunculus 
which acts as its overseer, Dennett describes a process whereby a 
sensory area of the brain receives and registers a stimulus and then 
passes it on for further discrimination. He likens the process to 
evolving multiple drafts of a piece of writing: 
... this multitrack process occurs over hundreds of 
milliseconds, during which time various additions, 
incorporations, emendations, and overwritings of content occur, 
in various orders. These yield, over the course of time, 
something rather like a narrative stream or sequence, which 
can be thought of as subject to continual editing by many 
processes distributed around in the brain, and continuing 
indefinitely into the future. (Dennett 135) 
As the brain embellishes or amends the original sensory information, 
the series of responses to the original stimulus become "multiple 
drafts of narrative fragments at various stages of editing in various 
places in the brain" ( 135). As Dennett sees it, these narrative drafts 
become what we perceive as the stream of consciousness. 
Erich Harth, author of The Creative Loon.. also speculating on 
the puzzle of consciousness, concludes that "we cannot escape the 
fundamental conundrum that either single neurons are capable of 
knowing and understanding or else some strange non/oca/ processes 
are going on" (63). Harth, a physics professor, considers the 
thalamus to be crucial to consciousness and those "nonlocal" 
processes. In particular, Harth theorizes that the lateral geniculate 
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nucleus (LGN), the thalamic visual relay between the senses and the 
cortex, not only transmits stimuli received from the retina to visual 
centers in the cortex but that the LGN also is the locus of feedback 
pathways from both the cortex and the brainstem. The brainstem, 
one of the oldest structures in the brain, includes the reticular 
formation which is known to be essential to consciousness and 
thought. Harth concludes that the LGN not only receives sensory 
messages but modifies them "at the behest of higher brain centers"-
-thereby participating actively in the perceptual process (65). A 
"physicalist" looking for a way "to give a physical account of our 
feelings of selfhood and apparent cognitive unity," Harth makes his 
case for a self-referent process, the "creative loop," in which there is 
"an inversion of sensory processing through which images are re-
created and projected on screens near the bottom of the sensory 
pathways ILGNI where they originated in the first place" (xxiii). He 
describes the perceptual process which goes on in the LGN as "a 
competition between the re.ali!_J··· that is conveyed from the eyes and 
the fancy that comes down from the cortex" (68). Harth says the 
observer of this process is the brain itself, "which analyzes and 
recreates, and then observes its own creations" (xxiii). 
Nobel laureate Francis Crick, who in collaboration with james 
Watson discovered the structure of the DNA molecule, offers yet 
another variation on the theme of how the brain makes a mind. In 
his Faustian-titled book The Astonishing_HyP-othesis: The Scientific 
Search for the Soul .. Crick redefines the soul in the terms of 
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materialist science. He counterpoints the religious definition of soul 
as expressed in the Roman Catholic catechism ("The soul is a living 
being without a body, having reason and free will.") with his own 
"Astonishing Hypothesis" that each individual's joys, sorrows, 
memories, ambitions, sense of personal identity and free will are "no 
more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their 
associated molecules" (3). In an appendix to The Astonishing 
Hynothesis, Crick even proposes an anatomical location for Free Will 
--the anterior cingulate sulcus next to Brodmann's area 24 (267). 
Like Harth, Crick speculates that consciousness depends on crucial 
thalamic connections with the cortex. Positing the presence of 
theoretical "reverberatory circuits" in the cortex, Crick declares that 
consciousness exists only when the thalamus can transmit 
information to the cortex and strong reverberations occur. Basing his 
current brain research on studies of the visual system of mammals, 
Crick believes that "a detailed neurobiological understanding of 
visual awareness" will lead to understanding other forms of 
consciousness (268). He admits, however, that despite the enormous 
amount known about the psychology, physiology, and the molecular 
and cell biology of vision, "we really have no clear idea of how we 
see anything" (24). In a review of The Astonishing Hypothesis, poet 
Fred Chappell finds Crick's assumptions in the face of admitted 
ignorance ironical. Surveying the author's supple embrace of 
theories that depend on future verification of crucial elements, 
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Chappell expresses his sarcastic admiration for "Crick's religious faith 
in the laboratory and its luminous future" (Chappell F5). 
Physicist Roger Penrose, who shared with Stephen Hawking the 
1988 Wolf Prize for physics in honor of their joint contribution to our 
understanding of the universe, offers an hypothesis about the nature 
of mind which is far more astonishing than Crick's. Penrose believes 
that we will need a new physics in order to understand mind. He 
maintains that as yet no physical, biological, or computational theory 
comes close "to explaining our consciousness and consequent 
intelligence" and that any scientific world-view with pretensions to 
completeness must "profoundly" come to terms with the problem of 
conscious minds (8). 
Penrose envisions the new physics capable of explaining mind 
as combining the priniciples of quantum theory with Einstein's 
general relativity for a "quantum-gravitational phenomenon" and 
including noncomputability as an essential feature. Although he, too, 
believes that mind is the product of physical processes, Penrose 
considers a significant element of consciousness to be 
"noncomputational"--i.e., something that cannot be duplicated or 
mimicked by the artificial intelligence of digital computers because it 
"cannot be encapsulated in any finite set of rules" and therefore 
cannot be simulated computationally (59) .I A I though it has not yet 
been encountered in known physics, Penrose believes that an 
element of "mathematically precise activity" that can be proved to be 
beyond computation must be inherent in physical laws that shape 
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both the world and the mind (27-28). Claiming that "in mathematics 
... our thinking processes have their purest form," Penrose also 
insists that "it is within mathematics that we find the clearest 
evidence that there must actually be something in our conscious 
thought processes that eludes computation" ( 64). He believes that 
this noncomputational element of mathematical thought is confirmed 
by "the most important theorem in mathematical logic"--Kurt Godel's 
incompleteness theorem. Penrose calls Godel's theorem (articulated 
in 1930) "probably the most fundamental" contribution to the 
foundation of mathematics and says it initiated "a major step 
forward in the philosophy of mind" (64). Penrose argues that Godel's 
establishing "indisputably ... that no formal system of sound 
mathematical rules of proof can ever suffice, even in principle, to 
establish all the true propositions of ordinary arithmetic" makes a 
strong case for the proposition "that human understanding and 
insight cannot be reduced to any set of computational rules"--
because without a system of formal rules those arithmetical truths 
have been discovered !J.v human intuition and insight (64-65). 
In Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of 
Consciousness, Penrose proposes that mind is much more mysterious 
than neurons talking to one another. Penrose postulates that 
quantum states can occur within the protected environment of the 
microtubules inside individual neurons and that consciousness itself 
is the result of a global quantum state occurring across large areas of 
the brain. He speculates that quantum action in the cytoskeletal 
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control of neuronal synaptic connections interfaces with the larger 
classical brain functions (nerve signals) to exert its fundamental 
influence on brain behaviour manifested as consciousness. Penrose 
says for Nature biologically to create the unity of a single mind out of 
quantum coherence is so remarkable as to be almost incredible, but 
the main evidence that she has done so comes from "the fact of our 
mentality" (373). 
The Oxford mathematician believes that his quantum theory of 
mentation requires the brain to operate on biological systems that 
"harness the details of a physics that is yet unknown to human 
physicists" (373). For Penrose, this as-yet-unknown physics waits 
for our discovery in "the Platonic world of mathematical forms"--a 
third world which he considers to co-exist along with the world of 
our conscious perceptions and the world of physical reality. In fact, 
Penrose believes that the world of perfect forms is primary to the 
physical and mental worlds, which are themselves shadows of the 
Platonic (417). Penrose says the Platonic world pre-existed life on 
earth and "will remain after all life has perished" (413). Only some 
of its forms--"a rag-bag of abstract concepts" like Euclidean and non-
Euclidean geometry, natural numbers, Lagrange's theorem, the 
algebra of complex numbers, etc.--have been discovered (not 
created) by human beings. Penrose identifies three mysteries 
spawned by these three worlds of consciousness, materiality, and 
forms: 1) " ... the mystery of why such precise and profoundly 
mathematical laws play such an important role in the behaviour of 
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the physical world," 2) " ... the mystery of how it is that perceiving 
beings can arise out of the physical world," and 3) " ... the mystery 
of how it is that mentality is able seemingly to 'create' mathematical 
concepts out of some kind of mental model" (414). He finds it 
equally amazing that the physical world somehow emerges out of the 
Platonic world of mathematics as that "subtly organized material 
objects can mysteriously conjure up mental entities from out of ... 
material substance" and that "_apparently vague, unreliable, and often 
inappropriate mental tools ... appear nevertheless mysteriously ... 
to conjure up abstract mathematical forms, and thereby enable our 
minds to gain entry, by understanding, into the Platonic 
mathematical realm" (413-414). Searching for an explanation of the 
mind, the physicist becomes a Platonist, a mystic, convinced that the 
mystery of nature and the mystery of mind will partake of a shared 
solution. 
As Penrose, Edelman, Crick, Harth, and Dennett currently 
pursue through biology, physics, philosophy, and psychology the 
mystery of how the brain makes a mind, Loren Eiseley searched the 
past to expl;>,in the presence of the mind-making brain. He tried to 
understand the nature of nature and the nature of mind by seeking 
for the beginnings, looking for patterns across the eons of 
evolutionary time--patterns that would explain the development of 
the human brain and the ensuing burden and joy of consciousness. 
In doing so, he used broken fragments, the evidence of paleontology 
and anthropology, the history of science and the concept of evolution, 
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to devise latter day creation myths which offer little comfort and 
much uncertainty .2 Like all myths, his speculative recreations of 
natural history are full of mystery and portent. They replace the 
spare, primitive creation myths dominated by one-time maker-gods 
with the complexity of a slow, inexorable process that continues 
through the present and moves toward a future that makes no 
promise to include us. As Eiseley recreates it, the past is as full of 
contingency and indeterminancy as the present. His history of the 
effort to know ourselves and our world through paleontology, 
anthropology, biology, and botany takes on the tone of a latter-day 
Paradise Lost: his studies of Darwin, Wallace, Hutton, and Bacon 
substitute for religious hagiography. His descriptions of possible 
beginnings of consciousness--as lungfish or as hominid groping, 
without intentionality, toward humanness--convey a deep sense of 
mystery and religious awe and a working out of some teleology and 
theod icy of which humans are a part, but not an end. 
Richard Wilbur, on the other hand, probes the world and mind 
with poetry, trying to say the things of the world with an exactness 
that does not exclude the mystery which mind either makes or finds 
there. He uses metaphor in the way Dennett describes it, as "a tool 
for thought" (455). Like Eiseley, Wilbur bears witness to the puzzles 
of nature and mind--how, in resistance, they make one another as· 
the mind tries to shape the world into completeness and coherence 
with its tools of words and metaphor and the world resists the 
sculptor's tools, escaping all concretion and finality, remaining on the 
--- ~------· 
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other side of the best metaphors. Like Eisel ey, Wilbur also has an 
exquisite sense of the drive toward being--the biological urge to 
assume form and assert self in time. an urge so strong that it is 
capable of the heroics of autumn--accepting the doom of taking 
shape. Though delighting in an intense awareness, Wilbur recognizes 
the limitations of consciousness--the narrow world of knowing--and 
therefore writes poetry on the borderland between consciousness 
and unconsciousness--the vast world of unknowing, a world vaguely 
intuited but not yet able to be approximated in words. In the world 
below consciousness, even the mind itself escapes our daylight 
understanding and remains as furtive and free as a bat in a dark 
cave, skillfully eluding the snare of words. 
This chapter will be devoted to exploring the conundrums in 
the nature of nature and the nature of mind as they are represented 
in the writings of Wilbur and Eiseley. The first task is to try to 
understand the nature of nature--how, historically, the world 
became "natural" and what it means to be natural as Eiseley saw it in 
the context of the twentieth century. The next problem will be to 
understand the mind as nature. If nature is natural, the mind too is 
natural--nature-made, a by-product of the same processes that 
produced the rest of the world. However, even though the origin and 
being of the mind mimic the origin and being of the cosmos, we 
humans seem to ourselves .. unnatural." Mind is left puzzled, looking 
for its own reason for being. We seem to have leaped across a great 
chasm that separates us from other species--out of instinct into 
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reason, out of an eternal present into time that remembers the past 
and anticipates the future, out of a limited animal world into a world 
made much vaster and far more intense by language that allows 
shared experience and by writing that stores that experience, out of 
the sensory world of appearances into the counter-intuitive world of 
science. And life inevitably implies time-boundedness, and mind 
implies the awareness of time-- its power both to make and unmake. 
Bound inextricably together, life and time generate counter-urges: 
the desire to be vaguely vast and eternal competes with the will to 
take shape in time. Finally, the puzzle comes down to the nature of 
mind itself. The subject that we would know is our only agent of 
knowing. We are left trying to turn around quickly enough to catch a 
glimpse of ourselves. 
The Nature of Nature: How the World Became Natural 
In The Firmament of Time, Eiseley presents his view of how 
the world "became natural "--i.e., how human beings gradually came 
to see the present world as a product of slow evolutionary forces 
guided by discernible physical laws rather than the product of 
cataclysmic divine fiat. In western civilization, the predominant 
judea-Christian world-view had limited time and all of history to less 
than six thousand years since the Biblical creation. Such a 
compressed time frame required cataclysm to explain the great 
heaps of boulders that seemed to have been strewn by a Noachian 
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flood and required miracle to explain the presence and purpose of 
man among the rest of creation. To break out of this 
religious/scientific model, human beings had to acquire, through 
enormous effort, new knowledge and new imaginations to recognize 
the silent, slow miracles--the tremendous potentialities contained in 
time and raindrops: 
Men who could visualize readily the horrors of a universal 
Flood were deaf to the roar of the invisible Niagara falling into 
the rain barrel outs ide their window. They could not hear it 
because they lived in a time span so short that the only way 
geologic change could be effected was by the convulsions of 
earthquakes, or the forty torrential days and nights that 
brought the Biblical Deluge. (FOT II) 
For Christians of the prescientific era, the universe was entirely man-
centered--with earth as the focus about which the celestial bodies 
moved and as "the platform of divine but short-lived drama--a 
drama so brief that there was little reason to study the stage 
properties" (FOT 11). Centered upon this drama of man-- "his 
supernatural origins, the drama of his Fall from the deathless Garden, 
the coming of his Redeemer, and the day of his judgment"--and 
accepting the received truths of the past (the Ptolemaic universe, 
Aristotelean logic, the Platonic ideal), Western men were "busied 
about their souls, not about far voyages either in space or in time" 
( 11 ) . 
Yet, drawn ~y the innate urge to solve "the mystery of things 
that are," men began to think their way into a new earth, a new 
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universe, new concepts of time and space, and new ways to look at 
life on this planet. A gradual accretion of discovery and deduction 
reshaped the creation into nature. The work of Copernicus and 
Kepler and Galileo reoriented the universe; the sun became the 
center of the solar system with the earth one of several planets 
revolving about it. Olaus Roemer's observation of a slight lag in the 
reappearance of one of the moons of jupiter after an eclipse led to 
his subsequent deduction that light did not travel instantaneously 
but at a speed later calculated to be 186,000 miles per second. This 
discovery then led to the concept of 1 ight-years and "to astronomical 
time the magnitude of which lay beyond human comprehension" 
(FOT 14). Newton's description of the laws of gravitation depicted a 
mechanical universe that left miracle out of the process "save at the 
moment of creation" ( 15). Subsequent thinkers--Kant and Laplace--
extended Newton's laws back into the space that Roemer's 
observation had made possible and elaborated a nebular hypothesis 
suggesting that stars and planets had their origins in clouds of 
rotating gas. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, geological evolution began to 
be discussed along with cosmic evolution. james Hutton 
accomplished in geology what Newton had achieved in astronomy 
and mathematics (FOT 18). As astronomers read messages in the 
sky, Hutton read the message of time in rocks. His emphasis on the 
dynamics of the earth's crust, its decay and renewal, was similar to 
Newton's emphasis on the balanced celestial machine that was self-
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maintaining. Examining the present earth to understand the past, 
Hutton "postulated the integration of small events to produce great 
cumulative ones in geology" (FOT 22). Eiseley says that "[olne has the 
feeling that !Hutton! sensed, on his remote Scottish farm, when frost 
split a stone on a winter night" (25). Alone among his 
contemporaries in his understanding of earth dynamics, Hutton 
considered that '"Nature lives in motion.· Every particle in the world 
was hurrying somewhere, or was so destined in the long traverse of 
time" (FOT 25). Though Hutton wrote little about fossils, Eiseley says 
the geologist "set the scene" for the rise of evolutionary theory fifty 
years later; he had established geologic evidence for the length of 
time that the theory of evolution would require. Hutton also 
articulated the precept that would become the basis of natural 
science: study forces at work in the present in order to understand 
the past. Yet he was too wise to limit nature to '"the uniformity of an 
equable progression.·" He simply considered that the violence and 
upheaval which could occur in nature were of natural, not 
supernatural, origins. A convinced eighteenth-century deist, Hutton 
believed in the sanctity of reason and the undeviating law which he 
saw directing nature's course (FOT 26). 
Thus, based on the work of Newton and Hutton and others, 
science began to change human concepts of the nature of nature: 
... when the Divine Maker was retired from the earthly scene 
by science, leaving only secondary causes to operate nature for 
him, men, animals and the celestial and world machines alike 
were no longer to be quite what they had been in the days of 
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supernatural intrusion, of a tampering by the Unseen. Man's 
world was finally to be completely natural. Yet at the close of 
the eighteenth century it was still a world considered to be of 
divine origin and created for human habitation. (FOT 29) 
But this paradigm would not last either. Two centuries later, as 
Eiseley points out, the world would be found to be "without the 
balance of stabilized perfection" that had comforted the eighteenth-
century scientists ( 29). As concepts of nature changed in the 
twentieth century, the stab it ity of Newtonian physics would be 
replaced by contingency, indeterminancy, and relativity. 
After expanding time and space to make room to explain the 
changes evidenced in rocks and fossils and to fit in the much larger 
Newtonian universe, Eiseley says that the second step in the 
naturalization of nature was to make death natural. He says that 
mankind "has tended to take life for granted," but has frequently felt 
the need to explain death: "Death was the unnatural thing, the result 
of malice or mistake, the after-message of the gods, or, in the 
Christian world, the result of the Fall from the Garden" (FOT 33). For 
the progress ion of scientific thought, death had to be demythologized; 
it had to become natural. Time and geologic change make 
evolutionary change possible; evolutionary change requires species 
or phylogenetic death. Inevitably, scientific observation conflicted 
with seventeenth and eighteenth century theology which declared 
that extinction was impossible because it challenged "the benignity of 
Providence" and subverted the ordered universe expressed in the 
Scala Naturae--a theory of organic relationships "based on a 
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gradation which emerged instantaneously at the moment of creation, 
and which rises by imperceptible transitions from the inorganic 
through the organic world to man, and even beyond him to divine 
spiritual natures .. (FOT 37). 
Eiseley says that this "Ladder of Being" was perceived as an 
indissoluble chain holding together creation, and the idea that a link 
could be lost brought horror. Aimless disappearances would suggest 
a capricious Providence who might forget his creature man. For a 
while, devout naturalists aware of fossil remains of animals unknown 
among the living were able to reconcile their beliefs with their 
observations by presuming that the living representatives of the 
species had retired to the interior of yet unexplored continents. 
Deists of the eighteenth century who believed that human reason 
reflected the Divine and that God could be known through his 
creation were troubled to explain "the apparent irrationality and 
waste involved in the discovery of extinction": "Why would a 
supremely rational God reject and repudiate his creations? ... if 
such repudiation occurred, was there not danger that man himself 
might be swept from the stage of life?" (FOT 42). Eiseley describes 
the discovery of "lt]he hint of extinction in the geological past .. as "a 
cold wind out of a dark cellar" (43). It threatened the world order 
constructed specifically for the benefit of man: "a vast and shadowy 
history loomed in the rocks. It threatened to be a history in which 
man's entire destiny would lose the significance he had always 
attached to it" (43). 
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Hutton's views of cumulative changes in the earth's surface 
over eons conflicted sharply with the world-view of catastrophism. 
"the school of vioience" articulated by the "transcendental 
evolutionists" during the first fifty years of the nineteenth century as 
part of their "geological theology" (lJ. 151). "Catastrophism" was a 
compromise between theology and science which made death and 
progressive change in the universe acceptable by extending "such 
mythological events as the world-shattering Biblical Deluge" and by 
creating "a form of geological prophecy which left man still the 
dominant figure in his universe" (FOT 44). Catastrophism "predicated 
vast, unknown and perhaps supernatural forces at work" causing 
"mysterious geological upheavals and re-c~·eations of life" and 
seemed more Biblical than the "limitless and invisibly moving 
landscapes" that Hutton had proposed. Eiseley describes the world-
view of the catastrophists in the early part of the nineteenth century: 
The deathless Eden of the Biblical first creation has been 
replaced by a succession of natural but successive worlds 
divided from each other by floods or other violent cataclysms 
which absolutely exterminate the life of a particular age. 
Divinity then replaces the lost fauna with new forms in 
succeeding eras. Disconformities in geological strata, breaks in 
the paleontological record, are taken as signs of world-wide 
disaster terminating periods of calm. In contrast to eighteenth-
century concern over the death of species, and anxiety to 
establish seemingly extinct animals as still in existence, the 
natural theologians now revel in violence as excessive as that 
of the Old Testament. Whole orders of life are swept out of 
existence in the great march toward mar11. The stage which 
awaits the coming of the last great drama has to be prepared. 
Floods destroy the earlier actors. Enormous death demands 
equally enormous creation ... (FOT 48). 
314 
Instead of worrying about the loss of a single link in the scale of 
nature, catastrophists saw in the foss i1 bones of lost species evidence 
of bursts of new creation following divinely ordained cataclysms-- "a 
universe that progressed in leaps amidst colossal destruction" (FOT 
48). Catastrophists saw no phylogenetic links between lost species 
and those that followed: "There was only the Platonic ideal of pure 
substanceless form existing in the mind of God" (48). 
Catastrophism was a progression of scientific knowledge in that 
it did recognize that species extinction had occurred and that fossils 
could be used to separate and distinguish the strata of different 
geologic ages. Early paleontologists also came to recognize life as an 
unreturning progression in which old forms were not repeated, but 
they interpreted this progress ion teleologically: 
Life did not return upon its track. The record in the book of 
stone showed no reversals. Life ... was a historic progression 
in which the past died totally. But the goat was finalistic--it 
was man. Even coal forests had been laid down for his use. At 
times it seemed that the earlier creation existed only as some 
kind of phylogenetic portent of man. (FOT 49) 
In The Immense journey Eiseley describes the "strange half century" 
before Darwin's publication of The Origin of Snecies as "dominated by 
a generation that saw the world as a complex symbolic system 
pointing in the direction of man, who was foreknown and prefigured 
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from the beginning" (lJ. 153). Many of the transcendental 
evolutionists believed the process ended with man, and "no further 
changes in the world of life" were to be expected. 
Thinking began to change, however, when nineteenth-century 
geologist Charles Lyell discovered not drastic cataclysmic changes in 
fauna but local sequences of gradual change-- "'passage beds'" or 
strata linking one geological era with another and thereby 
demonstrating "the essential unity of earth's geological history" (FOT 
51). Through Lyell's discoveries, "point extinction," the demise of an 
individual species, replaced the mass death of catastrophism: "Death 
... was becoming natural--a product of the struggle for existence" 
(FOT 50. Geological changes producing environmental and climatic 
changes gave advantages to some forms of 1 ife and disadvantaged 
others. For Lyell this process explained extinction but did not 
explain how new creation emerged. Embracing Hutton's long time 
span and insistence on change produced by natural forces, Lyell was 
left with "the single great mystery"; he had to confront "a perverse 
unexplainable force that crawled and changed through the strata--
life" (FOT 54). Lyell could make death natural but life was harder to 
explain: " ... the catastrophists had been right about one thing. 
From its early beginnings in the seas, life had been journeying and 
growing in complexity. It is historic" (FOT 54). 
In a passage that is a prose poem, Eiseley describes his vision 
of how a "ghost" entered the inanimate machine, the physical world 
of force and counterforce. The fierce, inexorable momentum which 
began like the whisper of a mouse scurrying in a dark tomb 
crescendos into a pounding intensity, roaring like a freight-train 
carrying life through the present and tearing into the future: 
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... into this world of the machine--this mechanical disturbance 
surrounded by desert silence--a ghost has come, a ghost whose 
step must have been as light and imperceptible as the first 
scurry of a mouse in Cheops' tomb. Musing over the Archean 
strata, one can hear and see it in the subcellars of the mind 
itself, a little green in a fulminating spring, some strange 
objects floundering and helpless in the ooze on the tide line, 
something beating, beating, like a heart until a mounting 
thunder goes up through the towering strata, until no drum 
that ever was can produce its rhythm, until no mind can 
contain it, until it rises, wet and seaweed-crowned, an 
apparition from marsh and tide pool, gross with matter, 
gurgling and inarticulate, ape and man-ape, grisly and fang-
scarred, until the thunder is in oneself and is passing--to the 
ages beyond--to a world unknown, yet forever being born. 
(FOT 56) 
Eiseley says that the discovery of the fossil evidence of "natural" 
death has cast a shadow over the human spirit: it has complicated 
life. Recognizing the fossil marks imprinted by the passing of the 
ghost in the machine has left human beings with a sense of awe and 
a sense of dread. The thread of life passes through us but also very 
probably beyond us. 
Since the first human eye saw a leaf in Devonian sandstone and 
a puzzled finger reached to touch it, sadness has lain over the 
heart of man. By this tenuous thread of living protoplasm, 
stretching backward into time, we are linked forever to lost 
beaches whose sands have long since hardened into stone. The 
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stars that caught our blind amphibian stare have shifted far or 
vanished in their courses, but still that naked, glistening 
thread winds onward. No one knows the secret of its beginning 
or its end. Its forms are phantoms. The thread alone is real; 
the thread is life. (FOT 56) 
The feeling is both awe-struck and elegaic; human beings share the 
realness of the thread as both receivers and as transmitters, but we, 
like other life forms, are phantoms. Forms live and change, and some 
disappear completely, but life appears never to bring back the past. 
Life "seems to have had a single point of origin and to be traveling in 
a totally unique fashion in the time dimension" (FOT 57). 
This rising awareness that life is a prodigious, imperious, 
uncontainable force whose individual manifestations are always 
temporary had a positive as well as a negative impact on the human 
psyche. Eiseley says that in the naturalization of death--the 
recognition of the random demise of individual species--human 
beings also began to recognize the random evolution of new species: 
"By the comprehension of death man was beginning to glimpse 
another secret. The common day had turned marvelous. Creation--
whether seen or unseen--must be even now about us everywhere in 
the prosaic world of the present" (FOT 58). As death became natural, 
life became natural--and wondrous. 
When the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century faith in the 
fixed chain of being was challenged by the discovery of the fossil 
remains of organisms no longer extant, two alternative explanations 
arose. Progress ionism suggested that life progressed from the simple 
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to the more complex fauna in a process that was designed to lead to 
man. Ascending fauna would be annihilated by some geological 
catastrophe; subsequent, more advanced fauna would be created as 
replacements. The link between those destroyed and the newly 
created was not direct physical descent--there could be no gene 
passage--but was "a kind of ideal Platonic morphology"--the forms 
were connected in the mind of the creator. Evolution, "actual 
physical descent with bodily alterations from one age to another," 
became the other alternative whispered about at the end of the 
eighteenth century (FOT 66). Lamarck recognized that "creatures 
fitted themselves to the environment they occupied rather than 
being made for that specific environment" (67). In so doing, 
Lamarck directly challenged the traditional theological view of "the 
preordained character of the human emergence" (67). 
Tracing the gradual development of the theory of evolution 
which culminated with Darwin's articulation of the idea of natural 
selection, Eiseley identifies four necessary antecedents in scientific 
thought: 
l) the realization of the great antiquity of earth, 2) the recognition of 
"a true geological succession of forms on the planet," 3) the 
recognition of "the amount of individual variation in the living world 
and its possible significance in the creation of change," and 4) the 
replacement of the idea of the world as a perpetually balanced 
machine by the concept of an organic world of dynamic 
disequilibriums. "Life had to be seen ... as subject to ·indefinite 
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departure'--alteration ... subject to no return" (FOT 71). A "natural" 
explanation of life required "a rational explanation of change through 
the ages" (72). Eiseley argues that the concepts of variation, 
selection, and the struggle for existence were known before Darwin 
but that these concepts needed to be seen in the context of a new 
world view: "It was not really new facts that were needed so much 
as a new way of looking ·at the world from an old set of data" (72). 
When natural selection was seen to be taking place in a world 
without balance and a constraining, ordained scale of nature, the 
potential for change became infinite. The violent potential in a 
raindrop was seen to be equaled or surpassed by "the violence 
contained in a microscopic genetic particle" (FOT 81 ). Eiseley says 
that life then became unpredictable--a "vast uneasy river ... 
spreading into every possible niche." Although the concepts of all 
life linked as expressions of Platonic ideals existing in the mind of a 
Creator and of a fixed chain of being seemed illusory after the theory 
of evolution, Eiseley even so recognizes an "enormous stability" in the 
categories of life: 
... for all this flood of change, movement and destruction there 
is an enormous stability about the morphological plans which 
are built into the great phyla--the major divisions of life. They 
have all, or most of them, survived since the first fossil 
records. They do not vanish. The species alter ... but the 
Form, that greater animal which stretches across the millennia, 
survives. (FOT 82) 
Eiseley finds "curious comfort" in this stability. "It is almost as 
though somewhere outs ide, somewhere beyond the illusions, the 
several might be one" (82). 
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Eiseley himself is a Platonic idealist--valuing paradigm over 
particulars. Surveying the multiplicity and variety among crustacea, 
Eiseley concludes that "[i]t is not the individual that matters; it is the 
Plan and the incredible potentialities within it. The forms within the 
Form are endless and their emergence into time is endless" (FOT 84). 
But is Eiseley's Platonic view right? Is it not the individual that 
matters? In evolutionary morphology, do universal Platonic Forms 
exist or can form be known only through an aggregate of 
individuals? Can form be separated from being? Is form merely an 
expression of our categorizing minds, with no reality outside human 
thought? For Eiseley, the individual is part of the greater pattern of 
its order: " ... an order of life is like a diamond of many reflecting 
surfaces, each with its own pinpoint of light contributing·to the total 
effect" (FOT 85). He reverences the effect, and therefore tends to 
generalize rather than to individualize separate manifestations of the 
order of life--starfish, fox, orb spider, man. Eiseley seems to find 
comfort in this abstraction of life, a force depending on no individual 
or species manifestation for its permanence and efflorescence: " ... 
the many-faced animal of which we are one flashing and evanescent 
facet will not pass with us" (86). Life will continue in other forms. 
Eiseley's Platonism offers a consolation that Western religion has 
generally supplied in more personal terms. His concept of pattern 
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surviving the flux of form, in fact, displays a kinship with the Indian 
idea of the impermanence of all things but with the unity of 
Brahman underlying reality and with the Chinese belief that flow 
and change are essential features of nature but that there are 
constant patterns within these changes that are discernible by 
women and men (Capra 88, 1 05). 
As death and then life became natural, so also did human 
beings become '"natural. .. Eiseley describes '"a barren and disordered 
landscape" of red granite boulders strewn hundreds of miles from 
their point of origin by the glaciers of the last ice age. Before 
humans understood that the scattered boulders were the remnants 
of glacial action, they found it easy to believe in world deluges. 
Western religious mythology supported the cataclysmic 
interpretation of events. Looking at the newly understood glacial 
landscape, Eiseley finds in the scene something .. inhumanly remote 
and terrifying, .. but in it he also finds the place of man's beginnings: 
Man literally ends here. Beyond lies something morosely 
violent, of which we have no knowledge, or of which it might 
be better said that we have a traumatic eagerness to forget. 
For lurking in this domain is still the nature that created us: 
the nature of ringing ice fields, of choked forests, or 
unseasonable thunders. It is the unpredictable nature of the 
time before the gods, before man had laid hold upon any 
powers with his mind. It is a season of helplessness that stirs 
our submerged memories and that causes us to turn back at 
twilight to the safe road and the lights of town. Behind us 
whisper the ancient, uncontrollable winds .... This is man's 
place of birth, this region of inarticulate terror .... (FOT 90) 
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The work of other naturalists and his own observations has led 
Eiseley to a new creation myth in which man's beginning is terrifying 
and inexJ?licable. The diction and imagery of this passage are full of 
mystery and dread--"something morosely violent," "traumatic 
eagerness to forget," "[nature] lurking," "ringing ice fields ... choked 
forests ... unseasonable thunder," "unpredictable nature," 
"helplessness," "submerged memories," "twilight," "ancient, 
uncontrollable winds", and, finally, "this region of inarticulate terror." 
Ironically, knowledge has led man from a comfortable cosmic myth 
to the inexplicable and terrifying. 
Eiseley identifies two major discoveries which occurred in 1837 
and which accelerated the naturalization of man. Before the 
nineteenth century, most westerners would have agreed with 
Sedgwick, Darwin's biology teacher, that man had been "'but a few 
years' dweller on the earth'" and that man had been "'called into 
being within a few thousand years of the days in which we live by a 
provident contriving power'" (qtd. in FOT 93). In the nineteenth 
century, scientists began to find accumulating evidence that 
contradicted the generally accepted concept of Biblical time. Hugh 
Falconer's discovery of fossil remains of great apes and other 
primates in Tertiary beds of Northern India, and Louis Agassiz's 
recognition of the vast extent of North America and Europe which 
had been covered by the continental ice fields pushed the date of 
human emergence much further back into the past. The subsequent 
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discovery of a heavy-browed human skull along the gorge of the 
Neander near Dusseldorf, Germany, proved to be the "first relic of the 
ice age--of a long-vanished world where men and women had 
endured glacial cold and had struggled for existence armed only with 
crude spears and sharpened flints" (FOT I 04). The broad, low 
Neanderthal skull, which contained a brain as large or larger than 
modern man's, forced scholars to extend again the time required for 
human evolution. In the twentieth century, Dr. L. S. B. Leakey found 
a "bridge to man" or "near man" in the Olduvai Gorge in Tanganyika. 
Leakey estimated the age of the remains of this semi-vegetarian 
toolmaker at two million years. 
Given these distant origins in a primitive world where human 
shades into animal, what can be said of. the nature of human nature? 
Having robbed man of his place in time and creation--a being made 
in the image of God and just a little lower than the angels--and 
having reduced his pedigree tc; being just a little higher than the 
apes (and having taken some time to reach that rung on the ladder), 
early paleontologists like Raymond Dart began to speculate on the 
nature of this ape-descended man. Dart believed that human 
ancestors were successful carnivores with genetic streaks of sadism 
and cruelty. In a sanguine mood, Eiseley finds in Dart's view "a touch 
of disillusionment and distaste ... projected backward upon the wild 
era in which the human predicament began" (FOT 114). Eiseley, 
instead, is moved by evidence that Neanderthals buried their dead 
with gifts of food and treasures of worked flint and Leakey's 
-----------
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evidence that the "human gesture" of loving burial had been 
extended back in time a million years from the present. Eiseley 
concludes that man must partake "both of Darwinian toughness, 
resilence, and something else, a humanity ... that runs well nigh as 
deep as time itself" (FOT 114). Though man has become "natural," his 
nature escapes him: "perhaps his human freedom has left him the 
difficult choice of determining what it is his nature to be" ( 114). 
Eiseley believes that Darwin's "dreadful blow" to the human 
ego--demonstrating "man's physical relationship to the world of 
lower animals" --also invites a sense of cosmic isolation and 
alienation. Darwin's discoveries ensure the absolute uniqueness of 
complicated life forms and destroys the concept of geologic prophecy: 
... once undirected variation and natural selection are 
introduced as the mechanism controlling the development of 
plants and animals, the evolution of every world in space 
becomes a series of unique historical events. The precise 
accidental duplication of a complex form of life is extremely 
unlikely to occur in even the same environment, let alone in 
the different background and atmosphere of a far-off world. 
(lJ 158) 
Assuming undirected variation and natural selection, Eiseley 
concludes that "man is a solitary and peculiar development" (lJ. 158). 
The unity found in life forms results from "biological descent with 
modification." No formal pattern was imposed from without and life 
is "adjustable, not fixed" UJ. 160). Eiseley describes the evolution of 
life through many modifications along paths that can never be 
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retraced.· He declares that "[e]very creature alive is the product of a 
unique history" and says the statistical probability of its "precise 
reduplication" elsewhere in the universe is "so small as to be 
meaningless" (lJ 160). This uniqueness shared by every creature 
becomes a particular burden for human beings because we, 
seemingly unlike all others, can know our loneliness: 
In a universe whose size is beyond human imagining, where 
our world floats like a dust mote in the void of night, men have 
grown inconceivably lonely. We scan the time scale and the 
mechanisms of life itself for portents and signs of the invisible. 
As the only thinking mammals on the planet--perhaps the only 
thinking animals in the entire sidereal universe--the burden of 
consciousness has grown heavy upon us. (lJ 161) 
We search the stars for a possible future and rummage among the 
bones of the past in an attempt to understand our origins. We 
torture ourselves with the possibility that the wandering path has 
some yet-to-be-discovered meaning. Though there may be creatures 
of wisdom and power and yearning elsewhere in space, Eiseley 
concludes that according to the nature of life and the prinicples of 
evolution, "nowhere in all space or on a thousand worlds will there 
be men to share our loneliness" ( 162). 
Over the last few hundred years, human concepts about the 
world of nature have undergone dramatic changes. Technology has 
so enhanced our senses that "the phenomenal world, previously 
explored with the unaided senses, has undergone tremendous 
-------- ·-
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alteration in our minds" (FOT 118). With ever-more-powerful 
telescopes, misty 1 ights become a galaxy; with ever-more-powerful 
microscopes, the previously unseen becomes "a cosmos of both 
beautiful and repugnant life, while the tissues of the body have been 
resolved into a cellular hierarchy whose constituents mysteriously 
produce the human personality" ( 118). Like microscopic and 
intergalactic space, time also has expanded enormously into the 
before unimagined dimensions of the past, and "even its dead, 
forgotten life has been made to yield remarkable secrets" (118). Yet, 
Eiseley sees that this greatly enlarged awareness and knowledge 
have not been so comforting as the old myths of a smaller universe 
created just for man and man created to be its center and the 
comfort of a lonely God. Eiseley uses an Elizabethan stage metaphor 
to describe the quandry of twentieth-century humanity: 
... the world stage where the Elizabethans saw us strutting and 
mouthing our parts, has the skeletons of dead actors under the 
floor boards, and the dusty scenery of forgotten dramas lies 
abandoned in the wings. The idea necessarily comes home to 
us then with a sudden chill: What if we are not playing on the 
center stage? What if the Great Spectacle has no terminus and 
no meaning? What if there is no audience beyond the 
footlights, and the play, in spite of bold villains and posturing 
heroes, is a shabby repeat performance in an echoing vacuity? 
(FOT I I 8- I 1 9) 
We are left to wonder if the human drama is a comedy with much 
ado about nothing or a tragedy full of sound and fury but signifying 
nothing. 
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Why does it matter how we see nature? Because what we are 
depends on what nature is, and what nature is depends on what we 
are. Eiseley finds humans to be "mentally structured to look within 
as well as without and to be influenced within by what we consider 
the nature of the 'without' to be" (FOT 119). Thus, for Eiseley, the 
"without" and our means of apprehending it assume a pressing 
importance. Characters' interpretations of their parts may affect the 
plot of nature: 
Strange colorings have been given to reality and the colors 
have come mostly from within. As science extends itself, the 
colors, and through them the nature of reality, continue to 
change. The 'within' and 'without' are in some strange fashion 
intermingled. Perhaps, in a sense, the great play is actually a 
great magic, and we, the players, are a part of the illusion, 
making and transforming the plot as we go. (FOT 120) 
Eiseley concludes that the cosmos itself is like jean Cocteau's 
description of the theatre--"· a trick factory where truth has no 
currency.'" On "an infinitely greater scale" than the theatre, the 
cosmos tricks the observer with a "a set of lights forever changing, 
and ... actors themselves shape shifters, elongated shadows of 
something above or without" (IP 119). Thus, Eiseley considers that 
the word "natural," in the sense it is normally used, has no meaning, 
no concrete referent: "Perhaps ... there is really nothing at all 
natural in the universe or, at best ... the world is natural only in 
being unnatural, like some variegated, color-shifting chameleon" 
( 119). And humankind is as unnatural as the cosmos: "Man is no 
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more natural than the world... He himself creates the "phantom 
universe" of culture-- "a formidable realm of cloud shapes, ideas, 
potentialities, gods and cities, which with man's death will collapse 
into dust and vanish back into 'expected' nature" (IP 120). 
Eiseley says that "we must come to understand that learning is 
endless and that nowhere does it lead us behind the existent world" 
(FOT 160 ). As a "two-handed manipulator" with an insatiable desire 
for "mastery over the materials of his environment," man has 
"projected himself outward upon his surroundings in a way 
impossible to other creatures," and has succeeded in piercing "so 
deeply through the screen of appearances that the age-old 
distinctions between matter and energy have been dimmed to the 
point of disappearance" (FOT 158-159). In some cases, man has 
learned so much that he has frightened himself. Eiseley tells the 
story of a "distinguished scientist ... in his declining years" who 
developed a fear of "falling through the interstices of that largely 
empty molecular space which common men in their folly speak of as 
the world" (FOT 153). The very concept of the natural world which 
he had helped to develop--galaxies made up of electron clouds 
separated by light year distances mimicking the smaller electron 
galaxies of matter that we call the world--had taken him prisoner. 
The old scientist began to fear falling through those spaces his own 
imagination had helped to identify: "A 11 around him the ignorant 
rushed on their way over the illusion of substantial floors, leaping, 
though they did not see it, from particle to particle, over a~ bottomless 
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abyss" ( 153). Since, in the twentieth century, matter and energy 
have become virtually indistinguishable, the elderly physicist was 
left with uncertainty about even the material reality of the very 
particles themselves. 
In a surer time, in the seventeenth century, John Donne had 
described nature as "'the common law by which God governs us'" and 
had described miracle as '"God's Prerogative'" to over-rule that 
common law (qtd. in FOT 157). While ironically observing that "the 
laws of nature have a way of being altered from one generation of 
scientists to the next," Eiseley defines miracles as "an event 
transcending the known laws of nature" ( 171). Reviewing the 
gradual evolution of life and of the conscious, searching mind, Eiseley 
concludes that " ... nature itself is one vast miracle transcending the 
reality of night and nothingness" and that " ... each one of us in his 
personal life repeats that miracle" (FOT 171). That is, man is nature; 
nature is miracle; man is miracle. Some mysterious power changes 
the "dead, quiescent and unmoving" dust so that it becomes muskrat 
and poet and astronomer. That life should animate an assemblage of 
inert chemicals "may be the greatest chance of all, the most 
mysterious and unexplainable property in matter" ( 172). For Eiseley, 
the unreverenced small realities of the common day are the 
unnaturals of nature: 
Whatever may be the power behind those dancing motes to 
which the physicist has penetrated, it makes the light of the 
muskrat's world as it makes the world of the great poet. It 
makes, in fact, all of the innumerable and private worlds which 
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exist in the heads of men. There is a sense in which we can say 
that the planet, with its strange freight of life, is always just 
passing from the unnatural to the natural, from the Unseen 
which man has always reverenced to the small reality of the 
day. (FOT 171) 
And man--a "walking ape" who has come to "watch the red shift of 
light beyond the island universes"-- is as unnatural as the rest of 
nature: 
... [man! stands at the point where the miraculous comes into 
being, and after the event he calls it 'natural.' The imagination 
of man, in its highest manifestations, stands close to the 
doorway of the infinite, to the world beyond the nature that we 
know. Perhaps, after all, in this respect man constitutes the 
exertion of that act which Donne three centuries ago called God's 
Prerogative. (FOT 179) 
Yet man is a miracle with a dark side. Man himself is the greatest 
threat to the world made natural--himself included. Eiseley 
remembers what Pascal said of the human capacity to desacralize 
what was once ordained and holy: '"There is nothing we cannot 
make natural ... there is nothing natural which we do not destroy'" 
(qtd. in FOT 159). 
The Mind as Nature 
If nature is natural--whatever natural means--and man is 
natural, then the human mind itself is one of the many 
manifestations of nature. Trying to explain how matter came to 
3 31 
make a mind, how mind evolved out of matter, Eiseley affirms 
Thoceau's anticipation that '"thought must live with and be inspired 
with the life of the body'" (qtd. in MAN 59). In his first book, Eiseley 
traces The Immense Journey, the slow evolution of human 
consciousness as one of the late efflorescences (not, however, 
culminating or final) of life on our four-billion-year-old planet. 
Water was our source, the mother element of all life: "Turtle and fish 
and the pinpoint chirpings of individual frogs are all watery 
projections, concentrations--as man himself is a concentration--of 
that indescribable and liquid brew which is compounded in varying 
proportions of salt and sun and time" (IJ 20). Even though other 
elements are more numerous on earth's crust, our bones are made of 
calcium, carbonate of lime: "Our history is the reason--we came from 
the water. It was there the cells took the lime habit, and they kept it 
after we came ashore" (lJ 6). And of water are we still: "As for men, 
those myriad little detached ponds with their own swarming 
corpuscular life, what were they but a way that water has of going 
about beyond the reach of rivers?" (lJ 20). Quoting the French 
physiologist Bernard in his story of creation, the evolutionist offers 
the biological equivalent of the theological gift of free will--" 'the 
stability of the interior environment is the condition of free life'" 
(qtd. in lJ 42): 
... All of the tremendous differences between living forms 
have been achieved only by the elaboration of devices for the 
maintenance of that inner nourishing liquidity in which cells 
can live and grow within a certain narrow range of 
tolerance .... 
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The drifting cell masses of the early ocean lived in a nutrient 
solution. Salt and sun and moisture were accessible without 
great mechanical elaboration. It was the reaching out that 
changed this pattern, the reaching out that forced the cells to 
bring the sea ashore with them, to elaborate in their own 
bodies the very miniature of that all-embracing sea from which 
they came. (lJ. 42-43). 
All human choice is dependent upon the biological freedom that we 
are "'walking sacks of sea water.'" 
In water life began and from water life crawled upon the land. 
In his essay "How Flowers Changed the World," Eiseley describes how 
planet Earth--once only the colors of rock, sand, and dust-- came to 
twinkle with a greener light: 
... Out of the vast chemical broth of the sea--not from 
the deeps, but from the element-rich, light-exposed platforms 
of the continental shelves--wandering fingers of green had 
crept upward along the meanderings of river systems and 
fringed the gravels of forgotten lakes. 
In those first ages plants clung of necessity to swamps and 
watercourses .... The green marchers had gained a soggy 
foothold upon the land. (U. 62). 
Wilbur, in his poem "Fern-Beds in Hampshire County," uses imagery 
similar to Eiseley's to describe the march of plant life out of the 
green sea onto the land. Eiseley's "green marchers" become Wilbur's 
"green infantry": 
... let the wind grow bluff, and though 
The sea lies far to eastward, far below, 
These fluent spines, with whipped pale underside, 
Will climb through timber as a smoking tide 
Through pier-stakes, beat their sprays about the base 
Of every boulder, scale its creviced face 
And, wave on wave, like some green infantry, 
Storm all the slopes as high as eye can see. (Poems 125) 
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Wilbur suggests that the "airy plants" of the present-day fern-beds 
in Hampshire County repeat "an ancient conquest ... I As when they 
answered to the boomed command I That the sea's green rise up and 
take the land" (Poems 125-126). 
Emphasizing "the enormous interlinked complexity of life," 
Eiseley describes the evolution of the green world as a necessary 
prerequisite to the development of animal, including human, life. He 
tells of the "soundless, violent explosion" lasting a million years that 
changed the face of the planet. During the Cretaceous period, just 
before the close of the Age of Reptiles, angiosperms, the flowering 
plants, appeared: "Even the great evolutionist, Charles Darwin, called 
them 'an abominable mystery,· because they appeared so suddenly 
and spread so fast" {lJ 63). In the sequence of creation, Eiseley 
writes that "the appearance of the flowers contained also the equally 
mystifying emergence of man" (64): 
A high metabolic rate and the maintenance of a constant body 
temperature are supreme achievements in the evolution of life. 
They enable an animal to escape, within broad limits, from the 
overheating or chilling of its immediate surroundings, and at 
the same time to maintain a peak mental efficiency. 
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The agile brain of the warm-blooded birds and mammals 
demands a high oxygen consumption and food in concentrated 
forms, or the creatures cannot long sustain themselves. It was 
the rise of the flowering plants that provided that energy and 
changed the nature of the 1 iving world. Their appearance 
parallels in quite surprising manner the rise of the birds and 
mammals. (lJ. 64-66) 
Eventually, as a result of the tremendous production of seeds and 
fruits by flowering plants, llomo sapiens evolved from hominid 
ancestors: "The weight of a petal has changed the face of the world 
and made it ours" (lJ 77). In the world of living things prior to the 
concentration of food energy in flowering plants, "nothing saw save 
with the intense concentration of the hunt, nothing moved except 
with the grave sleepwalking intentness of the instinct-driven brain" 
(64). Millennia later, however, the tormented intelligence and 
imagination that painted Tile Sunflorvers had been made possible by 
the sunflowers themselves. Van Gogh's troubled, creative 
mammalian brain was able to evolve because eons of animal life had 
fed on the concentrated energy of the seed cases of angiosperms. 
None of this came easily, however. For Eiseley, nature is no 
gentle midwife; she drags new life painfully into being. Life came 
ashore from the water not In a "magnificent march through the 
breakers and up the cliffs"; instead, life-- "the failures of the sea"--
came ashore "in the swamps of inland waterways and along the tide 
flats of the estuaries where rivers come to the sea," making a 
stealthy advance "in suffocation and terror, amidst the leaching bite 
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of chemical discomfort" (lJ. 54). And nature has shown no loyalty to 
past favorites. The dominant species of one era does not breed the 
dominant master- type of the next geological era. The "law of the 
unspecialized" favors the "lowly and generalized animals ... capable 
of making new adaptations, and ... not narrowly restricted to a 
given environment" (lJ. 55). Marginal situations and encroachment 
by enemies push life into new dimensions. As Wilbur writes in 
"Marginalia," "Our riches are centrifugal": "Things concentrate at the 
edges; the pond-surface I Is bourne to fish and man ... " (266). 
Wilbur, in fact, embraces a view of nature's rigors that is 
similar to Eiseley's. In his poem "Orchard Trees, January," Wilbur 
disavows an easy, romantically benignant ideal for nature. Watching 
bare trees blown about by the blizzard winds of a world deep in 
January winter, Wilbur denies any snugness that dreamy watchers 
would project on the scene: 
It's not the case, though some might wish it so 
Who from a window watch the blizzard blow 
White riot through their branches vague and stark, 
That they keep snug beneath their pelted bark. 
(Poems 27) 
Instead, the orchard trees respond as Emily Dickinson might if she 
were among them: 
They take affliction in until it jells 
To crystal ice between their frozen cells, 
And each of them is inwardly a vault 
Of jewels rigorous and free of fault 
(Poems 27) 
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That icy hard, inward treasure-making is "lu]nglimpsed by us" until 
spring harvests winter's treasure: In May, each winter-frozen 
orchard tree bears its affliction in "A sudden crop of green-pronged 
solitaires" (27). 
Using his knowledge of the past to describe the earliest 
developments in the evolution of the human brain, Eiseley spins a 
creation myth which portrays how change comes out of desperation 
and an agonizing struggle to survive. He says that the brain "began 
as such things always begin--in the ooze of unnoticed swamps, in the 
darkness of eclipsed moons. It began with a strangled gasping for 
air" (lJ. 49). The place of the brain's beginnings was a dying pond: 
The pond was a place of reek and corruption, of fetid smells 
and oxygen-starved fish breathing through laboring gills. At 
times the slowly contracting circle of the water left little 
windrows of minnows who skittered desperately to escape the 
sun, but who died, nevertheless, in the fat, warm mud. It was 
a place of low life. In it the human brain began. (lJ. 49-50) 
The time of its beginning was three hundred million years ago when 
"ld]ust storms marched in incessant progression across a wilderness 
whose plants were the plants of long ago," in a time of dizzying 
change (50). In a doomed pond--the water fouled and oxygen-
deprived--a creature labored to breathe air directly "through a little 
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accessory lung." It was the only creature in the lifeless landscape 
that could walk: "It walked rarely and under protest, but that was 
not surprising. The creature was a fish" (50). The "Snout," as Eiseley 
calls it, survived by hobbling downstream "on the stumps of heavy 
fins" to another pond. The journey of this lung-fish was "best not 
observed in daylight, it was something that needed swamps and 
shadows and the touch of the night dew" because this fish's journey 
on land was "a monstrous penetration of a forbidden element ... " 
(51). In three hundred million years, Eiseley says this face averted 
from the light would become our own. The lung-fish was a driven 
and desperate fai!ure living in the swamp and tide flats where 
"strange compromises are made and new senses are born" (51). For 
the cumbersome and plodding Snout, a fresh-water Crossopterygian, 
"something had happened back of his eyes. The ooze had gotten in 
its work" (52). The ooze-marked brain of the Snout was fermenting 
into something "no longer entirely a fish." 
Eiseley explains how the human brain and the complexities of 
thought depended on the drying swamp and the air-hunger of a 
Devonian fish. Without the "green quagmire" out of which the Snout 
came, we might never have existed or we might have developed as 
mammalian insects with solid brains, "our neurones wired for 
mechanical perfection, our lives running out with the perfection of 
beautiful, intricate, and mindless clocks" (52). The development of 
the human brain depended on the appearance of two thin-walled 
bubbles at the end of the Snout's small brain. The Snout developed a 
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tiny brain that was essentially a thin-walled tube fed on the 
peripheral surface by a myriad of blood vessels and on the central 
surface by the vessels of the enlarged choroid plexuses. If the Snout 
had possessed the solid brain of the fishes living in highly 
oxygenated waters, it would not have survived the pond's drying. In 
addition, if the Snout had not evolved the thin, tubular brain with 
the two hemispheric bubbles but had instead developed the 
thickened, solid brain, human kind would have lost its necessary 
hollow-brained progenitor and the road to higher consciousness: 
"There is a mystery about those thickenings which culminate in the 
so-called solid brain. It is the brain of insects, of the modern fishes, 
of some reptiles and all birds. Always it marks the appearance of 
elaborate patterns of instinct and the end of thought" UJ 53). Eiseley 
says those tiny bubbles of the lung-fish not only allowed the Snout to 
survive but also allowed the area upon which higher correlation 
centers could be built to spread: "Wherever ... the thin sheets of 
gray matter expand upward into the enormous hemispheres of the 
human brain, laughter, or it may be sorrow, enter in. Out of the 
choked Devonian waters emerged sight and sound and the music that 
rolls invisible through the composer's brain" (lJ. 53-54). The Snout, 
the "bog-trapped failure, .. had unknowingly become "the first 
vertebrate to pop completely through the water membrane into a 
new dimension. His very specializations and failures, in a water 
sense, had preadapted him for a world he scarcely knew existed" (lJ. 
56). 
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Wilbur's poem "Lamarck Elaborated" affirms the evolutionary 
principle that creatures are products of their environment, that 
organs and capabilities develop in response to environmental 
pressure. Wilbur insists that "Out of our vivid ambiance came 
unsought I All sense . . . " and then wonders what made the mind 
(Poems 24 3).3 "Lamarck Elaborated" expands upon a quotation from 
the French biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck who believed that 
interaction with the environment produced changes in organisms 
which could then be passed on genetically. Wilbur uses Lamarck's 
assertion "'The environment creates the organ'" as an epigraph to the 
poem. Lamarck himself is not mentioned except in the title of the 
poem. 
In the opening stanza, Wilbur contradicts an ancient Greek 
concept that seeing occurs when visual rays from the eye strike an 
object in the environment: 
The Greeks were wrong who said our eyes have rays; 
Not from these sockets or these sparkling poles 
Comes the illumination of our days. 
It was the sun that bore these two blue holes. 
(Poems 243) 
In his book Catching the Light: The Entwined History of Light and 
Mind, Arthur Zajonc recounts the early Greek concepts of how seeing 
occurred. Empedocles believed that Aphrodite had fitted "marvelous 
passages" into the eye allowing it "to transmit a fine interior fire 
through the water of the eye and out into the world .... Sight 
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proceeded from the eye to the object seen; the eyes rayed out their 
own light" (20). Zajonc says that in Plato's account of vision, the 
iight of the eye also "played fully as important a role as the light of 
the sun," the two lights coming together to mediate between man and 
the dark of the external world. Zajonc writes: 
According to Plato, the fire of the eye causes a gentle light to 
issue from it. This interior light coalesces with the daylight, 
like to like, forming thereby a single homogeneous body of 
light. That body, a marriage of inner light and outer, forges a 
link between the objects of the world and the soul. It becomes 
the bridge along which the subtle motions of an exterior object 
may pass, causing the sensation of sight. (Zajonc 21) 
Thus, according to Empedocles and Plato, the light of the eye shared 
equally with the sun the power to make the external world vis ible.4 
Wilbur denies the power the Greeks attributed to the eyebeam 
and says that instead of our making the world with our seeing, the 
stimulations of the world call out our senses--sight, hearing, smell, 
taste, and touch: 
It was the song of doves begot the ear 
And not the ear first conceived of sound: 
That organ bloomed in vibrant atmosphere, 
As music conjured Ilium from the ground. 
The yielding water, the repugnant stone, 
The poisoned berry and the flaring rose 
Attired in sense the tactless finger-bone 
And set the taste-buds and inspired the nose. 
(Poems 243) 
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Thus, according to Wilbur, the senses are nature-made whether the 
forces of nature are accommodating or hostile. Both the "yielding 
water," a fluid that accepts the shape of its container, and the 
"repugnant stone" (repugnant having its archaic meaning of making 
or offering resistance, hostile) shape the perceiver. The word 
"tactless" in the phrase "tactless finger-bone" aiso returns to its 
origins, taking its meaning from the archaic denotation of "tact"--the 
sense of touch, feeling (derived from the Latin !actus). Using the 
archaic meanings of the words repugnant and tact underscores the 
process of change. Like the senses, words evolved; the form 
preserves the historical meaning even though the current usage has 
changed. The "tactless finger-bone," both senseless and insensitive, 
learned both sensation and sensibility from the soft water and 
resistant stone. Similarly, the "poisoned berry" educated the palate--
"set the taste-buds"--and the "flaring rose ... inspired the nose." The 
animating fragrance of the rose "inspires" the nose to breathe in, to 
take air into the lungs--not just for the necessary oxygen, but for the 
sensory delight of its perfume. Thus, Wilbur concludes that our 
senses do not make the world but instead the world makes our 
senses. 
Wilbur finds, however, one exception to the world-created 
senses: 
Out of our vivid ambiance came unsought 
All sense but that most formidably dim. 
The shell of balance rolls in seas of thought. 
(Poems 243) 
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The vividness of nature stimulated the development of all senses 
except the one "most formidably dim." The "sense ... most 
formidably dim" is ambiguous. Does it mean the sense of balance 
whose organs of control are invisible and autonomous, not subject to 
the conscious mind and which describes not the exterior world but 
the organism's position and stability or instability within the 
surrounding world? Or does "sense ... most formidably dim" have a 
broader meaning? "Sense" can refer to signification, meaning, 
something to be grasped; it can refer to a mechanism or faculty of 
perception. Sense can also mean consciousness, instinctive 
comprehension, or a vague and unanalyzable but persistent 
awareness or feeling. Sense, in its broadest meaning, refers to the 
mind, sentience, or intelligence. Is it, perhaps, the consciousness, the 
mind, which is "most formidably dim"--dim suggesting both 
something that emits a limited or insufficient amount of light and 
something seen indistinctly, without clear outlines or details? 
Nietzsche found the consciousness "formidably dim": 
'Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic, 
and is consequently the most unfinished and least powerful of 
these developments. Every extension .of knowledge arises from 
making conscious the unconsciousness. The great basic activity 
is unconscious. For it is narro~~ this room of consciousness.· 
(qtd. in Koestler, The Act of Creation 153) 
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Dependence on this sense, consciousness, keeps us in the dark of 
what is known, isolated from the unknown, "the great basic activity 
of the unconscious." The "sense ... most formidably dim" is unlike 
the other senses in another way. Taste, smell, sight, touch, <;~.nd 
hearing came "unsought" --conjured like 11 i urn from absenc1e to give 
nature her due regard. The sixth and extra-sense came differently, 
by inference, desired rather than "unsought." 
In the last two lines of the fourth stanza, Wilbur plays with the 
concept of "balance" in the sense of mental as well as physical 
equilibrium. 
The shell of balance rolls in seas of thought. 
It was the mind that taught the head to swim. (243) 
Wilbur may be mistakenly referring to the snaitshell-like cochlea as 
the "shell of balance." The cochlea, the last structure deep within the 
inner ear, is actually an organ of hearing; the semi-circular canals 
along with the utricle and saccule in the vestibule of the inner ear 
are the organs of balance.5 If one can overlook the mistake of 
function, the shell of balance rolling in seas of thought (the brain) 
conveys aptly the sense of precarious and dynamic balance. 
Physically, the mind interprets the signals from the labyrinthine 
organs and in some cases "teaches the head to swim" --causes vertigo. 
Also, the mind in the complexities and perplexities of conscious and 
unconscious thought creates a roiling sea in which mental balance 
becomes difficult. Sense data can become confused, its reliability 
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suspect; what is imagined seems more true that what is putatively 
real. Thought becomes an ocean of disequilibrium. Though, as Harth 
suggests in The Creative Loog, natural science is a way of seeking a 
bond with the cosmos through knowledge, human beings can, on the 
other hand, become oppressed with the burden of what is known 
(Harth xix). Scientific discoveries challenga long-held understandings 
about the nature of the universe and inflict on us an awareness of 
the existence of worlds we cannot ever know: "Newton's numbers 
set to cosmic lyres" --his application of the infinitesimal calculus to 
the laws of planetary motion-- "Whet med us in whirling wor Ids we 
could not know" (Poems 243). 
Continuing the metaphor begun with the shell of balance rolling 
in seas of thought, Wilbur concludes that some other sense beyond 
the senses has kept us off-balance, stumbling about, following the 
lure of a Siren-song: 
And by the imagined floods of our desires 
The voice of Sirens gave us vertigo. 
(Poems 243) 
As nature's demands for witness called forth the perceiving senses, 
our desires, our longings for union with something outside ourselves 
are manifested in "imagined floods." We imagine the turbulent seas 
where imagined Sirens sing us into vertigo. If the five senses grew 
vivid in response to the ambiance of the natural world, did some 
unknown call forth the imagination and the interior world of 
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consciousness? As nature called forth the senses to bear witness, do 
we conjure up some witness to give us due regard? Do our longings 
for something more, something beyond that which we perceive, 
inspire us to create imaginatively the hazards upon which we 
founder? Or, is there something ytJt undiscovered or unrecognized 
that--like the rose, the water, the stone, the sun, the song of doves--
calls forth the imagination to "sense" it? Or, does our need for 
coherence, some self-referential explanation for all that is, project an 
unknown--for which we must then search--into the universe? If all 
the mysteries were solved, would that be the end of mind? 
In his book Consciousness Exglained, Dennett describes human 
consciousness as "just about the last surviving mystery," but he 
believes that the mystery does not need to be protected from 
science. Dennett suggests that the eventual demystification of 
consciousness will have an effect similar to the scientific explanations 
of cosmology and cell replication: 
We find no diminution of wonder: on the contrary, we 
find deeper beauties and more dazzling visions of the 
complexity of the universe than the protectors of mystery ever 
conceived .... When we understand consciousness--when there 
is no more mystery--consciousness will be different, but there 
will still be beauty, and more room than ever for awe. 
(Dennett 25) 
Dennett presumes that current theories of cosmology and cell 
replication are final resolutions of long-standing mysteries rather 
than introductions to new mysteries. He is right that knowledge has 
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given us more cause for wonder, but that is, in part, because 
knowledge brings with it ever-new mysteries. In fact, twentieth-
century science has discovered an inherent, minimal degree of 
uncertainty (Planck's constant) in knowing the universe, in 
measuring the location and velocity of any particle. Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle, which Steven Hawking calls "a fundamental, 
inescapable property of the world," underlies the theory of quantum 
mechanics and introduces "an unavoidable element of 
unpredictability or randomness into science" (Hawking 56). 
In addition to this basic uncertainty at the foundation of 
modern science, there are questions science does not attempt. 
Science does not consider metaphysical problems like Heidegger's 
"question of questions": "Why is there any Being at all--why not far 
rather Nothing?" (Existence and Being 380). In the face of such a 
question, Stephen Hawking observes that the values of "many 
fundamental numbers, like the size of the electric charge of the 
electron and the ratio of the masses of the proton and the electron" 
seem to have been "very finely adjusted to make possible the 
development of life." Hawking says that most other sets of values 
could also give rise to universes but not, he believes, to intelligent 
life: " ... although they might be very beautiful, [these universes] 
would contain no one able to wonder at that beauty" (Hawking 125). 
Another scientist might observe that intelligent life was able to 
evolve simply because the numbers happened to be what they are, 
not because cosmogenesis and evolution had any supernatural 
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guidance. However, with or without intention on the part of some 
transcendent force, life on earth has evolved human consciousness 
to be a seeker after understanding and "a giver of due regard." The 
mind has taught the head to swim in the sense of a dizzy wonder but 
also in the sense of a struggle against the current toward the alluring 
unknown. 
Both Wilbur and Eiseley share a sense that man is "a shadow 
come out of the past," inextricably connected to, yet irrevocably 
separated from, the life forms which preceded the human species 
and from which and through which human DNA has gradually 
evolved. Despite the interconnectedness of the web of life and 
humankind's vast inheritance from precedent life, we human beings 
are isolated in our own cognitions; our sense perceptions, reasoning, 
and imagination have not only individual but species limitations; 
thus, we must work constantly at an awareness of our inevitable 
solipsisms. Yet, it is also true that only through our sensory 
awareness, reason, memory, and, most of all, our imaginations that 
we can know the things of this world. 
Ironically, the perceptive organs of our senses which have 
been called forth by the environment and which make it possible to 
know the world also effectively separate us from it. To see like a 
human means not to see the world as it is perceived by an insect, a 
bird, a dog. We have forgotten the evolutionary stations along our 
way. Using a frayed length of rope as his visual aid, Eiseley the 
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teacher tries to tell his students that "this is the way we came, the 
way/ of the invisible rope I in the beginning cast I somewhere in the 
Devonian darkness or below" (NOA l 08). He tells them: 
... there was a similar rope 
as loosely frayed 
that bound them to the past, 
a rope that somewhere ran 
to an old salt-oozing eye 
in the deep sea, 
and that strange eye 
still stared from underneath their brows 
full at me, 
just as the interlocked vertebrae of their dextrous spines 
was long ago 
a fish's gift 
just as 
their lungs had labored gasping in a swamp 
to serve a fish's needs (NOA l 05) 
These frayed strands of "The Rope" which had served diverse times 
and needs "in sea and swamp and forest" had "twisted finally I into 
our living substance, hidden in ourselves I that code of DNA, I that 
secret spiral ladder made up of bits and pieces of I that past that 
never dies but lives entwined in us" (NOA l 05). 
Though we are bound to other species by our shared 
evolutionary heritage, we are also separated by the species 
differentiation that raises insuperable barriers between us. Eiseley, 
in his poem "Magic, .. which tells of a long-term, symbiotic 
relationship with cardinals who learned how to teach the man to feed 
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them, speaks of his love of forms beyond his own and his regret for 
the unbreachab le otherness that separates him from them: 
I have lived much among animals 
in a small way, 
bartering food for information, 
trying to dis cern 
whether the bright flame in the mind of man 
is at all matched 
in fur or feather 
for I 
love forms beyond my own 
and regret the borders between us. 
(NOA 65) 
Human beings can try to reach imaginatively across the barriers of 
neurophysiology, cognition, and instinct, but, in the end, the 
imagination itself is tethered by the wonderful otherness of the 
human brain. 
In his poem "Trolling for Blues," Richard Wilbur portrays 
human contact with the otherness of a bluefish. "We" try to 
anthropomorphize the external world by endowing it with human 
attributes, making the tern "dapper," the sole cloud "like a slow-
moving embryo," and the fish "keen"--each a mirror of our kind. 
The fish, "[w]hom fight and beauty have endeared to us,"' becomes an 
object of conception, a product of the imagination: "How clearly, 
musing to the engine's thrum, I Do we conceive him as he waits 
below." Yet this clarity of conception comes only with setting aside 
all in the blue's behavior that is so mystifyingly unclear, so 
350 
nonhuman--"His unreflectivenesss, his flings in air,/ The aberration 
of his flocking swerve I To spawning-grounds a hundred miles at 
sea" (Poems 29). Deep in his genomes the fish harbors patterns of 
behavior and instincts that escape anthropomorphizing; they affirm 
his very nonhuman otherness. The "mind's blue eye" imagines the 
bluefish "in the water's blue, which is the shade I Of thought." The 
narrowness of the human perspective is like a visual spectrum 
limited to blue; the perceiver sees with his blue eye a blue fish in 
blue water. The water's blue, however, is the "shade" of thought--
both the color of thought and the darkness which imagination cannot 
penetrate. 
In the "scintillating flux" of blue water--mesmerizing and 
deceptive--the fish is imaginatively caught: "Poised, weightless, all 
attention, yet on edge I To lunge and seize with sure incisiveness." 
To the mind's eye, "lh]e is a type of coolest intellect" until suddenly 
the b 1 ue asserts its otherness: "He strikes and runs unseen beneath 
the rip, I Yanking imagination back and down I Past recognition to 
the unlit deep." Suddenly the fish escapes the man's conceiving, 
"strikes and runs." The rip is an extent of rough, broken water 
caused by the meeting of cross currents or tides. In the poem it is 
also the rough water of the imagination, broken and stirred by the 
sudden recognition of a reality, an otherness which exists outside its 
dominion and understanding--man meets fish. In a punning sense, it 
is also a rip in the fabric of the poet's conceptualizing and a 
fracturing of the "mirror of our kind." 
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The fish "runs unseen" back and down into the unlit deep "Of 
the old darkness of Devonian dream I Phase of meditation not our 
own... The Devonian period occurred during the Paleozoic Era, after 
the Siluran and before the Carboniferous; it was marked by the 
dominance of the fish. Thus, the bluefish ya.'lks the imagination back 
into a "[p]hase of meditation not our own." Ironically, the man has 
been caught by the fish. What Wallace Stevens called "the lure of the 
real'" has hooked him and pulled him into the blue domininon of the 
fish. He is drawn back to a place in time that antedates the 
imagination-- "That long melee where selves were not." Though the 
life of that Devonian dream is in human terms, preconscious--
'"merciless, painless, sleepless, unaware"--it is not irretrievably alien 
and outside us. Indeed, it is inside us, the home in time "[f]rom 
which ... unthinkably we rose" as well as the dark sea of our own 
unconscious or preconscious minds. Humankind--reflective, musing, 
conceiving, attentive, imaginative, cognitive--comes "unthinkably" 
from that life so unaware. The mysterious Devonian sea, past 
recognition, is the place from which we came and from which we 
come now. Teilhard de Chardin in The Phenomenon of Man 
emphasizes the presence of whatever IS--including human thought--
since the beginning of the evolutionary process: "In the world, 
nothing could ever bu;-st forth as final across the different thresholds 
successively traversed by evolution (however critical they be) which 
has not existed in an obscure and primordial way" (71 ). 
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Thought and imagination evolved out of the unthinking and 
continue to evolve out of that dark abyssal sea, the private depths of 
self which we cannot plumb with the conscious mind. Bruce 
Michelson describes the imagination's fight with "something 
different, primordial, a consciousness either inscrutable or simply not 
here at all": 
The 'shade of thought,' as the middle-dark in which 
consciousness can troll, fancying, and fancying itself to be 
getting somewhere in understanding the world's depths, gives 
way now to the 'old darkness of Devonian dream' --an 
unknowable blackness too far back in history, and too far down 
in one's own mind, down in the place where 'selves were not,' 
and life was utterly unlike life as we understand or dream it. 
(Michelson 59). 
The "1 ure of the real" has led the poet to an encounter with otherness 
not only outside himself--the bluefish that escapes his conceiving--
but also the otherness within--the blue water of thought that shades 
into the darkness where consciousness cannot follow. As we have 
discovered the vastness of sidereal space, we have also learned, 
Eiseley says, that" ... the spaces within stretch as far as those 
without" (IP 82). 
Eiseley calls the human brain "the most remarkable creation in 
the world" (lJ 94). He says that it appears that man acquired the 
essential features of a modern brain within the recent geological 
past--five hundred thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand 
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years ago--and that the process of brain change was "surprisingly 
rapid" (IJ. 118). For man to evolve, four things had to happen 
simultaneously. The brain had to triple in size, but the change had to 
occur after birth rather than before. Childhood had to be lengthened 
to allow the lost instinctive responses to be replaced with learned 
behavior. Family bonds had to be extended beyond the limit of the 
mating season so that the smarter but more defenseless child could 
have a protected period of maturation. Eiseley says the dizzying 
spectacle of rapid brain growth was complex and many-sided and 
whatever "touched it off is hidden under the leaf mold of forgotten 
centuries" (U. 123). Eiseley believes that the selective forces that 
promoted the rapid brain growth were not competition among 
humanoid groups but forces which "lay essentially in the nature of 
the socio-cultural world itself" (U 120). Eiseley speculates that a 
"strange reduction of instincts in man in some manner forced a 
precipitous brain growth as compensation" thereby compelling man 
to struggle to build about him "a world of ideas to replace his lost 
animal environment" (lJ. 92-93). 
He was becoming something the world had never seen before--
a dream animal--living at least partially within a secret 
universe of his own creation and sharing that secret universe 
in his head with other, similar heads. Symbolic communication 
had begun. Man had escaped out of the eternal present of the 
animal world into a knowledge of past and future. The unseen 
gods, the powers behind the world of phenomenal appearance, 
began to stalk through his dreams. (U. 120). 
Thus, man crossed over into a "new invisible environment." 
Considering what had to happen to allow the evolution of the 
"dreaming animal," Eiseley is "amazed and humbled that man was 
achieved at all" (lJ 122). 
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As man changed, nature changed--because man is one of 
nature's many manifestations. "Nature ... was beginning to reach 
out into the dark behind itself. Nature was beginning to evade its 
own limitations in the shape of this strange, dreaming and observant 
brain" (lJ. 1 21). Whatever worlds were gained with the growth of 
the dreaming human brain, another world was lost: "The Eden of the 
eternal present that the animal world had known for ages was 
shattered at last. Through the human mind, time and darkness, good 
and evil, would enter and possess the world" ( 121 ). In the new 
world of the large-brained dreamer, the struggle for survival was 
fought "not by ax and spear ... but in the world of streaming 
shadows forever hidden behind the forehead of man" (121). 
In The Invisible Pyramid Eiseley imagines what consciousness 
might have been like for the prehistoric, then prehuman, creatures 
who were our ancestors. The neolithic people who would build the 
hill forts on the British downs buried their dead "in red ochre under 
the fire pit, the red standing for blood" for a people "quick in 
analogies and magic. The ochre was for life elsewhere and farewell" 
(IP l 0). Further back, across two separate glaciations and two 
interglacial summers, cruder people with wild, uncertain eyes did not 
sew garments or make weapons other than pointed stones; they had 
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trouble making and keeping fire. They left their dead where they 
fell, and did not try to increase the spoils of the hunt with magic or 
cave paintings. Their faces took on the cavernous look of the places 
they inhabited. Less sure they were men, these people had fewer 
words and were "terrifyingly ignorant and given to frustrated anger. 
There was too much locked up in us that we could not express" (IP 
l 0). Eiseley speaks the rage and frustration of these creatures, 
neither human nor animal: 
We were being used, and perhaps it was against this that 
we unconsciously raged the most. We were neither beast nor 
man. We were only a bridge transmitting life. I say we were 
almost animals and knew little, but this we felt and raged 
against. There were no words to help us. No one could think of 
them. Sometimes we were stalked by the huge cats, but it was 
the inner stalking that was most terrible. (IP l 0-11). 
The last journey back in time across the first ice age leads to a 
creature freed from this terrible "inner stalking," a creature who 
walks upright but makes no fire and no tools except "an occasional 
bone club." These small, unclothed pygmies, "no longer stare at the 
stars or think of the unreal": "The dead are dead. No one follows us 
at nightfall. Do not repeat this. I think we are animals. I think we 
have reached beyond the bridge. We are happy here. Tell no one" 
( ll ). Thus, Eiseley imagines man back to Eden, to the time before 
consciousness brought weeping and memory. In The Immense 
journey, Eiseley writes that the Eden story is a fitt~ng allegory for the 
rise of human consciousness during the time between the beginnings 
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of the first and second ice ages: " ... [man] walking memoryless 
through bars of sunlight and shade in the morning of the world, sat 
down and passed a wondering hand across his heavy forehead. Time 
and darkness, knowledge of good and evil. have walked with him 
ever since" ( 125). Between the beginnings of the two ice ages, " a 
new world of terror and loneliness appears to have been created in 
the soul of man" (lj125). 
Nietzsche, for whom consciousness was a disease, offered his 
own hypothesis on the origin of mankind's bad conscience; his theory 
of the beginnings of consciousness is remarkably close to Eiseley's. 
Nietzsche speculated that the change came when human beings 
began to repress instinct so as to live in mutually supportive groups: 
"I take bad conscience to be a deep-seated malady to which man 
succumbed under the pressure of the most profound transformation 
he ever underwent---the one that made him once and for all a 
sociable and pacific creature" (Genealogy 217). 6 Like sea creatures 
forced to become land animals, humans, in the process of leaving 
their unconscious animal beginnings were "forced to change their 
natures." Abruptly bereft of the guidance of unconscious instinctual 
drives, people were forced by what Nietzsche called an ineluctable 
disaster "to think, deduce, calculate, weigh cause and effect--
unhappy people, reduced to their weakest, most fallible organ, their 
consciousness!" (217). 
When they were driven underground, Nietzsche believes that 
these repressed instincts created an interior world into which to vent 
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themselves: "This is what I call man's interiorization; it alone 
provides the soil for the growth of what is later called man's soul" 
(217). Nietzsche believed that this interior world expanded as the 
outward discharge of instinctual drives was restricted. And as these 
"wild, extravagant instincts" turned inward, they attacked the host: 
Hostility, cruelty, the delight in persecution, raids, excitement, 
destruction all turned against their begetter. Lacking external 
enemies and resistances, and confined within an oppressive 
narrowness and regularity, man began rending, persecuting, 
terrifying himself, like a wild beast hurling itself against the 
bars of its cage. (Genealogy 218) 
Deprived of the excitement and gratification of the lost animal world, 
languishing man turned "himself into an adventure, a torture 
chamber, an insecure and dangerous wilderness--this fool, this 
pining and desperate prisoner, became the inventor of 'bad 
conscience"' (218). According to Nietzsche, man thereby infected 
himself with "the greatest and most disastrous of maladies ... his 
sickness of himself" (218). This interiorization and bad conscience 
resulted, Nietzsche believed, from man's "violent severance from his 
animal past, by his sudden leap and fall into new layers and 
conditions of existence, by this declaration of war against the old 
instincts that had hitherto been the foundation of his power, his joy, 
and his awesomeness" (218). 
Nietzsche says that this change in man begat an even larger 
change; man's interior struggle required a witness: 
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... the phenomenon of an animal soul turning in upon itself, 
taking arms against itself, was so novel, profound, mysterious, 
contradictory, and pregnant with possibility, that the whole 
complexion of the universe was changed thereby. This 
spectacle ... required a divine audience to do it justice. It was 
a spectacle too sublime and paradoxical to pass unnoticed on 
some trivial planet .... Man now aroused an interest, a 
suspense, a hope, almost a conviction--as though in him 
something were heralded, as though he were not a goal but a 
way, an interlude, a bridge, a great promise .... " 
(Genealogy 218-219) 
For Nietzsche and Eiseley, man becomes not an end in himself but an 
interlude in some larger process. They even use the same image of 
the stages of human consciousness as bridges to something beyond. 
Eiseley believes that human beings continue to pay with 
anxiety and terror for crossing the threshold into conscious thought. 
Near the end of The Invisible Pyramid, he writes that man seems to 
feel the need to appease--by "some act unknown"--some 
unidentifiable forces for the Promethean effrontery of intruding into 
the world of thought: "For this purpose he has raised pyramids and 
temples, but all in vain. A greater sacrifice is demanded, the act of a 
truly great magician, the man capable of transforming himself" ( 150). 
Eiseley says that also buried in our haunted subconscious is "a simple 
terror of what has come with us" from that forest time before the 
small apes became homo sapiens. We seek to shelter ourselves with 
the artifice of culture from the first world that haunts our animal 
bodies: "The curious sorcery of sound symbols and written 
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hieroglyphs in man's new brain had to be made to lure him farther 
and farther from the swaying reeds" (IP 151). And the anxiety and 
terror leftover from our flight from the forest world of our origins 
insure that the we will seek even in space flight a way out of the 
"cosmic prison" of our bodies: "A creature who has once passed from 
visible nature into the ghostly insubstantial world evolved and 
projected from his own mind will never cease to pursue thereafter 
the worlds beyond this world" (IP 151). Mankind has come to live as 
much in the world of imagination as in the physical, external world 
of nature, and humans range imaginatively across time. Although 
this new interior world, a temporary eternity of memory and hope 
and fancy, may be an escape from the oppress ion of the present, it 
may also become a place of horrors--the forebodings of !POtential 
miseries and inevitable death, the fecund soil to raise up the dragon 
seeds of man-imagined and then man-made terrors, and the 
repository of most awful memories. 
The capacity to share this interior world--its joy and its terror 
--depends on the ability to transfer vast amounts of information that 
cannot be transmitted genetically as instinct or as observable, 
patterned behavior. Symbolic communication had to replace instinct: 
"This emergent creature was not whole, was not made truly human 
until, in infancy, the dreams of the group ... had been implanted in 
the waiting, receptive substance of his brain" (lJ. 121 ) . Plant 
domestication and grain storage made possible "a spectacular 
increase in human numbers," allowing also for the diversification of 
360 
labor and the ability to feed concentrated population centers. As 
civilization became possible, so did shared cultures: " ... the old sun-
plant civilizations provided leisure for meditation, mathematics, and 
transport energy through the use of sails" (IP 67). The shared 
social/cultural brain evolved because the seed case of writing made 
possible the accumulation and transmission of vast amounts of 
knowledge that could not be contained in DNA or learned through 
patterned behavior. "Writing ... created a kind of stored thought-
energy, an enhanced social brain" (IP 67). just as the seeds of 
angiosperms had stored the sun energy necessary to make possible 
the development of warm-blooded mammals, writing became the 
means of storing and transmitting thought energy thereby sharing 
knowledge and ideas across time and space and making the progress 
of conscious learning possible. Eiseley speculates that it may be the 
combined power of many individual units into the human social 
brain which holds the potential for immortality: "Even now ... the 
brain of man, with all its individual never-to-be-abandoned richness, 
is becoming merely a unit in the vast social brain which is potentially 
immortal, and whose memory is the heaped wisdom of the world's 
great thinkers" (lJ 125). 
Following the invention of the written word, Eiseley says that 
the scientific method, "the invention of inventions," brought the next 
great revolution in human knowledge. Man became the agent of 
nature's self discovery. In the Advancement of Learning, Francis 
Bacon, the father of the scientific method, wrote, "' ... we are not to 
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imagine or suppose, but to discover what nature does or may be 
made to do"' (qtd. in IP 68 ). For Bacon, scientific knowledge--the 
discovery and proof of nature's laws--had to be acquired through 
observation and experiment, not through meditation and 
extrapolation from Aristotle and Ptolemy. Also, Bacon recognized 
that scientific achievement would depend on institutionalized 
support over human generations; it could not be contained '"in the 
hourglass of one man's life"' (68). As nature created the developing 
mind, the mind set about recreating its image of nature, gradually 
changing our understanding of the world outside. William Barrett 
has suggested that the revolution of modern science has introduced a 
way of thinking that might very well be described as "a mutation of 
the human mind" (Death of the Soul 70). From an evolutionary view-
point, mind in its conceptual and scientific use is "an extension of our 
sensory faculties" which it functions to correct and amplify. Mind 
"helps us to see our way farther and better in going about our 
ordinary world" (80). 
In the very constructivity of our scientific concepts--the 
human mind fabricates concepts that literally are not found in 
its ordinary world--we already have taken a step beyond 
nature, in order subsequently to deal with it. Nor is there 
anything 'unnatural' in this step; indeed in taking that step the 
human mind comes into the fullness of its own nature and its 
powers. (Death of the Soul 74) 
After the scientific revolution, the "ordinary world of the senses" no 
longer seemed to be "the true world" (Death of the Soul 16). 
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Yet, this mind that grew out of nature is even so made of 
nature's substance and shares nature's qualities. In The Mind as 
Nature--a title that Howard Nemerov found "as appealing as 
appalling" ( 18)-- Eiseley compares the evolution of the mind to the 
evolution of the universe: both are drawn into being out of nothing 
(for light years or earth years) and then return to the creative void. 
The life of the mind replicates the life of the cosmos: 
... the evolution of the entire universe--stars, elements, life, 
man--is a process of drawing something out of nothing, out of 
the utter void of non-being. The creative element in the mind 
of man--that latency which can conceive gods, carve statues, 
move the heart with the symbols of great poetry, or devise the 
formulas of modern physics--emerges in as mysterious a 
fashion as those elementary particles which leap into 
momentary existence in great cyclotrons, only to vanish again 
like infinitesimal ghosts. The reality we know in our limited 
lifetimes is dwarfed by the unseen potential of the abyss 
where science stops. In a similar way the smaller universe of 
the individual human brain has its lonely cometary passages, 
or flares suddenly like a super nova, only to subside in death 
while the waves of energy it has released roll on through 
unnumbered generations" (MAN 45-46). 
Both universe and individual arise out of nothing, flash momentarily, 
and return to nothing. Mind and nature share the flight of the 
sparrow as Bede described it in "The Conversion of King Edwin": The 
sparrow flies from the dark night of a winter storm into the warm, 
brightly lit mead hall and immediately vanishes out another door, 
back into the dark winter from which it emerged (Bede 75). Mind 
and world exist in the brief space between two darks. But the end of 
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the individual universe or the individual mind, Eiseley says, releases 
energy back into the void to be recycled into new creation. 
As the universe and the individual share similar origins and 
ends, they share also a similar doubleness. Eiseley sees a duality in 
nature, a world divided into two aspects--one apparent, the other 
veiled--and finds that same duality mimicked in human thought. 
Behind the daily presentation of "the ridiculous, wonderful tentshow 
of woodpeckers, giraffes, and hoptoads" lurks another universe: 
"some kind of dark, brooding, but creative void out of which these 
things emerge--some anti-matter universe, some web of dark 
tensions running beneath and creating the superficial show of form 
that so delights us" (MAN 17). Eiseley sees in individuals a 
duplication of this double-sided universe: "we mirror in ourselves 
the universe with all its dark vacuity and also its simultaneous urge 
to create anew, in each generation, the beauty and the terror of our 
mortal existence" (MAN 18). Eiseley describes the universe as "that 
vast sprawling emergent" and refers to life as "its even more 
fantastic shadow" (MAN 28). Creativity he terms an enigma "'set in 
the invisible'" (28). He quotes Dewey who insisted in fumerience and 
Nature "' [ t]hat the tangible rests precariously upon the untouched 
and ungrasped'" (qtd in MAN 28). Eiseley believes human creativity 
parallels nature's furtive methods of creation. Islands isolated from 
the mainland allow for "a great evolutionary proliferation amongst 
the flora and fauna" of "strange shapes" and "exotic growths"--forms 
that, unprotected by isolation, would have been exterminated by 
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more powerful and dominant life forms: "Sometimes the rare, the 
beautiful can only emerge or survive in isolation" (MAN 29). Eiseley 
finds that likewise "some degree of withdrawal serves to nurture 
man's creative powers." In a necessarily lonely process, "[t]he artist 
and scientist bring out of the dark void, like the mysterious universe 
itself, the unique, the strange, the unexpected" (MAN 29). To 
understand the mind we must look at nature: 
If the mind is indigenous and integral to nature itself in its 
unfolding, and operates in nature's ways and under nature's 
laws, we must seek to understand this creative aspect of nature 
in its implications for the human mind .... the natural laws of 
the mind include an emergent novelty ... (MAN 59). 
The mind possesses "a latent, lurking fertility not unrelated to the 
universe from which it sprang" (MAN 30). 
Eiseley also sees an analogy between the biological screen 
which limits through natural selection the number of potential life 
forms permitted actually to materialize and the mental censor that 
interferes with creation out of the multitude of potentials within the 
unconscious. Biologically, only a small portion of the "potential 
fecundity of life in the universe" manages "to break through the 
living screen, the biosphere, into reality": "Organic opportunity has 
thus placed sharp limits upon a far greater life potential than is ever 
permitted to enter the actual world" (MAN 50). Yet Eiseley sees in 
this hidden world "of possible but nonexistent futures ... a constant 
accompaniment, a real but wholly latent twin, of the nature in which 
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we have our being" (MAN 50). And Eiseley intuits an equally vast 
and procreant void in the space within the human psyche and 
believes there are both genetic and cultural barriers that limit 
creativity: 
just as, in a given situation, the living biological screen may 
pr·event the emergence of a higher form of life, or precipitate 
its destruction, so in that dark, soundless area of the brain, 
which parallels the similarly pregnant void of space, much may 
be barred from creation that exists only as a potentiality" (51). 
Again, mind is a microcosm of the universe. 
And finally, Eiseley is also aware "of something else than the 
geometric extension of power, whether in a civilization or a man" 
(MAN 57). As nature continually unmakes its creations, there seems 
to exist also in man a counter-urge toward decreation. 
There comes a time when the thistles spring up over man's 
ruins with a sense of relief. ... The tiny incremental thoughts 
of men tend to congeal in strange vast fabrics, from gladiatorial 
coliseums to sky scrapers, and then mutely demand release. In 
the end the mind rejects the hewn stone and rusting iron it has 
used as the visible expression of its inner dream. Instead it 
asks release for new casts at eternity, new opportunities to 
confine in fanes the uncapturable and elusive gods. (MAN 58) 
The searching, hungry mind tires of the struggle to understand its 
condition: 
Has it occurred to us sufficiently that it is part of the continuing 
growth of this mind that it may desire to be lost--lost among 
366 
whalebones in the farthest seas, in that great book of which 
Melville, its author, wrote, 'a polar wind blows through it,' lost 
among the instinctive villainies of insects in the parched field 
where Henri Fabre labored, lost with St. Exupery amidst the 
crevasses and thin air of the high Andes, down which the first 
airmail pilots drifted to their deaths. (MAN 55-56) 
Eiseley believes that because "the burden of consciousness has grown 
heavy upon us," something within humankind seeks extinction and 
escape from time, flees the responsibility of too much knowing and 
too mariy impossible aspirations, and desires to unburden itself of 
the weight of consciousness. 
Eiseley's way of investigating the mind was to explore its 
origins, trying to understand how mind came to be. Intrigued by the 
process of nature creating a mind that would become its own 
discoverer and witness, Eiseley traces the mind-creating brain's 
evolution over eons: from pond scum moving greenward onto the 
land, to air-hungry fish struggling to live in a drying swamp, to the 
bursting forth of angiosperms whose seedcases contained the energy 
to feed mammalian brains, to the great leap in brain size and rise of 
consciousness that occurred during or between the Ice Ages, to the 
invention of writing that preserves and transmits the thoughts of 
individual minds (so thought can outlive mind), to the development 
of the scientific method that looks beyond sensory perception 
(escaping the limitations and misperceptions of the senses) to 
understand the nature of nature. Through enhanced human 
consciousness, worlds invisible to sense--the cosmos, the atom--
become visible to mind, and humankind becomes the agent of 
nature's self-discovery. 
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But consciousness comes with loss as well as gain. The faculties 
of mind that allow us to delve into nature's mysteries also cut us off 
and set us apart; we are confined within our own consciousnesses, 
compelled to be astigmatized observers of the otherness in nature, in 
our own species, and even in our own unconscious. Despite our best 
attempts to follow, the bluefish escapes into the shadows where 
mind cannot follow. In this sense, consciousness itself becomes what 
Einstein called a "limit case" or Nietzsche, a narrow room. 
Consciousness also arouses in us questions we have, as yet, ·been 
unable to answer. Acknowledging that we are evolutionary 
creatures and that our senses have been called out by their 
environment, Wilbur is left to wonder what is it that has called out 
mind--and what calls it still with the siren song of the unknown. 
Reflecting on the great awakening to self-consciousness and world-
consciousness that came sometime between the ice ages, Eiseley 
emphasizes the cost rather than the joy. He says we continue to pay 
with anxiety and terror for crossing the threshold, for walking out of 
the limited awareness of an eternal present and into time. 
Nevertheless, Eiseley describes the process of evolution of the 
human mind as a slow miracle, a phenomenon arising out of vague 
beginnings, millenia past. As a product of nature, the mind shares 
nature's attributes: Both arise out of and then disappear back into 
the void after a flash of existence. Both display a novelty that 
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emerges out of a latent, lurking fecundity, and these creative 
displays of both mind and nature represent only a small portion of 
the hidden potential that never comes to form. And Eiseley sees in 
man a replication of nature's impulse to decreation, the will to 
unmake what has been so carefully wrought. Like nature, the 
human mind is as mysterious and complex as the concept of soul has 
ever been. To say that the mind is natural does not begin to explain 
away its mysteries. The mind then simply becomes part of the 
incredible mystery of creation. 
In The Man Who Saw Through Time, his book on Sir Francis 
Bacon, Eiseley affirms his belief in a wild unpredictability hidden 
behind the ordinary facade of what we call the world: 
Physicists, it now appears, are convinced that a principle of 
uncertainty exists in the submicroscopic realm of particles and 
that out of this queer domain of accident and impact has 
emerged, by some kind of mathematical magic, the sustaining 
world of natural law by which we make our way to the bank, 
the theatre, to our homes, and finally to our graves. ( l 0 I) 
Eiseley contends that "such a world so created has something wild 
and unpredictable lurking behind its more sober manifestations" 
( 10 1). He also asserts his belief that this "rare freedom of the 
particle to do what particles never do is duplicated in the solitary 
universe of the human mind" ( 101 ). From nature seen as "natural" 
and the mind seen as one of its ever-evolving manifestations, we 
will now turn to the nature of the solitary universe of the human 
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mind--from the mind as nature to the nature of mind. We will look 
at mind, not through science and the natural history of evolution, but 
through the lens of poetry. As Eiseley wrote, ..... mere words can 
sometimes be more penetrating probes into the nature of the 
universe than any instrument wielded in a lab oratory.·· (MWSTT 71). 
The Nature of Mind 
In his poem "lcarium Mare, .. Wilbur uses the image .. [tlhe 
saint's geodic skull bowed in his cave" to describe the disciple john 
exiled to the isle of Patmos, alone in a cave writing the Book of 
Revelation. The image of John's ""geodic skull" is of a cave within a 
cave. A geode on its exterior surface looks unremarkable--a dull-
surfaced, nodular ~tone--but a good one split open reveals an interior 
hollow alive with crystal light and form, sometimes deep amethyst 
or rose quartz or Chartres blue. Like the light that exposes the 
interior wonder of a geode, language reveals the interior marvels of 
the human skull, the the mind-making brain. ·Awareness exists 
without words--just as the crystal cave exists inside an unopened 
geode--but consciousness, the self-awareness that allows the brain to 
discourse with itself and with other minds, requires symbolic 
language, words or images or music. Since the ice ages, it has been 
the nature of the human mind to speak in such symbolic language. 
Language allows the brain to have ideas, to sustain and rethink and 
remember them; language allows the mind to observe and amplify 
sensory data, correcting mistakes and misperceptions. Language 
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permits the mind to think about itself and wonder about its own 
reason for being. But language also fails. Colin Falck says that "the 
greatest literature has always called the whole world in question and 
has always worried about the difficulty of saying what we mean" 
(MYth. Truth and Literature 159). Language has its limitations. 
Declaring in her book The Mind of the Maker that all language is 
analogical and that "we think in a series of metaphors," Dorothy L. 
Sayers says that "we can explain nothing in terms of itself, but only 
in terms of other things" ( 188). Symbolic communication means that 
nothing can be spoken of directly; everything must be told in terms 
of something else. Like Prufrock, the poet discovers '"It is impossible 
to say just what I mean!'" (Eliot 6) . . 
Though language makes its best failures in poetry, it also falls 
short in religion and science because both the ineffable and the 
subatomic elude our sense-bound metaphors. In The Tao of Physics, 
Fritjof Capra explains how language fails both Eastern mysticism and 
Western science. Capra writes that for nearly a century scientists 
have recognized that verbal interpretations of scientific theories 
suffered from "the inaccuracy of our language"; however, with the 
discovery of atomic and subatomic reality, scientists have found that 
"our common language is not only inaccurate, but totally inadequate" 
to express the discoveries of quantum theory and relativity theory 
(Capra 45). Werner Heisenberg describes the '"problems of 
language'" as '"really serious'": "'We cannot speak about atoms in 
ordinary language"' (qtd. in Capra 45). The mathematical symbols 
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used to express quantum theory cannot be translated into verbal 
language without significant distortion. Mysticism, however, 
discovered this failure of words millenia ago. Unlike Western 
science, philosophy, and even religion--which, according to Bertrand 
Russell, have all depended on logic and reason--Eastern mysticism 
has always assumed "that reality transcends ordinary language" 
(Capra 46). Buddhist scholar D. T. Suzuki writes that "'we have to use 
language to communicate our inner experience which in its very 
nature transcends linguistics'" (qtd. in Capra 45). Therefore, 
Hinduism has resorted to myth, and Buddhism and Taoism have 
exposed the limits of logic thrC?ugh paradox. Because both quantum 
physics and mysticism concern realities which are not accessible to 
sensory experience, they transcend our sensory imaginations, and 
"our ordinary language, which takes its images from the world of the 
senses, is no longer adequate to describe the observed phenomena" 
(Capra 51). Thus, when either the physicst or the mystic attempts to 
communicate knowledge through language, "their statements are 
paradoxical and full of logical contradictions" (46). 
Yet, it is in the very failures of language that we intuit the 
beyond which cannot be said. Language pushed to the brink brings 
us to the edge of that which is unsayable. The ineffable may be 
discovered by our inability to say it. In "Lying," a poem about 
poetry, Wilbur writes that " ... a thing is most itself when likened" 
(Poems 1 0). This paradoxical aphorism expresses the revealing truth 
that the best comparisons work because they create a highlighting 
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border of difference. Metaphor succeeds because it fails. Failures of 
language also reveal that there is more to mind than wide-awake, 
conscious reasoning, that there are, in fact, aspects of mind itself 
which cannot be said. There is something noncomputational and 
nonmetaphorical in thought that allows mind access to realities that 
are not analogical and therefore remain pre- or post-linguistic. Falck 
says that "a certain obscurity" is, in fact, necessary to poetry: "a 
disparity between our intuitive apprehensions and the categories of 
our already-existing language ... is the necessary condition of all 
poetry and the very element in which it works" ( 159). 
As Eiseley sought to explain the mind as nature by examining 
its natural history, Wilbur explores the nature of mind by creating 
poems in which the mind can observe itself at play in metaphors. In 
his "mind poems," Wilbur explores the nature of the mind's 
interchange with the vast world inside and outside the skull by 
creating suitable metaphors--figures that allows him to say 
something about the mind engaging the realities it struggles to know. 
Unvaryingly in these poems, Wilbur tests and challenges his own 
metaphors and inevitably locates revealing failures of similitude, 
thereby discovering something that the original figures, however apt, 
had obscured. In three poems ("Mind," "The Writer," and "An Event") 
Wilbur likens the mind to flying things--a bat, a starling, and a flock 
of swallows. Like the restless mind, the bat and birds are in flight or 
are gathering themselves for flight. In the end, words fail and bat 
and birds and mind escape the poet, but not before he has had a 
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fleeting glimpse of what it is he has not been able to net in the web 
of words. 
In other poems--" The Rider" and "In Limbo"--Wit bur tries 
another tactic to discover aspects of mind that are not accessible to 
consciousness or logic; he places the persona of his poem on the 
borderland between just-awakening consciousness and the just-
fading world. of a dream. There he creates a mental topography 
where the constraints of logic and ordinary sensory realism are 
tenuous, where the mind's normal daylight confidence in its 
conceptions of the world are shaken, and where mind gropes after 
vaguely understood possibilities. Michelson says that "[f]or Wilbur, 
the sanest man, the most reluctant visionary, can perceive a 'sublime 
decor'--illusion, perhaps, or perhaps something more than illusion--
only when the mind is near some strange edge between the 
restrained, waking sensibility and the self-loss of deep dream" (68). 
And finally, in his poem "The Mind-Reader" Wilbur creates a mind 
that knows both too much and not enough and thereby becomes a 
revealing extreme of the human condition. 
In his poem "Mind," Wilbur begins by likening the mind to a bat: 
Mind in its purest play is like some bat 
That beats about in caverns all alone, 
Contriving by a kind of senseless wit 
Not to conclude against a wall of stone. 
It has no need to falter or explore; 
Darkly it knows what obstacles are there, 
And so may weave and flitter, dip and soar 
In perfect courses through the blackest air. 
(Poems 340) 
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The mind in the "purest play" of imagination can careen about the 
dark interior world of thought avoiding, through "senseless wit," a 
conclusion "against a wall of stone." Wilbur plays on the oxymoron of 
"senseless wit": Senseless normally means destitute of, deficient in, 
or contrary to sense, lacking sensibilty or feeling--unconscious, 
insensible. U~'t, on the other hand, is synonymous with mind, 
memory, sanity, astuteness of perception or judgment. According to 
The Oxford English Diction~. wit can refer to the "faculties of 
perception," in particular, the five senses. Wit also suggests creative 
imagination, intellectual brilliance and subtlety--specifically 
(according to Webster's Third New International Dictionary.) "the 
ability to discover amusing analogies between unrelated things and 
to express them cleverly"--which is exactly what Wilbur displays in 
this poem. On the surface, the juxtaposition of these two words 
creates an oxymoron, but combined in the context of the poem, the 
words senseless rJrJ't suggest a faculty larger than the five senses, far 
more imaginative than common sense; both bat and mind are capable 
of perceptions and understandings that are beyond the ordinary and 
that are e.;~tra-sensoo-: The mind--the thinking--flies about in the 
opaque solitude of the human skull, the cavernous vault of stone, 
guided by aspects of the intelligence which are not entirely 
dependent upon the limited information supplied by the senses or 
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governed by common sense logic. The mind is capable of creative 
synthesis, generating within itself imaginings concocted from what it 
knows of the world and from intuitions of what it does not know. 
When the imagining is successful, the mind makes a larger world for 
itself through its own senseless perception. Generally, the mind can 
express this synihesis only through the images and symbols of the 
senses, the world outside--thus, the need for metaphor. 
As with "senseless wit," Wilbur also plays with the meanings of 
the verb "conclude." The bat-like mind contrives "ln]ot to conclude 
against a wall of stone." Conclude vacillates between the meaning 
"to reach through reason a final judgment" and the meaning "to bring 
to an end, to terminate." A bat by virtue of its sonar perception of 
solid objects-- "a kind of senseless wit"--is able to avoid concluding or 
terminating by crashing into a cave wall. Likewise, the mind seems 
to have an intuition that prevents it from needing "to falter or 
explore": "Darkly it knows what obstacles are there, I And so may 
weave and flitter, dip and soar I In perfect courses through the 
blackest air." (Poems 240). There is, however a subtle ambiguity in 
this dark knowing. "Darkly it knows" conveys the sense that 
understanding may come obscurely, vaguely, or mysteriously, not in 
a way traceable to the usual sensory channels or the rational 
processes of induction or deduction. The phrase also conveys the 
sense of an "obscured vision" --something known dimly rather than 
in a full light; it suggests a kind of knowing that keeps us in the dark. 
Thus, these three words suggest two contradictory kinds of knowing: 
376 
one knowing that is larger than the senses or logic and another kind 
of knowing constrained by a diminished awareness. In one sense, 
the bat and the bat-like mind know the unseen limits, the hardness 
past which flight and thought cannot go without crashing into the 
wall of perceived conclusion. Though the wall that is known becomes 
the end of knowing, it also creates the setting of possibility. The 
circumscribed world of the dark cave--the bat's cavern and the 
mind's knowing--allows a limited perfection-- "perfect courses 
through blackest air." The mind at play is like a bat contriving to 
make a game of its dark and limited world; in swoops and 
arabesques, mind and bat define the boundaries and even achieve a 
splendid virtuosity as they describe in darts and abrupt careenings 
the borders of the cave and of knowing. The wall also presents a 
challenge, something to get beyond. 
Wilbur stops to re-say and consider his metaphor: "mind in its 
purest play is like some bat I That beats about in caverns all alone," 
not needing "to falter or explore" but darkly knowing "what obstacles 
are there." Then he asks, "And has this simile a like perfection?" 
Answering, he "concludes": "The mind is like a bat. Precisely." For 
that moment he asserts the perfection of his simile only immediately 
and splendidly to undercut it, destroying its perfection to illustrate 
perfectly how the mind is not like a bat. The abrupt reversal both 
replicates the flight of a bat which suddenly alters course upon 
detecting its impending dangerous "conclusion" and demonstrates the 
mind's marvelous ability to create out of imperfection: 
The mind is like a bat. Precisely. Save 
That in the very happiest intell.ection 
A graceful error may correct the cave. (Poems 24 0) 
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In the process of thinking about and writing this poem, Wilbur said 
that he "felt something was going to happen at the end to explode 
the metaphor" (Conversations 47). At the word "Save," the poem--
like a bat-- changes courses and asserts that "graceful error" has a 
higher beauty and efficacy than limited perfection. An idea, a 
specific act of the intellect can completely alter what has been 
traditionally accepted as fact. Suddenly the earth is round, not flat, 
and it is not the center of the universe but a small planet rotating 
around a minor sun. "Graceful error" expands the physical universe 
and the universe of thought. Graceful suggests both an action that is 
aesthetically pleasing and one that exhibits divine beneficence. 
Graceful error--dynamic, creative, and risk-taking--escapes the 
confines of static, bounded perfection. 'f:he "happiest intellection" 
changes both inner and outer wort d .7 
In fact, graceful error, rather than perfection seems to be built 
into the nature of things as the necessary agent of change. In The 
Creative LooQ., Harth says that creativity requires a degree of 
unpredictability and impenetrability. The thinking mind makes 
errors, but errors made mind. Genetic mistakes made and continue 
to make change--including the development of mind--possible. The 
rare errors in the replication of the DNA molecule, the unique 
378 
blueprint of every life form, may result in harm to an individual of a 
species, but such genetic errors function to allow variation and 
adaptation within the species. Harth writes: "Without such errors, 
which power the engine of all adaptive changes and the generation of 
new species, life on earth would never have advanced beyond the 
stage of the primitive procaryotic cell. In fact, it would have gotten 
stuck at a much more primitive stage" (21). Genetic mutation made 
mind possible. Observing that "lolur ability to reason, our ingenuity, 
and our linguistic skills place us so far above any competing animal 
species," Harth speculates that " .... perhaps a unique mutation freed 
our brains from the constraints of instinct and gave us a mind" 
(Harth xviii). Sociobiologist Edward A. Wilson reached back into 
Greek myth to propose a name for this hypothetical mutation; he 
suggested calling the gene that gave the gift of mental fire to humans 
"the Promethean gene" (Harth xviii). 
In his poem "The Writer," Wilbur again likens the mind to a 
flying creature confined in a too-limited space. This time the symbol 
for mind is a common starling, a bird which had inadvertently 
blundered in and trapped itself in a small room and then struggled to 
find the way out. "The Writer" begins with the poet's description of 
his daughter writing a story "liln her room at the prow of the house I 
Where light breaks, and the windows are tossed with linden." 
Continuing the ship imagery begun with "at the prow," Wilbur tells of 
pausing in the stairwell to hear "From her shut door a commotion of 
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typewriter-keys I Like a chain hauled over a gunwale." He 
recognizes that even as "Young as she is, the stuff I Of her life is a 
great cargo, and some of it heavy ... The father/writer wishes his 
daughter/writer "a lucky passage" in her voyage of discovery. His 
off-hand wish and conventional imagery meet with a sudden silence 
in which he hears a loud rejection of his "easy figure": 
But now it is she who pauses, 
As if to reject my thought and its easy figure. 
A stillness greatens, in which 
The whole house seems to be thinking, 
And then she is at it again with a bunched clamor 
Of strokes, and again is silent. (Poems 53) 
The storms of flurried activity followed by dense silence as thought 
gathers for another attempt against the whiteness of the page 
remind the poet of a similar struggle that occurred in the same room 
two years earlier: 
I remember the dazed starting 
Which was trapped in that very room, two years ago ... 
(Poems 53) 
He remembers how they "stole in" to lift the sash without affrighting 
the bird and then watched ''for a helpless hour, through the crack of 
the door": 
We watched the sleek, wild dark 
And iridescent creature 
Batter against the brilliance, drop like a glove 
To the hard floor, or the desk-top 
And wait then, humped and bloody, 
For the wits to try it again .... (Poems 53-54). 
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The starling's frenzied hurling itself against the transparent window 
glass--the "battering against brilliance"--followed by its quiet, 
"humped and bloody" struggle for "the wits to try it again" becomes a 
metaphor for the writers' (father and daughter's) own battering 
against brilliance--the frenzied flow of words onto the page followed 
by the recognition of failure, and the struggle in silence to find the 
words to try it again.8 The elation of finally finding the right words 
is symbolized by the starling's hard-won success in finding the way 
through the brilliance: 
... how our spirits 
Rose when, suddenly sure, 
It lifted off from a chair-back, 
Beating a smooth course for the right window 
And clearing the sill of the world. (Poems 54) 
In the last verse, the father-poet expresses his sense of the 
common struggle as he and his daughter and the starling batter 
against the brilliance of reality. To clear the sill of the world and say 
something that is true requires an agonizing and patient effort. 
381 
Having thus really confronted his earlier image that life is "a great 
cargo, and some of it heavy," the poet again wishes his daughter "a 
lucky passage"--but now .with no off-hand ease: 
It is always a matter, my darling, 
Of life or death, as I had forgotten. I wish 
What I had wished you before, but harder. (Poems 54) 
In this poem in which he speaks publicly to his daughter Ellen, 
Wilbur says that he is wishing her a "lucky passage" in two ways--" in 
the sense of making connections with the world, getting out of 
oneself, and of writing a good paragraph" (Conversations 233). He 
wishes her good writing and "a successful coming to terms with the 
world by way of the common means of language" (234). Their 
shared witness of the starling's struggles becomes the metaphor for 
their own shared struggles as writers. The poem recognizes that 
starling and writers are bound in a community of fierce effort: "It is 
always a matter ... I Of life or death." 
The "graceful error" --creative evasion and 1 ucky-chance 
remaking of the exterior world--of "The Mind" becomes something 
harder and more desperate in "The Writer." The deft, instinctive 
maneuverings of a bat in flight have a magical, miraculous quality 
for dark-blind humans. Using some "senseless wit" even more 
amazing than sixth-sense sonar, the bat/mind makes the mistake 
that should have it concluding against a wall of stone but which 
instead changes the shape of the world of thought. This "graceful 
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error" compares with Kepler's intuitions of oval orbits and of the 
invisible force emanating from the sun to control the motion of the 
planets; his dissent from the accepted Ptolemaic forms (following 
Copernicus and preceding Galileo) changed the cave of the world as 
human beings perceive it. However, the mind-bat could make its 
graceful, correcting error only after a thorough exploration of the 
known architecture of the cave. Arthur Koestler says that Kepler's 
intuition came after spending six years trying to work out the orbit 
of Mars using the accurate observations supplied by Tycho Brahe. 
His discovery of a discrepancy between the observed positions of 
Mars and those his theory projected led him to transform his error 
into " ... the cornerstone of a new science. For those eight minutes 
arc had at last made him realize that the field of astronomy in its 
traditional framework was well and truly blocked" (Koestler 128). In 
"The Writer," the starling/mind finds the way out of its confines only 
by overtly bashing itself against the wall of brilliance--the thin pane 
of transparency that lets it see the world it would fly into but that 
separates it from that reality. Only through its repeated mistakes, 
only by hurling itself against that barrier does the starling/mind 
finally discover the way through. But even that escape has a bit of 
the earned miracle about it. 
"An Event~' is another poem in which birds teach the poet 
something about the mind. The poet watches his mind at play in 
metaphor as it observes and then tries to say for itself the nature of 
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what it sees. The "event" of which the title speaks is the poet's 
witnessing of a flock of birds whose communal flight behavior--all 
responding simultaneously, unanimously to some invisible cues--
mystifies the poet. The first stanza opens with a splendid, apt 
metapho:r that captures the movement of the birds as the reversal of 
another action: 
As if a cast of grain leapt back to the hand, 
A landscape of small black birds, intent 
On the far south, convene at some command 
At once in the middle of the air, at once are gone 
With headlong and unanimous consent 
From the pale trees and fields they settled on. (Poems 274) 
The precise unanimity of their flight leads the poet to exclaim, "What 
is an individual thing?" The birds' unity of motion and purpose 
seems to create an entity superior to the lone individual. Then, he 
gives "their image to my soul" in another metaphor: "They roll I Like 
a drunken fingerprint across the sky!" Ironically, the image he uses 
to convey the birds' group behavior is that of the uniquely 
individual--a fingerprint--but a fingerprint that becomes erratic and 
irregular as it moves drunkenly across the sky. Then the birds seem 
to rebel against his likening, his categorizing, pigeon-holing 
metaphors: 
... as if refusing to be caught 
In any singular vision of my eye 
Or in the nets and cages of my thought 
They tower up, shatter, and madden space 
With their divergences, are each alone 
Swallowed from sight, and leave me in this place 
Shaping these images to make them stay . . . . (Poems 274) 
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As though asserting their existence outside his perception and 
imagination, the birds refuse to allow his "singular vision" to make 
any one thing of them; they shatter into many bird selves and are 
"swallowed" from sight.9 Here Wilbur puns on the double meanings 
of swallowed. The birds are individually "swallowed" or engulfed in 
the vastness of the sky, and they also assert their swallowness. The 
small black birds are neither the rewind of a fling of grain nor a 
drunken fingerprint wobbling across the sky; their swallowness 
escapes human imagining (like the bluefish in "Trolling for Blues"). 
In this tug of war between the watcher and the watched, the 
poet shapes images to make the birds stay, but he is as much 
captured as he captures: 
Meanwhile, in some formation of their own, 
They fly me still, and steal my thoughts away. (Poems 274) 
He sees the birds as makers of "some formation of their own"--as 
intricately deliberate as his own lines of iambic pentameter, the end 
rhymes of each stanza following the pattern a, b, a, c, b, c. The man 
makes arresting images of the birds; the birds make a poet of the 
man. 
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In the final stanza, Wilbur expresses delight with himself and 
the birds. In fact, as God of his little universe of a twenty-four line 
poem, he will recreate them: "I set them down and give them leave 
to be." Wilbur finds in his image-making and the shattering of his 
images, the glimpse he seeks--not so much Robert Frost's 
"momentary stay against confusion," but a momentary sense of pure 
delight as the mind at play with words engages the world: 
It is by words and the defeat of words, 
Down vistas of vain attempt, 
That for a flying moment one may see 
By what cross-purposes the world is dreamt. (Poems 274) 
He struggles to know and say the world by finding the startling 
likeness, the memorable image, and in doing so he captures 
something, but not the thing itself. However, even the defeat of 
words creates "sudden vistas of the vain attempt"--a place for a 
fleeting vision, the flying moment in which one may at least see what 
it is that has escaped the web of words. Michelson says, "Language 
fails--that is a given. But it gives us some of the words we need to 
name that failure, and to reach some imaginative dominion over it" 
(34). The world is dreamt by cross-purposes--by the mind 
intersecting with a contrary, ungovernable reality. Words are the 
way the conscious mind knows and the way it talks to itself about 
what it knows. Through the failure of words, mind learns where its 
knowing stops. Perhaps the real event comes with the failure. 
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Anthony Hecht finds a "salutary and characteristic humility" in "The 
Event": 
In an era when a lot of supremely pompous things have been 
claimed for the omnipotence of language, it is refreshing in the 
work of so accomplished a poet to encounter an 
acknowledgment of the 'the defeat of words' in the face of the 
richness and multiplicity of an external reality that will always 
supersede and evade the limitationtions of our vocabulary, 
however well deployed. ("Master of Metaphor" 25) 
Like Wilbur, Eiseley uses natural imagery to create a vignette 
in which he can discover and say something about mind. In the 
process, Eiseley, too, discovers the limitations of words. Investigating 
in metaphor the mind's way of holding and, much later, uncovering 
fragments from the past, Eiseley finds that the meaning of his 
imagery cannot be explained without diminishing it. He can only 
create the figure but not explain it. Eiseley encountered his 
metaphor for the mind while perched atop a ladder surveying the 
cluttered universe of "a great black and yellow embodiment of the 
life force," an orb spider plaiting an autumnal web in the temporary 
warmth of a "minor sun"--a suburban street light. He found the 
history of her universe in fragments: 
... a couple of irridescent green beetle cases turning slowly on 
a loose strand of web, a fragment of luminescent eye from a 
moth's wing and a large indeterminable object, perhaps a 
cicada, that had struggled and been wrapped in silk ... also 
little bits and slivers, little red and blue flashes from the scales 
of anonymous wings that had crashed there. (U 177) 
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Eiseley could imagine that some days these shards and remnants 
would be "dull and gray ... the shine out of them" but then the dew 
would polish them again and hang in drops on the silk "until 
everything is gleaming and turning in the light." He concludes that 
the world of the orb spider, weaving as the universe runs down 
toward winter, is "like a mind, really, where everything changes but 
remains, and in the end you have these eaten-out bits of experience 
like beetle wings" ( 177). Watching the spider tightening her lines 
and improving her web, Eiseley realizes "that the web and its 
threatening yellow occupant had been added to some 1 uminous store 
of experience, shining for a moment in the fogbound reaches of my 
brain" ( 177-178). The experience might hang for long periods 
forgotten, its fragments faded, colorless in the back reaches of 
memory. But brought again to consciousness and bejeweled by the 
dew of the imagination, the fragments of meaning would flash again, 
blue, red, and irridescent green and everything gleam and turn in 
the 1 ight the mind can make. 
Leaving his adventure with the spider, Eiseley concludes that 
the .. mind ... is a very remarkable thing; it has gotten itself a kind of 
courage by looking at a spider in a street lamp" (lJ 178). Thinking 
that he should set down a message to the future, "to those who will 
fight our final freezing battle with the void," Eiseley is tempted to 
write, "In tbe day--s of the frost seek a minor sun" ( 178). But he feels 
the marvel escaping him--" a sense of bigness beyond the man· s 
power to grasp, the essence of life in its great dealing with the 
universe" (178). 
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It was better, I decided, for the emissaries returning from the 
wilderness, even if they were merely descending from a 
stepladder, to record their marvel, not to define its meaning. 
In that way it would go echoing on through the minds of men, 
each grasping at that beyond out of which the miracles emerge, 
and which, once defined, ceases to satisfy the human need for 
symbols. (lJ 178) 
It is characteristic of the human mind to grasp "at that beyond out of 
which the miracles proceed" but also never to be satisfied once 
things are explained or "defined." Definition--confining meaning 
within the logic of words--necessarily shuts out the beyond, the 
mystery which the mind craves. Symbol and metaphor, while 
limited by analogical thinking and sensory perception, bend logic and 
leave room for the unknown; they say what can be said and then 
gesture toward the ineffable. The mind for all its splendid capacities 
does not have a tongue that can say the mystery it seeks. The very 
suggestiveness of language implies that meaning exists beyond 
words; sometimes that extra-linguistic meaning can be glimpsed 
when language is pushed to edge of failure. Some illumination is 
possible in the flash just when the wick gutters and goes out. 
Not only poets are troubled by the limits of logic and the 
conscious mind. Arthur Koestler, considering the limits of logic in his 
book The Act of Creation, writes that discovery in science and 
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mathematics is full of "arrivals at unexpected destinations, and 
arrivals at the right destination by the wrong boat" ( 145). Koestler 
finds "evidence for large chunks of irrationality embedded in the 
creative process, not only in art ... but in the exact sciences as well . 
. . it is particularly conspicuous in the most rational of all sciences: 
mathematics and mathematical physics" (146). Among the "intimate 
writings" of "men of science," Koestler discovers these recurrent 
themes: "the belittling of logic and deductive reasoning (except for 
verification after the act); horror of the one-track mind; distrust of 
too much consistency ... [and] scepticism regarding all-too-conscious 
thinking ... "(146). Regarding the last ("all-too-conscious thinking"), 
Koestler quotes Einstein: '"It seems to me that what you call full 
consciousness is a limit case which can never be fully accomplished. 
This seems to me connected with the fact called the narrowness of 
consciousness Enge des Bewusstseins'" ( 146). 
Eiseley, also, affirms in his essay "The Mind as Nature" his 
belief that "the freedom to create is somehow linked with facility of 
access to those obscure regions below the conscious mind" (50). He 
quotes Thoreau in a passage written in the "pre-Freudian, pre-
jungian days of 1852": 
·I catch myself phi 1 osophizing most abstractly when first 
returning to consciousness in the night or morning. I make the 
truest observations and distinctions then, when the will is yet 
wholly asleep and the mind works like a machine without 
friction. I am conscious of having, in my sleep, transcended the 
limits of the individual, and made observations and carried on 
conversations which in my waking hours I can neither recall 
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nor appreciate. As if in sleep our individual fell into the 
infinite mind, and at the moment of awakening we found 
ourselves on the confines of the latter.' (qtd. in MAN 49-50) 
The challenge for the human intellect is to find a way to access the 
irrational, unconscious realm of creativity and bring some part of it 
into an expanded consciousness. 
Wilbur shares Thoreau's sense of mentally visiting during sleep 
a world of preconscious, prelinguistic awareness and knowledge that 
rapidly fades with awakening to the confines of consciousness and a 
world limited to thoughts that can be framed in words. Return to 
consciousness can bring with it a vague, uneasy awareness of a world 
lost. Therefore, Wilbur has developed a tactic (learned from Dante 
and Poe among others) that enables him to explore aspects of the 
mind that are not usually accessible to consciousness or logic: He 
places the persona of his poem on the borderland between the just-
awakening consciousness and the just-fading world of sleep. In this 
border country of the mind, the standard rules of mental gravitation 
do not apply. The constraints of logic and ordinary sensory realism 
are loosened, and the mind gropes after vaguely understood 
possibilities. The poet/persona of Dante's Divine Comedy cannot 
rightly tell us how he entered the Inferno to begin his journey from 
Hell through Purgatory and then to Heaven because "so full of sleep 
was I about the moment that I left the true way" and only knows 
that he awoke to find himself "in a dark wood." In attempts to 
understand the mind, reality, and the mind's interactions with 
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realities beyond consciousness, Wilbur frequently resorts to 
suspending normal mentation--altering the consciousness by locating 
the poem's speaker in a half-sleep, half-dream state ("Love Calls Us 
to the Things of This World," "In Limbo," "Merlin Enthralled," 
"Walking to Sleep," "The Ride") or under a mind-altering influence 
("Next Door," "A Voice from Under the Table," "The Undead"). Writing 
poetry on the boundary between the conscious and the unconscious 
mind, between logic and intuition, between what is real and what is 
dream or hallucination heightens Wilbur's perceptions and brings 
him closer to the mystery his poetry pursues. This strategy allows 
Wilbur to come as near as possible to unconscious or pre-linguistic 
intuitions while still preserving enough of conscious awareness to be 
able to speak of them. 
Wilbur's poem "The Ride" expresses the just-awakening 
memory of a dream world that can only be suggested. The poem 
shimmers and trembles like a mirage that is most convincing just 
before it fades. It contains the aura of mystery, the sense of being 
drawn by some beneficent force through blank nothingness. The 
knowing in "The Ride" comes from underground; the faith it 
expresses comes from somewhere below consciousness: 
The horse beneath me seemed 
To know what course to steer 
Through the horror of snow I dreamed, 
And so I had no fear, 
Nor was I chilled to death 
By the wind· s white shudders, thanks 
To the veils of his patient breath 
And the mist of sweat from his flanks. 
It seemed that all night through, 
Within my hand no rein 
And nothing in my view 
But the pillar of his mane, 
I rode with magic ease 
At a quick, unstumbling trot 
Through shattering vacancies 
On into what was not, 
Till the weave of the storm grew thin, 
With a threading of cedar-smoke, 
And the ice-blind pane of an inn 
Shimmered, and I awoke. (Poems 4) 
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The dream world has no concretions; the rider moves in a "horror of 
snow" and "the wind's white shudders." Even his comforts are 
vaporous and unformed--the warmth that comes from the veils of 
the horse's patient breath and "the mist of sweat from his flanks" 
(4). In his dream, the poet who loves and celebrates the solid, 
sensible things of this world travels through "shattering vacancies" to 
"what was not"--a not-place, an anti-matter universe that escapes 
characterization and ordering of words and consciousness. 
Awakened by visual stimulation (a sensory arousal like the 
screech of the clothesline in "Love Calls Us to the Things of the 
World" and the unidentified sound in "In Limbo")--"the ice-blind 
pane of an inn I Shimmered, and I awoke"--the poet/rider is left 
with a longing to get back to care for the horse that carried him 
through his dream: 
How sha.ll I now get back 
To the inn-yard wheJ:e he stands, 
Burdened with every lack 
And waken the stable-hands 
To give him, before I think 
That there was no horse at all, 
Some hay, some water to drink, 
A blanket and a stall? (Poems 4-5) 
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The horse suggests, in part, the mythic Pegasus, the symbol of poetic 
inspiration and the imagination, but it also conveys the sense of some 
vaguely understood but steadfast and benignant power. During his 
ride through the "horror of snow" and "shattering vacancies." the 
poet/rider "had no fear, I Nor was ... chilled to death" because he 
was sustained and assured by the horse's "unstumbling trot" and 
magic ease. Like the ancient Israelites being led out of Egypt, the 
poet is protected and guided by cloud ("the veils of his patient breath 
I And the mist of sweat from his flanks") and pillar ("nothing in my 
view I But the pillar of his mane"),IO Despite diction loaded with 
implicit dread--horror, fear. chilled to death, white shudders, night, 
nothing, shattering vacancies, ice-blind--there is an abiding sense of 
sureness and faith in the invincible goodness of the steed the poet 
rides. Wilbur might have chosen as an epigraph for "The Ride" 
Emerson's admonition to "Trust the divine animal who carries us 
thro_ugh the world." 
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The thinning weave of storm--the lightening of sleep--allows 
the poet to be stirred by a thread of cedar-smoke and the shimmer 
of an ice-blind pane: awakened, he feels a desperate need to get back 
to provide for the beast who had cared for him before the real world, 
the world of consciousness and wide-awake logic, convinces him that 
"there was no horse at all." just on the edge between the 
preconscious and the conscious, the poet's vision shimmers before it 
breaks. Awake, the poet believes the horse was part of a dream, but 
in the dream, the horse had a this-world realness--its warm breath 
blowing white clouds in cold air, its sweat vaporizing from warm 
flanks into cold air, the solidity of its mane rising steady in a world 
of vacancies. It is the realness of the horse that the poet loves and 
the realness of the a.nimal's physical needs that the poet longs to 
assuage. The insubstantial mists--like the mind--arise out of solid 
substance--the chest and flanks of a warm-blooded, living but 
transient creature. For the beast which comforted and protected him 
amid shattering vacancies and "what was not," the poet longs to do 
similar service--see that the horse has the home comforts of food, 
water, warmth, and shelter. Yet the poet knows that his feeling of 
the horse's reality is temporary; he knows that the tunnel of 
consciousness will narrow his vision. While he is still close to the 
dream and feels it real, he wonders, "How shall I now get back ... 
before I think I That there was no horse at all ... ?" Ironically and 
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paradoxically, the real-world details made the dream real, but the 
real world will now crowd in and erase the poet's faith in the 
realness of the dream horse. He is left with a rapidly fading sense of 
a separate reality, with a longing to get back to the inn-yard to rouse 
the stable hands to tend the horse "[b]urdened with every lack." 
Awakening, the poet is left troubled by the sense that his wide-
awake mind is deceiving him, denying him a deeper awareness and 
thereby causing him to fail an important obligation. For the moment 
of the poe~, the poet holds on to the shadowy awareness of a world 
beyond consciousness. 
In ''In Limbo," Wilbur's again explores the nature of the 
conscious/unconscious mind by examining a half-awake state when 
identity and place and time are confused. The poem poses the 
problem: 
For a half-kindled mind that flares and sinks 
Dampened by a slumber which may be a child's, 
How to know when one is or where? (Poems 63) 
The poem acknowledges the mystery of self--vaguely and confusedly 
perceived as consciousness regains ascendency and tries to 
reassemble the various times and places and ages and selves that 
come unglued or dis-integrated when the seemingly unified 
consciousness has lost the upperhand.ll The various possibilities are 
provoked by a sound eliciting the question, "What rattles in the 
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dark?" For the half-kindled mind, there are a lifetime of answers--
the noise of the blinds in the seaside house where he slept as a boy; 
the clank of a bent fan-blade of a hotel air conditioner listened to by 
an exhausted man; the sound heard by a young soldier, a military 
convoy "[t]roubling the planking of a wooden bridge" in "the shocked 
night of France." Puzzled, the listener cannot "in any case, forget and 
sleep"; something commands him to listen and review the 
possibilities. The sound may be the opening of the "hinged roof of 
the Cinema Vascello" with the "[c]rashed majors of a final panorama" 
or a ··spume of music" from "adolescence and the jersey night, I 
Where a late car, tuned into wild casinos, I Guns past the quiet house 
towards my desire." The poet/persona attaches great importance to 
identifying the sound because what the sound is determines, from 
the multitude of possible selves, who he is--young boy, yearning 
adolescent, frightened soldier, tired middle-aged man. If it is the 
blinds at Brewster rattling in the dark, "I am a boy then, sleeping by 
the sea." Time and identity are relative and fluid. The problem is 
"How to know when one is, or where?" (Poems 63). 
The half-asleep, half-wakeful man in limbo imagines a dream 
of personal wholeness and unity--a kingdom where all the would-be 
rulers of consciousness set aside conflicting claims: 
Now I could dream that all my selves and ages, 
Pretenders to the shadowed face I wear, 
Might in this clearing of the wits, forgetting 
Deaths and successions, parley and atone. (Poems 63) 
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Hoping that these multiple selves will have the discussions that bring 
them out of enmity and opposition into a state of harmony, the poet 
recognizes that the rapproachment must come through words and 
that all the pretenders share a common voice: 
It is my voice which prays it; mine replies 
With stammered passion or the speaker's pause, 
Rough banter slogans, timid questionings--
Oh, all my broken dialects together . . . (Poems 63) 
But the "slow tongue which mumbles to invent I The language of the 
mended soul is breathless" as it hears "an infant howl demand the 
world." The inarticulate wail of the primal need for wholeness, the 
all of the world, takes away the breath that could frame the language 
to mend the soul. 
Lying fearful in the dark, torn between anxious uncertainty 
and a tenuous hold on the facts of his personal reality, the poet 
struggles to know what is real: 
Someone is breathing. Is it I? Or is it 
Darkness conspiring in the nursery corner? 
Is there another lying here beside me? 
Have I a cherished wife of thirty years? (Poems 64) 
Trying thus to ground himself in some sureness of identity, he has 
the sense of "a long susurrus" --a whispering whirlwind moving 
overhead toward the east and "recurrent day." This spiraling funnel, 
uncertainly of clockwise or counterclockwise air, seems to collect or 
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be made of of "our flagellate cries I Rising from love-bed, child-bed, 
bed of death." All human suffering and delight seem to swirl in this 
muttering sound of the susurrus as though all the selves mentioned 
in the first two stanzas join in a twining helix. Beyond this whirl of 
muted, rustling voices, the poet hears "farther still I Couched in the 
void," the sound he heard before which he now identifies as: "The 
god who dreams us, breathing out and in " (64). The poet/dreamer 
and all the world with him become only the phantasms of "the god 
who dreams us" and who may momentarily awake, collecting his 
thoughts and our existence with them. 
Out of this confusion of selves, out of his pervasive sense of 
uncertainty about the nature of reality, and out of the failure of 
language to find the words to mend the soul, the poet reaches for the 
organizing principle of light thereby to challenge incertitude with 
substance: "Out of all that I fumble for the lamp-chain." Abruptly, 
the pseudo-daylight order asserts itself over the shifting, amorphous 
dream world of the dark. The world becomes recognizable and solid: 
A room condenses and at once is true--
Curtains, a clock, a mirror which will frame 
This blinking mask the light has clapped upon me. (Poems 64) 
Michelson finds this passage full of ironic uncertainty: 
'Condenses' is a powerful verb, calling up those odd physical 
processes by which something seems to come of nothing, 
substance out of not-so-thin air. And what condenses out is 
not a mundane bedroom, but details which seem Daliesque, 
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poised between dream and wakefulness. 'Curtains, a clock, a 
mirror': without diving for metaphoric significance, one can see 
here components of a surrealist still life, and if one must have 
conventional symbols, one can find them too, as the curtain, 
clock and mirror signify what the poem has been about--death 
and concealed truths, time, the self. (Richard Wilbur 26) 
Michelson also points out the multiplicity of meanings "frame" 
suggests: "To be framed is to defined, or as it were, condensed and 
coalesced; it is also to be bordered, or circumscribed, and in common 
speech it means to be betrayed, deceived, undone by design or 
circumstance" (26). Thus, consciousness and the world-organizing 
light impose an order but do not erase ambiguity. Light claps a 
"blinking mask" on the man if old selves- -gives them a perceived 
identity, a semblance of unity, but the dream world continues in the 
background--vague but ever-returning as "recurrent day." 
The poet marvels that "when we choose to live again," "lh]ow 
quickly ... I As Er once told, the cloudier knowledge passes." In his 
notes to The Mind-Reader poems, Wilbur mentions that Plato 
recounts the dream of Er near the end of The Reuublic. As the story 
is told by Plato, Er was a valiant man supposedly killed in battle who 
· came back to life on his funeral pyre. He awoke to tell his assembled 
friends about his soul's journey out of his body to "the other world." 
There, in a marvellous place, Er had seen two openings leading to 
heaven and two to the underworld, and there Er learned that he had 
been brought "to carry tidings of the other world to mankind" (Plato 
351 ). Listening to those returning from their thousand-year sojourns 
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in either heaven or hell, Er learned that deeds--good or bad--are 
recompensed tenfold in blessings or penalties in the afterlife. Er saw 
the place to which those who had completed their millenium of 
reward or punishment traveled. There, under the supervision of the 
Fates--the three daughters of Necessity--those souls ready to return 
to life on earth chose the 1 ives to which they would be bound.l2 Er 
describes the place as dominated by a pure rainbow of the light 
which holds all the world together: 
... a place whence they could see a straight shaft of light, like a 
pillar, stretching from above throughout heaven and earth, 
more like the rainbow than anything else but brighter and 
purer .... there, at the middle of the light, they saw stretching 
from heaven the extremities of its chains; for this light binds 
the heavens, holding together all the revolving firmament, like 
the undergirths of a ship of war. (Plato 353) 
However deceptive they may be, the mind depends upon sense 
perceptions--sound, sight, touch--to assure itself of a world. In 
Plato's fable and in Wilbur's poem, light is the chain that binds the 
world together into a seeming wholeness. Awakened in the dark, 
denied the composing force of light, the poet listens, hoping to hear a 
sound around which to shape a world. When the sound only 
increases his uncertainty, he reaches for the light chain to turn on a 
world. With light comes the wakeful, conscious mind. 
According to Er, after the Fates had confirmed and made 
irreversible the choices of those soon-to-be-born-again, the 
expectant souls camped on the Plain of Lethe next to the River of 
Unmindfulness, from which all were required to drink: 
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Every man as he drinks forgets everything. When they had 
fallen asleep, at midnight there was thunder and an 
earthquake, and in a moment they were carried up, this way 
and that to their birth, like shooting stars." (Plato 359) 
In Plato's recounting of the story of Er, the souls who had chosen to 
live again return quickly and as quickly the "cloudier knowledge" of 
the other world passes. Er alone, who was not allowed to drink of 
the water of Lethe, returns with· the cloudier knowledge intact. 
Suddenly and unexplained ly, at dawn twelve days after his supposed 
death in battle, his spirit rejoins his body lying on its funeral pyre. 
For Wilbur, the story of Er and the unremembering souls serves as a 
metaphor for daily awakening. When we choose to "live again," we 
pass through layers of unconsciounsess to consciousness, with vague 
and tantalizing memories of dream lives which rapidly fade. 
Somewhere on the border between night and morning, between 
sleep and wakefulness we taste the water of Lethe, and for us, too, 
the cloudier knowledge passes. In a larger context, Er's story is also 
a metaphor for the Romantic sense of having being born into life and 
consciousness at the cost of a major lapse in memory and knowing. 
In his "Intimations Ode," Wordsworth describes birth as "but a sleep 
and a forgetting" and says that the light of "trailing clouds of glory" is 
gradually shaded until it fades "into the light of common day" 
(Wordsworth 281). 
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Wilbur concludes "In Limbo" with an affirmation that embraces 
the human condition of being a wanderer, truant from a world of 
completion and wholeness and left with insatiable longings. 
I am a truant portion of the all 
Misshaped by time, incorrigible desire 
And dear attachment to a sleeping hand, 
Who I ie here on a certain day and I is ten 
To the first birdsong, homelessly at home. (Poems 64) 
The poet accepts the misshaping effects of time, "incorrigible desire," 
and "dear attachment." Implicit in his "dear attachment to a sleeping 
hand" (his "cherished wife of thirty years") is the sense of inevitable 
loss and separation. Michelson says the adjective "certain" means 
"both what it says and the opposite." Certain can mean particular or 
specific-- "a certain day"--but as Michelson suggests it can be used 
nonspecifically to denominate a certain day "when memory fails and 
we cannot recollect, for certain, which one" (26). Certain, in one 
word, underlines the uncertainty of the whole poem--" In Limbo." 
The poet discovers that as "a truant portion of the all," the phantasm 
of a dreaming god, he has no home in time, no place he can hold onto 
and take shelter in, no possessions--not even a self--that cannot 
escape his grasp. Nevertheless, on a "certain day" he lies "homelessly 
at home," gathered by delight in a sound as he listens to the first 
birdsong. He finds life worth the price of ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
finitude. 
403 
Startled into consciousness and untethered from his usual 
sensory moorings, the poet persona of "In Limbo" awakes to discover 
mind to be multiform, deprived of the usual conscious assemblage 
which is its mask. In the post-Einstein twentieth century, time and 
place and identity are relative, each depending on the point of view 
of the observer mind. A change in perception alters space-time, and 
causes identity to shift like the pattern-making fragments in a 
kaleidoscope. Mind is no longer comfortably unitary; we are 
confronted with the silent babble of many selves, a present crowded 
with past and future, and the haunting sense of a world forgotten or 
not yet known. 
Just as the sense of a unified consciousness and the ordinary 
expectedness of reality become destabilized in the border country 
between sleep and wakefulnees, the mind can be unhinged from its 
normal moorings by a quirk in mentation or the effects of too much 
alcohol. Being loosened from the normal constraints on thought and 
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perception, the drunken mind like "A Voice from under the Table" 
can, in its thirst, conceive "a fierier universe" and hear "the birds in 
the burning trees I ... chant their holy lucid drunkenness" (Poems 
247). The mind unhinged reveals in its abnormality some things 
about the normal. The hallucinations of madman or drunk or mystic 
challenge our perceptions of the nature of the world and put in doubt 
what is known. They also reveal the sometimes terrible burden of 
knowing. In one of his longest poems, "The Mind Reader," Wilbur 
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illustrates how the burden of what we "know" can keep us from what 
we do not know. The mind-reader of the poem becomes an 
exaggeration of the human condition--extraordinarily gifted and set 
apart by that mental gift, yet locked within the expanded though 
simultaneously narrowed world of enhanced perception. A dramatic 
monologue, "The Mind Reader" presents the speaker as an aging, 
alcoholic magus who tries to escape the burden of his gift in mezzo-
litros of wine. 
The "mind-reader" opens the poem by offering his audience of 
one some examples of things "truly lost"--objects which 
surreptitiously slip the leash of their owners' possession and 
disappear forever. He then contrasts the vanished objects with 
memories which the mind-reader says can never be truly lost. The 
vivid descriptions of person, place, thing, and action seem improvised 
by the speaker with specific details optional, dependent on taste or 
inclination. The speaker's off-hand comments and direct address to 
"you" invite the auditor to participate in the construction of the 
scenes or alter them as he will--" ... a giant view of some 
description: I Haggard escarpments if you like." The reader is left 
with a cinematic sense of impersonal distance, as though witnessing 
what happens when no one is looking. 
In contrast to three young women, "one, perhaps, in mourning," 
who talk in a "crenellate shade," a lost sun-hat seems playful and 
mischievous in its frolic with the wind: 
A slight wind plucks 
And budges it; it scuffs to the edge and cartwheels 
Into a giant view of some description: 
. . . . The sun-hat falls, 
With what free flirts and stoops you can imagine, 
Down through that reeling vista or another, 
Unseen by any, even by you or me. (Poems 1 06) 
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The phrase "that reeling vista" alludes to the dramatic landscape ("a 
giant view of some description") which the magus suggests as 
perhaps appropriate but not necessary in any specific detail to the 
sun-hat's fall: 
Think of a sun-hat 
Laid for the moment on a parapet 
While three young women 
Talk in the crenellate shade. (Poems 1 06) 
The elements each suggest romance and mystery. The sun-hat and 
mourning dress suggest a time past. The parapet suggests a place 
with a past, and the "crenellate shade" evokes a darkness notched 
with light in the pattern of a castellated battlement. 
The mind-reader offers the reader a dramatic backdrop, a 
landscape dynamic with percipience and flashing light; Wilbur"s 
diction and imagery vivify the scene: 
Haggard escarpments, if you like, plunge down 
Through mica shimmer to a moss of pines 
Amidst which, here or there, a half-seen river 
Lobs up a blink of light. (106) 
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The words "haggard escarpments" convey in sound as well as 
meaning the torn, irregular declivity falling steeply away from a 
fortification. The "plunge down" is softened by the cushion of 
humming m's and the whisperings's in "mica shimmer to a moss of 
pines." Wilbur catches the abrupt, intermittent glints of light shot up 
from the "half-seen river" in the words he chooses for the mind-
reader--" ... here or there, a half-seen river I Lobs up a blink of 
light." The careful, vibrant diction and imagery are juxtaposed to the 
seeming off-handed causalness of the mind-reader's proposal of the 
tentative details--"Think of a sun-hat ... "; "one, perhaps, in 
mourning"; "lh]aggard escarpments, if you like"; "amidst which, here 
or there ... "; "With what free flirts and stoops you can imagine"; " .. 
. that reeling vista or another." The implication of the mind-reader's 
off-hand description is that the details are unimportant--subject to 
change as one likes or imagines. Yet, the brilliance of the description 
of the sun-hat's fall makes the details seem of the first importance--
they are what capture the reader/auditor's imagination. Anthony 
Hecht describes this scene as a "suberb visualization of motion, of 
diminution into irretrievable distances." Hecht points out, however, 
that "for all the specificity of imagery, the event is all conjectural, 
hypothetical, the work and motion of the mind itself. The sun-hat is 
merely proposed as a subject for thought, everything it moves 
through is contingent" (129). The "free flirts and stoops" of the sun-
hat's "floating, limpid descent becomes a metaphor for the 
imagination, the graceful motions of the mind" ( 129 ). 
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The poet/speaker next offers two comparable disappearances, 
each in equally splendid imagery. The first comparison presents a 
scene utterly changed from the romance of three girls, one in 
mourning, on a ragged escarpment. The scene becomes mundane 
and present tense: 
It is as when a pipe-wrench, catapulted 
From the jounced back of a pick-up tuck, dives headlong 
Into a bushy culvert. ( 1 06) 
Though the scene is everyday, the word choice and images are 
powerful and exact. The pipe-wrench, flung as though hurled from a 
catapult, flies from "the jounced back of a pick-up truck." "jounced" 
sounds and says the motion of a vehicle with a bad suspension 
jarring along on a rough road. The reader can see the wrench's 
head long dive into the oblivion of the overgrown culvert. Though 
this scene has a far different aura than the one with the sun-hat, the 
likenesses are both real and subtle. They share the imagery of a 
falling object headed down a precipice; the word "catapulted" 
subliminally connects with the earlier "crenellate" and "escarpments" 
to conjure up medieval battlements. 
The second comparison likens the sun-hat's fall to a book 
slipping off a cruise ship into the sea: 
... a book 
Whose reader is asleep, garbling the story, 
Glides from beneath a steamer chair and yields 
Its flurried pages to the printless sea. ( 1 06) 
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The book--perhaps of words as carefully constructed as this poem--
is doubly lost. Its reader falls asleep reading and thereby confusedly 
intertwines the book's content with a dream. The book itself follows 
the inc line of gravity and the motion of the waves and slides into the 
sea. It leaves no mark, no imprint on "the printless sea." Michelson 
finds the sea "printless" in three ways: "the fallen book leaves no 
imprint, no track on the surface; the sea is itself printless, 
inscrutable; and it is "printless" meaning inexpressible, for no 
language, no quantity of print, will penetrate its mysteries" (55).13 
Next, the mind-reader makes a larger comparison by 
contrasting the off-hand ways in which objects can vanish with the 
way memories can be hidden but are never lost or shed: 
It is one thing to escape from consciousness 
As such things do, another to be pent 
In the dream-cache or stony oubliette 
Of someone' s head. ( 1 06) 
These lines imply that disturbing, important matters may also 
"escape from consciousness," be submerged in mental seas or lost in 
some culvert of the mind, but just as the hat, the wrench, the book 
exist out of consciousness, so do the memories stored in dream-cache 
and stony oubliette. Coming from the French verb oub/ier meaning 
to forget, oubliette refers to a narrow dungeon, usually with a trap 
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door at the top as its only opening. A prisoner could be penned in 
the cramped darkness with only room to stand and be forgotten--·left 
first to go mad and then to starve. The mind-reader has access to 
these dark holes, these oubliettes in other people's heads, but he 
suffers from his gift. He is himself trapped inside his burdensome 
perception and clairvoyance. 
The mind-reader tells us that his gift of second sight was 
discovered when he was a child: 
They found, when I was little, 
That I could tell the place of missing objects. 
I stood by the bed of a girl, or the frayed knee 
Of an old man whose face was I ost in shadow 
Wnen did you miss it?, people would be saying 
Where did ~vou see it last? ( 1 06) 
Even then his gift was an oppression. He describes the episodes as 
turbulence and approaching storm: 
And then those voices, 
Querying or replying, came to sound 
Like cries of birds when the leaves race and whiten 
And a black overcast is shelving over. 
In description that echoes the thought terrain of the the title poem of 
his previous volume of poems, "Walking to Sleep," Wilbur has the 
mind-reader describe his interior world: 
The mind is not a landscape, but if it were 
There would in such case be a tilted moon 
Wheeling beyond the wood through which you groped, 
Its fine spokes breaking in the tangled thickets. 
There would be obfuscations, paths which turned 
To dried-up stream-beds, hemlocks which invited 
Through shiny clearings to a groundless shade; 
And yet in a sure stupor you would come 
At once upon dilapidated cairns, 
Abraded moss, and half-healed blazes leading 
To where, around the turning of a fear, 
The lost thing shone. ( 1 07) 
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The mind-reader locates the "lost thing" in a mental landscape. In 
the first stanza, he created landscapes in which to lose a sun-hat, a 
wrench, a book; in the third stanza he conjures an obscure, 
mysterious, mental landscape in which to find lost things. Amid 
broken moonlight and groundless shade, come the certain signs--
"dilapidated cairns I Abraded moss, and half-healed blazes." The lost 
thing pursued through obfuscations and bottomless darkness is 
found "around the turning of a fear." Mary Kinzie describes the chief 
imaginative accomplishment of "The Mind-Reader" to be its 
"rendering of the quirky, subjective mind as a place like the world 
into which things can disappear. The mind can and does literally 
absorb the concrete things with which it has engaged so that keys, 
photos, and ultimately lost eras of the heart reside in a place of 
thought" ("The Cheshire Smile" 18). 
The mind-reader creates three vignettes to suggest the 
tentative, vague, suppressed awareness of "things put out of mind." 
In the first he asks us to "li]magine a railway platform": 
The long cars come to a cloudy halt beside it, 
And the fogged windows offering a view 
Neither to those within nor those without. 
Now, in the crowd--forgive my predilection--
Is a young woman standing amidst her luggage, 
Expecting to be met by you, a stranger. 
See how she turns her head, the eyes engaging 
And disengaging, pausing and shying away. (I 07) 
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In his second metaphor for the forgotten/not forgotten, the mind-
reader suggests "a lost key hangs I Trammeled by threads in what 
you come to see I As the webbed darkness of a sewing basket, I 
Flashing a little"' ( 1 07). The third comparison suggests "a photograph 
I Misplaced in an old ledger, turns its bled I Oblivious profile to 
rebuff your vision, I Yet glistens with the fixative of thought" (I 07). 
The mind-reader considers the phrase "things put out of mind" a 
'"queer saying" because he knows that nothing is forgotten but just 
stuffed below consciousness in some "dream cache or stony 
oubliette." Thought is a fixative: 
What can be wiped from memory? Not the least 
Meanness, obscenity, humiliation, 
Terror which made you clench your eyes, or pulse 
Of happiness which quickened your despair. ( 107-1 08) 
The mind-reader declares with finality that "nothing can be 
forgotten, as I am not I Permitted to forget" ( 108 ). 
He informs us that it was not far from his childhood 
clairvoyance to "this corner cafe table" where now an old man with 
"tank grey hair and vatic gaze" he sits and drinks "at the receipt of 
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custom"--receiving latter day publicans and sinners.14 The seer 
ennumerates the list of those who come to seek this knowledge and 
assistance: "Sad women of the quarter," "blinking clerks," "men of 
affairs," fellow drunkards, "fashionable people" who are both 
"lmlocking and ravenously credulous," and the skeptics bent on 
proving him a fraud "for fear that some small wonder, unexplained, I 
Should leave a fissure in the world, and all I Saint Michael's host 
come flapping back" ( 108 ).15 
To all comers, the mind-reader gives paper and pencil and then 
turns away to light a cigarrette. He performs an act that grossly 
mimics the oracle of Delphi: 
They write their questions; fold them up; I lay 
My hand on theirs and go into my frenzy, 
Raising my eyes to heaven, snorting smoke, 
Lolling my head as in the fume of Delphi, 
And then, with shaken, spirit-guided fingers, 
Set down the oracle. ( 1 08) 
The mind-reader admits to his auditor who has witnessed the act 
("as you have seen me do") that this mumbo-jumbo is "trumpery" 
but also insists that "nine times out of ten I What words float up 
within another's thought I Surface as soon in mine ... " ( 1 08). He 
also acknowledges that "liln the tenth case," his gift fails and "I cheat 
a little ... Recognizing that he has shocked his listener, the mind-
reader defends his occasional duplicity against the world's unfair 
judgment: 
But consider: what I do 
Cannot, so most conceive, be done at all, 
And when I fail, I am a charlatan 
Even to such as I have once astounded--
Whereas a tailor can mis-cut my coat 
And be a tailor still. ( 1 08-1 09) 
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As in most dramatic monologues, the reader learns not only 
about the speaker but also about the person to whom or of whom the 
monologist speaks. Scattered throughout the poem are clues to the 
auditor; they come as off-hand asides, the speaker's assumptions 
concerning the "you," and the the auditor's interests and reactions as 
conveyed by the mind-reader. The mind-reader assumes that the 
listener is an attentive and active participant in these ruminations. 
He invites his audience of one to "[t]hink of a sun-hat"; he tailors his 
descriptions to what he thinks will please the auditor-- "Haggard 
escarpments, if you like .... " He simply assumes his listener's 
willing and active imagination ("With what free flirts and stoops you 
can imagine," "Imagine a railway platform ... ") and a shared 
perspicacity ("Unseen by any, even by you and me"). He includes the 
auditor as an actor in his imagined landscapes-- "And yet in a sure 
stupor you would come" and " ... a young woman standing amidst 
her luggage, I Expecting to met by you a stranger" and " ... a lost 
key hangs I Trammeled by threads in what you come to see I As the 
webbed darkness of a sewing basket." The mind-reader considers 
his listener someone to whom he can confess the "trumpery" of his 
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Delphic-oracle act but recognizes that his confession to "cheating a 
little" when the one time out of ten his gift fails seems to shock his 
friend. He reassures the listener that he can speak to him of his 
failures because the listener knows "'that I have the gift, the 
burden." Rhetorically, he asks the listening you, "What should I tell 
them?" and then confesses "I have no answers." Commenting on his 
clients, the mind-reader tells the listener his bitter truth that those 
who come to him are "lm]ute breathers ... of self ish hopes I And 
small anxieties." Regarding "faith, justice, valor I All those reputed 
rarities of soul," the mind-reader confirms that "you may be sure 
that they are rare indeed I Where the soul mopes in private, and I 
listen" ( 109 ). 
Wondering "if the blame is mine; I If through a sullen fault of 
the mind's ear I I miss a resonance in all their fretting," the mind-
reader asks his companion what he thinks: 
Is there some huge attention, do you think, 
Which suffers us and is inviolate, 
To which all hearts are open, which remarks 
The sparrow's weighty fall, and overhears 
In the worst rancor a deflected sweetness? ( 109-110) 
Poignantly, the speaker confesses to his friend, "I should be glad to 
know it"--to know of the existence of such a sentient and forgiving 
intelligence. 
Unlike "some huge attention" which is able to see the smallness 
and sordidness of interior, private selves but remain inviolate--pure 
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and unblemished--the mind-reader feels burdened and sullied by 
too much knowing. Not capable of the saving grace of hearing a 
deflected sweetness and longing to be spared the consciousness of 
the sordidness he perceives all about him, the mind-reader bears the 
burden of his gift by narrowing his regard. He practices "the shrewd 
habit of concupiscence I Which like a visor narrows my regard." 
Earlier in the poem, when the mind-reader envisioned "a young 
woman standing amidst her luggage" on a railway platform, he asked 
his auditor to "forgive my predilection." Generally, concupisence 
suggests lust, but it can also mean any strong or ardent desire--
either a longing of the soul for what will give it delight or for what is 
agreeable to the senses. Soul-delight having escaped him , the mind-
reader dulls his longing in part with sensual desire. He has found 
another partial anodyne--by "drinking studiously," he can numb his 
brain "until my thought I Is a blind lowered almost to the sill." He 
hankers for oblivion, "that place beyond the sparrow," longs to be 
lost truly-- "Where the wrench beds in mud, the sun-hat hangs 1 In 
densest branches, and the book is drowned"-- "to escape from 
consciousness." His friend understands him. Ironically, the mind-
reader's mind is read and the profe.ssore" obliges him: 
Ah, you have read my mind. One more, perhaps ... 
A mezzo-litro. Grazie, professore. (II 0) 
The reader is left wondering if the "professore" is not one of those 
skeptics bent on proving the mind-reader a fraud--one of those who 
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fears that some small, unexplained wonder might "leave a fissure in 
the world" and room for the trailing in of things that reason cannot 
explain. Has the mind-reader encountered one of the "tenth cases" 
whose thoughts he cannot penetrate? Does he mistakenly assume his 
listener's belief in "the gift, the burden"? Perhaps the shock the 
professore manifests when the mind-reader admits that he has to 
fake his clairvoyance one time out of ten is not chagrin at the 
savant's duplicity but disconcertion that the confessor can actually 
read minds nine times out of ten! 
Rather than violating the sanctity and privacy of the minds he 
reads, the mind-reader himself feels violated: "Whether or not I put 
my mind to it, I The world usurps me ceaselessly" ( 1 09). Wilbur's 
poem is based on a "mind-reader" whom the poet met in Rome in 
1954 (qtd. in "Craft Interview" 86). The man told Wilbur that his 
mind, possessed by the world, was "like a common latrine" (Acts of 
Mind 140). So befouled, the mind-reader describes his "gift" as a 
burden: 
... my sixth 
And never-resting sense is a cheap room 
Black with the anger of insomnia, 
Whose wall-boards vibrate with the mutters, p taints, 
And flushings of the race. (I 09) 
Wilbur creates a Sartrean image of a being trapped forever awake in 
a cheap hotel room where the thin walls transmit rather than muffle 
the discontent, the whinings, and the psychic excrement of all those 
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who happen to share the same time and space. Like Prufrock, the 
mind-reader's awareness suffers "restless nights in one-night cheap 
hotels," and like Prufrock he is led "to an overwhelming question" for 
which he has no answer: "What should I tell them? I I have no 
answers" ( 1 09). Without answers for himself or his customers , the 
mind-reader scribbles the vaguely consoling generalities that 
palmists and astrologers offer their clients: 
Set y"Our fears at rest, 
I scribble when I must. Your paramour 
Is faithful, and y"Our spouse is unsuspecting. 
You were· not seen, that day~ beneath the fig- tree. 
Still, !Je more cautious. 1-Vhen the time is ripe, 
E'ipect promotion. I forsee a message 
From a far person ,vho is rich and d.ving. 
You are admired in secret. If, in y"Our judgment, 
Profit is in it, you should take the gamble. 
As for these fits of rs1eeping_ the_v will pass. ( l 09) 
The mind-reader's consciousness has become a trap; he is the 
prisoner of his own gift.l6 For him, the only consolation is to numb 
himself into oblivion. 
The mind-reader's predicament can be seen to be as a 
metaphor for the human condition. We, too, are gifted with mental 
powers which seem far in excess of those possessed by other species. 
Like the mind-reader, we have an enhanced capacity for awareness 
--not only for seeing what is there but also for making what is there. 
Like the mind-reader, we set the scene; our flaunts of imagination 
launch the sun-hat on its free fall down the escarpment of our 
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interior landscape. Like the mind-reader, we suffer from knowing 
and memory. We are tortured by what we know of ourselves and 
what we know or suspect of others; our minds are mined with 
oubliettes of festering rot. Like the mind-reader, human beings 
hunger for either forgetfulness or cleansing absolution. We long to 
believe in some forgiving intelligence willing to see past our sin to 
some hoped for sanctity. Despite the mind-reader's longing for 
oblivion to erase his misery of knowing, there is a kind of triumph in 
this poem, in what is otherwise a dismal picture of the burden of 
consciousness. Underlying the mind-reader's burden is the maker, 
the poet's delight. The poem itself is a virtuoso expression of what 
the mind can see and say, what consciousness can make of the world. 
The dazzling imagery and metaphors bespeak an awareness that 
loves the things of the world. The poet's attention to and sympathy 
for the figure of his creation suggest a sensitivity that indeed hears 
"[i]n the worst rancor a deflected sweetness." The poet's compassion 
itself affirms the possibility of "some huge attention ... I Which 
suffers us and is inviolate," an attention "which remarks I The 
sparrow's weighty fall "--a God made in the poet's image. 
The mind portrayed in Wilbur's poems is a restless, craving 
creature trapped in a space too small for its longings. Like a bird 
which has blundered through an open window into a small room, the 
mind struggles to escape the limitations of consciousness and sensory 
perception. Flying like a bat in dark cave, the mind may perform the 
unbat-like feat of not just detecting a wall of stone but flying 
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through it--by graceful error and happy intellection changing the 
shape of the cave. Insight may come not just through words--the 
sonar-like instruments of the mind, the tools for thought--but 
through the defeat of words: "Down vistas of vain attempt I ... for a 
flying moment one may see." The mind, though trapped in 
consciousness and the sensory world, may experience intuitions of a 
larger reality when it is untethered by sleep or a quirk in mentation 
from the moorings of the ordinary daylight, expected world. The 
"blinking mask" of identity may slip revealing the multitude of 
voices stretched across space-time, voices hidden in a seemingly 
unitary self. Despite extra-ordinary perspicuity, the mind has 
trouble reading itself and experiences the vague, nagging sense of 
having forgotten something. Sometimes knowing itself seems a trap 
that keeps the mind from the alluring unknown, and sometimes 
knowing is a threat and a reminder. The mind itself is part of that 
unknown, one of the final mysteries, but it is a mystery locked in 
time. A creature of earth-time with a vision of space-time, the mind 
beats its wings against the cage of mortality, looking with dying eyes 
for the sill of eternity. 
The Wound of Time 
In his Confessions, Augustine said that his mind burned to 
solve an intricate puzzle "at once so familiar and so mysterious": "My 
problem is to discover the fundamental nature of time and what 
power it has" (271). Musing over the problem, Augustine decided 
that "time is merely an extension" but he did not know of what it 
was an extension. Then he began to wonder if time is not "an 
extension of the mind itself" (274). 
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Wilbur's poem "The Mill" asks about the mind--the puzzling 
way it works and the conundrum of what happens to the workings of 
the mind when the individual mind stops working. "The Mill" begins 
with the poet's remembrance of a friend's dying thoughts and 
rambling odds and ends of memories. The "spoiling daylight" inching 
along, "[o]range and cloudy, slowly igniting lint" parallels the fading 
mind as it hazily gropes among and illuminates briefly the fuzzy 
sheddings of a lifetime. In his own mind, the poet speaks to his dead 
friend: 
... sti 11 your voice, 
Serene with failure and with the ease of dying, 
Rose from the shades that more and more became you. 
Turning among its images, your mind 
Produced the names of streets, the exact look 
Of lilacs, 1903, in Cincinnati .... (Poems 276) 
The poet wonders if the dying man's miscellanous recollections are 
simply "--Random, as if your testament were made, I The round 
sums all bestowed, and now you spent I Your pocket change, so as to 
be rid of it" or if he spoke with more serious intent: "Or was it that 
you half-hoped to surprise I Your dead life's sound and sovereign 
anecdote?" (276). 
421 
For the poet, one among his friend's tellings does indeed 
achieve the status of a "sound and sovereign anecdote." The poet 
remembers best his dead friend's description of "the wrecked mill I 
You stumbled on in Tennessee." Sheepishly and ironically, the 
speaker asks "or was it I Somewhere down in Brazil?" and admits, "It 
slips my mind I Already" (Poems 276). The facts of the story slip 
away, but the truth of it remains. The mill becomes a metaphor for a 
mind's working in a solitude overgrown with thoughts and memory 
and a symbol for some mysterious, inexorable force at the wild 
center of all being: 
... there it was in a still valley 
Far from the towns. No road or path came near it. 
If there had been a clearing now it was gone, 
And all you found amidst the choke of green 
Was three walls standing, hurdled by great vines 
And thatched by height on height of hushing leaves. 
But still the mill-wheel turned! its crazy buckets 
Creaking and lumbering out of the clogged race 
And sounding, as you said, as if you'd found 
Time all alone and talking to himself 
In his eternal rattle. (Poems 276) 
Three times in this poem Wilbur uses the word still-- "still your 
voice," "in a still valley," "But still the mill-wheel turned" --to create 
both the hush in which to hear a dying voice and the constancy of a 
perpetual motion. The poet asks himself what has happened to all 
his friends' thoughts and memories since the mind that turned them 
is gone: 
How should I guess 
Where they are gone to, now that you are gone, 
Those fading streets and those most fragile lilacs, 
Those fragmentary views, those times of day? (Poems 276) 
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Though nearly all the events and memories of his friend's life have 
died with him, the poet has one certainty: 
All that I can be sure of is the mill-wheel. 
It turns and turns in my mind, over and over. (Poems 276) 
The friend's image, the force of his "dead life's sound and sovereign 
anecdote," continues its work in the poet's imagination and becomes 
a symbol for the pervasive, mysterious energy that, locked into an 
individual being, longs to preserve itself. Michelson says that "The 
Mitt" is an elegy not just for a friend but "for the ultimate loss of 
every mind's accumulated lore, its perceptions, its special intuitions, 
its own strange, perishable, and perhaps wonderful connections" 
(Wilbur's Poetr:.y 5). 
"The earth makes wraiths of us," Eiseley warns in "Men Have 
Their Times" (AKA 33). In his poem "From Us without Singing" 
Eiseley rages against the earth's death claim on all the living, against 
"the ugly innocent necessary work of nature I ... carried on by 
beetles, ants, blowflies"--those processes that return a dead bird and 
a man's thoughts to "the wheel of existence." 
all those immediate molecular transpositions 
that ensure 
the endless procession of pine needles, new eggs, 
new birds and in their turn 
new deaths. (NOAA 51) 
The poet imagines his own thoughts dissolving like a rotting bird, 
. both disarticulated. 
I do not understand very well 
where thought goes, I resent the slow 
disarticulation of this summer bird and his own 
particular eye, to be a transplant 
in a beetle's stomach. 
I am bound like this bird 
to my own carcass, I 
love this year's light, 
the music in his, my mind. (NOAA 50 
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Eiseley finds no comfort in the promise of "reentering the wheel of 
existence." What he craves is consciousness: "I want to know I 
where thought is restored I and memory under this one summer's 
sun" (52). Since he was "born in cyclone time, raised out of glacial 
dust," Eiseley demands that if he must give up thought and reenter 
the eternal cycle: 
let it be on the scale of my hatred, 
let me crawl with boulders like the diamonds on a snake's 
back, 
let me coil ice and utter silence, 
if there can be no thought, 
halfway around the world. (NOAA 52) 
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Time made nature natural and time made mind. As 
humankind came to see the world as natural and the mind itself as 
one of manifestations of nature evolved over time, we discovered the 
problem with time: Time made mind. Time mal;:es mind. And, in 
the end, time unmakes mind. Mind is time-bound, stuck in mortal 
flesh: "mind is locked in matter like the spirit Ariel in a cloven pine. 
Like Ariel, men struggle to escape the drag of the matter they 
inhabit yet it is the spirit that they fear" (NC 145). Eiseley says that 
humankind suffers from "the wound of time--that genius of man, 
which, as Emerson long ago remarked, 'is a continuation of the power 
that made him and that has not done making him'" (MAN 55). When 
human beings acquired the self-awareness that we call consciousness 
and left behind "the safe confines of the instinctive world of 
animals," we acquired "otherness" and became supremely conscious 
of our own mortality (55). Eiseley says that we suffer, therefore, 
from "the ability of the mind to extend itself across a duration 
greater than the capacity of mortal flesh to endure," and that we are 
left with a gnawing hunger-- "this mind which, mortal and encased in 
flesh, would contain the past and seek to devour eternity"(55). We 
are the prisoners of time, maimed by our evolutionary wound. We 
are both "abstracted out of time yet trapped within it: the mind, by 
chance distorted, locked into a white-ribbed cage which effervesces 
into air the moment it approaches wisdom" (56). Like the heart 
Yeats describes in "Sailing to Byzantium," the mind "knows not what 
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it is" but that it is "sick with desire I And fastened to a dying animal 
(Yeats 191). 
Writing about Francis Bacon and Bacon's "uncanny sensitivity 
to time," Eiseley quotes historian Frederich Meinecke's description of 
the discovery of history and "world time" as '"one of the greatest 
spiritual revolutions which western thought has experienced'" (qtd. 
in MWSTT 61 ). According to Eiseley, western thinkers have had to 
revise their conception of time, its length and its effects, twice--first 
from the brief, contained few thousand years of judea-Christian time 
to "eons of inconceivable antiquity" and then with greater difficulty 
"to perceive that this lengthened time-span was peopled with 
wraiths and changing cloud forms" rather than a fixed chain of 
divinely created immutables (IP 14). As the concept of time was 
extended back to a barely imaginable point when life was only 
potential, the concept of form suffered a similar change: Living flesh 
itself came to be seen as alterable. What had once seemed to be 
stability of form came to be understood as "an illusion fostered by a 
few millenia of written history" (IP 15). Given the longview of time, 
we have been forced to see all things as flux, momentary 
manifestations in the progression to becoming something else. 
In his introduction to his volume of poems The Innocent 
Assassins Eiseley wrote that during his paleontological work as a 
young man his mind had been imprinted "by the visible evidence of 
time and change of enormous magnitude" (lA 233). Describing his 
own personal struggle with "the wound of time," Eiseley writes of a 
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morning when, "surfeited with the smell of mortality and tired of the 
years ... spent in archaeological dustbins," he had ridden "into the 
past on horseback" (FOT 160). In "a black cloud of merciless 
thought," he had decided it was time to face up to "the dust and the 
broken teeth and the spilled chemicals of life seeping away into the 
sand" ( 160): 
It was time I admitted that life was of the earth, earthy, and 
could be turned into a piece of wretched tar ... that man had 
as little to do with his fate as a seed b I own against a grating. It 
was time I looked upon the world without spectacles and saw 
love and pride and beauty dissolving into effervescing juices." 
(FOT 161) 
On horseback, Eiseley entered a world left by the glaciers that once 
covered much of the northern hemisphere-- "places scoured by 
ancient ice action, through boulder fields where nothing moved, and 
yet where one could feel time like an enemy hidden beh~nd each 
stone" (161). He and his horse traveled "in an eternal dangerous 
present" ( 161). 
As he dropped through "gloomy woods and canyons," his mind 
"cleansed and scoured" by the wind that smelled alternately of ice 
and snow, of cedar or desert "began, like the water in those rumb I ing 
gorges, to talk in a variety of voices, to debate, to argue, to push at 
stones, or curve subtly around obstacles" (FOT 162). Eiseley wonders 
"whether we are only endlessly repeating in our heads an argument 
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that is going on in the world's foundations among crashing stones and 
recalcitrant roots" (162). 
'Fall, fall, fall,' cried the roaring water and the grinding 
pebbles in the torrent. 'Let go, come with us, come home to the 
place without light.' But the roots clung and climbed and the 
trees pushed up, impeding the water, and forests filled even 
the wind with their sighing and grasped after the sun. 
(FOT 162) 
All matter, organic and inorganic, seems bound in a perpetual debate . 
between the entropic pull toward annihilation and the life-shaping 
urge to take on form, however temporary, against oblivion. And 
Eiseley says that same debate between form and oblivion goes on 
inside our heads:· "It is so in the mind. One can hear the rattle of 
falling stones in the night, and the thoughts like trees holding their 
place" (FOT 162). 
In a passage that has the surreal quality of moving through a 
dream, Eiseley, traces life back through time as he rides down the 
mountainside. The journey down begins after a night spent listening 
to the world· s argument roaring like a mountain storm in his head 
and he himself holding on "like the roots that wait for daylight." The 
journey began and ends in vacancy. It began at the mountain top 
among stones "dotted with pink and gray lichens--a barren land 
dreaming life's last dreams in the thin air of a cold and future world" 
(FOT 163). Moving downward, Eiseley passed a meadow mouse 
among fallen petals--a symbol of the golden age of mammals before 
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the ascendence of man. Then he traveled back into the "reptilian 
dark," through "the stiff, endless green forests" of the Age of 
Dinosaurs and past a wary green lizard on a rock. As things "grew 
more lonely," he came to the small, grubby life on the barren ridges 
of an old sea beach that had long ago become desert floor; there he 
saw the "hot, warning scarlet of peculiar desert ants" flash among the 
stones and felt as though he had lost all trace of himself. From under 
one of the stones came a scorpion, "old enough to know the secret" of 
human origin, raising its poisoned tail in warning. Possessed by an 
"enormous emptiness," Eiseley came again to a vacancy like the thin 
air of the mountain's peak-- "to the end of all things in the cold 
starlight of space" ( 164). After passing "some indefinable bones and 
shells in the salt-crusted wall of a dry arroyo," Eiseley finally arrived 
at waves of sand dunes where life became invisible: "It was like 
coming down to the end--to the place of fires where we began" 
( 164). 
Realizing that life had gone from desert bush to towering pine, 
"from these dry, envenomed things to the deer nuzzliag a fawn in the 
meadows far above," Eiseley wondered about the nature and 
meaning of life: 
... my mind went up that figurative ladder of the ages, bone 
by bone, skull by skull, seeking an answer. There was none, 
except that in all that downrush of wild energy that I had 
passed in the canyons there was this other strange organized 
stream that marched liPJr"ard, gaining a foothold here, tossing 
there a pine cone a little farther upward into a crevice in the 
rock. (FOT 165; emphasis added) 
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The question he asked of the past, he also asks of the future, '"Why 
did we live?'" He could hear no answer: "The living river flowed out 
of nowhere into nothing. No one knew its source or its departing. It 
was an apparition. If one did not see it there was no way to prove 
that it was real" (165). This strange organized stream of life can only 
be proved real by the mind itself: " .. the mind, in some strange 
manner so involved with time ... has yet its own small skull-borne 
image of eternity .... the human mind can transcend time, even 
though trapped, to all appearances, within that medium" ( 165-166). 
Eiseley presents two other examples of his mind traveling back 
and forth through time, mixing past, present, and future. Personally 
and phylogenetically, he sees himself as a wraith and shape-shifter--
one of the many forms living matter assumes over time. First, he 
remembers himself as a child and young man, the suffering and 
challenges that shaped his character. With fear and anguish, he 
moves in imagination and memory about the vanished youth like a 
ghost: "I exhort, I plead. He does not hear me. Indeed, he too is 
already a ghost. He has become me. I am what I am" (FOT 166). 
Eiseley's other illustration of the mind slipping the shackles of the 
present creates an image that is quietly terrifying--half Hieronymus 
Bosch, half Rene Magritte. In the classroom, the anthropology 
professor experiences "a chink torn in a dimension life was never 
intended to look through" ( 167). While translating "three billion 
years of time into chalk scrawls and uncertain words," he is asked by 
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a student if he the teacher believes that there is a direction to 
evolution. Eiseley hears the words of the question become "'a faint 
piping"'; he sees "'an eager scholar's face squeezed and dissolving on 
the body of a chest-thumping ape": 
I see it then--the trunk that stretches monstrously behind 
him. It winds out of the door, down dark and obscure corridors 
to the cellar, and vanishes into the floor. It writhes, it crawls, it 
barks and snuffles and roars, and the odor of the swamp 
exhales from it. That pale young scholar's face is the last bloom 
on a curious animal extrusion through time. (FOT 168) 
The image leaves Eiseley wondering which of the many shapes is 
real, "'or if, perhaps, the entire shape in time is not a greater and 
more curious animal that its single experience"' ( 168). He has a sense 
of himself with a loathesome trunk ·stretching behind him on the 
floor and knows himself to be .. a many-vis aged thing that has 
climbed upward out of the dark of endless leaf falls, and has slunk, 
furred, through the glitter of blue glacial nights"' ( 168). He, too, is a 
part of that strange organizing stream moving upward: "I am the 
unfolding worm, and mud fish, the weird tree of lgdrasit shaping 
itself endlessly out of darkness toward the light .. ( 168). 
With such experiences, Eiseley is able to persuade himself that 
human beings "'are not wholly given over to time" or "'such leaps 
through the gray medium, would be impossible" (FOT 166). He also 
has a sense that a change in knowing has occurred. He believes that 
the mind of man is becoming "'a little microcosm, a replica of 
whatever it is that, from some unimaginable 'outside,· contains the 
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universe and all the fractured bits of seeing which the world's 
creatures see" ( 166). The brain which opens this world makes the 
knower a castaway with no refuge in time-- "a terrible new sense has 
opened a faint crack into the Absolute" ( 169). Seeing through time, 
experiencing this sense of strangeness, Eiseley confronts a great 
mystery--the mystery "that life and time bear some curious 
relationship to each other that is not shared by inanimate things" 
( 169 ). Erleen j. Christensen describes Eiseley's concepts of time as "a 
form of religious belief." She believes that Eiseley was "trying to deal 
with death and loss by seeing the larger perspective, feeling part of 
some larger time span than a human lifetime" ("Loren Eiseley, 
Student of Time" 31 ). 
In his poetry, Wilbur, too, looks at this "wound of time" and the 
mind's struggles to understand the force which both makes and, 
inevitably, unmakes it. With an equal feeling of mystery but with 
more faith and less terror, Wilbur expresses the same sense of the 
link between life and time and of the uncanny, urgent, insistent life 
force that drives through animate matter. In his poem "Seed 
Leaves," Wilbur presents this mystery and this force contained in the 
form of a dicotyledonous plant: 
Here something stubborn comes, 
Dislodging the earth crumbs 
And making crusty rubble. 
It comes up bending double, 
And looks like a green staple. 
It could be seedling maple, 
Or artichoke, or bean. 
That remains to be seen. 
Forced to make choice of ends, 
The stalk in time unbends, 
Shakes off the seed-case, heaves 
A loft, and spreads two leaves 
Which sti 11 display no sure 
And special signature. 
Toothless and fat, they keep 
The oval form of sleep. (Poems 129) 
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In these two stanzas, Wilbur succinctly describes the process 
whereby ad icotyledonous seed comes to life as a seedling. The "'seed 
leaves"' of the title refers to the cotyledons, the leaf-like structures 
inside the external seed coat; these cotyledons initially digest food 
from the endosperm as the seedling grows and later become the 
plant's first leaves. Exposed to moisture, the seed coat softens and 
sp 1i ts allowing the hypocotyl to press downward to become the 
primary root and the epicotyl to curve upward like a green staple, 
eventually pulling the seed of epigeal plants (like beans) above 
ground. The uncovered cotyledons (seed leaves) open causing the 
torn seed coat to fall away. The cotyledons become the oval, 
undifferentiated first leaves; the first "'true"' leaves bearing the 
characteristic shape and markings of the species to which the plant 
belongs grow from the plumule as the stalk lengthens. With the true 
leaves the plant takes on the identity--including the innate time 
limits--of its species. 
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The line "lflorced to make choice of ends" implies both 
biological and philosophical choosing. Biologically, the plant is 
compelled to grow in one direction or the other. The plant must 
choose between its ends: The hypocotyl presses downward to 
become the root; the epicotyl curves upward in an arc until it has the 
length and strength to lift the seed out of the soil. The line also 
conveys the inevitabli lity of ends--a seed must either germinate or 
die. If it germinates, the seedling may grow into a mature plant, 
propagate its own seeds, and die. The choice of time-bound, living 
things is among "ends." Wilbur describes the plant's two competing 
but mutually exclusive urges--
This plant would like to grow 
And yet be embryo; 
Increase, and yet escape 
The doom of taking shape; 
Be vaguely vast, and climb 
To the tip end of time 
With all of space to fill, 
Like boundless lgdrasil 
That has the stars for fruit. (Poems 129) 
The small seed longs to expand without limitation in time or space. 
Happily, it would become "vaguely vast" like the world tree lgdrasil 
(Yggdrasill) of Norse mythology--the timeless ash which served as 
the axis of all the levels and worlds of creation, the tree which 
"always was and waves over all that is" and would survive even 
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Ragnarok, the battle between gods and men, giants and monsters at 
the end of time (Crossley-Bolland 174). 
However, one desire overpowers the other: some undeniable, 
invisible force commits the seed to taking shape, accepting the doom 
that comes with form called out of the infinite, accepting, as Eliot 
wrote in "East Coker," that "liln my beginning is my end." 
But something at the root 
More urgent than that urge 
Bids two true leaves emerge .... (Poems 130) 
The seed leaves are stirred by the force that stirs the "Fern-Beds in 
Hampshire County"--
Whatever at the heart 
Of creatures makes them branch and burst apart, 
Or at the core of star or tree may burn 
At last to turn 
And make an end of time .... (Poems 125) 
The invisible urge which pushes from inside the seed is both time-
bound and perpetual. Somehow the limitation of finitude seems to 
give the biological urge its strength; an internal clock knows the time 
for life is brief and must be seized. The urge itself is perpetuated, 
however, despite the death of an individual plant. There is a 
wonderful paradox here: Taking shape, becoming individual dooms 
the plant but preserves its form in propagated seed--the form and 
the urge become eternal, hidden and perpetuated in the seed. The 
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propagated seeds are envelopes for the invisible force and pattern 
that continually re-emerge. Even when specific patterns are broken 
by extinction, variants of the design continue--e.g., dinosaurs faded 
Escher- like into birds. The unspecified drive--the "something 
stubborn,"' "'something at the root"" --is perhaps best expressed in 
Wilbur's poem "'In the Field"' which immediately follows "'Seed 
Leaves"'; there he describes "'the heart's wish for life"' as "'the one I 
Unbounded thing we know" (Poems 133).17 
The form of the poem "'Seed Leaves"' mimics its content. The 
first two stanzas are eight lines of iambic trimeter put together in 
rhymed coup lets. The rhythm of the simple meter and the sound of 
the predictable rhymes rock the poem in the contained, oval forms of 
sleep. These two stanzas "' ... display no sure I And special 
signature"; they are "toothless."' The last two stanzas, however, are 
each jagged--notched by the oddness of an added, defining line. The 
ninth line of the third stanza rhymes with the first of the nine lines 
of the fourth stanza so that the last two verses become a pair of "true 
leaves"' fallowing the pair of undifferentiated "'seed leaves"' of the 
first two verses. 
Driven by the more urgent urge to shake off oblivion, "'It] he 
oval form of sleep,"' the plant accepts the loss of substanceless 
eternity for the sake of temporal being: 
And now the plant, resigned 
To being self-defined 
Before it can commerce 
With the great universe, 
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Takes aim at all the sky 
And starts to ramify. (Poems 130) 
"Self-defined" implies the genetic heritage that determines that a 
maple cannot become an artichoke but also implies the inevitable 
variations in conditions and choices--ramifications--that insure that 
one maple is not another maple, that each artichoke is unique. "Self-
defined" also suggests the identity acquired by taking on the limits of 
a self as opposed to remaining indistinctly part of the "all." Ramify 
has two specific denotations. Ramify in one sense means 
enlargement--to branch out or to spread or extend in the form of 
branches into a number of offshoots or subdivisions. In another 
sense, ramify means diminution--to break up or separate into 
branches or analogous parts. Thus, the word ramify suggests both 
increase and attrition--becoming more means becoming less. The 
plant, as it grows, grows from larger to smaller. Taking shape 
requires giving up mass for form, but only in that way can the plant 
become a presence among other presences and thereby commune 
with the rest of creation-- "take aim at all the sky." The plant, 
"resigned I To being self-defined," accepts the necessity of taking 
shape and accepts the limits which will define its otherness.l8 The 
compensation is that it can then "commerce I With the great 
universe." One of the meanings of Wilbur's well-chosen verb 
commerce is to communicate or have intercourse in the affairs of 
life. The "affairs of life" exist in time among time-limited creatures. 
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Annie Dillard writes that the world has signed a pact with the devil 
and that the terms are clear: 
If you want to live, you have to die .... The world came into 
being with the signing of the contract. A scientist calls it the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics. A poet says, 'The force that 
through the green fuse drives the flower I Drives my green 
age.' This is what we know. The rest is gravy. (Pilgrim 181) 
Wilbur presents in "The Undead" the counter urge to the 
powerful drive to take on form in the temporal. finite world where 
death is indeed the mother of beauty, where taking shape dooms all 
things that come to life. In a note to "The Undead" at the end of his 
collection Advice to a Proghet and Other Poems .. Wilbur supplies a 
definition of vampire from the Standard Dictionary: of Folklore .. 
Mythology, and Legend: '"One of the types of the undead, a living 
corpse or soulless body that comes from its burial place and drinks 
the blood of the living'" (Poems 227). The tone of the poem (which 
begins with a past tense reprise of the fear that begat the Undead) is 
a mixture of fascination, disgust, pity, and identification or fellow-
feeling for the "Undead" who, even as children, were late sleepers--
preferring dreams to the ever-threatening potential of a mutable 
world--
Preferring their dreams, even when quick with monsters, 
To the world with all its breakable toys, 
Its compacts with the dying. 
(Poems 196) 
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The child vampires chose to live in an unreal world of dreams, even 
if that world were to be alive and writhing with monsters, rather 
than risk the real world of time where "breakable toys" shadowed 
childish happiness with the ever-present threat of coming apart, of 
disassembling. The real world makes its compacts with the dying. 
All living things share an implicit covenant with the world of being: 
life and form can be only temporary and will be withdrawn at some 
future, unspecified date acccording to the tacit contract entered into 
by all mortals. Life will always be time bound. 
The vampires rejected this compact; they shrank from all signs 
of change, "fearing contagion of the mortal." Not only did they see 
"'the stretched arms of withered trees" as harbingers of winter and 
death, but so, too, "the plums of summer." Ripeness precedes rot; 
fruit implies the seed which mortals bear to pass on the life they can 
give away but not hold. The vampires became emblems of not-life, 
drifting under the summer plums "like winter moons"--distant, pale, 
aloof--high above the time-bound world. 
Secret, unfriendly, pale, possessed 
Of the one wish, the thirst for mere survival, 
They came, as all extremists do 
In time, to a sort of grandeur ... 
(Poems 196) 
The Undead, "possessed I Of the one wish, the thirst for mere 
survival," set themselves apart by the intensity and singularity of 
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their obsession. It is ironical that these "extremists" came to "a sort 
of grandeur" in time. Their rejection of time--the deliberate choice 
to give up "their first lives" in the "vulgar town" --and their embrace 
of undeath made them stark and frightening. They become 
insatiable predators, feeding their "thirst for mere survival" on the 
lifeblood of mortals. With the moon (one of nature's clocks), the 
vampires rise "to their Balkan battlements"--Transylvania, their 
legendary place of origin, a province of Romania on the Balkan 
peninsula--soaring above "the vulgar town of their first lives"--the 
shabby mortality of things breakable and passing. The poet observes 
another paradox: 
Strange 
That their utter self concern 
Should in the end, have left them selfless: 
Mirrors fail to perceive them as they float 
Through the great hall and up the staircase; 
Nor are cobwebs broken. 
(Poems 196) 
Although they are undead, the Vampires have indeed met an end; 
for, "in the end," they are left selfless. Self can only be determined 
through relationship with what is not self. Abhoring untidy, mortal 
relationships, the Undead lose that definition and become self-less. 
They lose their boundaries and become so substanceless that their 
passing cannot even tear a cobweb. 
Called to their perpetual and obligatory predation, these 
Undead stoke19 the mind's eye--i.e., stir up and fire their 
imaginations--
With lewd thoughts of the pressed flowers 
And bric-a-brac of rooms with something to lose,--
Of love-dismembered dolls, and children 
Buried in quilted sleep. 
(Poems 196) 
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Here, "lewd" takes the meaning "inciting to sensual desire or 
imagination." The vampires must excite themselves by thinking of 
the ephemeral things of this world. The "pressed flowers" and "bric-
a-brac" convey a sense of nostalgia; they are emblems of times past, 
lovingly remembered. With pressed flowers, people struggle to hold 
some bit of beauty from a dance, a wedding, a garden, a funeral; the 
dried flowers symbolize the transient matter to which is attached 
deep feeling. "Bric-a-brac" suggests the memorabilia, the tokens of 
affections, souvenirs of trips, and treasured heirlooms that litter and 
decorate our rooms and 1ives.20 The pressed flowers and fragile 
ornaments are also symbols of life itself. The living, in contrast to the 
Undead, always have "something to lose." The Undead have 
immortality--therefore, nothing left to lose; they have already 
sacrificed everthing to mere survival. They have, in their undeath, 
already lost time and change and all the dear attachments of a time-
bound world. 
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The vampires' "lewd thoughts" also include "love-dismembered 
dolls, and children I Buried in quilted sleep" (Poems I 96). The 
phrase "love-dismembered dolls" redeems the word dismembered 
from the movie image of a murderous, depraved madman who cuts 
up the bodies of his victims. In contrast, "love-dismembered" 
describes a doll so hugged and treasured, so clung to and lugged 
about that it finally comes apart, losing head or arms or legs, but still 
treasured and irreplacable in its brokenness. The description 
"children I Buried in quilted sleep" suggests the vulnerability both of 
the children and of the parents who adore these dearest of "dear 
attachments." "IQ]uilted sleep" conveys the warmth and comfort of 
bedcovering stitched lovingly and handed down through generations, 
but that image is undermined by the double sense of "buried." The 
children in quilted sleep are buried treasures, but the word buried 
also carries with it the omnipresent threat of death, that all we love 
is mortal--even our children. Vampires preserve their lives 
uncluttered from all these bric-a-brac potentials for loss, yet they 
must titillate their imaginations with images of all that they have 
renounced to achieve the "negative frenzy," the agitation and 
madness required to perpetuate their diminished existences: 
Then they are off in a negative frenzy, 
Their black shapes cropped into sudden bats 
That swarm, burst, and are gone. 
(Poems 197) 
442 
Paradoxically, their craving for immortality becomes a lust for the 
mortal. 
Despite their mystique and extremist grandeur, the poet does not 
find the Undead very impressive: 
Thinking 
Of a thrush cold in the leaves 
Who has sung his few summers truly, 
Or an old scholar resting his eyes at last, 
We cannot be much impressed with vampires, 
Colorful though they are. ( 197) 
The poet loves the creatures of this fragile, tenuous world, those who 
give their lives to sing a "few summers truly" or pursue knowledge 
and meaning against the grain of time. Wilbur chooses to love 
breakable toys and to make inevitably painful compacts with the 
dying. He loves the things that cannot last, the flings of spirit in 
birdsong or scholarship, and the courage of "the Light-Dwellers, 
pouring I A life to the dark-sea" (Poems 135). Wilbur's thrush 
singing in winter calls to mind Hardy's "Darkling Thrush." In a 
landscape of spectre-gray frost and death-lamenting wind, Winter's 
dregs have desolated "I t]he Weakening eye of day," and --
The ancient pulse of germ and birth 
Was shrunken hard and dry 
And every spirit upon earth 
Seemed fervourless as I. 
(Modern Poetry 50) 
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Amid this bleak scene comes a voice "In a full-hearted evensong I Of 
joy illimited." What Hardy admired, and Wilbur after him, was 
"An aged thrush, frail, gaunt, and small, I In blast-beruffled plume," 
a frail creature who "Had chosen thus to fling his soul I Upon the 
growing gloom" and sing in winter of the few summers of his life. 
Yet, even though his sympathy lies with the mortal, Wilbur 
acknowledges the reality of the vampires' pain which "requires our 
pity." He asks the living who treasure the bric-a-brac and pressed 
flowers and broken dolls of a mortal life to have pity for the 
vampires' perpetual, incessant thirst, the consequence of their choice 
to become Undead: 
... Think how sad it must be 
To thirst always for a scorned elixir, 
The salt quotidian blood 
Which, if mistrusted, has no savor: 
To prey on life forever and not possess it. 
(Poems 197) 
The "salt quotidian blood" which for the Undead has lost its savor 
tacitly alludes to Jesus' warning to "the salt of the earth" that salt 
which has lost its savor, "wherewith shall it be salted? it is 
thenceforth good for nothing but to be cast out, and to be trodden 
under the foot of men" (Matthew 5: 13). For the vampires who have 
"mistrusted," life no longer has any zest or piquancy; they are left 
craving the "scorned elixir" which is to them tasteless. Wilbur 
creates an image which brilliantly captures the pathetic attempt of 
something small and self-narrowed trying to hold something vast 
and changing, something that can be contained only within the 
mobile form of its own vastness: 
As rock-hollows, tide after tide, 
Glassily strand the sea. 
(Poems 197) 
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Hollows worn into sea rocks can contain only a tiny portion of the 
water and life of the sea. Though the small pools fill regularly with 
the tidal flow, the still, glassy water loses the very essence of the 
sea--the powerful, crashing motion of waves in constant change. The 
still water in the rock-hollows may gleam with the reflection of 
sunlight or moonlight, but their smallness estranges them from the 
sun and moon's power. The rock-hollow pools cannot be moved by 
the forces that move the sea--the spin of the earth as it turns on its 
axis and revolves around the sun, the tug of the moon's gravitational 
pull, the churning of thermal currents. The rock-hollows may strand 
a measure of the sea's substance, but they cannot become what they 
have chosen to leave; envious, the small pools lie trapped in failed 
attempts at mimicry. They prey on life but cannot possess it. 
Of course, poets are vampires, preying on life, trying to strand 
in the rock-hollows of poems a portion of the vast sea of life, 
wringing the elixir from experience to taste its essence again and 
again. They would make the beautiful and changing, secure and 
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immortal in art. These "connoisseurs of thirst" have been tricked by 
joy: 
joy's trick is to supply 
Dry lips with what can cool and slake, 
Leaving them dumbstruck also with an ache 
Nothing can satisfy. (Poems 41) 
In contrast to the pallid Undead whose passage does not 
disturb a cobweb or cause a reflection in a mirror, the "October 
Maples, Portland" blush with "with a sanguine glow I As cannot fail 
to leave a lasting stain" (Poems 198). This poem which immediately 
follows "The Undead" celebrates the beauty that can come only to a 
dying world. Fall has turned the maples to scarlet gold; the autumnal 
beauty of these deciduous hardwoods results from the seasonal ebb 
and, like the flowers and green of spring, cannot last: "It is a light of 
maples, and will go" ( 198). Yet the light of these maples wilt not go 
"before it washes eye and brain I With such a tincture" as to stain 
our minds with remembrance and the intuition of eternity 
manifested in time: 
The leaves, though little time they have to live, 
Were never so unfallen as today, 
And seem to yield us through a rustled sieve 
The very light from which time fell away. ( 198) 
Eternity manifests its beauty in the "fall." The dappled, shifting light 
shining through the dying, crimson-gold leaves becomes a "showered 
446 
fire," redeeming the air like the flaming tongues of Pentecost. The 
October maples make visible i-n time "the very light from which time 
fell away." Eternity seems to need time to manifest itself in beauty. 
As "Seed Leaves," a spring poem, presents the urge to take on 
form despite the inevitable doom it entails, Wilbur's "Alatus," like 
"October Maples," presents the heroics of autumn when the subjects 
of time express "true valor" in "a rash consent to change." Using the 
diction of chivalric warfare, Wilbur creates an extended metaphor of 
battle to describe the autumnal rout of deciduous trees, "lt]heir 
supply-lines cut," going "down to defeat." With leaves "lt]urning, 
flying, but I Bravely so," the ash shakes "May light's citron flash" 
from blade and pennon (the flag used as an ensign by a knight or 
regiment of lancers). 
And rock maple, though 
Its globed array be shivered, 
Strews its fallen so 
As to mock the cold, 
Blanketing earth with earnest 
Of a summer's gold. (Poems 7) 
The word "shivered" suggests both splintering (as of a lance) and the 
chilling of the coming winter. The fallen leaves of the rock maple are 
like battle dead, strewn as golden tokens of a summer's light. The 
fall begins with sumac's change to reddened leaves and ends with 
the oak still hanging on to sere brown leaves. Though· "sumac-gore" 
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suggests clotted blood from a wound, and the "rattling oak" hints at 
rattling sabers and death rattles, Wilbur denies the metaphor that 
these and the earlier carefully selected diction and imagery have 
constructed: 
Still, what sumac-gore 
Began, and rattling oak shall 
End, is not a war .... (Poems 7). 
He has used the diction of battle to set up the opportunity to speak of 
valor, a word commonly used to describe bravery in battle, but then 
declares that what he speaks of is not a war. 
The title of this poem "Alatus" refers to the winged euonymus 
(Euon.vmus a/ala), a vase-shaped shrub whose bright green summer 
leaves ignite in early autumn to a dramatic, flaming red (Floyd et at 
II 0). Quickly, two weeks before other foliage changes color, the 
winged euonymus becomes a burning "fire-bush"; when the leaves 
fall, the shrub is "circled I By a crimson verge I Of its own sifting" 
(Poems 7). The word verge means both something that borders, 
limits, or bounds and also the point marking the beginning of a new 
or different state or condition or action; verge suggests both end and 
beginning. With the "time's true valor," the alatus gives its own "rash 
consent to change." Affirming the power and rightness of a process 
that requires the shrub's acquiesence to "crumbling pallor, I Dust, 
and dark re-merge," the alatus--its bared stems winged by the 
flared, empty seed pods which have spilled their orange berry-seeds 
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and by the "wings" of one-half-inch-wide, flat corky growths 
projecting along the branches--stands a winter witness to the force 
which drives its temporal clock. The fire-bush alatus 
Bristles aloft its every 
Naked stem, lifting 
Beyond the faint sun, 
Toward the hid pulse of things, its 
Winged skeleton. (Poems 7) 
The sculptural symmetry of the fallen bush--its holy fire burned 
out--becomes a silent testimony to a cycle that takes its momentum 
from "the hid pulse of things," the rhythm which binds the stars, the 
seasons, and leaf fall in a common cadence. The alatus participates in 
a vegetable faith in some larger all which requires decreation to 
renew creation. Wilbur's affirmation of the cycle offers, however, no 
easy consolations about spring resurrections; the leaves of the next 
spring are never the same leaves lost in the fall: 
Nor are leaves the same 
(Though May come back in triumph), 
Crumpled once by flame. (Poems 7) 
The flame of fall continually destroys the individual leafy 
manifestations of life to make possible the process. Life requires 
valor, the rash consent to change. john P. Farrell says that Wilbur 
envisions "two kinds of change, disintegrative and metamorphic" and 
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that a reverence for life becomes possible when we can reconcile the 
disintegrative changes with "the metamorphic and regenerative life 
of the universe" ("Beautiful Changes" 189). Though not without its 
tragic consequences, change makes possible plenitude. 
As the change of decreation makes new life possible, it also 
erases the mistakes of the past. For Wilbur, the inexorable processes 
of time bless nature with a redemptive, corrective power which can 
obliterate the botches of human making--those objects made without 
awareness of or fidelity to the nature of things. In "Junk"--written in 
the strong, alliterative form of Anglo-Saxon verse as though 
following the grain of the language to give a tempered, seasoned 
strength to the poem--Wilbur recognizes this betrayal among a 
variety of ashcan discards. The "shivered shaft" of an axe handle 
that is "hell's handiwork"--
The flow of the grain 
He sees also 
... the sheer shards 
That were not annealed 
the wood not hickory, 
not faithfully followed. 
(Poems 185) 
of shattered tumblers 
for the time needful 
a cast-off cabinet 
Of wavily-warped 
unseasoned wood 
( 185) 
The poet cringes with shame at the compromise of both self and 
material that these pieces of junk represent: 
The heart winces 
For junk and gimcrack, 
for jerry built things 
And the men who make them 
for a little money, 
Bartering pride 
like the bought boxer 
Who pulls his punches . . . ( 185-186). 
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The axe-maker failed the nature of the wood by using an unsuitable 
type and by not following the grain to use the wood ·s natural 
strength, the form which could add resi lence and vigor to the 
function.21 The cabinetmaker, in a hurry to make something for 
money, was untrue to the nature of his material: he did not age and 
dry the lumber so that later, as it did dry out, the finished product 
warped out of shape. The glassmaker failed to anneal the glass of 
the shattered tumblers for the time needed. Annealing is toughening 
or tempering glass from a highly brittle state by continuously 
exposing it to a slowly diminshing heat. In each case, the failure to 
be true to the nature of things also represents a failure to season and 
anneal the maker, to find the hard, true grain of self. Both self and 
substance are betrayed. 
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Yet, despite the human failure and despoilation, Wilbur finds 
redemption in the nature of things: 
Yet the things themselves 
in thoughtless honor 
Have kept composure, 
like captives who would not 
Talk under torture. (Poems 186) 
The shards and fragments of junk tossed on the dump " ... shall 
waste in weather I toward what they were." 
The sun shall glory 
in the glitter of glass-chips, 
Foreseeing the salvage 
of the prisoned sand, 
And the blistering paint 
That the good grain 
peel off in patches, 
be discovered again. 
(Poems 186) 
The botched products of human making will be burnt, bulldozed, and 
then buried "To the depths of diamonds I in the making dark" ( 186). 
Through the process of decreation, the materials debased or ill-used 
will be biodegraded and then reassembled--the way rotted ferns are, 
over eons, transformed by "the making dark" into oil or coal or 
diamonds. Enormous power and mystery inhabit the lines, 
in the making dark 
Where halt Hephaestus 
keeps his hammer .... 
(Poems 186) 
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They contain the sense of some awe-inspiring, subterranean urge, 
some creative making that is, like gravity, one of the shaping forces 
of the universe. And like "halt Hephaestus"--the lame and ugly 
smith, architect, and armorer to the gods--the innovative force is a 
creative, therefore imperfect, power. 
But the process of redemptive unmaking comes with a price: 
just as the broken remnants of shoddy manufacture waste toward 
what they were, "Wayland's work" is also "worn away." The 
epigraph to "junk" is a sentence from a fragmentary Anglo-Saxon 
poem in which the speaker Waldere tells of the legendary smith 
Wayland. Wilbur translates the Old English: "'Truly, Wayland's 
handiwork--the sword Mimming which he made--will never fail any 
man who knows how to use it bravely'" (Poems 2 27). Deftly, in one 
line broken by a caesura, the poet tells us that the work of the 
master craftsman, an object as fine as the sword Mimming, will also 
be worn away--like the junk and gimcrack and jerry built things--
.. in the making dark." And so will all things and all makers in the 
world of time. Knowing this, Wilbur the poet has fashioned a poem 
made like the sword Mimming out of the hard steel of Anglo-Saxon-
like verse, full of alliteration, stress, and pause. In "junk" Wilbur 
affirms the creativity and redemption made possible in time without 
denying that redemption has its price. 
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In a later poem written "To the Etruscan Poets," Wilbur echoes 
this theme of things excellently crafted lost to the inexorable 
processes of time: 
Dream fluently, still brothers, who when young 
Took with your mothers' milk the mother tongue, 
In which pure matrix, joining world and mind, 
You strove to leave some line of verse behind 
Like a fresh track across a field of snow, 
Not reckoning that all could melt and go. (Poems 55) 
Though they had striven in the "pure matrix" of language to join 
"world and mind," the Etruscan poets were sculptors in snow. The 
Etruscan alphabet originated in the eighth or ninth century B.C., but 
the written language gradually disappeared from its Tuscan 
homeland as Latin became ascendant. Today, the language is mainly 
undecipherable despite the survival of more than 11,000 
inscriptions. Though the Etruscan poets were legendary in the 
classical world for the beauty of their poetry, their handiwork fell 
into the making, unmaking dark that awaited the sword Mimming 
and the jerrybuilt things. Yet, out of the stilled voices of his lost 
brothers, Wilbur himself makes a rhyme, even though he knows that 
in the scheme of creation he, too, is a sculptor in snow. Stirred by 
"the hid pulse of things," he becomes a maker, replicating the infinite 
act of creation by not requiring that his making last. 
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Eiseley as well as Wilbur anticipated the death beyond death--
his words lost in time. Speculating on the beginning of the printed 
word, Eiseley imagines "how a man in Sumer I half the world and 
millennia away" saw the imprint of birds' feet in the drying mud and 
thought--
there is a way of saying upon clay, fire-hardened, 
there is a way of saying 
'loneliness' 
a way of saying 
'where are you?' across the centuries 
a way of saying 
·forgive me' 
a way of saying 
'We were young. I remember ... .' (AKA 16) 
Eiseley identifies with the men of Sumer who etched their longings in 
clay: "We are the scriveners who with pain I outlasted our bodies." 
·Tablets with inscriptions in the language of ancient Babylon date 
back to 4000 B.C., but the language has been extinct since the third 
century B. C. Holding a hand ax that had survived from the ice age, 
Eiseley writes that though "out of fashion I a hundred millennia, I ... 
you can still/ recognize its true purpose." The same is not true of 
words which get "knocked out of shape" or take "some other 
meaning I not given to stones I before they die." He wishes it were 
possible "to fix a word between us I which would last in the torrent I 
longer than slivers of bone" (NOAA 91). Human messages and 
artifacts inevitably become part of the indecipherable flux of nature. 
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Eiseley concludes that "[e]verything drifts by fire and flood and ruin 
into the final ambiguous lettering of the earth's own book of stone" 
(ASH 212). 
Leaving a carved stone among "The Little Treasures" in the 
outwash fan of a dried glacial stream, Eiseley thinks of his persona( 
artifact lying there "when earth's perturbed orbit I drifts toward the 
final dark" (AKA 57). His stone will make its meager contribution to 
this world's end: "My stone will stretch the shadow of the last 
evening." Haunted by the fact that human life is the flicker between 
two darks, Eiseley recognizes the origins of the human urge to leave 
behind shaped stones: 
For what else have stones been shaped 
but to prolong the human presence and to say 
soundlessly in lost tongues: 
We loved the earth 
But could not stay? 
We it was and not the immortals 
who shaped the stones. (AKA 57) 
In another poem "The Builders" from The Innocent Assassins, Eiseley 
writes that "I think myself that we are mated to the stone, that we 
were born I long, long ago from caverns, menhirs, cromlechs, 
dolmens" (49). Born of such "rough elements," man "Ia] stone-
caressing animal," creates out of the same need that created man. 
In his poem "Children of Darkness," a sanguine and light-hearted 
variation on the theme of "The Undead," Wilbur celebrates the silent, 
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dark unmaking that is part of nature's continuous creativity in the 
world of time.22 In the first two lines of what Frank McConnell calls 
"certainly the best fungoid lyric in English" (37), the poet humorously 
challenges the naive romantic ism which characterizes a wood as a 
temple of natural purity: "If groves are choirs and sanctuaried fanes 
I What have we here?" His answer describes assorted fungi which, 
unlike other plants (as his footnote tells us), do not have "true roots, 
stems, leaves, or fruit, and do not increase by means of chlorophyll 
and light. They were early associated with darkness, snake-pits, 
witches, devils, and evil in general" (Poems 112). Wilbur answers his 
"What have we here?" with a witch's stew of ill-begotten parts 
breeding and feeding on broken trees and moldering leaves: 
An elm-bole cocks a bloody ear: 
In the oak's shadow lies a strew of brains. 
Wherever, after the deep rains, 
The woodlands are morose and reek of punk, 
These gob bets grow--
Tongue, lobe, hand, hoof or butchered toe 
Amassing on the fallen branch half-sunk 
In leaf-mold, or the riddled trunk. 
Such violence done, it comes as no surprise 
To notice next 
How some parodically sexed, 
Puff, blush, or gape, while shameless phalloi rise, 
To whose slimed heads come carrion flies. (Poems 80) 
These "Children of Darkness" whose "gift is not for life" exist as 
saprophytes, feeding on the decaying organic material and making "it 
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their pleasure to undo I All that has heart and fiber" (80).22 They 
mimic the forms (ear, brains, tongue, lobe, hand, hoof, toe, phallus) 
"which they eschew." 
Yet Wilbur sees redemption in the children of darkness; they 
are nature's agents in the endless process of creation out of 
decreation: "What these break down I Wells up refreshed in branch 
and crown." They reduce the forest debris to organic mulch, 
composted nutrients for the elm, oak, aspen, beech, and pine they 
grow among. Wilbur invites the reader to reconsider the old 
superstitions and fables about the wood fungi: 
May we not after all forget that Norse 
Drivel of Wotan's panicked horse, 
And every rumor bred of forest-fear? 
Are these the brood 
Of adders? Are they devil 's food, 
Minced witches, or the seed of rutting deer? 
(Poems 80-81) 
Wilbur finds among the children of darkness clear water, good food, 
color to delight the eye, and imagery for the imagination: 
Nowhere does water stand so clear 
As in stalked cups where pine has come to grief; 
The chanterelle 
And cepe are not the fare of hell; 
Where coral schools the beech and aspen leaf 
To seethe like fishes of a reef, 
Light strikes into a gloom in which are found 
Red disc, grey mist, 
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Gold-auburn firfoot, amethyst, 
Food for the eye whose pleasant stinks abound, 
And dead men's fingers break the ground. (Poems 81) 
For Wilbur, these children of darkness are "jgjargoyles ... at worst." 
Even if they should flaunt themselves as something else-- "demons, 
ghouls, or elves"--they would be wrapped in the interplay of light 
and shadow that composes all of being: 
The holy chiaroscuro of the wood 
Still would embrace them. They are good. (81) 
Though time, like the god Shiva, destroys as it creates, Wilbur has 
faith in the world's goodness and the hard benificence of nature. For 
Wilbur, the earth is "no outer dark I But a small province haunted by 
the good" (Poems 20). 
As Wilbur finds in his poems "junk" and "Children of Darkness" 
a measure of consolation and even delight in the agents of time 
which wear away of all things, he also finds in time a fidelity, an 
assurance that certain natural phenomena can be counted on to 
repeat themselves and that human beings can, as Emerson wrote, 
come to understand the mysterious relation of mind and matter. In 
his small poem "Gnomons" that assurance is made of sunlight and 
shadow (like"the holy chiaroscuro" in "Children of Darkness") and the 
communion of minds separated across thirteen centuries. The word 
gnomon comes from a Latin and Greek verb meaning to know. In 
those languages a gnomon was an interpreter, discerner, or pointer. 
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In English, gnomon refers to "an object that by the position or length 
of its shadow serves as an indicator, especially of the hour of the 
day" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary). On an ordinary 
sundial, the gnomon is the style, pin, or plate set parallel to the 
earth's axis so that its shadow on the dial tells the hour of the day. 
In Wilbur's poem, the earth is the sundial and two men--first the 
Venerable Bede and then the poet himself--take turns being the 
shadow-casting gnomon. 
In "Gnomons" Wilbur remembers and then tries to reproduce a 
simple observation and discovery made by Bede, a Benedictine 
monk, thirteen centuries earlier. Called "the greatest English writer 
of the age" and the "medieval scholar par e.ra:e/lence ," Bede lived 
most of his life (c. 673-735 A.D.) at his order's monastery at jarrow 
where he pursued his devout and scholarly interests in history, 
scripture, hagiography, science, and rhetoric (Greenfield 15). His 
extant writings in Latin include "the lore of Christendom" --his church 
history ( Historia Ecclesiastica Gent is Angloru!liJ, treatises on time (De 
Temoori!Jus and De Tem.fl.orum Ration~. and studies of various 
natural phenomena in De Natura Rerum. 
In the first stanza of the poem, Wilbur reports Bede's 
observation, made in eighth-century England, of the length of a 
man's shadow cast by the sun at the third hour after dawn. 
In April, thirteen centuries ago, 
Bede cast his cassocked shadow on the ground 
Of jarrow and, proceeding heel-to-toe, 
Measured to where a head that could contain 
The lore of Christendom had darkly lain, 
And thereby, for that place and season, found 
That a man's shade, at the third hour from dawn, 
Stretches eleven feet upon the lawn. (Poems 6) 
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In the same sun's 1 ight but in another Apri 1 more than a thousand 
years later, the poet tests the written record left by the Venerable 
Bede: "[H]is tables in my hand," Wilbur repeats Bede's "heel-to-toe" 
measure by pacing off "[f]oot after foot" the distance his shadow casts 
in "April sunlight. .. Across centuries, Wilbur re-proves the accuracy 
of Bede's calculation and conclusion--"a wall I On which he knew my 
shadow's end would fall" despite "[w]hatever dark might plague the 
age... Nature's light--the power of the sun to cast the same length of 
shad ow three hours after dawn in another time, ad jus ted to another 
place--could be counted on to endure "[a]s April's green endures" 
(Stevens 6). The "fidelity of time" tested by the phenomenon of 
shadow length cast in a particular time in a particular month, the 
calculation adapted to the latitude of Massachusetts instead of 
Northumbria, unites the minds of the monk and the poet across a 
millenium. Bede's gifts for wonder and careful observation are 
revivified in the poet's encounter with the living words of the dead 
monk. "[W]armed by the fidelity of time," Wilbur makes with Bede's 
"sun-ringed head a dusky rhyme." 
Bede's head is "sun-ringed" in the sense that the morning sun 
behind him haloed his head as he tested the length of his shadow in 
the monastery gardens at jarrow and in the sense that the light of 
saintliness glowed around him. Bede's head is also "sun-ringed .. in 
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the sense that it trails clouds of glory. Wilbur shares with Bede a 
reverence and delight in the measurable regularities of the creation 
and in the human mind that longs to measure them. Wilbur is awed 
at the possibility that, through Bede's record written thirteen 
centuries earlier, he can share that reverence across death and time. 
Wilbur calls his rhyme "dusky"--i.e., "characterized by slight or 
deficient light" or "obscure, partially hidden"--because "Gnomons" 
can only hint at the vastness of order and urge implied by their 
shared curiosity and subsequent proof of the fidelity of time.24 The 
poem itself is a gnomon, a pointer that tells of the light by casting 
revealing shadows in dusky rhymes. The human mind, the mind of 
nature seeking to know itself, burns with the energy and light of the 
sun--and like the sun casts shadows as it makes light. The mind is 
like a candle lit from a great flame; the shadows cast by its flickering 
are themselves evidence of some greater light. 
Both Eiseley and Wilbur have an intense awareness of time as 
the powerful, inexorable force that moves through matter, binding 
and loosing, making and unmaking, appointing death as it allots life. 
For Eiseley, time is a fierce, impersonal, and terrifying duality made 
of a "downrush of wild energy" mated to a "strange organized 
stream" that marches upward. Tantalized by the seeming progress of 
life into more and more complex forms over time, Eiseley wonders 
why the mind has evolved to bear witness to these patterns that 
only the mind itself can prove real. Outside of the human mind, the 
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strange organized stream marching upward is not discernible. For 
Eiseley the mind itself seems to have become a clumsy imitation in 
miniature of a vast, cosmic awareness that contains all the fragments 
of creation bound into exquisite and intelligible patterns: "a little 
microcosm, a replica of whatever it is that, from some unimaginable 
'outside,' contains the universe and all the fractured bits of seeing 
which the world's creatures see" (FOT 166). Having opened "a faint 
crack into the Absolute," the mind knows both too much and too 
little. It becomes a castaway, aware like any animal of diurnal and 
seasonal time, but also flung onto the vast sea of cosmic time. The 
mind is left struggling with two mysteries--first, the mystery of the 
strange relationship which binds life and time and second, the 
mystery of why a mind should evolve longing to find the answer to 
the first. 
Wilbur's vision of time is more present tense than Eiseley's and 
his terror is refined into an awed affirmation of the process. Instead 
of stepping back to see the grand patterns over eons, Wilbur sees the 
cosmic represented in forms immediate and close at hand--in a 
dicotyledenous seedling, an alatus bush, and October maples. He 
acknowledges the hard fact that the living must make inevitable 
compacts with dying, that the heart's wish for life is so strong that it 
will pay the necessary price and accept that doom comes with taking 
shape in time. For Wilbur, life becomes an occasion for valor, for "the 
rash consent to change." To make the coward's choice of "mere 
survival" would leave one preying on life, but not possessing it. 
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Wilbur also finds redemption in time. Time unmakes to make again, 
salvaging the botched and the beautiful to be recycled through 
decreation into new creation. But Wil bur·s consolation is neither off-
hand nor easy. Time tosses everything, including the sword 
Mimming and Etruscan poetry into the furnace of nature's "making 
dark." Everything, no matter how exquisitely wrought, has its end in 
its beginning. Even so, Wilbur finds in the destroyers, the "children 
of darkness" whose "gift is not for life," another expression of the 
creation's indomitable will toward being: "What these break down I 
Wells up refreshed in branch and crown" (Poems 80). Time has a 
fidelity that the searching mind can discover. 
The mind which grew out of nature has discovered, in part, the 
nature of nature. Investigating its origins and finding them 
"natural, .. the mind has also discovered how awe-inspiring and 
mysterious "'natural" is. As Eiseley describes it, the concept of life 
arising from inert chemicals and evolving from procaryotic cells to 
lungfish to hominid to human requires as much faith and more 
imagination than any traditionally religious creation myth. The rapid 
mutation of mind into an organ capable of visualizing worlds 
invisible to sense has altered the nature of nature as we see (don't 
see) it. Mind, through the process of becoming, discovered first 
historical then cosmic time. With that discovery, cosmos became a 
four dimensional abstraction of space-time which can only be 
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described in terms of the speed of light and is forever beyond our 
direct knowledge. 
Mind has discovered not only this outer space but also its inner 
space. The interior world of the mind is as vast, mysterious, and 
puzzling as the world outside. Identity has become shifting, 
amorphous, and multivocal, a function relative to time and space and 
others. Freeing us from instinct but also depriving us of instinct, 
consciousness tremendously expands awareness but also 
simultaneously confines awareness to a world expressible in 
symbolic thought and analogy. Wilbur describes the mind as trapped 
by time and its own limitations, searching in words for the way 
through to the larger reality. The known tends to exc 1 ude the 
unknown so that intuitions of the unconscious and preconscious 
remain inexpressible unless we can create enough fissionable 
metaphor to explode through the walls of perceived conclusions. 
Paradoxically, the failures of logic and words bring consciousness to 
the border of the elusive and ineffable that exist just outside our 
knowing. 
Four hundred years ago, Francis Bacon saw Nature as a second 
Book of Revelation, unclouded by the human error and confusion that 
surrounded the first. Believing that nature holds whatever is, 
including '"vast and unusual swells ... outrages and insurrections"' 
within '"her inextricable net, wove as it were of adamant,"' Bacon 
longed "'to make the mind! of man, by help of art, a match for the 
nature of things'" (qtd. in MWSTT 85-86). Eiseley, Hke Bacon, 
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believed that the worlds hidden in nature and time could only be 
discovered by great acts of the human imagination (MWSTT 62). Yet, 
part of the hiddenness of nature is within the human mind itself. 
Discovering "the nature of things" will require enough imagination to 
understand imagination. 
CHAPTER Ill 
IMAGINATION AS MORAL AGENT 
His self and the sun were one 
And his poems, although makings of his self, 
Were no less makings of the sun. 
--Wallace Stevens 
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The poet, like the lightning rod must reach from a point nearer 
the sky than all surrounding objects down to the earth, and 
into the dark wet soil, or neither is of use. 
--Emerson 
To imagine is an act which give human beings the chance to 
engage in something akin to creation. 
--Rene Dubos 
... the poet makes the terms themselves. He does not make 
judgements ... he only makes them possible--and only he 
makes them possible. 
--Owen Barfield 
What is our praise or pride 
But to imagine excellence, and try to make it? 
What does it say over the door of Heaven 
But !Jomo fee it? 
--Richard Wilbur 
During the "Age of Reason" and the establishment of the 
Galileo/Newton scientific paradigm, Immanuel Kant made clear the 
contrast between two perceived realities which constantly 
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confronted his consciousness and created an insuperable conflict: 
"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing awe and 
admiration the more frequently and continuously reflection is 
occupied with them; the starred heaven above me and the moral law 
within me" (Kant 261). Kant saw that, relative to the scale of the 
universe, we human beings are infintesimal and inconsequential 
specks of matter; but with respect to our interior sense of 
conscience-compelling moral law, we may perceive ourselves as 
agents of some higher purpose which dignifies and gives importance 
to our individual existences. Given these two seemingly 
irreconciliable realities, we may experience what William Barrett in 
Death of the Soul calls, "the separation of the natural and the moral, 
the cleft between man as moral agent and nonmoral universe" (91 ). 
Throughout history people have expressed the feeling of being 
haunted by "some spiritual destiny beyond the material order," but 
we can experience that intuition only in the context of our 
understandings of the material world. Our vision of the cosmos and 
our sense of ourselves as beings of moral consequence interpenetrate 
and determine one another. As Barrett writes, "Our beliefs about the 
universe enter into our view of morality. Our ethical being is 
projected against some imagination of the cosmos as a whole" ( 111 ). 
Ambrose claimed in the He.:'r.ameron, that it is in the 
imagination that human beings resemble the Creator: 
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The soul therefore is after the image of God, being measured 
not by bodily but by mental activity, for it sees those who are 
absent, casts its gaze upon things across the sea, scans them 
with its glance, examines what is hidden, and hither and 
thither in a single moment makes its perceptions range 
throughout the limits of the world and the secrets of the 
universe .... (qtd. in Clemoes 67) 
Imagination is the nonlogical, preverbal process whereby the 
conscious and the unconscious aspects of the mind have contact with 
one another and with the world. Through imagination we learn 
about the world outside us and discover the world inside us. 
Through the imagination we can change both worlds for better or 
worse. Emerson said that the "[t]he very design of imagination is to 
domesticate us in another, a celestial nature." Defining "presence" as 
"not what is evanescent and passes but [what] confronts us waiting 
and enduring" (64), Buber says that the imagination can lead us to 
come to grips with the "living active being that confronts us" and that 
such imagination is "the drive to turn everything into a You" (78). 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in le Visible et l 'invis!Jie defines "Being ... 
as 'that rJ?!Jic!J demands creation from us in order for us to have 
experience of it'" (qtd. in Falck 51; Merleau-Ponty 251 ). 
Both Eiseley and Wilbur have a romantic sense of poetry 
arising from a preverbal, preconscious world of subterranean 
imagination where intuition makes discoveries not available to logic. 
Wilbur describes the process of writing a poem as "translation from 
the preverbal": 
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I happen to think, in the teeth of certain philosophers, that 
there are preverbal thoughts from which we fumblingly begin. 
Don't we often, well before the 'idea' of a poem has begun to 
clarify, feel an odd certainty about the proportions of what is 
coming on, about its tenor, savor, stance, or mode--about the 
channels of logic or feeling in which it is going to run? (qtd. in 
Honig 176) 
Beginning in a kind of "speech-before-speech," Wilbur says "the 
subject before we fully know it, seems to have done a good deal of 
occult marshalling" (qtd. in Honig 177). 
Eiseley, like Thoreau, saw in the artist an intense self-
awareness which was both a burden and a delight and which insisted 
on expression (NC 216). In TheN ight Country, Eiseley writes of his 
belief that "we mirror in ourselves the universe with all its dark 
vacuity and also its simultaneous urge to create anew, in each 
generation, the beauty and terror of our mortal existence" ( 196). He 
says that both the artist and the scientist "bring out of the dark void, 
like the mysterious universe itself, the unique, the strange, the 
unexpected" (NC 204). Eiseley describes great art as "the night 
thought of man" which emerges "without warning from the soundless 
depths of the unconscious, just as supernovae may blaze up suddenly 
in the fartherest reaches of void space." In response to such creative 
eruptions, "critics, like astronomers, can afterwards trianguiate such 
worlds but not account for them" (UU 64). Freud described the 
unconscious as a roiling mass of competing irrational urges; Eiseley 
believed that interior void contained limitless potential for good as 
well as evil: " ... out of the depths of unreason, the murkiness of the 
subconscious, have come also some of the most poignant works of 
great art and literature. Even scientists have, on occasion, 
acknowledged indebtedness to that subterranean river" (ST 21 0). 
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Falck declares that all language has its foundation in a process 
of "pre- or extra-linguistic intuition" and that "our ability to 'say new 
things' must rest on our pre-articulate sensing or intuition of the 
'thing we need to express' and of the words in our available language 
which we can most effectively call upon to try to express it" (58-59). 
According to Falck, we possess also "pre-subjective" intuitive modes 
of awareness that, given an openness of disposition, "open up 
continually new horizons within the reality which we inhabit" (59). 
He believes that our most fundamental apprehensions come through 
feeling rather than thought: 
Since the primal appearances which 'come to us' are 
primitively emotional as well as primitively perceptual ... it is 
through our moods, which must underlie and surround all our 
conscious experience and conceptual formulations, that we 
have our most fundamental apprehensions of the nature of the 
reality around us. (59) 
Falck says that on the "pre-experiential or ontological level, 'mood' 
carries something of the poet's overtones of ·intimation' or of 
'apprehension' ... and is what Wordsworth refers to and begins to 
define, when [in "Tintern Abbey"] he speaks of 'that blessed mood I 
In which the burthen of the mystery I ... I Is lightened out' and 'We 
see into the life of things'" (59-60). Falck therefore attributes a 
special importance to lyric poety which "derives its revelatory power 
from the primitive unities of thought and feeling which lie at the 
very basis of language itself" (60). He calls lyric poetry "the most 
essential of our linguistic modes of apprehension of reality" (60). 
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Susanne K. Langer in Phi losoghy: in a New Key: describes a cycle 
in which new ideas first come in bewildering metaphors which over 
time become rationalized by discursive language until science 
eventually replaces myth. Though she admits that "bare denotative 
language'' is "a most excellent instrument of exact reason," Langer 
says literal language is "a stiff and conventional medium, unadapted 
to the expression of genuinely new ideas." Genuinely new ideas 
must "break in upon the mind through some great and bewildering 
metaphor." She describes myth as "the indispensable forerunner of 
metaphysics." Ideas presented fantastically in myth and metaphor 
become "real intellectual property only when discursive language 
rises to their expression": 
... metaphysics is the literal formulation of basic abstraction, 
on which our comprehension of sober facts is based. All detail 
of knowledge, all exact distinction, measure, and practical 
manipulation, are possible only on a basis of truly abstract 
concepts, and a framework of such concepts constitutes a 
philosophy of nature, literal, denotative, and systematic. Only 
language has the power to effect such an analysis of 
experience, such a rationalization of knowledge. But it is only 
where experience is already presented--through some other 
formative medium, some vehicle of apprehension and memory 
--that the canons of literal thought have any application. J.Ve 
must have ideas before fi'B can make literal ana/..J,.."Ses of them, 
and realf..v nerv ideas have their orvn modes of appe.arance in 
tbe unpredictable creative mind ( 173; emphasis added) 
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Langer says that when attention turns to the literal or factual values 
of myth, discursive thinking replaces the poetic, and the scientific 
world view become ascendent over the mythical. There ensues "the 
silly conflict of religion and science, in which science must triumph, 
not because what it says about religion is just, but because religion 
rests on a young and provisional form of thought, to which 
philosophy of nature--proudly called 'science' or 'knowledge'--must 
succeed if thinking is to go on" ( 173). That, however, is not the end 
of things. Once the original vision expressed in "great and 
bewildering metaphor" is "totally rationalized, the ideas exploited 
and exhausted," the stage is set for the appearance of a new vision, a 
new mythology. 
Describing a process of meaning acquisition very similar to 
Langer's, Falck recognizes "an uncloseable gap between our sense of 
reality and the systems of concepts which we rely on to express this 
sense" (47). "The feeling of approximating to truth--to the disclosure 
or revelation of how things really are--is a manifestation of the 
fundamental vital process of meaning-creation, and is a necessary 
component of every act of language-using where we feel that 
something has successfully been expressed" (47). Like Langer, Falck 
perceives different kinds of knowing, one analytic, the other intuitive 
and creative: "Logic ... deals with linguistic meanings which we 
have already acquired; meanwhile, in its actual use within the 
historical world, language deploys an 'edge' or an intutive 'reaching 
beyond the confines of experience,' which logic is by definition 
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unable to 'get quite on level terms with'" (47-48). Falck quotes 
Nietzsche who said in Twilight of the Idols, "'whatever we have 
words for, we have already got beyond"' (qtd. in Falck 48). 
"[I]ndividual creative speech-acts--or writing-acts--which take us a 
step beyond the various meanings which we have up to that moment 
possessed" make possible the process of building up the meanings 
which constitute our language-system (48). Falck says that "reality 
is ontologically revealed to us in our most ordinary experience"; he 
claims that "there is a kind of 'imagination' at work in our most 
ordinary perception which is continuous with, and not self-
declaringly distinguishable from the kind of imagination which is at 
work in our more innovative or 'creative' perceptions of form or 
significance" (67).1 
jacques Maritain also argues for a preconscious life of the mind. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, Maritain defines poetry as "not the 
particular art which consists in writing verses, but a process more 
general and primary: that intercommunication between the inner 
being of things and the inner being of the human Self which is a kind 
of divination" (Creative Intuition 3). Maritain says that the intellect 
or reason plays an essential part in poetry, but that "poetry has its 
source in the preconceptuallife of the intellect" (4). According to 
Maritain, reason or intellect is not merely logical reason: "it involves 
an exceedingly more profound--and more obscure--life, which is 
revealed to us in proportion as we endeavor to penetrate the 
recesses of poetic activity ... " ( 4). Reason is not limited to the 
conceptual, logical, and discursive: " ... reason ... does not only 
articulate, connect, and infer, it also sees; and reason"s intuitive 
grasping, intuitus rationis, is the primary act and function of that 
one and single power which is called intellect or reason" (55). 
Maritain posits "a quite particular intellectual process, without 
parallel in logical reason" at the the root of the creative process. 
According to Maritain, poetic knowledge is acquired through 
subjectivity: 
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An obscure knowledge through inclination--born in the 
preconscious of the spirit--in which the world is known in and 
through subj'ectivit.v, grasped both together and inseparably 
by means of an emotion become intentional and intuitive. Such 
a knowledge is utterly different from what we ordinarily call 
knowledge, it is more experience than knowledge. It is neither 
conceptual nor conceptualizable; it is ineffable in itself, 
expressible only in signs and images and, finally, only in a 
work made. But precisely because it is not abstactive nor 
rational, it has no intelligible boundaries, and expands, as it 
were, to the infinite. (Creative Intuition 141) 
Declaring the subject matter of poetry to be "the mutual 
entanglement of Nature and man ... the coming together of the 
World and the Self,"' Maritain defines the Self as "'the singularity and 
the infinite internal depths of this flesh-and-blood and spiritual 
existent, the artist" and calls "the secretive depths and the 
implacable advance of that infinite host of beings, aspects, events, 
physical and moral tangles of horror and beauty--of that world, that 
undecipherable Other--with which Man the artist is faced"' simply 
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"the things of the world" --using as he says "the poorest and tritest 
word of the human language," Things (9). Echoing Buber's precept 
that the I is made in relationship with the You, Maritain explains 
how the Self is revealed in things and things are revealed through 
the Self: 
... when art only intent on Things succeeds in revealing Things 
and their hidden meanings, it does also reveal obscurely, 
despite itself, the creative subjectivity of the artist. While 
endeavoring to catch and manifest what matters most in Things 
and the secret significance on which they live, the poetic 
perception which animates art does involve at the same time 
a disclosure and manifestation, unitentional as it may be, of the 
human Self. On the other hand, when art primarily intent on 
the artist's Self succeeds in revealing creative subjectivity, it 
does also reveal obscurely Things and their hidden aspects and 
meanings .... While endeavoring to disclose and manifest the 
artist's Self, the poetic perception which animates art catches 
and manifests at the same time what matters most in Things, 
the transapparent reality and secret significance on which they 
live. (Creative Intuition 29) 
Maritain says that the ordinar.Y r'Jsibilit..v of Things "conceals but 
can, by virtue of man's spiritual power, reveal the ocean of being" 
(29: emphasis added). 
William Heyen believes that all literature is essentially moral 
but says that "the dilemma of the mg;dern condition is a feeling of 
positivistic helplessness in trying to defend traditional virtues ... 
once we have lost our capacity for figural thought, once we realize 
we are not sponsored ... " ("On Richard Wilbur" 629). Falck sees an 
476 
advantage to the loss of mythic absolutes and looks to literature to 
supply us with the help we need to live our lives: 
The great absolute myths--of God, of the center, of eternity--may 
perhaps do us no great spiritual harm in so far as they are ways 
of focusing our idealism; but in the modern world they are 
unlikely to do us any great spiritual good either, since they 
encourage us towards intolerance in our ideas or extremism in 
our behavior, and can give us little guidance in the great middle 
ground of action and commitment within which we live our actual 
reflective lives. The help that we need in this middle ground will 
be available to us above all from the fictions of literature--from 
those fictions which we feel to be idealistically credible or real, 
rather than from those which our better judgement enab tes us to 
see to be superficial, sentimental, frivolous or fantastic. ( 143) 
That literature which we perceive as "idealistically credible" becomes 
the~ a continuing book of revelation. Falck says that a literary 
fiction or a poem is effective because it "gives us an immediate 
presence or presentation of ontological meaning" and because " ... 
literature inscribes reality, and is a concentrated or intensified 
expression of life as it occurs at the distinctively human level·· ( 122-
123). 
Asked how much the reader must assent to the ideas in a 
poem, Wilbur replied, "What you want in poetry is not rightness of 
wrongness of belief, but adequacy of attitude, a sufficient. 
comprehensiveness and richness of attitude" (qtd. in Frank and 
Mitchell 35). Wilbur says what is wanted in poetry in regard to 
ideas is "not convincing argumentation, or the attractive presentation 
of ideas in which you already believe, but a demonstration of how 
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the world would look, how you would feel, if you dwelt in the 
presence of a certain idea" (35). Noting that it is not necessary to 
embrace Catholic theology to appreciate the opportunity Dante 
affords the reader to see and think and feel as a medieval Catholic, 
Wilbur says that "lt]he issue of reading the poem is not conversion, 
but enrichment of experience, a stretching of one's sense of the 
possibilities of the world" (35). 
When the imagination acts as a moral agent, art does not 
become didactic or prescriptive--for it to do so would confine truth 
and goodness to the limited understandings of the present moment 
and assume that morality could not continually evolve to higher 
levels. Falck says that what makes a story or a piece of literature 
significant is that 
... it gives us insights into, or that it reveals or discloses, 
something of importance about what human 1 ife, or therefore 
reality as it is humanly experienced, is essentially like. This is 
not something which it makes statements about or tells us. 
What a poem or story says or tells us (if it says or tells us 
anything) is only the means by which it shows us something. 
What it shows us is something which we can recognize only 
through the sense of a certain rightness (the sense of a certain 
fidelity to the essential nature of human life or reality) which it 
gives us as we experience it. (Falck l 08) 
The essential function of literature, according to Falck, is "to show us 
how things are --not by describing them in their actuality, but by 
revealing them in their essential forms and their essential rhythms" 
(33) .2 
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Falck, Langer, and Maritain--each of whom posits a pre-
rational or pre-linguistic apprehension of meaning--suggest how 
language and myth participate in a process of learning whereby what 
is felt becomes what is known--consciously, i.e., in words. The 
intuition of goodness, truth, beauty may be translated into poetry or 
literature, transmitting the new apprehension in a sharable form that 
allows the reader to participate in the reenactment and enhancement 
of the artist's discovery. Gradually, the verbally-approximated new 
knowledge becomes generally available, but no such discovery is 
ever a complete or completely understood revelation because words 
can only approximate the ineffable. Each discovery both advances 
the awareness of truth, goodness, and beauty but also intimates, 
through what Marcel calls "fructifying obscurity," more to be 
discovered and tantalizingly invites pursuit. 
Michelson dec lares that in the late twentieth century, the mind 
of the poet has more work to do: 
It must be aware of an endlessly expanded universe, of new 
conceptions of time, new uncertainties about human 
consequence; it must be aware of a cultural past and of the 
limits of culture as a source of strength; above all it must be 
aware of awareness, of the delusions and stubborn mysteries of 
dreaming and knowing. ( 60) 
Zajonc in "Light and Cognition" says that "loin nearly every front we 
are being called on tore-imagine the world we inhabit"; in order to 
create the necessary capacities for understanding our future, "we 
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must dwell precisely in the tensions, the paradoxes, the annoying 
anomalies of our time." He says "[o]nly thus will we develop the 
faculties suited to understand the nature of light and ... see the way 
through our perilous times" ("Light and Cognition" 126). Rolston 
says that "[n]ature thrusts at least one kind of its creatures into 
responsibility, and this call to morality refuses to dissolve before the 
reductions of science" (244). 
For both Wilbur and Eiseley, the imagination is a moral agent. 
Their writing becomes a means of discovery, of pushing off the verge 
of the known into the mystery of the yet-to-be-known. They make 
vivid the things of the world so that they can be seen and honored in 
the fullness of their being. They reveal the complexity and 
ambiguity of knowing. Through imagination, they discover unities 
that bind people, animals, plants, places, memories, events, natural 
law into an interdependent web of existence. They confront the 
human potential for great good and appalling evil. After looking at 
Eiseley and Wilbur's individual concepts of imagination and the 
function of art, I will examine in detail Wilbur's "The Fourth of july" 
and Eiseley's "The Innocent Fox" to illustrate how their symbols for 
the unifying imagination bring into coherence what would seem 
disparate and unlikely material. I will also examine Wilbur's poem 
"On the Marginal Way" and Eisetey's essay "The Star Thrower" to 
illustrate how these pieces compell attention to difficult problems of 
good and evil and offer a vision of the good without prescriptive 
answers to persistent concerns. 
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Eiseley: An Endurable Future 
Speculating on the emergence of language and writing, Eiseley 
remembers episodes from his own experience which suggested to 
him the human capacity to make an "alphabet of forms." While 
traveling alone on a solitary stretch of coast, Eiseley began to see 
"little distorted faces" begin to peer up meaningfully at him "from 
the oddly fractured shells on the beach." On another occasion, 
crossing a plain at night on foot, Eiseley saw the clouds in moonlight 
"begin to build into archaic, voiceless pictures," and he became 
convinced "that the reading of such pictures has long preceded what 
men of today call language." The capacity to see a face in shell or a 
pointing finger in a cloud has, Eiseley believes, changed man-- "both 
magnified and contracted his person in a way verging on the 
uncanny": "There existed in the growing cortex of man, in its endless 
ramifications and prolonged growth, a place where, paradoxically, 
time both flowed and lingered, where mental pictures multiplied and 
transposed themselves·· (IP 141 ). 
Eiseley says that it is the "venerable, word-loving trait in man . 
. . [that] enables him to transmit his eternal hunger--his yearning for 
the country of the unchanging autumn light. Words are man's 
domain, from his beginning to his fall" (IP 125). Taking man out of 
the strictly natural world, language became "the cradle of the human 
universe": 
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Objects and men are no longer camp letely within the world we 
call natural--they are subject to the transpositions which the 
brain can evoke or project. The past can be remembered and 
caused to haunt the present. Gods may murmur in the trees, or 
ideas of cosmic proportions can twine a web of sustaining 
mathematics around the cosmos. (IP 142). 
The power of language is in "'displacement, .. the linguistic term which 
describes "'the ability to talk about what is absent, to make use of the 
imaginary to control the real"' (IP 145). Displacement allows human 
beings to manipulate time and ideas and objects within the .mind and 
even to make in thought a potential reality which we can then 
impose on the real world. Social structures, traditions, and even tools 
exist in the mind before they exist in reality. Eiseley says the 
corollary of displacement is the ability of language to receive 
"'constant increments and modifications"' (1Pl45). The easy ingestion 
of the new within structured yet amazingly flexible language "'allows 
us a distant glimpse of the endlessly streaming shadows that make 
up the living brain"' (IP 145). 
Yet, for all its value, for all it makes possible, language is by its 
nature limiting and "'creates for man an invisible prison"': 
Language implies boundaries. A word spoken creates a dog, a 
rabbit, a man. It fixes their nature before our eyes; henceforth 
their shapes are, in a sense, our own creation. They are no 
longer part of the unnamed shifting architecture of the 
universe. They have been transfixed as if by sorcery, frozen 
into a concept, a word. Powerful though the spell of human 
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language has proven itself to be, it has laid boundaries upon 
the cosmos. (IP 31) 
Through the spell of language, man transforms the emerging present 
into words, creating "an unnatural world of his own"--the world of 
human culture. Eiseley says the inadequacy of this language 
universe transformed into "a cosmic prison house" becomes quickly 
apparent. This second world of language and a shared mental 
culture comes with a price: 
In the attempt to understand his universe, man has to give 
away a part of himself which can never be regained--the 
certainty of the animal that what it senses is actually there in 
the shape the eye beholds. By contrast, man finds himself in 
Plato's cave of illusion. He has acquired an interest in the 
whole of the natural world at the expense of being ejected from 
it and returning, all to frequently, as an angry despoiler. 
(IP 143). 
At considerable cost, the human imagination has acquired 
incredible power. Eiseley says that "lt]he mind that once visualized 
animals on a cave wall is now engaged in a vast ramification of itself 
through time and space. Man has broken through the boundaries 
that control all other life" (UU 53). Like the orb spider, we lie at the 
heart of the web we have spun but the human web extends "through 
the starry reaches of sidereal space as well as backward into the 
dark realm of pre-history. It is a web no creature of earth has ever 
spun before .... Knowledge has given [us] memory of the earth's 
history beyond the time of [human] emergence" (UU 53-54). We 
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touch with our minds worlds we can never see in the flesh. Yet, 
Eiseley says, it no longer enough simply to see into the past or to the 
ends of the universe. We are also a part of the future which we 
possess a power to shape. Unfortunately, we have discovered that 
wisdom does not necessarily come with knowledge and that "learning 
is endless and ... nowhere does it lead us behind the existent world. 
It may reduce the prejudices of ignorance, set our bones, build our 
cities. In itself, it will never make us ethical men" (FOT 160). 
In The Invisible Pvramid Eiseley writes that "part of human 
destiny ... is not fixed irrevocably but is subject to the flying 
shuttles of chance and will"' (IP 55). We are evolutionary creatures 
still in the process of being made: "[S]omething is still undetermi(led 
in the human psyche" (IP 56). Out of the dark forests of evolution, 
human beings have brought "a new unprophesiable world--a latent, 
lurking universe within our heads" (IP 18). Eiseley says that the 
evolving brain has created "a superorganic structure" which has 
enabled man to evade organic specialization and "mount, with wings 
spun in the brain, the heights of air": "'Because of speech, drawn 
from an infinitesimal spark along a nerve end, the vague, ill-defined 
surroundings of the animal world [have been] transformed, named, 
and categorized" (IP 19-2 0). A bout human beings lingers a 
superorganic "'penumbral rainbow ... that cloud of ideas, visions, 
institutions which hover about, indeed constitute human society, but 
which can be dissected from no single brain" (21). Among human 
beings, cultural evolution has superseded physical evolution as the 
primary shaping force; evolution continues and accelerates as 
culture. 
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Carlisle describes what George Gaylord Simpson in The Meaning 
of Evolution calls "the new evolution." This new evolution has 
evolved out of and depends to an extent on organic evolution but "it 
is peculiar to man and depends largely on his capacities of 
intelligence, flexibility, individualization, and socialization" ("Heretical 
Science" 370). Society and culture as well as genetics influence the 
course of human evolution. Heredity is "no longer simply organic, it 
has become linguistic or mental--social and cultural. With man's 
great unique capacities, evolution has become 'subject to conscious 
control"' (370). Carlisle suggests that this new evolution will require 
a new biology that blurs the distinctions between science and other 
disciplines, including both the systematic and analytic and the 
personal and contemplative (374). james Schwartz in "Loren Eiseley: 
The Scientist as Literary Artist" believes that "our new evolutionary 
course into the future will be dictated by spiritual rather than 
physical dynamics" (862-863) and the learning of a "wise sorrow" 
(867). 
The imagination is a moral burden because we are all creators, 
whether we like it or not. We live in what Eiseley calls "an eternal 
dangerous present" (FOT 161 ), in a creative universe where life is 
never fixed and stable, a universe in which we make choices that 
construct the "past" out of which the future will be spun. Even what 
is forgotten is remembered: " ... the shadow fingers of lost ideas 
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reach forward into time to affect our world view, and with it, our 
future destinies and happiness" (ST 252). The future is "neither 
ahead nor behind, on one side or another. Nor is it dark or light. It 
is contained within ourselves; it is drawn from ourselves; its evil and 
its good are perpetually within us" (NC 73). And "[t[he future's 
gestation is now. It is made of stuff immediate and inescapable--
ourselves" (NC 74). Out of the stuff of ourselves will come, if it 
comes, an "endurable future." Eiseley says that such an endurable 
future cannot be solely a product of outward knowledge or the 
experimental method: It will be born of compassion, of "inward 
seeing" (NC 74). Eiseley believed that "all responsible decisions are 
acts of compassion and disinterest; they exist within time and history 
but they are also outside of it, unique and individual and, because 
individual, spiritually free" (ST 2 64). Whether we choose to moral 
agents or not "every human generation [performs] against the future 
the acts which justify creation or annul it" (ST 266). Freed from the 
oppression and security of instinct, we live in a world of imagination 
and uncertainty--as Eiseley puts it, we felt "out of the secure world 
of instinct into a place of wonder" (ST 221). Because our actions are 
less compelled and more chosen, we have greater responsibility for 
our individual participation in the ongoing cosmogenesis. 
In Darwin's Century, Eiseley writes that if evolution has taught 
us anything it has taught us "that life is infinitely creative" or, as 
Henri Bergson remarked, "'the role of life is to insert some 
indetermination into matter'" (qtd. in DC 247). That creative 
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indetermination has given man "an advanced brain capable of 
multiple choices .... He is a 'reservoir of indetermination.·" Protean 
and elusive, capable of great good and appalling evil, man, for 
Eiseley, "represents the genuine triumph of volition, life's near 
evasion of the forces that have molded it" (DC 350). Imagination is 
one of the manifestations of the ever-emergent novelty inherent in 
nature. Definition--whether cell walls, rock faces, or human 
knowledge--merely creates a verge, the edges or boundaries where 
change wi 11 occur. lmaginat ion brings the imaginer to the verge 
where the known melts into the unknown. Eiseley described 
Thoreau as "a dweller along the edge of the known, a place where the 
new begins" (UU 137). Yet, Eiseley found no happy assurance in 
human imaginative power: "We are more dangerous than we seem 
and more potent in our ability to materialize the unexpected that is 
drawn from our minds" (UU 46). 
The imagination at its worst can become an instrument of 
darkness. Writing of Shakespeare's Macbeth, "this old murderous 
tale of the scentific twilight," Eiseley begins his essay "Instruments of 
Darkness" with a perceptive analysis of the scene in which Macbeth 
undergoes a "malevolent change in character." The title of Eiseley's 
essay comes from Banquo's lines warning that the "Instruments of 
Darkness" win us to our harms with honest trifles but then betray us 
"li]n deepest consequence." Eiseley sees Macbeth's witches as "an 
exteriorized portion of ourselves": 
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They are projections from our own psyche, smoking wisps of 
mental vapor that proclaim our subconscious intentions and 
bolster them with Delphic utterances--half-truths which we 
consciously accept, and which then take power over us. Under 
the spell of such oracles we create, not a necessary or real 
future, but a counterfeit drawn from within ourselves, which 
we then superimpose, through purely human power, upon 
reality. (NC 48) 
The danger for human beings lies in what we choose to believe about 
ourselves. We are what we imagine; we become the myth we create 
for ourselves: " ... Macbeth's demons, by prophecy, worked in him a 
transformation of character which then created inevitable tragedy. 
Until the appearance of the witches on the heath gave it shape, that 
tragedy existed only as a latent possibility in Macbeth's 
subconscious" (NC 49). Shakespeare wrote that "he which is was 
wished until he were"; Eiseley says that "ltlhe terror that confronts 
our age is our own conception of ourselves" (NC 55). Shakespeare's 
message "that what we wish will come," Eiseley says is "the deadliest 
message man will ever encounter in all literature" because it thrusts 
upon us the inescapable choices whereby we will make our future 
(NC 55). 
Eiseley finds in the ruins of every civilization "the marks of 
men trying to express themselves, to leave an impression upon the 
earth" (NC 85). Because we in modern times have learned more of 
the past than any p receding era-- " . . . . turned more stones, 1i s tened 
to more buried voices ... "--Eiseley believes that we should possess 
the "kind of pity that comes with time" and be safe from the savage 
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brutality of "the man who is not aware he is a shadow" (NC 85). Of 
all the fallibilities of the human condition, Eiseley says the most 
grievous wound we have suffered in the process of acquiring a 
thinking brain is a "shadow of madness," "an insatiable thirst for 
cruelty" (NC 85). 
At its best, Eiseley sees the imagination as the agent of human 
freedom and the precursor of all new learning: "it is this impossible 
fertile world of our imagination which gave birth to liberty in the 
midst of oppresssion, and which persists in seeking until what is 
sought is seen" (ST 269 ). Eiseley says that it is the artist who serves 
to waken the individual from the dream of self: 
The symbols used by the great artist are a key releasing our 
humanity from the solitary tower of the self. ... the artist 
plays an enormous role in this act of self creation. It is he who 
touches the hidden strings of pity, who searches our hearts, 
who makes us sensitive to beauty, who asks questions about 
fate and destiny. (ST 274) 
Eiseley believes that through "artistic imagination" we can discover 
"those humane insights and understandings which alone can lighten 
our burden and enable us to shape ourselves .... into the forms 
which great art has anticipated" (ST 279). 
Eiseley likens the poet to the watchful and elusive crab: "He is 
born wary and is frequently in retreat because he is a protector of 
the human spirit" (IP 124). He fancies poets "lurking about the edge 
of all our activities, testing with a probing eye, if not claw, our 
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thoughts as well as our machines" ( 124). Remembering Emerson's 
stubborn assertion that "[tlhe soul is no traveller," Eiseley says that 
the great writer is "peculiarly a product of his native environment" 
who is able to select "from his surroundings a fiery train of dissimilar 
memory particles--'unlike things' which are woven at last into the 
likeness of truth" (IP 124-125). In another metaphor, Eiseley calls 
poets and writers the "spore bearers of thought" and says that they 
found "the keys to what originally appeared to be the impregnable 
prison of selfhood" (IP 125). Though according to Emerson the poet 
has no need to t:ravel in space beyond his native land, Eiseley sees 
the poet as a time-traveler with "a preternatural sensitivity to the 
backward and forward reaches of time" and an ability to see into 
things in ways that exceed the capacity of science and its 
instruments: "!Poets! probe into life as fa:r as, if not farther than, the 
molecular biologist does, because they touch life itself and not its 
particulate stucture" (IP 125). 
Eiseley considered looking to be the business of art and he 
considered it "the real business of the artist to seek for man's 
salvation, and by understanding his ingredients to make him less of 
an outlaw to himself, civilize him, in fact, back into that titanic 
otherness, that star's substance from which he had risen" (ST 237-
238). In the question, "How should we see?," Eiseley heard the terror 
of the modern age (ST 249). Like Wilbur, Eiseley believed that it is 
in the natural world that we see ourselves: "A flower might open a 
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man's mind, a box tortoise endow him with mercy, a mist enable him 
to see his own shifting and uncertain configuration" (ST 238). 
We see, as artists, as scientists, each in his own way, through 
the inexorable lens we cannot alter. In a nature which Thoreau 
recognized as unfixed and lawless anything might happen. The 
artist's endeavor is to make it happen--the unlawful, the 
oncoming world, whether endurable or mad, but shaped, 
shaped always by the harsh angles of truth, the truth as 
glimpsed through the terrible crystal of genius. This is the one 
sure rule of that other civilization [nature] which we have come 
to know is greater than our own. (ST 250) 
The artist must serve as midwife, bringing into being "the unlawful, 
the oncoming world." 
Eiseley believed that human seeing can be numbed into 
blindness, however, by too much daylight and that really intense 
vision would come with lightning flashes briefly, dramatically 
illuminating the dark and demanding our attention: 
How much more we would see ... if the world were lit solely 
by lightning flashes from the Elizabethan stage. What 
miraculous insights and perceptions might our senses be 
trained to receive amidst the alternate crash of thunder and 
the hurtling force that give a peculiar and momentary shine to 
an old tree on a wet night. Our world might be transformed 
interiorly from its staid arrangement of laws and uniformity of 
expression into one where the unexpected and blinding 
illumination constituted our faith in reality. (NC 136) 
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In the seeing that comes with a flash of lightning we have a'chance 
to discover the "wild and unpredictable" that lurks behind the 
world's ordinarily sober manifestations. 
Eisetey believed that such flashes of "the light of universes 
beyond our ken" occur only in rare individuals of genius but the 
vision caught in the flash can be communicated to the rest of us. The 
momentary illumination in an individual brain can, as Thoreau said, 
change our way of seeing--"· from seeing things as men describe 
them, to seeing them as men cannot describe them'" (qtd. in NC 137). 
Without the absolute unexpectedness, the lightning strokes of the 
great artists, we would lose much: 
... [we] would never have known the fairyland of The 
Temgest, the midnight world of Dostoevsky, or the blackbirds 
on the yellow harvest fields of Van Gogh. We would have seen 
blackbirds and endured the depravity of our own hearts, but it 
would not be the same landscape that the act of genius 
transformed. The world without Shakespeare's insights is a 
lesser world, our griefs shut more inarticulately in upon 
themselves. We grow mute at the thought--just as an element 
seems to disappear from sunlight without Van Gogh. 
(NC 137-138) 
Eiseley compares these lightning strokes of genius to the "particle 
episodes" of subatomic physics in which the world we call ordinary is 
created by the "accident and impact" of whirling electrons. Because 
the elusive particle may "play a role in biological change and 
diversity ... the mysterious world of particles may influence events 
within the realm of the living" (NC 138). The artist, living in a world 
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of "inifinite variability" and individual act, shares the creative 
potential of the universe. Creations of the artist are "'acts without 
precedent, a kind of disobedience of normality, unprophesiable by 
science, und uplicable by other individuals on demand" (NC 138). 
Eiseley says such events are part of "unpredictable newness .. which 
makes the universe never fully knowable and the future a mystery. 
The rigors of the scientific method do not allow questions of 
fate and destiny, compassion and beauty, to be pursued directly, but 
science does share some methodology with art. Eiseley believed 
science as much as art needs metaphoric language: "it is only by the 
hook of the analogy, by the root metaphor ... that science succeeds 
in extending its domain" (FOT 20). Science uses analogy and symbol 
to transfer ideas from one field to another. Successful analogies and 
symbols "genuinely resemble the figures and enchantments of great 
literature, whose meanings similarly can never be totally grasped 
because of their endless power to ramify in the individual mind"' (ST 
274). According to Eiseley, Bacon and Shakespeare, contemporaries 
in time, shared "a recognition of the creativeness which adds to 
nature, and which emerges from nature as 'an art which nature 
makes'" (ST 278). 
Eiseley identifies three natural phenomena which have become 
for science symbols of vast significance. Evolution, the expanding 
universe, and the unconscious have themselves become figurative 
symbols in the human imagination just like the archetypal symbols 
of art. Sir Charles Lyell saw in evolutionary signs like the fossili2ed 
prints of raindrops "the persistence of the world's natural forces 
through the incredible, mysterious aeons of geologic time" and "a 
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vast hitherto unglimpsed order" (ST 274). The prints of fossil 
raindrops were evidence to Lyell that rain fell in the remote past as 
it does today; imaginatively he could see in the fossilized rain-prints 
the great stretching back of the natural order in its process of slow, 
incessant change. Eiseley says that, likewise today, "the eyes of 
ancient trilobite tells us similarly of the unchanging laws of light," 
and a scratched pebble whispers of far-reaching ice ages melted into 
the past (ST 275). Eiseley believes that "[sluch images drawn from 
the world of science are every bit as powerful as literary symbolism 
and equally demanding upon the individual imagination of the 
scientist who would fully grasp the extension of meaning which it 
involved" (ST 275). Behind "the visible evidence" of these all-
embracing concepts (evolution, the expanding universe, and the 
unconscious) lurks "vast shadows no longer quite of that world which 
we term natural" (ST 275). "Reality itself has been superseded by a 
greater reality" or, as Eiseley quotes john Donne, '"The substance of 
the truth is in the greater images which lie behind" (ST 275). 
Although he respected the power of the scientific imagination 
to open the world to us, Eiseley was not seduced into believing it a 
panacea for human ills. He counters the "bouyant optimism" of "the 
empire of science" with the observation that science is human: "It 
has not prevented war; it has perfected it. It has not abolished 
cruelty or corruption; it has enabled these abominations to be 
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practiced on a scale unknown before in human history" (UU 43). 
Even when acting benignly, science solves problems but "[s]olutions 
to problems create problems," and the solutions to those problems 
create others so that the progression is algebraic. This "evolution of 
contigency" in human hands "flickers unseen behind every whirl of 
our machines, every pronouncement of political policy" (UU 44). 
Eiseley saw that science itself could not wrest a utopia from nature; 
given the multiform nature of humanity as a whole and our 
individual capacities for both good and evil: 
... science is not enough for man. It is not the road back to the 
waiting Garden, for that road lies through the heart of man. 
Only when man has recognized this fact will science become 
what it was for Bacon, something to speak of as 'touching upon 
Hope.· Only then will man be truly human. (FOT 149 ). 
Eiseley recognized the danger of the human imagination 
unanticipated by Bacon four hundred years earlier. Bacon had 
believed that man could draw a "second world" of his own making 
from the world of nature and confidently expected that such a world 
would be utopian-- '"ourselves made perfect"' (NC 132). Eiseley says 
we have learned to our sorrow that more than one world can be 
drawn out of nature (NC 134). The worlds we draw from the 
maelstrom of the protean, malleable natural world by the effort of 
our own imaginations are human and share in human 
imperfectibility. These second worlds "do not always serve the 
individual imprisoned within the substance of things" (NC 134). At 
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the end of The Firmament of Time, Eiseley describes the man with 
two faces struggling to control the horses of his imagination, the 
power his mind has harnessed. The figure with face half demon, half 
angel symbolizes the human predicament: torn by conflicting drives 
within our own natures, we struggle to master the forces our minds 
have flogged into action. Eiseley came to believe that the hope for 
the future lies in contemplation and contrition. The "endurable 
future" will not come solely through "outward knowledge" or the 
experimental method; an endurable future must be ''born of 
compassion ... born of introspection" (N C 85). "It is one thing 
successfully to plan a moon voyage; it is quite another to solve the 
moral problems of a distraught, unenlightened, and confused 
humanity" ( 1 07). 
Eiseley describes the giant reflecting eye of the Mount Palomar 
telescope as one of the sequelae of evolution: "the water and the salt 
and the vapors of the sun have built it; things that squirmed in the 
tide silts have devised it" UJ 45). Although "It light year beyond light 
year, deep beyond deep, the mind may rove by means- of it, hanging 
above the bottomless and surveying impartially the state of matter 
in the white dwarf suns," Eiseley concludes that the giant telescope is 
itself not the greatest extension of vision. Rather, "the most 
enormous extension of vision of which life is capable" is "the 
projection of itself into other lives." And this capacity is "the lonely 
magnificent power of humanity. It is, far more than any spatial 
adventure, the supreme epitome of reaching out" (lJ. 46). 
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A moment of vision, of seeing beyond the self into the needs 
and claims of other life comes for Eiseley in "Obituary of a Bone 
Hunter." In that essay, Eiseley recounts three episodes in which he 
says he gave up opportunities for a possibly significant discovery in 
human paleontology. In the second instance, he chose the potential 
for life in an owl's egg over the bones of the past. To have conducted 
explorations for the remains of early man in a cave that showed 
promising signs of prehistoric habitation, Eiseley would have to have 
destroyed a nest containing the single egg of an endangered species 
of owl. He says he decided to forgo the skull that might make him 
famous for the sake of an egg that, undisturbed, would become an 
owl. He affirms the rightness of his choice: "I had had charge of [the 
egg] in the universe's sight for a single hour, and I had done well by 
life" (NC 188). In The Immense Journey Eiseley said that "the need is 
not really for more brains, the need is now for a gentler, more 
tolerant people than those who won for us against the ice, the tiger, 
and the bear" UJ. 140). 
Both Wilbur and Eiseley speak of the human obligation to be 
alive to the world. As an anthropologist, Eiseley had a sense of his 
obligation to help human beings discover their past so that "we can 
learn our limitations and suffer life with compassion." Eiseley also 
believed in the importance of an individual search that adds to the 
shared community of knowledge and reverence. He says each, like 
Thoreau, must possess his own wilderness and "consider what 
marvels are to be observed there": "On the world island we are all 
castaways, so that what is seen by one may be dark or obscure to 
another" (lJ 13-14). 
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In All the Strange Hours, Eiseley compares the writer's mind to 
an artist's loft. Unseen within the writer's brain hang pictures, some 
askew, "pictures with outlines barely chalked in, pictures torn, 
pictures the artist has striven unsuccessfully to erase, pictures that 
only emerge and glow in a certain light." Memories of a lifetime 
hang "teleported, stolen ... out of time. They represent no longer the 
sequential flow of ordinary memory. They can be pulled about on 
easels, examined within the mind itself" (ASH 151 ). The act of recall 
is not total but is "the use of things extracted from their context in 
such a way that have become the unique possession of a single life." 
The person remembering cannot--as Wilbur's mind-reader could 
not--control the flow of memories; but he does have some control 
over his response. Isolated memories can become endowed with 
"symbolic life": "He cannot obliterate them. He can only drag them 
about, magnify or reduce them as his artistic sense dictates, or 
juxtapose them in order to enhance a pattern. One thing he cannot 
do. He cannot destroy what will not be destroyed; he cannot 
determine in advance what will enter his mind" (ASH 151). 
In "The Last Neanderthal," the artist's loft becomes a 
junkman's wagon. The essay is made of an assortment of 
unexpected, dissimilar fragments gathered together in the cart of one 
man's mind. Laden with concerns about time, memory, death, and 
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the urgency of life expressed in a miscellany of symbols, Eiseley's 
story both states and demonstrates his theory of memory and 
creation. The central image about which the three-part essay, 
ostensibly set in tropical Curacao, coalesces is the memory of a "spot 
of time" which occurred forty-five years earlier in Nebraska. As a 
boy of sixteen, Eiseley had, with adolescent urgency, just discovered 
time and his own transience: "It is all going, I thought .... No one 
can hold us. Each and all, we are riding into the dark. Even living, 
we cannot remember half the events of our own days" (UU 217). 
Struck by this sudden realization, Eiseley had willed himself to save 
that very passing moment. By chance, a junk dealer was just going 
by at the intersection between R and Fourteenth Streets. Eiseley 
ordered himself, " ... now, save him, immortalize the unseizable 
moment. The junkman is the symbol of all that is going or is gone. 
He is passing the intersection into nothingness. Say to the mind, 
'Hold him, do not forget'" (217). 
Before me passed a broken old horse plodding _before a cart 
laden with bags of cast-off clothing, discarded furniture, and 
abandoned metal. The horse's harness was a makeshift 
combination of straps mended with rope. The bearded man 
perched high in the driver's seat looked as though he had been 
compounded from the assorted junk heap in the wagon bed. 
(UU 216) 
What burns most vividly in Eiseley's memory. nearly a half a century 
later on a beach in the Netherland Antilles is a street sign and a 
year--"a year that scurried into shape with the flickering alacrity of 
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the 1 izards" which rustled in some cardboard boxes beside a fence: 
'"R Street,' they spelled, and the year was 1923" (UU 216). The 
human brain was able to hold the scene in process. The junkman on 
R Street would stay in Eiseley's memory until his mind crumbled. 
Fiery images and allusions to burning appear throughout "The 
Last Neanderthal," first as smolderings and finally as flames and 
smoke. The junkman's wagon becomes an emblem for the story 
itself--a collection of disparate pieces from various times and places 
drawn together and carried forward by the primal energy of 
memory and imagination. Among the first images drawn out of the 
shambles of the anthropologist's memories is a collection of bones. 
On a littered beach where "only a student of desolation would find 
cause to linger," Eiseley finds washed up among the other debris the 
nearly skeletal remains of a young dog--a fisherman's pet which had 
died and been buried at sea. Despite the smell of death, Eiseley feels 
it "a sacrilege" to turn away without due acknowledgment because it 
occurs to him that "this particular tattered garment had once lived. 
Scenes on the living sea that would never in all eternity recur again 
had streamed through the sockets of those vanished eyes" (UU 215).3 
As he leaves the dog's remains to be washed out to sea or "to 
bleach starkly upon coral and conch shells, mingling the little lime of 
his bones with all else that had once stood upright on these shores," 
Eiseley becomes aware of "a tracery of lizard tails amidst the sand 
and the semidesert shrubbery." The numerous, swift lizards "had a 
tangential way of darting off to the side like inconsequential 
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thoughts that never paused long enough to be fully apprehended" 
(UU 215-216). Taking shelter from the blazing equatorial sun under 
a manzanillo tree fruited with poison apples, Eiseley sees "the darting 
lizard points" begin to run together into the pattern of a memory, the 
junkman's cart from forty-five years before. He says the apples or 
the lizards may have made the connection or "it may have been the 
tropic sun, lending its flames to life with a kind of dreadful 
indifference as to the result" (UU 216). Of course, there is the 
connection Eiseley does not mention: He wears the "tattered flesh" of 
an old man whose bones will soon, like the sailor's dog, return their 
bit of lime to the earth and whose eye sockets will become hollowed 
of their unique vision. The "blistering apples" of the manzanillo tree 
remind him of "an inconsequential wild-plum fall far away in 
Nebraska." The inedible apples also seem a simpler version "of the 
mystery hidden in our heads." Like the brain, the apples were 
"hoarding and dispersing energy while the inanimate universe was 
running down around us" (UU 218). 
Puzzled about how the mind works and wondering if "it would 
be possible to understand humanity a little better if one could follow 
along just a step of the evolutionary pathway," Eiseley returns in 
memory to Nebraska and recalls meeting during a bone-hunting 
expedition in his youth "the last Neanderthal," a young woman living 
in an isolated sod hut. The stocky, barefoot girl brought eggs and 
milk to the digging party. Seen in the shadows and dancing 
highlights of the campfire, the girl's massive-boned head gave her an 
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alien appearance. She had a ridge at the orbits along the frontal 
bone, a feature that had disappeared "particularly in women ... 
before the close of the Wurmian ice" (UU 222). The girl had asked a 
haunting question--" "Do you have a home?" "--that seemed for Eiseley 
as much a question about a place in time as in Nebraska. He had the 
feeling of stepping out of time and participating in an encounter 
between a Neanderthal and the sapiens who had eliminated the 
earlier human species. In that "fragile episode," Eiseley perceived 
himself experiencing "the endurance in a single mind of two stages of 
man's climb up the energy ladder that may be both his triumph and 
his doom" (UU 225). Looking back at human development, he 
realizes that the "surging tide of power" man now rides was "first 
conceived in the hearth fires of dead caverns" of the Ice Age: "The 
eel! that had somehow mastered the secret of controlled energy, of 
surreptitious burning to a purpose ... finally produced the mind ... " 
(UU 226). But the mind that had learned to control the fire at the 
cave mouth has since learned to rupture the nucleus of the atom, 
loosing the fire that can "cause substance to vanish and the earth 
itself to tremble" (UU 226). 
In the third section of "The Last Neanderthal," Eiseley considers 
how life with a "kind of desperate wi 11" resides so powerfully even in 
a root that will "burst a rock face on a mountain" in its covert 
struggle with the heat death decreed by the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics.4 In man the hoarded energy--"the strange 
hoarding at the heart of 1 ife" --has taken strange forms and, according 
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to Eiseley, seems to be "driving toward a climax." (UU 229). Bacon 
believed a "second world" of invention, toleration, and reason could 
be drawn out of nature "by the sheer power of the human mind" (UU 
229), but that power has also shaken our conception of the natural 
order: 
A mathematical formula traveling weakly along the fibers of 
the neopallium may serve to wreck the planet. It is a kind of 
metabolic energy never envisaged by the lichen attacking a 
rock face or dreamed of in the flickering shadows of a cave fire. 
Yet from these ancient sources man's hunger has been drawn. 
Its potential is to be found in the life of the world we call 
natural, just as its terrifying intricacy is the product of the 
second visionary world evoked in the brain of man. (UU 230) 
Eiseley sees "the energy whose limited planetary store lies at the 
root of the struggle for existence" pass by way of the human mind 
into another and terrifying dimension. 
After the dog skeleton, the junkman's cart, and the Neanderthal 
girl, Eiseley offers one more emblem of the struggle between creation 
and entropy. He reminds the reader that several pages earlier he 
had briefly mentioned a wild-plum thicket in connection with the 
manzanillo tree. The poison apples had stirred a youthful memory of 
visiting the plum thicket in autumn: "All the hoarded juices of 
summer had fallen with that lush untasted fruit upon the grass" (UU 
230-231 ). The tiny engines of the plum tree had turned sugar and 
syrup into fruit and seed. Eiseley remembers that the "energy 
dispersion was so beneficent on that autumn afternoon that earth 
itself seemed anxious to promote the process against the downward 
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guttering of the stars." Tasting the fruit, Eiseley was "scooping up 
some of it into thoughts and dreams" (UU 231). 
Long after his Antillean adventure, Eiseley says he returned to 
the plum thicket. Musing in the drifting smoke of burning fall 
leaves, Eiseley wonders if in humans fire "is only concealed and 
grown slyly conscious of its own burning." As in The Immense 
journey he had imagined humans as walking sacks of sea water, now 
he imagines them as contained fire: "What if I am, in some way, only 
a sophisticated fire that has acquired an ability to regulate its rate of 
combustion and to hoard its fuel in order to see and walk?" (UU 231). 
Recognizing that he is old and in need of husbanding his remaining 
embers, Eiseley wills to release the junkman's horse and drop his 
carefully hoarded memories "like the blue plums in some gesture of 
love toward the universe ... " (UU 232). He concludes that the secret 
is to travel always in the first world of nature and not in the second 
world drawn out of the mind--or at least, to know one from the 
other. Clutching a carved flint, his talisman from the long-ago dig on 
the escarpment where he met the last Neanderthal, Eiseley follows 
the smoke of burning leaves but hears behind him a crackling "as 
though I myself were burning" (UU 233). 
What connects all these disparate images is the slow, controlled 
oxidation in a human brain which makes possible its witness of the 
perpetual struggle between the creative life force and the inexorable 
heat death legislated by the Second Law. Eiseley says that "[olf all 
the unexpected qualities of an unexpected universe, the sheer 
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organizing power of animal and plant metabolism is one of the most 
remarkable," but, like other "everyday marvels," it is mostly invisible 
to us because we tend to take the existent for granted. Life, unlike 
fire in a thicket, has learned to burn cunningly and hoard its 
resources. The "sullen and obstinate burning" of living cells 
generates the organizing power out of which the human mind makes 
history. The oxygen-devouring brain burns, evokes, and transposes 
visions, "whether of lizard tails, alphabets from the sea, or the realms 
beyond the galaxy" (UU 218). 
Often Eiseley opens his essays with what Carrithers calls a "a 
defined and presumptively shareable sensory complex" ( 196). In 
"The Last Neanderthal" the opening sensory image is "the simple 
observation" that desert rocks can "glow with heat for a time after 
sundown" (UU 213). Eiseley then draws a parallel to the heat stored 
in the stone to the creative energy stored in the human brain: 
"Similar emanations may come from the writer or the scientist. The 
creative individual is someone upon whom mysterious rays have 
converged and are again reflected, not necessarily immediately, but 
in the course of years" (UU 213). In "Man the Firemaker" printed in 
the posthumous collection The Star Thrower, Eiseley says of mao--
the discoverer, not the inventor of fire--that his "long adventure 
with knowledge has, to a very marked degree, been a climb up the 
heat ladder" and that man himself is "a consuming fire" (ST 45). In 
an earlier essay in The U nexnected Universe, "The Angry Winter," 
Eiseley described fire as "the only natural force on the planet that 
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can both feed and travel" (UU 116). Like an animal, fire must be 
tended, and like an animal, it can rage out of control. Eiseley says 
that unlike speech for which we are biologically adapted by "a simple 
gift from the dark powers behind nature," fire is "our own triumph, 
our grasp upon invisible chemical power" (UU 115). Fire which 
"undoubtedly enhanced" our opportunities for brain growth has also, 
as suggested by "lingering legends," separated us from animals. In 
"The Last Neanderthal," Eiseley recognizes that thought, the "wispy 
geometry of dreams and memories," is itself "a kind of slow-burning 
oxidation carried on in an equally diffuse and mediating web of 
nerve and sense cells" and thought arising from the particulate brain 
is even capable of disobeying the precept against natural leaps (UU 
213-214). Thought, like fire, changes things: "The same incident 
may stand as a simple fact to some, an intangible hint of the nature 
of the universe to others, a useful myth to a savage, or any number 
of other things. The receptive mind makes all the difference, 
shadowing or lighting the original object" (UU 214). 
Wilbur: " ... a struggle with something powerfully other" 
According to Wilbur, all poets are moved by two urges, but one 
is usually more predominant. The two impulses to poetry are "the 
impulse to .name the world and the impulse to clarify and embody 
the self" ("Poetry and Happiness" 102). In an interview with Peter 
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Stitt, Wilbur said, "It is the thing, and not myself, which I set out to 
explore." Wilbur describes his own poetic inspiration as "a sudden, 
confident sense that there is an exploitable and interesting 
relationship between something perceived out there and something 
in the way of incipient meaning within [the poet!." What is seen has 
to be seen freshly in order to provoke the process: "Noting a likeness 
or resemblance between two things in nature can provide this 
freshness" as long as it coincides with "a feeling that some kind of 
idea is implicit within that resemblance" (Stitt, "Interview" 41 ). 
Wilbur identifies a "primitive desire" that he considers "radical to 
poetry"-- "the desire to lay claim to as much of the world as possible 
through uttering the names of things." He believes that catalogues 
of things make us feel "vicariously alert" and "more alive to things." 
Wilbur says the cataloging impulse almost always expresses "a 
longing to possess the whole world, and to praise it, or at least feel it" 
("Poetry and Happiness" 93). Description, he calls "an elaborate and 
enchanted form of naming" ( 1 02). 
Presuming the "''' speaker of the poem to represent the poet as 
well as the mil"k weed plant, joseph Brodsky finds Richard Wilbur's 
stylistic and sensual credo in the eight-line poem "A Milkweed" 
(Brodsky 203): 
Anonymous as cherubs 
Over the crib of God, 
White seeds are floating 
Out of my burst pod. 
What power had I 
Before I learned to yield? 
Shatter me, great wind: 
I shall possess the field. 
(Poems 181) 
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Brodsky is right. In Wilbur's aesthetic there is a willing acquiesence, 
an unguarded exposure of the imagination to things of this world. In 
order to seed the field, to send out poems fertile with life, the poet 
must hazard the dangers of a consciousness open to the fierce, 
beautiful winds of otherness in the world about him. He cannot like 
"The Mind Reader" practice "the shrewd habit of concupiscence" 
which like a visor narrows his regard, protecting his awareness till 
his "thought I Is a blind lowered almost to the sill" (Poems II 0). 
But there is another aspect to Wilbur's aesthetic. The 
milkweed is only one of "Two Voices in a Meadow." The other voice 
is Wilbur speaking through "A Stone": 
As casual as cow-dung 
Under the crib of God, 
I lie where chance would have me, 
Up to the ears in sod. 
Why should I move? To move 
Befits a light desire. 
The sill of Heaven would founder, 
Did such as I aspire. (Poems 181) 
The companion to Wilbur's aesthetic suppleness and yielding 
imagination is a firm resistance to etherializing the things of this 
world, himself among them. He espouses a trueness to self, a 
trueness to form like that described in his poem "Seed Leaves": 
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"Something stubborn" within him recognizes that growth only comes 
with "the doom of taking shape" --accepting the special signature, 
resigning himself "to being self-defined" (Poems 129 ). To have 
"commerce I With the great universe" requires that instead of 
becoming "vaguely vast," the leaf take on the jagged sawtooth edges 
of identity, requires that the stone remain in the sod "As casual as 
cow-dung I Under the crib of God." 
Wilbur likes resistance: "I like the world to resist my ordering 
of it, so that I can feel it is real and that I'm honoring its reality" 
(qtd. in Hutton 63 ). In his essay "The Bottles Become New, Too," 
Wilbur insists that neither the mysterious world nor the formative 
mind can be denied (219). Poetry and other arts become posssible 
when the willing imagination both accepts the bashings of reality and 
asserts its own mastery. Wilbur's description of Cezanne's art is also 
true of his own: 
In the best paintings of Cezanne you are aware of the 
tremendous mass, immediacy, and entity of the world, and at 
the same time of the mastery of the mind which got that into a 
frame. Every Cezanne is a moment of tension between a 
formative mind and a reality which that mind insists on 
recognizing. It is a dynamic balance, a fierce calm like that in 
Delacroix's fresco at Saint-Sulpice of the struggle between Jacob 
and the Angel. ("The Bottles Become New, Too" 219). 
Wilbur concludes his assessment of Cezanne with the 
acknowledgment that "Sainte Victoire is more than any painting of it. 
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But the important thing is to have a relation to the mountain" (219; 
emphasis added). 
In "Regarding Places," an essay written as an introduction for a 
collection of landscape paintings, Wilbur describes the difficulty a 
painter had adjusting his art to the desert of New Mexico: 
"At first the dunes, mesas, mountains, and sky had impressed 
him as vast, empty, and paralyzing, and he had made out only 
four or five colors. It was a whole half-year before he 
apprehended great motions in the landscape, and a granular 
subtlety of color which called, so he judged , for a species of 
pointillist attack. Observation, the adaptation of his technique, 
and the discovery of what in himself the scenery might 
declare had at last made it possible for him to paint. 
("Regarding Places" 158) 
Wilbur says that what he liked in the artist's account of his inventing 
New Mexico was that it implied "no easy affinity, no facile 
personalization or imposition of mood, but a struggle rn'th something 
por~rer/ul/..v other" (158; emphasis added). Wilbur asks if one could 
not "just as well say that the desert, in requiring of the painter a 
fresh self, had in its own good time imagined him?" (158). In one 
sense the artist remakes the desert, and in another sense the desert 
remakes the artist. And out of the interaction of the imagination of 
the perceiver and the reality of otherness comes a work of art that is 
truly made, not imposed or merely copied. Wilbur defines the 
artistic achievement of place as creating "a fusion of human and 
natural order ... a peculiar window on the whole" ("Regarding 
Places" 160 ). 
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For Wilbur, every genuine act of creation must begin with a 
feeling of inadequacy before the reality which exists beyond all 
constructions of the consciousness. The elements, objects, plants, 
animals are all "isolable representatives" of that ambient reality 
("The Bottles Become New, Too" 218). Wilbur considers the difficulty 
of the mind's direct apprehension and expression of these objects to 
be "insuperable," and therefore suggests that every poem ought to 
begin "by a disorderly retreat to defensible positions." Because of 
the hopelessness of direct combat, the artist must "resort to the 
warfare of spells, effigies, and prophecies"; his relationship to reality 
must be a consciously oblique one ("The Bottles Become New, Too" 
220). Though art begins in the humility of the imagination being 
resisted by reality, the process of struggle affirms the individual 
imagination as, in fact, one of the aspects of reality. The paintings or 
poems which result from the conflict are in themselves new realities. 
When the milkweed pods are broken by the wind, flat, brown seeds 
tufted with silken feathers possess the field. 
Wilbur believes that we discover ourselves through nature and 
out of nature we make the metaphors and analogies for our 
discoveries about what is not us. In his poem "Advice to a Prophet," 
the speaker advises the prophet who would forewarn us of the 
horrors of nuclear war to speak in terms which we can understand 
and which will have impact on us: 
Spare us all word of the weapons, their force and range, 
The long numbers that rocket the mind; 
Our slow, unreckoning hearts will be left behind, 
Unable to fear what is too strange. 
Nor shall you scare us with talk of the death of the race. 
How shall we dream of this place without us? ( 182) 
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What will terrify us into having pity on ourselves will be to "Speak of 
the world's own change": 
We could believe, 
If you told us so, that the white-tailed deer will slip 
Into perfect shade, grown perfectly shy, 
The lark avoid the reaches of our eye, 
The jack-pine lose its knuckled grip 
On the cold ledge, and every torrent burn 
As Xanthus5 once, its gliding trout 
Stunned in a twinkling. ( 182) 
Because we have seen the dreamt cloud crumble and seen the vines 
blackened by frost, we can believe that the deer and the lark can be 
lost to our sight, that the tree be felled and the fish killed. "What 
should we be without I .... These things in which we have seen 
ourselves and spoken" or, as he says in "lcarium Mare," these 
"Creatures without which vision would be blind?" Without the 
world of nature, humans would lose their voices and their images: 
Ask us prophet, how we shall call 
Our natures forth when that live tongue is all 
Dispelled, that glass obscured or broken 
In which we have said the rose of our love and clean 
Horse of our courage . . . 
Ask us, ask us ... 
Whether there shall be lofty or long standing 
When the bronze annals of the oak-tree close. ( 183) 
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Losing nature we would lose the analogies and metaphors that make 
it possible to know and speak of ourselves; humanity would be 
unrnade.6 The adviser to ihe prophet does not believe that the 
human imagination will stretch far enough nor the human ego shrink 
small enough to encompass the possibility of the nuclear annihilation 
of mankind. However, the speaker thinks the evidence of the senses 
and our egos will persuade us to believe that we could destroy the 
natural world. And the terror of losing the things of this world will 
perhaps convince us to save them and, thereby, ourselves.? 
In another poem, Wilbur illustrates his own need of natural 
objects as the link between himself and a world that otherwise 
seems faraway and alien. Even though he had been a soldier himself, 
Wilbur could find no kinship with the Civil War veterans in a 
photograph until he found something in their natural world to which 
he could respond. In his poem "Looking into History," the poet is not 
able to feel a filial relationship with the five soldiers pictures in the 
"amber atmosphere" of one of Matthew Brady's Civil War 
photographs because the men stand in unfamiliar, affected postures 
of another time and "in a land subdued beyond belief." A 11 is strange 
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until the poet glimpses beyond the tents "a file of trees I Verging a 
road that struggles up a hill. I They're sycamores." Naming the 
familiar trees, Wilbur feels the stasis and alienation broken; his 
imagination is stirred as "[t]he long-abated breeze I Flares in those 
boughs I know, and hauls the sound I Of guns and a great forest in 
distress." He has seen himself and spoken in the things of a shared 
world and can name his fathers and know his cause: "Fathers, I 
know my cause, and we are bound I Beyond the hill to fight at 
Wilderness" (Poems 252). 
Knowing comes through metaphor, through seeming or 
lil,.ening. The natural world provides the metaphors whereby we 
can know ourselves and the world and speak to one another of what 
we know. Wilbur's poem "Lying" is about the power and the 
insistence of the imagination on making images, on making the world 
cohere in metaphor. "Lying" is about lies, truth, and poetry--a way 
of lying in order to tell the truth. The poem opens on a note of 
flabby ennui; the speaker, a cousin to the Mind-Reader or the 
monologist of "Walking to Sleep," advises the listening "you" on the 
harmlessness of casual social untruths--falsehoods that do not have 
the energy to be called a lie: 
To claim, at a dead party, to have spotted a grackle, 
When in fact you haven't of late, can do no harm. 
Your reputation for saying things of interest 
Will not be marred, if you hasten to other topics, 
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Nor will the delicate web of human trust 
Be ruptured by that airy fabrication. (Poems 9) 
Assuming far-He conversation to be the substrate of the social matrix, 
the speaker allows a "white lie" to get things going. His assurance 
that claiming falsely to have spotted a grackle will not harm "[y]our 
reputation for saying things of interest" is ironical. Since the 
common grackle is quite common year-round in most areas of the 
Eastern United States, the subject does not seem likely to a 
scintillating topic of conversation--but then perhaps the person 
spoken to may have such a reputation for not "saying things of 
interest" that his reputation will indeed not be marred by such an 
inanity. The adjective of "airy fabrication" may euphemistically 
mean gaseous. The advisor warns his auditor that a tear in the 
"delicate web of human trust" may come though if too much energy 
is expended on inconsequence: 
Late, however, talking with toxic zest 
Of golf, or taxes, or the rest of it 
Wher-e the beaked ladle plies the chuckling ice, 
You may enjoy a chill of severance, hearing 
Above your head the shrug of unreal wings. (Poems 9) 
The party-goer seems to have bored even the fictitious grackles: He 
paradoxically enj'o_J..-·s "the cluJ/ of severance" while "the beaked 
ladle plies the chuckling ice," and he hears "the shrug of unre.al 
wings"--while he talks with "toxic zest I Of golf, or taxes, or the rest 
of it." 
The speaker and the listener of "Lying" share a common 
knowledge: 
We know what boredom is : it is a dull 
Impatience or a fierce velleity, 
A champing wish, stalled by our lassitude, 
To make 9r do. (Poems 9) 
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The oxymorons of "fierce velleity" and "champing wish" underscore 
the sort of lazy dissatisfaction of boredom which has only the energy 
to sense its dis-ease but not the gumption to overc~me indolence and 
"make or do." 
At this point in the poem, the tone changes from ennui to 
attention. The change comes with a realization, a sense of humility, 
and a catalogue: 
In the strict sense, of course, 
We invent nothing, merely bearing witness 
To what each morning brings again to light: 
Gold crosses, cornices, astonishment 
Of panes, the turbine-vent which natural law 
Spins on the grill-end of the diner's roof, 
Then grass and grackles or, at the end of town 
In sheen-swept pastureland, the horse's neck 
Clothed with its usual thunder, and the stones 
Beginning now to tug their shadows in 
And track the air with glitter. (Poems 9) 
Instead of vaporizing about taxes and fictitious grackles, the speaker 
opens his eyes to the real world where the grackles are real--and 
interesting. Seeing requires humility--the acknowledgement that we 
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invent nothing, we merely bear witness to what is. The view as 
though from a window (""astonishment I Of panes"") over roof tops 
(""Gold crosses, cornices"") offers simple spectacles: the turbine-vent 
on a diner operating by virtue of the mystery of natural law, the 
horse"s neck, a common thing, ""clothed with its usual thunder""--
suggesting just how unusual the usual is. 
A l1 these things 
Are there before us; there before we look 
Or fai 1 to look; there to be seen or not 
By us, as by the bee"s twelve thousand eyes, 
According to our means and purposes. (Poems 9) 
Not only the ""ordinary,"" but also the extraordinary exist with or 
without our attention: 
So too with strangeness not to be ignored, 
Total eclipse or snow upon the rose, . 
And so with that most rare conception, nothing. (Poems 9) 
The speaker then asks and answers what nothing, ""that most 
rare conception," is: 
What is it, after all, but something missed? 
It is the water of a dried-up well 
Gone to assail the cliffs of Labrador. (Poems 9-l 0) 
Nothing is what we see when we fail to see. Saying " [ t]here is what 
galled the arch-negator"--the fact that there i~ no nothingness, only 
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lack of vision--the speaker then recounts the malicious 
determination of Satan, the ur-liar, to mar the perfection of Eden as 
it is told in the ninth book of Paradise Lost: 
There is what galled the arch-negator, sprung 
From Hell to probe with intellectual sight 
The cells and heavens of a given wort d 
Which he could take but as another prison: 
Small wonder that, pretending not to be, 
He drifted through the bar-t ike boles of Eden 
In a blac/{ mist low creeping, dragging down 
And darkening with moody self-absorption 
What, when he left it, lifted and if seen 
From the sun's vantage seethed with vaulting hues. 
(Poems l 0) 
Satan's dark, self-absorbed imagination, "like a black mist low 
creeping," changed the coloration of the world; when he withdrew 
again into his own blackness, the world seen from "the sun's vantage" 
was alive with rainbow colors. 
Satan's fraud, "pretending not to be," and his failure to see the 
world as it is cause the speaker to make an association and an 
observation: "Closer to making than the deftest fraud I Is seeing ... " 
Seeing is closer to the original creative act than the most skilled 
imitation. 
Closer to making than the deftest fraud 
Is seeing how the catbird's tail was made 
To counterpoise, on the mock-orange spray, 
Its light, up-tilted spine; or, lighter still, 
How the shucked tunic of an onion, brushed 
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To one side on a backlit chopping-board 
And rocked by trifling currents, prints and prints 
Its bright, ribbed shadow like a flapping sail. (Poems I 0) 
These images so simple, so wonderfully ordinary, so exquisitely 
observed convey fierce attention and an intense, patient effort to see 
and say what is there--to see what is present where a casual, bored 
glance might say there is nothing. The tone is remarkably changed 
from the poem's opening where the speaker said "[w]e know what 
boredom is." 
Caught in the beautiful lies of likening, the poet describes the 
phenomenon and asks about the pleasure it gives: 
Odd that a thing is most itself when likened: 
The eye mists over, basil hints of clove, 
The river glazes toward the dam and spills 
To the drubbed rocks below its crashing cullet, 
And in the barnyard near the sawdust-pile 
Some great thing is tormented. Either it is 
A tarp torn loose and in the groaning wind 
Now puffed, now flattened, or a hip-shot beast 
Which tries again, and once again, to rise. 
What, though for pain there is no other word, 
Finds pleasure in the cruellest simile? (Poems l 0) 
"[A] thing is most itself when likened" because metaphor tacitly 
acknowledges differences while speaking the similarities. When a 
shining river is glazed and its water crashing to the rocks below is 
broken glass, we enjoy the thinking that the river resembles a 
flowing mirror shattered on the rocks, but we also know that the 
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river is not solid and the water, not broken; we know that, unlike a 
mirror, the river can put itself back together again. 
Seeing "[s]ome great thing ... tormented" near a barnyard 
sawdust-pile, the poet offers our imaginations a choice--either it is a 
tarp torn loose and alternately filled and flattened by the wind, or it 
is "a hip-shot beast I Which tries again, and once again, to rise." The 
pain and cruelty of the second image raises a question: "What ... I 
Finds pleasure in the cruellest simile?" How can the poet take 
pleasure in making and the reader take pleasure in reading such an 
evocation of the futile struggles of a suffering, frightened animal? 
The poet gives his answer in another simile: 
It is something in us like the catbird's song 
From neighbor bushes in the grey of morning 
That, harsh or sweet, of its own accord, 
Proclaims its kin. (Poems 1 0) 
The catbird, like its cousin the mocking bird, imitates other birds' 
songs; it gets its name from one of its mewing call notes that sounds 
like a cat. In his answer to what finds pleasure in the cruelest simile, 
Wilbur suggests that we find pure joy in making, in imitation of 
whatever exists--no matter how painful the image. Yeats declares in 
"Lapis Lazuli" that "Hamlet and Lear are gay"; in "[t[ragedy wrought 
to the uttermost," Yeats finds a "[g]aiety transfiguring all that dread": 
"All things fall and are built again, I And those that build them are 
gay" (Collected Poems 292). Even tragedy offers the possibility of 
aesthetic joy. We also find a kinship with whatever is; in the 
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suffering of a frightened beast, we see the possibility of our own 
pain, and in pity we imaginatively reach across the barrier of form. 
Looking becomes a kind of acknowledgment, the attention that must 
be paid. Wilbur says that our joy in metaphor, like the catbird's 
song, has primordial origins: 
It is a chant 
Of the first springs, and it is tributary 
To the great lies told with the eyes half-shut 
That have the truth in view (Poems 1 0- 1 I ) 
Wilbur mentions three of those "great lies" which have the 
truth in view. First is "the tale of Chiron I Who, with sage head, wild 
heart, and planted hoof I Instructed brute Achilles in the lyre" (311 ). 
Chiron, an anomaly among the fierce and violent centaurs, was fabled 
to be good and wise. Homer in The Iliad refers to Chiron as the 
teacher of Achilles and the "most righteous of Centaurs" (Iliad 
II :832). In punning irony, Wilbur reminds us that the righteous 
centaur taught Achilles to play the ly-re. The second "great lie" 
tells--
... of the garden where we first mislaid 
Simplicity of wish and will, forgetting 
Out of what cognate splendor all things came 
To take their scattering names ... (Poems 12). 
The Genesis story of Eden recounts, among other things, how we laid 
aside simplicity for metaphor. The lying of likening attempts to 
recover the "cognate sp 1 end or," when common nature and origin 
were evident, before things fell into difference and took "their 
scattering names." In his elegy "For W. H. Auden," Wilbur 
remembers Auden as one "who sustained the civil tongue I In a 
scattering time" (Poems 26). 
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The third example of a great lie told with the truth in view is 
the story of The Song of Roland: 
That matter of a baggage-train surprised 
By a few Gascons in the Pyrenees 
Which, having worked three centuries and more 
In the dark caves of France, poured out at last 
The blood of Roland, who to Charles his king 
And to the dove that hatched the dove-tailed world 
Was faithful unto death, and shamed the Devi 1. (Poems 11) 
Wilbur refers to the evolution of the masterful epic drama Chanson 
de Noland from an historical event of relatively small importance 
among the military campaigns of Charlemagne. According to fact, a 
party of Basques attacked the rear-guard of Charlemagne's army as 
it returned across the Pyrenees from Spain in 778. They slaughtered 
the rear-guard and pillaged the baggage train. The tale of this attack 
in the valley of Roncevaux went under ground for several hundred 
years ("worked three centuries and more I In the dark caves of 
France") fermenting like wine into "a vast epic of heroic proportions 
and strong idealogical significance"--the twelfth century Chanson de 
Noland in medieval French. Roland, mentioned briefly in the 
historical account along with two other of Chademagne's nobles, 
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becomes in the epic version "the Emperor's nephew, the 'right hand 
of his body', the greatest warrior in the world, possessed of 
supernatural strength and powers and hero of innumerable 
marvellous exploits." The attack itself becomes "a major episode in 
the great conflict between Cross and Crescent," and the marauding 
Basques become "magnified into an enormous army of many 
thousand Saracens" (Sayers, Introduction 8). The "truth" of the 
imagined legend became vastly more influential than the facts of the 
historical event. In a "dove-tailed world" many disparate pieces fit 
together to make a marvellous whole that celebrates rather than 
diminishes the parts. 
Wilbur's earlier poem "All These Birds" suggests that the kind 
of boredom that begins "Lying"--the reduction of things to facts of 
grackles, taxes, or golf--serves as a stimulus to the imagination: 
Let us, with glass or gun, 
Watch (from our clever blinds) the monsters of the sky 
Dwindle to habit, habitat, and song, 
And tell the imagination it is wrong 
Till, lest it be undone, 
it spin a lie 
So fresh, so pure, so rare 
As to possess the air. (Poems 270) 
Our clever blindness that would dwindle the world to facts is 
counterbalanced by the exuberant imagination that will not let the 
world become ordinary but spins a tie to make us see the wonder. 
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For Wilbur, the imagination is a natural thing like the birds of the air 
and should be allowed their high-flying daring. 
Why should it be more shy 
Than chimney-nesting storks, or sparrows on a wall? 
Oh, let it climb wherever it can cling 
Like some great trumpet-vine, a natural thing 
To which all birds that fly 
come natural. 
Come, stranger, sister, dove: 
Put on the reins of love. (Poems 270) 
The imagination, "a natural thing," is the way the mind climbs not out 
of the world but into it, putting the world back together after it has 
been reduced to "habit, habitat, and song." The imagination, for 
Wilbur, is "the reins of love" which set things free to be known as 
themselves. 
Falck describes the urge to take on form as an unconscious 
force that manifests itself in biology and in art: 
The process of falling into shape, or of taking on meaning or 
value, is an intentionality below the level of conscious 
intention, and one which belongs neither to the subject nor to 
the world which the subject experiences, but which makes 
possible the coming into articulated existence of both .... Life 
... is inherently creative and the most exalted achievements of 
the human ·creative imagination' are from this point of view 
merely the continuation of the humblest and most ordinary 
processes of biological adaptation. (38) 
Wilbur writes in an essay called "Poetry and Landscape" that "[n]o 
word touches the heart of things. The word of botany and the word 
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of poetry each pursue a kind of truth" but Wilbur calls "the word of 
poetry . . . rather more important because it is spoken by the whole 
psyche" (89). Wilbur says that his poetry feels to him "ultimately at 
home in the world" and he finds himself most natural "when engaged 
in that artificial business" (90). 
Wherever I look in nature, I perceive fluid or energetic form--
in soils and rock-formations seen from a plane, in any climbing 
vine, in club-moss, in dripping tapwater .... What I write as 
my words energetically unravel and shape themselves, is a 
part of the truth of things, and a gesture toward the sources of 
form and energy. ("Poetry and Landscape" 90) 
Poetry not only expresses the drive toward form inherent in 
creation; as "a part of the truth of things," poetry also implicitly, and 
sometimes explicitly, celebrates the sources that impel vine and 
poem to take on shape and climb. 
Wilbur's poem "Hamlen Brook" reflects the form and energy of 
a world in the process of being and becoming. The poem offers a 
moment of intense vison which occurs as the casual side effect of a 
thirsty man bending over a stream for a drink. At "the alder-
darkened brink," the poet leans to the water, "dinting its top with 
sweat," but before he can drink from the stream slowed to "a lucid 
jet," his attention is caught by what is in and on and above the water. 
Just as his physical presence disturbs the scene--his sweat dropping 
on the water startles an "inchling trout I Of spotted near-
transparency, I Trawling a shadow solider than he" --the poet's 
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attention changes the world by framing a unique moment seen from 
an altered perspective. In quick association, one image flows 
naturally into another. The tiny trout swerves and darts--
To where, in a flicked s I ew 
Of sparks and glittering silt, he weaves 
Through stream-bed rocks, disturbing foundered leaves, 
And butts them out of view 
Beneath a sliding glass 
Crazed by the skimming of a brace 
Of burnished dragon-flies across its face, 
In which cloud lets pass 
And a white precipice 
Of mirrored birch-trees plunges down 
Toward where the azures of the zenith drown. (Poems 41) 
The whole world of Ham len Brook flickers and shimmers in the slow, 
clear water--the reflecting stream of the poet's attentive, framing 
imagination. Stunned he asks, "How shall I drink all this?" 
The changed angle of vis ion and the shimmer of the water 
dinted by his own drop of sweat suddenly make the whole world 
breathtakingly there. All is connected in the watery mirror. The 
poet has his drink, his taste of the world, but he is left with a joyful 
thirst that can never be satisfied. 
Joy's trick is to supply 
Dry lips with what can cool and slake, 
Leaving them dumbstruck also with an ache 
Nothing can satisfy. (Poems 41) 
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It takes imagination, not just eyes, to see the world. The poet 
becomes our Ham len Brook, showing us the world in the shimmering 
surface of his poem and leaving us with a life-enhancing ache for 
ever-more of the world's plenty. 
Wilbur values "the resistance of the world, its independence of 
the mind, its interaction with the mind" and does not want his vision 
to usurp reality but to bring reality into sharper focus. He does not 
want a poetry of disembodied ideas: 
What poetry does with ideas is to redeem them from 
abstraction and submerge them in sensibility; it embodies them 
in persons and things and surrounds them with a weather of 
feelings; it thereby tests the ability of any ideas to consort with 
human nature in its contemporary condition. 
("On My Own Work" 126) 
What Wilbur writes of Frost's response to Hyla Brook is true of his 
own response to the world: "Loving it for what it is, the poet does 
not try to elevate his subject, or metamorphose it, or turn it into pure 
symbol; it is sufficient that his words be lovingly adequate to the 
plain truth." For Wilbur "the best and happiest dreams of the poet 
are those that involve no denial of the fact" ("Poetry and Happiness 
1 04). "To me, the imagination is a faculty which fuses things, takes 
hold of the physical and ideal worlds and makes them one, 
provisionally. Fantasy ... is a poetic or artistic activity which leaves 
something out--it ignores the concrete and the actual in order to 
create a purely abstract, unreal realm" (qtd. in Stitt, "Interview" 48). 
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Wilbur fears an imagination detached from the world, lost in its 
own image-making, seduced away from reality by its own fantasies. 
Merlin in '"Merlin Enthralled'" represents such an enchanter who gets 
lost in his own enchantment and abandons the real. The poem 
depicts the despair of Arthur, Gawen, and others of the Round Table 
because Merlin, the wizard who had spun Camelot into being, has 
disappeared, and their world has lost its magic. Arthur's hand, .. now 
no Jess strong," cannot dream of haling a sword from stone as it 
could when Merlin was at his king's side. As they rode aimlessly in 
search of the lost sorcerer, the knights heard "[iln all the world ... 
no unnatural sound": 
Mystery watched them glade by glade; 
They saw it darkle from under leafy brows; 
But leaves were all its voice, and squirrels made 
An alien fracas in the ancient boughs. 
Once by a lake-edge something made them stop 
Yet what they found was the thumping of a frog, 
Bugs skating on the shut water-top 
Some hair-like algae bleaching on a log. (Poems_ 245) 
They seek mystery but cannot hear it because it speaks with the 
voice of leaves or squirrels or a frog; they cannot see it because it 
looks like water-walking bugs or hair-like algae. Only Gawen thinks 
he hears for a moment a whitethorn breath the name Niniane: 
That Siren's daughter 
Rose in a fort of dreams and spoke the word 
Sleep, her voice like dark diving water ... 
(Poems 245) 
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Niniane was the enchantress who had. enchanted Merlin. Ironically, 
Merlin himself had made her, and he made her of natural sounds--
the very sounds Gawen and Arthur ignore. Merlin had imagined this 
"creature to bewitch a sorcerer" of what he had learned to hear-- "[olf 
water-sounds and the deep unsound able swell." Imprisoned himself 
in the dream of Niniane's "towering spell," Merlin let the world of 
searching men and horses escape him: "History died; he gathered in 
its forces" (245). His mind took on the character of the water out of 
whose sounds he had made his enchantress: 
The mists of time condensed in the still head 
Until his mind, as clear as mountain water, 
Went raveling toward the deep transparent dream 
Who bade him sleep. And then the Siren's daughter 
Received him as the sea receives a stream. (Poems 245) 
Merlin merged with the natural element out of whose sounds and 
silence he had imagined his enchantress. He metamorphosed into a 
dream of his own making. 
Michelson writes that "[iln the poem, Merlin's great art is 
Camelot itself" (77). However, when Merlin's imagination got caught 
up in another dream, his mind "went raveling," and "the forsaken 
will not understand." As Gawen and Arthur rode off weeping, 
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""[t]heir mail grew quainter as they clopped along. I The sky became 
a still and woven blue" (Poems 246). Once the force of the 
enchanter's imagination had left his creation, Camelot became an 
artifact, a woven tapestry susceptible to unraveling. Unlike Arthur 
and Gawen, Merlin had heard the natural sounds; he did not dismiss 
them but he transformed them into something else. He enchanted 
himself with an image of his own making. Merlin imagined Camelot, 
a magical kingdom in a real world, but he fantasized N iniane and left 
the real world behind. For Wilbur, the imagination should lead back 
to the world, not to a neverland of the mind's making. 
To keep itself undeceived by its own images, the imagination 
needs the honesty and humility to recognize that its creations can 
only be likenings and not the thing itself. Wilbur would have us 
remember that we invent nothing, that we merely bear witness. In 
"A Sketch" Wilbur tries to catch the beauty and wonder of a 
goldfinch--"more coal than bird"--in stanzas that break and flit like a 
bright, small bird. The third line of each tercet of the terza rima 
form breaks into two parts, the second part of the line hopping down 
the way a nervous, energetic ·goldfinch moves before we have quite 
done seeing it on its first perch. 
Into the lower right 
Square of the window frame 
There came 
with scalloped flight 
A goldfinch, lit upon 
The dead branch of a pine, 
Shining, 
and then was gone, 
Tossed in a double arc 
Up into the thatched 
And cross-hatched 
pine-needle dark. 
Briefly, as fresh drafts stirred 
The tree, he dulled and gleamed 
And seemed 
more coal than bird 
(Poems 65) 
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Third lines enjamb into the next first line: diction and rhythm are 
alternately syncopal and flowing, mimicking the finch's constant but 
interrupted movement from "dead branch of pine" into "cross-
hatched I pine-needle dark" and onto "perch/ A birch- I twig" then 
"leaf-choked pane." 
After pursuing the bird for seven stanzas, the poet finally gives 
up and admits" ... I cannot well I tell you I all that he did" (66). No 
one frame of the poem can capture the not-still life of the bird, and 
the poet can not make enough poetry to catch each sequence of the 
bird in its process of being. No isolated image is enough to stand for 
the thing itself: 
It was like glancing at rough 
Sketches tacked on a wall, 
And all 
so less than enough 
Of gold on beaten wing, 
I could not choose that one 
-- - ---- ·--· 
Be done 
as the finished thing. 
(Poems 66) 
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Michelangelo left his Captives unfinished and Leonardo left his 
preparatory cartoon for The Virgin and Child with St. Anne, but he 
never completed the painting. Wilbur, too, recognizes the virtue of 
strategic retreat. The greatest honor and the only truth is to call 
attention to the marvel of the goldfinch and to show by his success 
and his failure what cannot be caught. Of the tacked up sketches, "all 
I so less than enough," he "could not choose that one I Be done I as 
the finished thing." 
"The Beautiful Changes," the title poem of Wilbur's first volume 
of poetry, presents the difficulty of seeing in a world where beauty 
camouflages itself in flux. The title itself changes, chameleon-like, 
according to the reader's understanding. Offering a choice between 
two grammatical forms, "The Beautiful Changes" can be read as 
article/adjective/noun or as article/noun/ verb. john Reibetanz 
points out these two forms can be interpreted in three different 
ways: first, as a noun with intransitive verb telling us that "what is 
beautiful is subject to change"; second, as a noun with transitive 
verb, insisting that "what is beautiful has the power to change 
things," to transform them; and third, as adjective and noun, 
suggesting that some changes are beautiful ("What Love Sees" 63). 
The title phrase is used twice in the short poem in the noun/verb 
·-- ---·---
construction: "The beautiful changes as a forest is changed I By a 
chameleon's tuning his skin to it" and--
... the beautiful changes 
In such kind ways, 
Wishing ever to sunder 
Things and things' selves for a second finding, to lose 
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For a moment all that it touches back to wonder. (Poems 39 2) 
We seem to see best what moves and changes or what disappears. 
The chameleon tuning his skin to the forest colors acknowledges his 
surroundings in the very physiology of his pigmentation. And a 
witness to the chameleon's changing is made to see the colors of the 
forest because of the impact of the animal's alteration. The 
chameleon becomes part of the colors of the forest, and the forest 
becomes chameleon-colored. Similarly, a green praying mantis on a 
green leaf becomes both part of the leaf visually but in another sense 
makes the leaf more distinct. The observer must look harder to see 
both leaf and mantis: 
As a mantis, arranged 
On a green leaf, grows 
Into it, makes the leaf leafier, and proves 
Any greenness is deeper than anyone knows. 
The work of the poetic imagination, then, requires bringing together 
things whose juxtaposition will reveal both likeness (a shared 
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greenness) and unlikeness (a green insect, a green leaf) and things 
whose imaginative proximity will revivify our sense of wonder--set 
us in awe of the possibilities of greenness. The beautiful changes in 
such various and beneficent ways so that essence can be temporarily 
separated from gestalt so that they both can be found again, lost in 
wonder. 
As Coleridge described it, the secondary imagination "dissolves, 
diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is 
rendered impossible, yet still, at all events, it struggles to idealize 
and to unify" (Biogranhia 167). Art, to sustain the continual effort of 
relating to "the always changing face of reality," requires "a 
perpetual revolution of the entire sensibility" (Wilbur, "The Bottles 
Become New, Too" 223). "Praise in Summer," Wilbur's Spenserian 
sonnet, addresses the prob I em of the remaking imagination, the 
poetic need to take things apart or disarrange them in order to 
remove the veneer of habitude and renew the sight by renewing the 
vision. However, this unmaking creates its own problem: what the 
poet has set out to celebrate is undone in the process-- "this mad 
instead I Perverts our praise to uncreation." "Obscurely yet most 
surely called to praise" by the beauty of summer, the poet turns the 
world inside out, describing the hills as space through which move 
star-nosed moles and the sky as a solid like the earth, which is 
excavated by trees and burrowed into by birds: 
The hills are heavens full of branching ways 
Where star-nosed moles fly overhead the dead; 
I said the trees are mines in air, I said 
See how the sparrows burrow in the sky! 
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Then the poet is caught up, made to wonder at his inversion of the 
natural order: 
... why 
Such savor's in this wrenching things awry. 
Does sense so stale that it must needs derange 
The world to know it? 
Finally, he asks if the world as it is, the world he has been called to 
praise, is not splendid enough: 
To a praiseful eye 
Should it not be enough of fresh and strange 
That trees grow green, and moles can course in clay, 
And sparrows sweep the ceiling of our day? 
Ironically, the disarrangements of the first part of the poem--making 
the hills heaven-space and the air solid to be mined by trees and 
burrowed by sparrows--prepare us to marvel at the "ordinary.·· The 
fey, airy fantasy prepares the reader to see the wonder of the world 
as it is. Compared to the "star-nosed moles" who fly through an 
earthy sky, the moles who "can course in clay" seem honest, true, and 
truly extraordinary. The solid, this-world strength of the last tines is 
built on what has come before. Playfully, Wilbur in the very last line 
slips in one final metaphor--"And sparrows sweep the cieiling of our 
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day" --as the poet's way of answering his own question--" Does sense 
so stale that it must needs derange I The world to know it?"--
affirmatively. 
The poem "juggler" from Ceremony and Other Poems 
straightforwardly asserts the need for art to disarrange the world so 
it can be seen again vividly. The first stanza of "juggler" compares 
the earth to a ball , finding a new alikeness in the two spheres. 
Wilbur tells us that it is in the nature of a ball to bounce but that a 
ball does not love bouncing: 
A ball will bounce, but less and less. It's not 
A light-hearted thing, resents its own resilience. 
Falling is what it loves ... (Poems 297) 
The earth, like a bouncing ball, "falls I So in our hearts from 
brilliance, I Settles and is forgot" (Poems 297). The ball bounces 
because of its resilience; the earth falls because of its brilliance. The 
constant stimulus of the earth's Qazzle fatigues our senses, and we 
become unaware until some "sky-blue juggler with five red balls" 
appears "[tlo shake our gravity up." Wilbur's "sky-blue" juggler 
reverses the force of gravity--the pull up, not down. Wheeling on 
the juggler's hands, the balls learn "the ways of lightness." Like stars 
or suns, the five red balls "[c]ling to their courses" and swing "a small 
heaven about the juggler's ears. 
But a heaven is easier made of nothing at all 
Than the earth regained. (Poems 297) 
536 
Heaven--the perfect, eternal, sublime, and beautiful--comes easily 
and seduces the imagination. The juggler, "'still and sole, .. must give 
up what is easy and make an heroic attempt, "'a gesture sure and 
noble"' to call our attention to the things of this world: 
He reels that heaven in, 
Landing it ball by ball, 
And trades it all for a broom, a plate, a table. (Poems 297) 
Turning to homely objects, the juggler, through his mastery, 
makes his audience see--briefly, at least--the things of daily 1 ife so 
often disregarded: 
Oh, on his toe the table is turning, the broom's 
Balancing up on his nose, and the plate whirls 
On the tip of the broom! Damn, what a show we cry. 
(Poems 297) 
The juggler foils gravity, yanks things from their ordinary places and 
their ordinary functions. His unusual placement and usage highlights 
what is normal about the objects. Normally, a table can be counted on 
to be solid and steady, waiting unnoticed to receive the equally 
placid plate. The broom rests quietly in a corner till our mundane 
need for sweeping gives it motion. But the juggler makes memorable 
what is, like the brilliant earth, settled and forgot. The poet 
~- ~----·--
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acknowledges that at the end of the show "All comes down" and that 
the juggler "bows and says good-bye," but he also sees the needed 
triumph that saves both objects and audience from the "daily dark": 
If the juggler is tired now, if the broom stands 
In the dust again, if the table starts to drop 
Through the daily dark again, and though the plate 
Lies flat on the table top, 
For him we batter our hands 
Who has won for once over the world's weight. (297) 
The world's weight makes us oblivious of the world's presence. 
Obviously, the poet is a juggler of words and images who lets the 
reader see "mercury like dew on cabbage-hide" (Poems 74 )--what is 
always there but often overlooked unless the light of imagination 
shines on it. 
"My Father Paints the Summer," a poem from Wilbur's first 
collection The Beautiful Changes •. speaks both of the ability of the 
imagination to recreate a remembered reality and of the necessity of 
the imagination to capture the experience in the beginning. Wilbur 
describes his remembrance of an episode in a seaside resort hotel 
during a cold, rainy july--a time of unseasonable weather when 
"summer chills and fails." While the cold, persistent rain confounds 
the season outside, in a room illuminated "by artificial light," his 
father, an artist, finds the "hoped-for summer" with his paint brush: 
... up in his room by artificial light 
My father paints the summer, and his brush 
Tricks into sight 
The prosperous sleep, the girdling stir and clear steep hush 
Of a summer never seen, 
A granted green. (Poems 363) 
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His father "tricks into sight" on the canvas an imagined summer, 
recreated from the attention that had preserved summer's memory. 
Wilbur's description of the "summer never seen" presents not 
specifics, but impressions, feelings of summer expressed as 
movement and stillness: "The prosperous sleep" suggests the 
indolence of leafed-out trees hanging limp in the heat. The "girdling 
stir and clear steep hush" convey the alternate faces of a summer--
an encircling world of moving, tossing green as a summer storm 
approaches and the quiet of a heavy summer afternoon when even 
the birds are silent. With words that are themselves devoid of 
images but full of the sense of summer, Wilbur like his artist father 
"tricks into sight ... [a] granted green." Imagination makes the gift 
of summer. 
However, the imagination can remake summer on a day when 
the season itself has failed in a chill rain only if the imagination has 
first "caught summer" while it was present: 
Caught Summer is always an imagined time. 
Time gave it, yes, but time out of any mind. 
There must be prime 
In the heart to beget that season, to reach past rain and find 
Riding the palest days 
Its perfect blaze. 
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Time gave it, and green is granted. These words suggest a gift but 
also the sense of a gift earned: "Time gave it, but time out of any 
mind. I There must be prime I In the heart to beget that season." 
Time--the world of perpetually changing seasons--gave this 
"imagined time," the "caught Summer" on Wilbur's father's canvas. 
The impressions and experiences of many real summers gained over 
time make possible the "imagined time" of the painting. Yet, Wilbur 
says this imagined time was "time out of any mind," playing on the 
phrase "time out of mind" with its meaning for eons, for periods 
longer than can be comprehended. As Wilbur uses "time out of any 
mind," the phrase suggests a time that is not understood by the 
intellect alone but requires "prime I In the heart." This "prime in the 
heart" needed to paint the summer recalls Stevens' "The Snow Man" 
which required "a mind of winter" to behold "nothing that is not 
there and the nothing that is." Prime may refer to the period of 
greatest productivity and vigor, but prime also suggests the "prime 
mover," the first cause, the self-moved being to which all motion is 
assumed to go back ultimately. In this sense, the artist's recreation 
of summer is a ripple emanating from the original and ongoing act of 
creation--as Coleridge said "a replication in the finite mind of the 
eternal act of creation of the great I AM." The universal process that 
provides for perpetual change and recreates from that which has 
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failed stirs the artist to make summer where the season lapsed. The 
artist becomes an agent of nature, of creation. 
Michelson describes Wilbur's poetry as "a poetry of 
transforming moments and momentary transformations" (82). He 
says Wilbur's "Digging for China" is a poem "about the need to look 
for the richest wonders in the daylight of one's actual and immediate 
surroundings" (187). The poem from Things of This World recounts a 
boyhood effort to test an undentified speaker's promise that if the 
boy would dig a hole deep enough he would be able to see the sky in 
China--'"As clear as at the bottom of a well. I Except it would be real 
--a different sky'" (Poems 256).8 Digging further, the boy would get 
through to the other side of the earth and come out under the China 
sky where the world would be .. 'nothing like New jersey. I There's 
people, trees, and houses, and all that, I But much, much different. 
Nothing looks the same"' (256). Naively, the boy gets a trowel and 
spends the morning on hands and knees digging, sweating "like a 
coolie." The posture and earnestness were "a sort I of praying." 
Even though he "tried and tried I To dream a place where nothing 
was the same," he seemed not to succeed: "The trowel never did 
break through to blue" (256). 
But then, having tired of being head down in a hole and looking 
into darkness, the boy stands up, only to have his vision of China: 
Before the dream could weary of itself 
My eyes were tired of looking into darkness, 
My sunbaked head of hanging down a hole. 
I stood up in a place I had forgotten, 
B 1 ink i ng and staggering while the earth went round 
And showed me silver barns, the fields dozing 
In palls of brightness, patens growing and gone 
In the tides of leaves, and the whole sky china blue. 
Until I got my balance back again 
All that I saw was China, China, China. (Poems 256) 
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Dizzy from turning himself upside down in a hole to look for 
something extraordinary, the boy stands up in a place that he had 
forgotten only to see the wonders that always surrounded him. The 
dizzily turning earth shows him silver barns, fields sleeping under 
""palls of brightness, .. and patens growing and disappearing in the 
trees. Pall as a noun can mean a fine cloth for covering something 
(like a coffin or tomb). an altar cloth or a linen cloth for covering the 
chalice, or an overspreading element that produces an effect of 
gloom. As a verb, pall can mean to lose in interest or attraction, to 
become tired of something at first pleasurable, or to deprive of 
pleasure in something by cloying or satiating. The ""palls of 
brightness,"" momentarily visible to the dizzy boy, re~ind us of the 
earth"s brillance which in the ""juggler"" causes it to fall in our hearts, 
settle, and be forgot; we become so satiated by the perpetual dazzle 
and beauty that we lose interest in the earth unless it takes on the 
allure of China. A ""paten"" is a thin metal disk or something 
resembling one or a plate of precious metal used for the bread in the 
eucharistic service. .. Patens growing and gone I In the tides of 
leaves .. suggests the golden disks of light that can glow and fade in 
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the vision when a person experiences vertigo. The light-headed boy 
sees the sunlight streaming through the trees transformed into 
golden patens. In the vertiginous vision that follows his "sort I Of 
praying," the whole sky is china blue. And until he gets his "balance" 
back, all he sees is China, a place with a "real--ad iff erent sky," a 
place where nothing looks the same. 
Catching a sudden glimpse of the world in "Hamlen Brook," the 
stunned poet asks, "How shall I drink all this?" Impelled by a desire 
to lay claim to the world by uttering the names of things, Wilbur 
combines an openness to the world with a refusal to etheral ize 
things. His poetry expresses moments of tension between his 
formative mind and the reality his mind insists on recognizing. 
Wilbur values the world's resistance to his shaping imagination, the 
sense of struggling with something powerfully other. In the process 
of the struggle, nature supplies the metaphors and images whereby 
we can know it and ourselves. "Lying" in metaphor is a way of 
telling the truths of the imagination. Wilbur counts on poetry to 
redeem ideas from abstraction. He is wary of the danger of the 
imagination's being seduced by its own images--enthralled like 
Merlin and estranged from the real world by a concocted fantasy 
world. Wilbur also recognizes the limits of the imagination. He 
knows that we invent nothing, merely bear witness to what is 
already there. He also knows that no image is complete or can equal 
the thing itself. His "Sketch" of the goldfinch can never capture the 
finished thing. Even so, we do need the imagination just to see the 
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world; "caught summer" is always an imagined time. In "Praise in 
Summer" Wilbur asks if sense so stales that "it needs derange I The 
world to know it." In that poem and in "juggler" he answers yes and 
declares it the poet's business to win for us over the world's weight 
which "falls I So in our hearts from brilliance, I Settles and is forgot." 
The poet knows we must dig to find the blue of China over our heads. 
Sunlight and Fog--Metaphors for the Imagination 
The metaphors Wilbur and Eiseley choose for imagination, the 
powerful agent that links the conscious to the unconscious and both 
to the world, reflect the personal temperaments which color their 
writings. Wilbur is frequently bomo /udens, the artist at play, 
delighting in making with words. He is at home in the world, and his 
dominant metaphor for the imagination is sunlight--as he entitled a 
poem, "Sunlight Is Imagination." Sunlight inevitably implies shadow, 
however, and Wilbur's poetry is dappled with the true light of 
common day. Eiseley, by contrast, prefers the dark of the night 
country to sunlit day. He is melancholic, haunted and tantalized by 
his fear of death, and obsessed with his sense of being a lost one, a 
fugitive stranded out of his proper time and place. His dominant 
metaphor for imagination is water, especially an ominous 
underground current or a tentative, exploring fog moving 
surreptitiously through space and time. Describing water, Eiseley 
could be speaking of the imagination: 
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If there is magic on this planet, it is contained in water .... a 
wind ripple may be translating itself into life. Thin vapors, 
rust, wet tar and sun are an alembic remarkably 1 ike the mind; 
they throw off odorous shadows that threaten to take real 
shape when no one is looking. (lJ 15) 
His description of water's omnipresence and creative and destructive 
power also applies to the the imagination: "Its substance reaches 
everywhere; it touches the past and prepares the future; it moves 
under the poles and wanders thinly in the heights of air. It can 
assume forms of exquisite perfection in a snow flake, or strip the 
living to a single shining bone cast up by the sea" (lJ. 16). Whether 
symbolized by sunlight or water, the imagination is a powerful force 
that can change our perceptions of reality, alter our concepts of good 
and evil, and unify the seeming chaos of experience into a coherent 
whole. 
In the essay "The Noble·Rider and the Sound of Words" in The 
N ecessarv Angru, Wallace Stevens identifies the subject matter of 
poetry by defining reality: "The subject-matter of poetry is not that 
'collection of solid, static objects extended in space' but the life that is 
lived in the scene that it composes; and so reality is not that external 
scene but the life that is lived in it" (25). Later, in "The Figure of the 
Youth as Virile Poet" Stevens defines "true imagination" as "the sum 
of our faculties." Describing poetry as "the scholar's art," Stevens 
then compares the imagination to "light itself": 
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The acute intelligence of the imagination, the illimitable 
resources of its memory, its power to possess the moment it 
perceives--if we were speaking of light itself, and thinking of 
the relationship between objects and light, no further 
demonstration would be necessary. Like tight, it adds nothing, 
except itself. (Stevens, Necessary Angel 61) 
Light adds nothing but itself, but 1 ight is everything. Light changes 
things--adding energy, making color visible, giving form, definition, 
solidity, and shadow. The imagination, like sunlight, lets us see the 
world, casting such a light upon the things of this world that we can 
in fact see past our habit of not seeing. Light is incarnating. just as 
sunlight provides the photosynthetic energy upon which plant and 
animal life depend, the sunlight of the imagination brings the world 
to life in our minds. 
"The Fourth of july": "Praise to all fire-fledged knowledge" 
Wilbur's poem "The Fourth of july," which Hecht says may be 
the best thing to come out of the American Bicentennial ( 130), is an 
intricately connected piece woven of disparate elements into a whole, 
successfully linking together Lewis Carroll, Ulysses Grant, A lice in 
Wonderland, Linnaeus, Copernicus, and "these States" whose birth is 
celebrated. These diverse characters are bound by the sunlight and 
shade of a given day and by the complexity of the nature of words, 
of language, and of knowing--the sum of our faculties, the 
imagination. Mary Kinzie describes "The Fourth of July" as "one of 
546 
the finest and most difficult poems, Wilbur has ever written" and 
says that it illustrates "the curvature of mind which makes him such 
an intellectually exciting poet" ("The Cheshire Smile" 19). 
The poem is dedicated to I. A. Richards under whom Wilbur 
worked for a while at Harvard and with whom he had contact later 
at Wesleyan (Conversations 159, 203). In answer to a question 
("Have you ever met anyone whom you thought to be truly great?") 
put by interviewers from The Amherst Student Review, Wilbur said 
that he found the quality of "greatness" in Richards: 
This greatness seemed to me to lie not necessarily in his ideas, 
or in any system of ideas he had come up with, but in the 
extraordinary verve and adventurousness of his mind. You 
had a perfect uncertainty as to where he would go next. He 
had an absolute readiness to take on whatever problematical 
thing arose in his path. Richards" great delight is mountain 
climbing, and the operations of his mind have the same type of 
daring that you associate with that sport. 
(qtd. in Bogan and Kaplan 159) 
Wilbur's dedication of the poem to I. A. Richards helps explain how 
the poem works. The people--historical and fictional--mentioned in 
"The Fourth of july" have the same sort of daring, adventurous minds 
as Richards possessed, willing to see what before had not been seen, 
to try what before had not been tried. Even the country--" these 
states"--embarked on a great, never-before-attempted adventure to 
make the guarantee of human liberty a government's raison d 'etre. 
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Wilbur's "Fourth of july" is connected to Richards in other 
ways. The poem's fascination with the web of words and celebration 
of two kinds of exploration and knowing--poetry and science--reflect 
interests that enthralled Richards throughout his life. In Poetries 
and Sciences, Richards describes his understanding of the dynamics 
of a poem and how words are differently used by a scientist and a 
poet. Richards writes that the nonlogical aspects (tone, occasion) of 
discourse--the very things science endeavours to eliminate--are the 
primary factors by which we interpret either poetry or a 
conversation: 
In nearly all poetry the sound and feel of the words, what is 
often called the form of the poem in opposition to its content, 
get to wor~ first, and the senses in which the words are later 
more explicitly taken are subtly influenced by this fact. Most 
words are ambiguous as regards their plain sense, especially 
poetry. We can take them as we please in a variety of senses. 
The sens·es we are pleased to choose are those which most suit 
the impluses already stirring and giving form to the verse. 
Thus the form often seems an inexplicable premonition of a 
meaning w!Jic!J we nave not _vet grasped. (Richards 31; 
emphasis added) 
Richards here describes how form works for the reader of a poem--
as "an inexplicable premonition" of meaning which the reader has yet 
to understand. Wilbur describes how form works from the 
perspective of a writer of poems: "I think of a poem of mine as 
discovering, in the process of its writing, the formal means which will 
back up its statement and increase its precision" (qtd. in Daceyll9). 
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Describing his "organic" method of composition, Wilbur says that he 
starts out "with a partial sense of a poem's tone of voice, theme, and 
probable length." He says that "as the first words of the poem 
arrive,". the words themselves seem to prescribe--" if I am well 
attuned to my half-guessed purpose"--various elements such as 
"rhythm, sonority and line length," and that the preliminary words 
"after a provisional line or two ... also seem to suggest rhyme, stanza 
division, or the like" (qtd. in Daceyll8-119). Thus, both Richards 
and Wi 1 bur describe form as a pre-1 inguistic or extra-linguistic 
facilitator of meaning. 
Richards and Wilbur also offer similar analyses of the 
intentions and strategies of a poet and the effects of these on 
readers. Wilbur writes that "lt]here would be no reason to write a 
poem if one were not aiming at an unusual fullness and accuracy of 
statement." To achieve that fullness and accuracy, "the poet must 
use words, rhythms and sounds in subtle, concentrated, deliberate 
ways, hoping at the same time to give an illusion of offhand 
delivery." Sincerity, for Wilbur, "lies not merely in meaning 
something but also taking the crafty trouble to embody the meaning 
exactly and coercively" (qtd. in Dacey 121-122). 
Richards explains in Poetries and Sciences how form coerces 
meaning: "In its use of words most poetry is the reverse of science" 
(32). Precise things are said in poetry, but not because logic guides 
word choice, eliminating all possibilities of meaning but one--the 
method of science. Although the poet may not be able to describe 
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his/her method, he or she--even when writing in prose--uses 
manner, tone, voice, cadence, and rhythm to play upon our interests 
to make "the reader pick out the precise particular senses required 
from an indefinite number of possible senses which a word, phrase 
or sentence may carry" (Richards 32). Richards describes the 
dynamic created by the poet's use of words "as a means of ordering, 
contro/Jing and consolidating the uttered experience of which they 
themselves are a main part" (33). The experience itself, "the tide of 
impulses sweeping through the mind," is the "source and sanction of 
the words." The words themselves come to represent the experience 
and will reproduce in the mind of a suitable reader, "a similar play of 
interests putting him for the while into a similar situation and 
leading to the same response" (33). For the poet, the words are the 
effect of the experience; for the reader, the words are the cause of 
the experience: "In both cases lthe words] are the part of the 
experience which binds it together, which gives it a definite structure 
and keeps it from being a mere welter of disconnected impulses" 
(Richards 34). Wilbur's poem "The Fourth of july'" demonstrates how 
a "welter of disconnected impulses" becomes through words a 
cohesive whole, first in the mind of the poet and then in the mind of 
the reader. 
The form of '"Fourth of july" offers insight into its meanings. In 
each of the five eleven-line stanzas, Wilbur keeps the same intricate 
rhyme scheme; each stanza follows the pattern a, !J, a, c, !J, c, d, a, d, 
e, e. The basic meter is iambic pentameter with some variation in 
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stresses for emphasis; however, in each stanza, the fifth and seventh 
lines are trimeter. Thus, the complex form of this poem, tailoring 
the words to the fitting rooms of rhyme and meter, exerts tight 
control over what intially seems the extremely various content of the 
poem. Numbering the stanzas l through 5 (a tactic uncommon to 
Wilbur·s poems) would seem to imply a sequence of straight-forward 
progression from one step to another. That is not what occurs. The 
first stanza confines itself to highly allusive references to the 
circumstances under which Lewis Carroll began his tales of Alice. 
The second stanza--linked by sun and shade imagery, great rivers, 
and a particular date to the first--confines itself to Ulysses S. Grant's 
search for military stratagems to bring the Confederates at Vicksburg 
to "terms." Stanza three questions the premises that have bound the 
first two stanzas and even wonders about the power of words to 
unify while simultaneously using the word "termless" to link itself to 
what has preceded and what then follows. With the fourth stanza, 
Wilbur turns to Linnaeus and his triumph and tragedy with words. 
Unlike the preceding stanzas which are grammatically complete, the 
fourth stanza enjambs into the fifth. The last three lines of stanza 
four begin a paean of praise to "fire-fledged knowledge" which links, 
by contrast, to Copernicus. The sentence which starts with "Praise" in 
stanza four begins its end in stanza five with "and honor to these 
States." Thus, what binds the poem is not superficially logical 
connections but imaginative leaps represented by the creative 
intuitions of those named within the poem and of the poet ·s 
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conceiving and expressing of their connectedness through imagery 
and their shared problems with words. The technically complex 
form of the poem itself presents another struggle. The demanding 
structure has the exactitude and precision of science; it tries and 
purifies the imaginative leaps and poetic vision in the retort of its 
discipline. 
Sunlight is the unifying image in "Fourth of July." Sunlight, 
Wilbur's recurrent symbol for the imagination, dapples the poem 
with light and shade. In the first stanza, sunlight is implied in the 
golden shade under the hay rick: Mr. Dodgson gives the girls tea, 
"lslhading their minds with golden fantasy." The "spangled, blindly 
flowing Thames" describes a sunlight so dazzling that it both 
bejewels and blinds the river. In stanza two, the "sun's I Mid-
morning fire beats on a wider stream." Sunlight appears in the haze 
clearing on Hard Times Landing and in the "settling smoke," both 
phenomena made manifest by sunlight. The sun is reaffirmed as a 
reality, not an image or symbol, in stanza three: "The sun is not a 
concept but a star. I What if its rays were once conjointly blurred I 
By tea-fumes and a general" s cigar?" Sunlight is also implicit by its 
absence in "the shade" of the termless wood where Alice stood. In 
stanza four, "the bald unknown" encroaches like a shadow upon 
Linnaeus's "memory, cell by cell." Sunlight is embodied in the "tree-
named" Linnaeus; sunlight actually becomes substances in the leaves 
of a tree and is released further up the food chain as thought energy 
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--imagination. Knowledge then is indeed "fire-fledged" --it comes 
literally from the sun. In stanza five the sun is the "solar disc" to 
which Copernicus's vision leapt, and it is the light of "this day"--the 
July fourths of past and present. 
All of these elements are present from the first stanza. On July 
4, 1862, as Wilbur points out in a note to this poem, Lewis Carroll--
"their oarsman, Mr. Dodgson"--was allowed by "Liddell, the Oxford 
lexicographer" (Liddell was dean of Christ Church Oxford and co-
editor with Robert Scott of the Greek-English Lexicon) to take 
Liddell's three small daughters--Alice, Larina, and Edith--on an 
outing, rowing on the Thames "from Folly Bridge to Godstow. "9 
I. 
Liddell, the Oxford lexicographer, 
Allowed his three small daughters on this day 
To row from Folly Bridge to Godstow, where 
Their oarsman, Mr. Dodgson, gave them tea 
Beneath a rick of hay, 
Shading their minds with golden fantasy. (Poems 69) 
Giving his young companions tea "]b]eneath a rick of hay," Mr. 
Dodgson, himself an Oxford mathematician and logician, shades "their 
mind with golden fantasy." Sunlight as imagination is implicit in the 
golden shade beneath the hay rick and as the actual streaming 
photons which spangle the "blindly flowing Thames." Speaking of the 
golden fantasy, Wilbur writes: 
And it was all fool's gold 
Croquet or caucus madder than a hare, 
That universe of which he sipped and told, 
Mocking all grammars, codes, and theorems ... (69). 
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Ironically, "'that universe"' of which Dodgson, the mathematician and 
logician, "'sipped and told .. mocked "'all grammars, codes, and 
theorems"'; he created an imaginative world in which none of the 
usual operatives on which we depend to maintain rational order 
worked. Wilbur obviously delights in the irony that Dodgson told his 
tales subverting grammars and codes to the children of a 
lexicographer. 
The world of Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass 
overturns the standards: l) grammar--the usual patterns and 
arrangements of word structures in languages, 2) codes-- the 
systematized rules for conduct or the assignment of specific meaning 
to symbols, and 3) theorems--guiding propositions evolved from 
accepted premises. In Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass 
all the rules are broken, nothing is as usual or as it seems. Knowing 
is not possible. Lewis Carroll's playfulness invites the reader to see 
the absurdity of "'normal" reality in the heightened absurdity of 
Alice's adventures, to recognize the instability of any order and the 
possibility of other grammars, codes and theorems. As james 
Playsted Wood explains in The Snark Jl'lls a Boojum, his biography 
of Lewis Carroll, the story that seemed to its author to come of itself, 
had its own truth: 
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The children knew that Dodgson was not making the story up 
through an effort of will. It was just something he knew and 
that he had always known and was telling them. They knew 
the story was true, not true because it was reasonable or in the 
way that the alphabet or a birthday is true, but true because, 
like a fact of nature, it existed. It was like the river. It was 
like the sunny afternoon. It was like themselves. It just was. 
(Wood 60). 
Paradoxically--although the words of his stories seemed to flow of 
themselves, without any effort of the author to concoct--Dodgson 
sought the company of young children because of his chronic trouble 
with words. He suffered from a stammer which grew worse when he 
was ill at ease but "disappeared altogether when he was talking with 
small children" (Wood 15). 
Dodgson's golden shade is made of fool's gold, a fantastical 
treasure, the "croquet or caucus madder than a hare." Wilbur's line 
refers to the episode in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland when 
Alice and the Queen and court play a frenentic and irregular croquet 
--traditionally the most genteel and English of games--on a ground 
"all ridges and furrows." The players use--or try to use--live 
flamingos as mallets, live hedgehogs for balls, and the playing card 
soldiers doubled over on hands and feet to make the arched hoops of 
the wickets. Played in Wonderland, croquet is a very difficult game 
indeed: 
The chief difficulty Alice found at first was in managing 
her flamingo: she succeeded in getting its body tucked away, 
comfortably enough, under her arm, with its legs hanging 
down, but generally, just as she had got its neck nicely 
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straightened out, and was going to give the hedgehog a blow 
with its head, it would twist itself round and look up in her 
face, with such a puzzled expression that she could not help 
bursting out laughing: and when she had got its head down, 
and was going to begin again, it was very provoking to find 
that the hedgehog had unrolled itself, and was in the act of 
crawling away: besides all this, there was generally a ridge or 
a furrow in the way wherever she wanted to send the 
hedgehog to, and, as the doubled-up soldiers were always 
getting up and walking off to other parts of the ground, Alice 
soon came to the conclusion that it was a very difficult game 
indeed. (Carroll, Alice's Adventures 71) 
Likewise, the Caucus-race to which Wilbur also alludes was a muddle 
which could only be explained by doing it: 
First [the Dodo] marked out the racecourse, in a sort of circle 
('the exact shape doesn't matter," it said). and then all the party 
were placed along the course, here and there. There was no 
·one, two, three, and away,' but they began running when they 
liked, and left off when they liked, so that it was not easy to 
know when the race was over. However, when they had been 
running half an hour or so ... the Dodo suddenly called out 
'The race is over!" and they all crowded round it, panting, and 
asking 'But who has won?" (Carroll, Alice·s Adventures 19). 
Of course, the only solution is that "'Everybody has won, and all must 
have prizes' .. ( 19). Both games are madder than the Hare who is 
mad, the Cheshire Cat assures Alice, because "'"we"re all mad here' .. __ 
Alice included or she would not have come. The universe of which 
the tutor of mathematics and logic told was "madder than a hare" 
and mocked "'all grammars, codes, and theorems." 
556 
Wilbur shifts the scene in the second stanza-- "the sun's I mid-
morning fire beat on a wider stream." The river is not the Thames 
but the Mississsippi, and Wilbur's notes to his poem inform the 
reader that Vicksburg fell to General Grant on july 4, 1863, a year to 
the day after Dodgson's outing which led to the Alice tales and the 
statnmering mathematician's metamorphosis into Lewis Carroll. 
Wilbur turns to another man who had trouble with words. 
2. 
Off to the west, in Memphis, where the sun's 
Mid-morning fire beat on a wider stream, 
His purpose headstrong as a river runs, 
Grant closed a smoky door on aides and guards 
And chewed through scheme on scheme 
For toppling Vicksburg like a house of cards. 
The haze at last would clear 
On Hard Times Landing, Porter's wattowed guns, 
The circling trenches that in just a year 
Brought the starved rebels through the settling smoke 
To ask for terms beside a stunted oak. (Poems 69) 
The lines which describe Grant as closing a "smoky door on aides and 
guards" and chewing "through scheme on scheme" suggest the year-
long struggle of the cigar-smoking general to formulate a strategy to 
take the seemingly impregnable Vicksburg. jefferson Davis called 
the town situated on a bluff overlooking the Mississippi '"the 
nailhead that held the South's two halves together'" (Korny 16).1 0 
Descriptions of the Union general in Gene Smith's "dual biography," 
Lee and Grant coincide with Wilbur's sense of a taciturn man, "[hlis 
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purpose headstrong as a river runs," who "closed a smoky door on 
aides and guards": 
Grant in his rusty and seedy uniform, the gold cord on his hat 
battered and worn, his coat open and lapels buttoned back, sat 
with his staff and listened while they talked about Vicksburg. 
When he got up and paced about, he did so with his hands 
jammed in his pockets and with the ever-present cigar in his 
mouth. He looked like a country storekeeper or western 
farmer, and none of his men ... ever decided exactly how 
their chief"s mind worked. They did not know what he was 
thinking, or even, they said, if he ever thought at all. 
(Smith 148) 
His aide General William Sherman said Grant knew nothing of 
military history and was dangerously impervious to fear but still 
managed to generate faith in his ability. Sherman said, "'He is a 
mystery to me and I believe also to himself"' (qtd. in Smith 148). "A 
mystery and a sphinx, silent, inarticulate," Grant, when he finally 
woke from his torpor, "leaped into a campaign the conclusion of 
which would find him compared with Hannibal invading Italy, with 
Napoleon at Ulm, the equal of Alexander and Caesar" (Smith 149).11 
In addition to repeating the sun and shade motif, Wilbur subtly 
connects the first two stanzas for readers who remember the Red 
Queen's guards: "toppling Vicksburg like a house of cards" recalls the 
playing card soldiers who doubled for wickets during the mad 
croquet match in Alice's Adventures. "The haze at last would clear"--
the fog which obscured a successful military stratagem, the smoke of 
Grant's cigar, the puzzlement of Grant's worried aides, the summer 
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mist "[o]n Hard Times Landing."l2 "[I]njustayear" to the day from 
Dodgson's adventure and with the help of the circling trenches of 
Grant's forty-seven-day seige and the "wallowed guns" of the Union 
Admiral Porter,l3 "the starved rebels" were brought "through the 
settling smoke I To ask for terms beside a stunted oak.' 
Then, in stanza three, Wilbur seems to confront his own 
methodology: Is it valid to juxtapose two so different events--
Charles Dodgson's invention of Alice in Wonderland and Ulysses 
Grant's strategy to take Vicksburg--under the neat coincidence that 
both culminated on the same date a year a part under the same sun? 
Are images of sunlight and shade, rivers and river journeys, spangle 
and smoke enough to bind the events imaginatively? 
3. 
The sun is not a concept but a star. 
What if its rays were once conjointly blurred 
By tea-fumes and a general's cigar? (Poems 69) 
Having questioned the validity of his artifice, the unity imposed upon 
his poem, Wilbur asks a broader, more fundamental question: 
Though, as for that, what grand arcanum saves 
Appearances, what word 
Holds all from foundering in points and waves? (Poems 69) 
What secret, what great mystery preserves the appearances we call 
reality? lti What imagination connects the multiplicity of seemingly 
random objects and events of creation? What Yvord keeps all from 
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disassembling into mere "points and waves"--dissolving into the dual 
nature of light itself? Strikingly, Wilbur describes the unifying force 
as a word. Then the poet suggests an ideal world, a peacable 
kingdom .not held together by words and not divided by words: 
No doubt the fairest game 
Play only in the groves where creatures are 
At one, distinct, and innocent of name. (Poems 70) 
Wilbur describes this idyllic place as the world which "Alice found, 
who in the termless wood/ Lacked words to thank the shade in 
which she stood." In a note to these lines, Wilbur points out that the 
"'termless wood' may be found in Through the Looking Glass, Chapter 
IJI"(ltl). 
During her conversation with Gnat after admitting that she 
does not "rejoice" in insects, Alice does say that she can name some 
of them. On learning that the insects where Alice comes from do not 
answer to their names, Gnat asks what is the the use of their having 
names. Alice replies: "No use to them . .. but it's useful to the people 
that name them, I suppose. If not, why do things have names at all? 
(Through the Looking Glass 147). Gnat admits that he cannot say but 
tells Alice of a wood where "'they've got no names'" (148). After 
Gnat sighs itself away in one of its melancholic exhalations, Alice 
wanders off into the cool shade of the wood where names are lost 
and where she "[l]acked words to thank the shade in which she 
stood": 
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'Well at any rate it's a great comfort,· she said as she stepped 
under the trees, 'after being so hot, to get into the--into the--
into what?' she went on, rather surprised at not being able to 
think of the word. ·I mean to get under the--under the --
under this, you know!' putting her hand on the trunk of the 
tree. 'What does it call itself? I do believe it's got no name--
why, to be sure it hasn't!' (Through the Looking Glass 151) 
Alice adventures into a nonsolipsistic world where things--shadow as 
well as tree--exist whether she can name them or not. Reality 
triumphs over words, over human naming and ordering. The 
"termless wood" is a place of unity where things exist and are known 
prior to language. 
While in the "termless wood," Alice encounters a Fawn; she 
walks along "her arms lovingly round the soft neck of the Fawn, till 
they come to another field ... " ( 15 3). Once out of the wood and in to 
the meadow, naming I identity reasserts: 
... the Fawn gave a sudden bound into the air, and shook itself 
free from Alice's arms. 'I'm a Fawn!' it cried out in a voice of 
delight. 'And, dear me, you're a human child!' A sudden look 
of alarm came into its beautiful brown eyes, and in another 
moment it had darted away at full speed. 
(Through the Looking Glass 153) 
With her companion's abrupt departure, Alice is ready to cry with 
vexation but she consoles herself: "'However, I know my name now . 
. . that's some comfort"' ( 153). Thus, words are the source of both 
loss and consolation. 
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Wilbur's adjective "termless" describing Alice's wood is another 
connector than subtly binds the stanzas of "The Fourth of july" 
together. The poem is about words or "terms"--their power and their 
impotence. Wilbur plays on the multiple meanings of the word term 
and its derivative "termless." 15 The latter generally means "limitless, 
boundless"--without term when term has its original meaning as "a 
point of time designating the beginning or end of a period" or "a 
period of time having definite limits." "Termless" can also mean 
"unconditional "--without terms as the "conditions of a contract, 
agreement ... that limit or define its scope or the action involved," as 
the "terms" of a treaty. With "termless wood," however, Wilbur 
plays on another sense of "termless" based on additional meanings of 
the word "term." Term also means "a word or phrase having a 
limiting and definite meaning in some science, art, etc.," or "any word 
or phrase used in a definite or precise sense" or "terms"--"words that 
express ideas in a limited or special forms." In its transitive verb 
form, "term" means "to call by a term, to name." Thus the wood is 
"termless" because it disallows the use of words for naming, isolating 
objects in a definite and precise sense. In addition, as evidenced by 
Alice's initial loving and fearless relationship with the Fawn, another 
meaning of "terms" applies-- a "mutual relationship between or 
among persons." Termlessness allows "those groves where creature 
are I At one, distinct, and innocent of name," but , on the other hand, 
Alice and the Fawn cannot know each other in the fullness of their 
differences. Alice and the Fawn cannot name themselves to each 
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other or talk about the world they inhabit. It is no accident that they 
quickly move out into an open field; otherwise the story could not 
continue. 
The art of literature is not possible in the "termless wood," but 
logic and mathematics also fail. In logic, term means "either of two 
concepts that have a stated relation, as the subject and predicate of a 
proposition" or "any one of the three parts of a syllogism." In 
mathematics, "term" can mean "either of the two quantities of a 
fraction ration," or "each of the quantities in a series," or "each of the 
quantities connected by plus or minus signs in an algebraic 
expression." Therefore, in this "termless wood" created by the 
mathematician and logician Dodgson, the rational, philosophical, 
scientific world held together by "terms" founders. The world 
remains but humans can no longer impose imaginative or intellectual 
order. 
Although Wilbur admits that "No doubt the fairest game I Play 
only in those groves ... " of the termless wood, he adds a qualifying 
"Nevertheless .. at the beginning of the fourth stanza: 
4. 
Nevertheless, no kindly swoon befell 
Tree-named Linnaeus when the bald unknown 
Encroached upon his memory, cell by cell, 
And he, whose love of all things made had brought 
Bird, beast, fish, plant, and stone 
Into the reaches of his branchy thought, 
Lost bitterly to mind 
Their names' sweet Latin and his own as well. (Poems 70) 
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In a note to these lines, Wilbur cites Eiseley's Darwin's Century as 
one of his sources of information about Linnaeus. Recalling the work 
of some of those who served as precursors to Darwin's theory of 
evolution, Eiseley writes of Linnaeus: "The genius must receive 
extraordinary suppa:rt and co-operation in intellectual circles. 
Linnaeus wrote and flourished in a time when tiJe educated public 
had become fascinated with the r.~rord, the delight in sneer naming" 
(DC 17; emphasis added). Eiseley further describes the period: 
It was at last the full if early morning of the scientific age. All 
over the world the night was passing and strange beautiful 
plants were opening their flowers to the sun. In that time of 
unfolding beauty· the purpose of science was sti'Jllargef.v to 
nome and marvel. In that art there was none to surpass 
Carolus Linnaeus. (DC 18; emphasis added) 
Through Linnaeus's efforts the earlier "confused, unsystematic, and 
verbose" methods of naming plants and animals were replaced by 
the system of binomial nomenclature in Latin--the first name 
generic, indicating "a general group of creatures visibly related" and 
the second adjectival, "denoting a restricted specific group" (DC 20-
21). 
Eiseley writes of the poetry of Linnaeus's nature-- "his 
Whitmanesque love of the incredible variety of life": 
It was basically this poetic hunger of the mind to experience 
personally every leaf, flower, and bird that could be 
564 
encompassed in a single life which explains his gigantic labors. 
He was the naming genius par excellence, a new Adam in the 
world's great garden, drunk with the utter wonder of creation. 
(DC 19) 
However, for this man who became in the eighteenth century "'the 
symbol of science itself, .. life contained major ironies: 
Not least among the ironies of Linnaeus's career is the fact that 
he whose taxonomy had, before his death, come to stand for 
the sure fixity an eternal order of relationships in the world of 
life should have entertained discreet doubts as to its reality ... 
(DC 18-19) 
Linnaeus had proclaimed the "'fixity of species .. __ " Nuf/ae species 
novae," that there were no new species, that all species had come 
"'from original pairs created on a small island, which in the beginning, 
had constituted the only dry land, the original Eden of the world" (DC 
25). But Linnaeus's theory--the faith that underlay his science and 
his religion--was taxed by the reality he so loved. Confronted with 
the "'sportiveness"' of nature and trying to cling to his original thesis, 
Linnaeus struggled "'to distinguish between the true species of the 
Creator and the varietal confusion and dis order of the moment, 
which might be artificially manipulated by the skill of gardeners .. (DC 
25). Eiseley discerns a "growing uncertainty and doubt"' in later 
editions of the SJ,..·stema Naturae: 
He cautiously removes from later editions of the Svstema the 
statement that no new species can arise. The fixity of species, 
the precise definition of the term, is no longer secure. .. Nuf/ae 
species novae" had been accepted by the world, but to the 
master taxonomist who had drawn the lines of relationship 
with geometric precis ion all was now wavering toward 
mutability and formlessness. (DC 25; emphasis added) 
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Having lost "the precise definition of the term," Linnaeus entered his 
first "termless wood." The second and final came later. 
Wilbur, in one of the notes to "The Fourth of july" quotes from 
an eighteenth century biography of Sir Charles Linnaeus by D. H. 
Stoever to explain that, according to Swedish custom and family 
example, Linneaus's father took his family name from a linden tree 
near the family's native place in Sweden. Thus, Wilbur's pun on 
Linnaeus's "branchy thought" alludes to both Linnaeus's systematic 
diagrams of the branches of various species of flora and also to the 
botanist's tree name. In an explanatory note to the poem, Wilbur 
quotes Eiseley regarding the final, terrible irony of Linneaus's life: 
"Owing to a stroke, Linneaus lost in his latter years 'the knowledge 
even of his own name."' (Poems 112 ). The "termless wood" thus 
becomes manifest in the aged scientist who was named for a tree and 
who saw his "terms" undermined by the evidence of his eyes and 
who was finally robbed of all "terms "--even his tree name--by the 
stroke that robbed him of words. Kinzie says that in Wilbur's poem 
Linnaeus "stands as synedoche for the whole imaginary forest ... " 
("The Cheshire Smile" 19). Linnaeus, unlike Alice, never got out of 
the "term less wood" once he entered it. 
Eiseley, citing Linnaeus's "poetic brooding over time and 
destiny," quoted the taxonomist's eulogy for great botanists. 
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Linnaeus had written that though the '"knowledge of the true and 
original Tree of Life'" was lost, the plants which remain and renew 
their flowers will '"exhale the sweet memory"' of the men whose own 
names name them, making them "'more lasting than marble, so they 
will outlive those of kings and heroes .... [Tihe whole of nature must 
be obliterated before the genera of plants disappear and he be 
forgotten who held the torch aloft in botany'" (qtd. in DC 19-29 ). 
Eiseley saw in those words the "nostalgia and melancholy of a man 
who, even at the height of his success, knew with preternatural 
insight that ... 'fate is always against great things'" (20). Eiseley, 
another scientist with a poetic hunger and Whitmanesque love of the 
variety of life, writes a beautiful summation of the ironies of 
Linnaeus's fate: 
There is something awe-inspiringly symbolic about the stroke 
that destroyed his mental competence. It savors of the divine 
nemesis of which he had once written and long feared. He who 
in youth had beheld the beautiful lines of life gleam for an 
instant like a spider web on a dew-hung morning glimpsed a 
truth which, as is true of so much human knowledge, was also 
an illusion. The rainbow bridge to the city of the gods had 
vanished, leaving an old memoryless man. The passionate 
cataloguer of the SJ,..-stema Naturae no longer knew his book. 
Finally and most dreadful fate of all, there passed away from 
the proud, world-famous man the knowledge even of his own 
name. There remained in his garden only the dried husk of an 
old plant among new flowers reaching for the sun. (DC 25-26) 
Having read this passage by Eiseley, Wilbur wrote that " ... no 
kindly swoon befell I Tree-named Linnaeus when the bald unknown 
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I Encroached upon his memory, cell by cell" and caused to be "[l]ost 
bitterly to mind" the names of all the things of this world which he 
had loved. 
In the fourth and fifth stanzas of "The Fourth of july," Wilbur 
praises both poetry and science as ways of knowing. First, he honors 
the kind of knowing that comes through "negative capability," 
knowing that passes through the fire of "uncertainties, Mysteries, 
doubts" and does not require the proof of fact and reason: 
Praise to all fire-fledged knowledge of the kind 
That, stooped beneath a hospitable roof, 
Brings only hunch and gaiety for proof ... (70). 
To "fledge" means to rear a young bird until it is able to fly; to be 
"fire-fledged" suggests a fierce kind of upbringing--a coming to 
feathers through scorching, as the phoenix is born from the ashes of 
its incinerated self. "[S]tooped beneath a hospitable roof" calls to 
mind something-that-would-be-larger confined by its dwelling 
place--knowledge limited by the knower's brain case, the boundaries 
of human perception, intellect, and imagination. But the phrase 
implies also human beings limited by the universe that crowds the 
far-traveling imagination that would reach beyond the barriers of 
matter. However, though crowding, the roof is "hospitable," offering 
the guest kindness, comfort, and beauty if not spaciousness. This 
"fire-fledged knowledge Wilbur praises "[b]rings only hunch and 
gaiety for proof," a high-spirited intellectual adventurousness that 
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delights in challenging "the known" with only premonitions of the 
unknown. In a_11 interview, Wilbur has said that he believes in a 
"redeeming gaiety," a "gaiety in art which confronts the most 
desperate things": "What art needs to do, as Mi 1 ton said, is to reflect 
how all things "Rising or falling still advance His praise,' and in the 
process to make a full acknowledgement of fallen-ness, doubt, and 
death" (qtd. in Dacey 121). In "Lapis Lazuli" Yeats refers to "[g]aiety 
transfiguring all that dread." 
Having praised "fire-fledged knowledge" based on hunch and 
gaiety, Wilbur adds another kind of knowing to his celebration: 
5. 
But also to Copernicus, who when 
His vision leapt into the solar disc 
And set the earth to wheeling, waited then 
To see what slate or quadrant might exact, 
Not hesitant to risk 
His dream-stuff in the fitting-rooms of fact" (70) 
Copernicus, the Polish clergyman and student of mathematics, 
philosophy, and astronomy, becomes the ideal model for this second 
kind of knowing--imaginative conceptions that have their basis and 
are tried in the measurable world of science. Copernicus was "[n]ot 
hesitant to risk I His dream-stuff in the fitting-rooms of fact." 
Copernicus had read the few ancient writers who suggested that the 
earth turns on its own axis and also revolves about the sun: he also 
knew the Ptolemaic view (an elaboration of the earth-centered 
Aristotelean view) which declared that the spherical earth is the 
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motionless center of the universe about which the celestial sphere 
rotates.l6 Ptolemy's sytematized compendium of ancient 
astronomical knowledge was transmitted to the West in the Almagest 
and dominated the understanding of astronomy for over one 
thousand years (Kesten 159). However, despite the universal 
credence given the Ptolemaic system, Copernicus could not accept the 
artificial complexity of Ptolemy's epicycles and eccentrics; he 
compared his own observations--with the naked eye, before the 
invention of the telescope--to the celestial observations of those 
ancients who took a heliocentric view. Out of his years of 
observation and study and "with the help of God" came De 
.Hevo/utionibus, the manuscript in which he set out to prove the 
earth turns on its axis and revolves about the sun in a universe much 
larger than the Ptolemaic conception allowed. Given that "[n]o duty 
is more completely neglected by men than their duty to become 
wiser," how did Copernicus have the perspicacity and courage to side 
with classical passages generally considered absurd by almost all the 
thinkers of antiquity and contradicted by all Christendom? "Religion 
was naturally inclined to hold the earth, the seat of mankind, as the 
center of the world. And language obeyed (as it still does today) 
appearances" (Kesten 165). 
The enormity of Copernicus' imaginative leap, his intuitive 
genius is conveyed in the following passage from an essay, Nicolaus 
CoJ2ernicus, by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg; it is quoted in Hermann 
Kesten's book Conernicus and his World: 
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... Now just think: this idea condemned by the greatest sages 
of antiquity, an idea which was disreputable, awkward, 
dangerous and seemingly contemptible ... this idea comes to 
Copernicus' notice from casual descriptions; it arouses his 
attention, he tests it--and defends it. This was done by a 
fifteenth-century canon, living among canons ... not in the 
gentle climate of Greece and Italy, but among the Sarmats in a 
region which at that time was on the frontiers of the civilized 
world. He follows up this idea with indefatigable patience, not 
for a couple of years, but throughout half of his seventy-year 
long life; compares it with the sky, finally corroborates it, and 
thus becomes the founder of a New Testament of astronomy. 
And be achieves all this ... almost a hundred years before the 
invention of the telescope, with wretched wooden instruments, 
on which the divisions were often shown only by lines marked 
in ink. If he is not a great man, who in the world can claim 
such a title? This was the work of the spirit of order that dwelt 
in him, the spirit that itself originates in heaven and 
manifested its own nature in his work, and discovered order all 
the more easily because it remained free through inner 
strength. {qtd. in Kesten 165) 
Thus the Copernicus whom Wilbur includes in his praise made an 
imaginative leap of faith in science. With the words of lJe 
RevolutioniiJus OriJium Coelestium liiJri VI (the title given to his 
work by its editors), Copernicus offered humanity a world view 
based on discernible observations and reproducible calculations, 
liberating the imagination from the confines of the Ptolemaic system, 
which Lichtenberg described as "the most delicate, most artificial and 
at the same time the strangest mixture of sagacity, subtlety and 
delusion that the human mind had ever accepted" (qtd. in Kesten 
160). 
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For Michelson, the last lines of "The Fourth of july" seem too 
summary and trite, a too-neat wrapping up and a congratulatory 
assumption that now then we will get it right: 
And honor to these States, 
Which come to see that black men too are men, 
Beginning, after troubled sleep, debates, 
Great bloodshed, and a century's delay, 
To mean what once we said upon this day. 
Michelson says the poem finishes up "too quickly" and is ill-
proportioned, giving less attention to our country's crisis than to 
Linnaeus's senility or Copernicus's solar theory: 
The point--unhappily one can use that word here--is that the 
republic is finally taking its opening words to heart, the ones 
about all men being created equal, and that as a culture we are 
reconciling our dream stuff with reality, remaking the truth to 
fit the word and the idea .... And the final line, with its 
suspicious "we," cannot but ring with patrician complacency, 
oratory from the bandstand, in the park, in the all-white part 
of town. (Michelson 1 12) 
However, the ending may be far more more subtle and 
subversive than it first appears. Given all the previous allusions to 
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass 
and the considerable emphasis on the ambiguity of meaning and 
language, one can fairly wonder if the last line-- "To mean what once 
we said upon this day"--might allude to the conversation among 
A lice, the Mad Hatter, the March Hare, and the Dormouse in the "Mad 
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Tea-Party" chapter of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. Alice is 
admonished by the March Hare to say what she means. Insisting 
that she does, Alice replies, " ... at least, I mean what I say--that's 
the same thing you know" (58). Her companions do not know that at 
all: 
'Not the same thing a bit!' said the Hatter. 'You might just as 
well say that "I see what I eat" is the same thing as "I eat what 
I see''!' 
'You might just as well say,' added the March Hare,'that "I 
like what I get" is the same thing as "I get what I like"!' 
'You might just as well say,' added the Dormouse, who 
seemed to be talking in his sleep, 'that "I breathe when I sleep" 
is the same thing as "I sleep when I breathe" !' 
'It is the same thing with you,' said the Hatter .... (Carroll 58) 
Some further evidence suggests that when he wrote the last I ine of 
"The Fourth of july"--"To mean what once we said upon this day"--
Wilbur may have been thinking of the tea party discussion of 
whether meaning what you say is the same as saying what you 
mean. After some moments of silence (during which Alice considers 
the riddle of ravens and writing desks which had provoked the 
above interchange), the Hatter asks Alice what day of the month it is: 
"Alice considered a little, and then said 'The Fourth'" (58). 
Thus, meaning "what once we said we said upon this day" is 
undermined for those who remember their Alice. What actually did 
the forefathers (Washington and jefferson among others were 
slaveholders) mean in writing "all men are created equal and are 
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endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights"? And just 
who was being guaranteed the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness--and who was not? Did the forefathers perhaps mean 
more than they could act and did they leave the redeeming of those 
words to later generations? Wilbur suggests that we now must give 
far more inclusive meaning to what was said on that day and that we 
must must marry our actions to our words, to mean what we now 
say. 
Words, at least human words, do not make the nonhuman 
world; the tree stands, the shade cools whether Alice can name them 
or not. But words do contribute to making the world inside and 
among us and do facilitate the imaginative contact with all that is 
beyond. In response to being toid by a magazine editor that the 
word "depletion" had been spoiled "because readers couldn't look at 
it without thinking of Texas and the oil depletion allowance," Wilbur 
wrote back saying that "we musn't let words be spoiled, that we 
must always figure that .we can redeem anything that has been used 
and misused, however badly" (qtd. in "Poet-to-Poet" 240). Wilbur's 
redemptive vision is manifest in this poem; the proof is in the 
working out of the poem itself. The dedication of "The Fourth of 
july" to I. A. Richards, the celebration of great imaginative 
adventurers in both science and poetry, the struggle with words--by 
Dodgson, Grant, Alice, Linnaeus, and Copernicus, by Wilbur himself--
suggest what human effort and human gaiety (the delight in 
creation) can do. The last lines which turn to the occasion--a Fourth 
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of july declaration--are not at variance with what has gone before or 
an abrupt moral tag. They affirm both the possibility and the 
uncertainty of making I finding meaning with words. 
One may reasonably ask if Wilbur is not trying to put too much 
together in "Fourth of july." In another context Wilbur asked that 
question himself. Wilbur wrote of Yeats' poem "King and No King" 
and his own proud elucidation thereof: "One must question the 
integrity, the artistic self-sufficiency, of any short poem that requires 
to be grasped through the reading of a bad five-act play and the 
consultation of a biography" ("Round About a Poem of Housman's" 
35). Though defending the poet's rights to literary and historical 
allusions, Wilbur recognizes misuses of the past, like antiquarian 
pedantry, which can "distract us from the uninterpreted fields and 
streets and rooms of the present, in which the real battles of the 
imagination must be fought" (3 7): 
The past which most properly concerns the poet is, as T. S. Eliot 
has said, both temporal and timeless. Above all it is a great 
index of human possibilities. It is a dimension in which we 
behold, and are beheld by all those forms of excellence and 
depravity that men have assumed and may assume again. The 
poet needs this lively past as a means of viewing the present 
without provinciality, and of saying much in little; he must 
hope for the tact and the talent to make the past usable for the 
audience that his poems imply. 
("Round About a Poem of Housman's" 38) 
Discussing the use of allusion, Wilbur insists that "to evoke a 
legitimate emotional response ... a reference must in every case be 
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proven .... it should be the use of the reference, and not its inherent 
prestige, which demands response" (qtd. in Cummins 18).17 In "The 
Fourth of july" Wilbur teaches us the power of words, that things can 
indeed be held together by words, but only if we are willing to share 
in the perpetual struggle for terms. 
In his words for the cantata "On Freedom's Ground" Wilbur 
asks us to "[m]ourn for the dead who died for this country" and to 
"[g]rieve for the ways in which we betrayed them I How we robbed 
their graves of a reason to die" (Poems 45-46). He then rehearses 
the ways in which we betrayed those who fought and died for 
freedom: 
The tribes pushed west, and the treaties broken 
The image of God on the auction block, 
The immigrant scorned, and the striker beaten, 
The vote denied to liberty's daughters. 
Asking what we can salvage from this shame, he answers, "Be proud 
at least that we know we were wrong" and then adds this 
celebration: 
Praise to this land for our power to change it, 
To confess our misdoings, to mend what we can, 
To learn what we mean and to make it the law, 
To become what we said we were going to be. (Poems 46) 
For Wilbur, poetry arises out of community. Poetry is both "a 
self-shaping activity of the whole society, a collective activity by 
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means of which a society creates a vision of itself, arranges its 
values, or adopts or adapts a culture," and poetry is poems written 
by poets as a "specific, expert, and tributary form of the general 
imaginative activity" ("Poetry and Happiness" 92). In "Poetry and 
Happiness," Wilbur says that, ideally, the poetry of an individual poet 
should help to clarify, enrich, and refresh the poetry of a people--
"that ensemble of articulate values by means of which a society 
shapes and affirms itself" ( l 08). However, in America he finds the 
poet isolated because we lack a nationally unifying culture: 
... one cannot deny that in the full sense of the word 'culture' 
--the sense that has to do with the humane unity of a whole 
people--our nation is impoverished. We are not an articulate 
organism, and what most characterizes our life is a disjunction 
and incoherence aggravated by an intolerable rate of change. 
( 1 07; emphasis added) 
Unlike Dante who lived and wrote, as T. S. Eliot said, '"at the center of 
a diamond,'" the modern American poet "has no sufficient cultural 
heart from which to write" ("Poetry and Happiness" lQ6). Wilbur 
says that "the poet hankers to write in and for a culture, countering 
its centrifugal development by continually fabricating a common and 
inclusive language in which all things are connected" ("Poetry and 
Happiness" 1 09). He declares that "we cannot enjoy poetic happiness, 
until the inner paradise is brought to terms with the world before us, 
and our vis ion fuses with the view from the window" ( 1 05).18 In his 
essay "On My Own Work," Wilbur says that "the incoherence of 
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America need not enforce a stance of alienation in the poet; rather, it 
may be seen as placing on him a peculiar imaginative burden, and 
commiting him perhaps to something like Yeats's long and loyal 
quarrel with his native Ireland" ( 116). Whitman called America the 
greatest poem and demanded poets who would create the necessary 
unifying archetypes for a disparate democracy. Reflecting the 
nation's own birth, Wilbur makes his celebration of the American 
Bicentennial of splendid fragments bound by the words of an 
imaginative vision. With words, he caiis us to honor the terms of 
liberty and justice, the imaginative adventure on which our country 
was founded. 
The Innocent Fox: " ... the thing that lives in the midst of the bones" 
The primitive response to mystery, "[tlo a world suspected of 
being woven together by unseen forces," was the organizing power of 
magic. Though crude and imperfect, magic is still, according to 
Eiseley, "man's first abstraction from nature, his first attempt to link 
disparate objects by the unseen attraction between them" (UU 32). 
Imagination itself is a kind of magical conjuring, drawing out the 
unseen connections. Eiseley speaks of encountering "along the 
borders of the known that 'awful power' which Wordsworth 
characterized as the human imagination" (ST 273). He remembers 
Wordsworth's description of the imagination rising suddenly from 
the mind's abyss and enwrapping the solitary traveler like a mist. In 
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"The Innocent Fox" the God-like imagination takes the form of a 
curious, enveloping fog. The essay binds together five different 
episodes from the author's life in a search for meaning and miracle. 
Like Wilbur's poem "The Fourth of July," Eiseley's essay brings 
together a variety of elements that are bound imaginatively by an all 
pervasive symbol--in Wilbur's poem the sunlight, in Eiseley's essay 
the fog. Unlike Wilbur who made his poem out of a conglomeration 
of events and other people, Eiseley uses episodes from his own life--
however fictionalized--as the elements to be bound by the powerful 
magic of imagination. 
From the opening of "The Innocent Fox," Eiseley sets a mood of 
mystery and persistent longing for something not yet understood. 
He declares himself and his fellow human beings to be seekers after 
meaning, searchers who have found in nature their first manuscripts 
of inscrutable hieroglyphs. Humankind has been haunted by vague 
intuitions of meaning ever since the first person looked into a still 
pool at "an impossible visage" and saw it tremble and disappear at a 
touch. The image maker (and dissolver) "went home and created a 
legend" to speak of what could not be fully understood or explained. 
According to Eiseley, these meanings have been felt "even in the 
wood, where the trees leaned over ... manifesting a vast and living 
presence .... The great trees never spoke but man knew that dryads 
slipped among their boles" (ST 53). And Eiseley believed that "the 
compulsive reading of such manuscripts"--the hieroglyphs of nature 
--will continue long after the volumes that contain humankind's 
579 
inmost thought have been "sealed away by the indefatigable spider" 
(ST 53). In his essay "The Chresmologue," Eiseley describes 
humankind as part of what Emerson called the mutable cloud of 
Nature, part of the hieroglyphic code. More than a single puzzle, man 
"is an indecipherable palimpsest, a walking document initialed and 
obscured by the scrawled testimony of a hundred ages" (NC 59). 
Written in his features and "the very texture of his bones are the 
half-effaced signatures of what he has been, of what he is, or of what 
he may become" (NC 60). 
Characterizing himself not as a "daylight reader" like some, but 
a "librarian of the night," Eiseley says that his "ephemeral documents 
consist of root-inscribed bones or whatever rustles in thickets upon 
solitary walks" (ST 53). Insisting that the compulsion to illuminate 
the night suggests "that we know more of the shadows than we are 
willing to recognize," Eiseley says that "[wle have come from the 
dark wood of the past, and our bodies carry the scars and unhealed 
wounds of that transition. Our minds are haunted by night terrors 
that arise from the subterranean domain of racial and private 
memories" (ST 53-54). We inhabit, Eiseley says, "a spiritual twilight 
on this planet," a feeling of loss that is not so much a deprivation as 
"an unrealized anticipation": "We imagine we are day creatures, but 
we grope in a lawless and smoky realm toward an exit that eludes 
us. We appear to know instinctively that such an exit exists" (ST 54). 
Quoting Santayana that "life is a movement from the forgotten into 
the unexpected," Eiseley asserts that man would not be here if it 
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were not to find the gates or mysterious holes in the hedge that "a 
child would know at once led to some other dimension at the world's 
end" (ST 54). Though the business of humankind is to look for the 
gates and openings that lead to the unforseen, too many adults are 
blindered by the preoccupations of living. In his tale of the fox cub, 
Eiseley recounts how a creature, young but not at all unreal or 
baffling or mysterious, helped him cross the threshold into another 
dimension. 
Having established a mood of eeriness, longing, and 
expectation, Eiseley recounts an autumn night in 1967 when one of 
those holes in the hedge appeared for him. Looking out from his 
study at "the attic cupola of an old Victorian house," he saw a 
brilliant blue light blaze like a lightning flash in the high dormer 
window. He recognized that what he saw was a "giant bolt of 
artificial lightning ... playing from a condenser, leaping at inervals 
across the interior of the black pane in the distance" (ST 55). Eiseley, 
the watcher, says that for years he had seen nothing out of his study 
window but "the relentless advance of suburban housing" and 
nothing "that did not spell the death of something I loved" (ST 55). 
But in those instant flashings he recognized the kind of artificial 
lightning that only a very few engineers with special equipment 
could produce. He fantasized that some "mad scientists" in a hidden 
room were engaged in a "fantastic experiment," "some remarkable 
and unheard of adventure" (ST 56). He tantalized himself with 
thinking that "there was a fresh intelligence groping after some 
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secret beyond pure technology." Watching, night after night, "while 
the leaves thinned and the bolt leaped at its appointed hour," he 
dreamed, of "that coruscating arc revivifying flesh or leaping sentient 
beyond it into some ungues sed state of being. Only for such 
purposes ... would a man toil in an attic room at midnight" (ST 56). 
And then, as suddenly as the phenomenon began, it ended. 
Eiseley watched but no lightning flashed. While he waited 
expectantly, nothing happened except that the autumn rains brought 
down the leaves which "yellowed the wet walks below the street 
lamps" and birds flew across the face of the moon (ST 56-57). 
Disappointed, Eiseley came to feel the episode expressed the 
recurrent limitations of science: 
[The episode] ... was altogether too much like science itself--
science with its lightning bolts, its bubbling retorts, its elusive 
promises of perfection. All too frequently the dream ended in 
a downpour of rain and leaves upon wet walks. The men 
involved had a way, like my mysterious neighbors, of 
vanishing silently and leaving, if anything at all, corroding bits 
of metal out of which no one could make sense" (ST 57). 
Eiseley had come to the episode at a time when he was growing 
dimly aware, despite his "encasing cocoon of books and papers," that 
something was missing from his life: "I was ... trapped in the 
despair ... the utterly hopeless fear confined to moderns--that no 
miracles can ever happen" (ST 55). It had been the charm of the 
unexpected and the beautiful which had attracted him to science, but 
he had come to a point in his life when "something more was needed" 
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and that something "verged on a miracle" though he, as a scientist, 
did not believe in miracles. Eiseley defines a miracle as an event 
without continuity in the natural order; it appears and disappears 
suddenly, dissolving or opposing the natural order. He also observes 
that this loose definition of miracle--something that both suddenly 
appears and disappears in opposition to the natural order--
" strangely· .. . would include each individual person" (ST 57; 
emphasis added). 
Eiseley recognized that his "whole life had been unconsciously a 
search" not restricted to the bones and stones of paleontology. This 
heightened awareness of a need for something more came for Eiseley 
at an age which allowed folly and demanded "a boldness that the 
young frequently cannot afford": "All I needed to do was to set forth 
either mentally or physically, but to where escaped me" (ST 55). His 
disappointment at the fruitless watching for his mad scientists to 
return led him to conclude that the experience had been "only a 
tantalizing expectation, a hint that I must look elsewhere than in 
retorts or coiled wire, however formidable the powers that could be 
coerced to inhabit them." He abandoned this "autumnal, sad magic" 
with "a growing feeling that miracles were particularly concerned 
with life, with the animal aspect of things" (ST 57). Thus, in a 
receptive mood and having promised himself a journey, Eiseley 
answered a summons that made necessary "a long night drive over 
poor roads through a dense forest" (ST 57). He calls that journey "a 
near approach to what I was seeking." Eiseley was ready for the 
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ensuing adventure because he had discovered that a miracle cannot 
simply be seen; one must refine one's perceptions and must be 
"reasonably sophisticated even to perceive the miraculous. It takes 
experience; otherwise, more miracles would be encountered" (ST 58). 
Eiseley describes a "journey of descent through the mountains"; 
alone on the twisting and turning road, he sees foliage lit by "the 
earthly starshine of eyes under leaves" and then intervals of 
"impenetrable gloom buttressed by the trunks of huge pines" (ST 58). 
Weary and sti 11 longing for that something more, the driver becomes 
"dimly aware" of something just beyond the reach of his headlights, a 
creature "amazingly fleet" whose outline he never really saw: 
It seemed, at times ... to be running upright like a man, or, 
again, its color appeared to shift in a multiform illusion. 
Sometimes it seemed to be boundi.ng forward. Sometimes it 
seemed to present a face me and dance backward. From weary 
consciousness of an animal I grew slowly aware that the being 
caught momentarily in my flickering headlights was as much a 
shape-shifter as the wolf in a folk tale. It was not an animal; it 
was a gliding, leaping mythology. (ST 58) 
Eiseley says that, though lost, he "understood the forest"; his blood 
"was not urban," coming from other times and "a far place," almost 
not human. Even so, he feels "the horror that even animals feel 
before the disruption of the natural order" (ST 59). He wonders if, in 
fact, there is a natural order but then considers the question absurd: 
"Why should life tremble before the unexpected if it had not already 
anticipated the answer? There was no order. Or, better, what order 
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t!Jere mig!Jt be was far wilder and more formidable than that 
conjured up by· human effort" (ST 59: emphasis added). Thus 
Eiseley has the intuition of a system that contains but is not limited 
by the human interpretations of life, matter, motion, and time. This 
wilder, more formidable order must be far larger and more complex 
than the kingdom, phylum, class, order, and species that human 
beings use to describe living things; the periodic table that orders 
chemical elements by weight; the laws of thermodynamics; and the 
measurement of time by the speed of light. 
A simple, ordinary explanation of what flew before him is not 
possible because ltnor1ling in the context of this wilder, more 
formidable order is not possible. Wryly, Eiseley observes that "[i]t 
did not help in the least to make out finally that the creature who 
had assigned himself to me was an absurdly spotted dog of dubious 
affinities," a dog whose coat had "the curious properties generally 
attributable to a magician"(ST 59). These "curious properties" are 
elucidated in the epigraph Eiseley chose for "The Innocent fox," a 
qutotation from Peter Beagle: 
'Only to a magician is the world forever fluid, infinitely 
mutable and eternally new. Only he knows the secret of 
change, only he knows truly that all things are crouched in 
eagerness to become something else, and it is from this 
universal tension that he draws his power.· (qtd. in ST 53) 
Eiseley casts himself as a magician who sees the world "forever fluid, 
infinitely mutable and eternally new." Knowing the secret of change 
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and that all things crouch in eagerness to become something else, he 
cannot not say "what shape this dog had originally possessed a half-
mile down the road," had "no way of securing [the dog's] word for it," 
and could not be sure it would remain a dog as it disappeared into 
the night. What he has called dog is a phantasm--" an i 11 usory 
succession of forms finally, but momentarily, frozen into the shape 
'dog' by me. A word, no more" (ST 59). What he has called dog 
escapes the confines of his perception and his ordering: 
... it had been picked by me out of a running weave of colors 
and faces into which it would lapse once more as it bounded 
silently into the inhuman, unpopulated wood. We deceive 
ourselves if we think our self-drawn categories exist there. 
The dog would simply become once more an endless running 
series of forms, which would not, the instant I might vanish, 
any longer know themselves as 'dog.' (ST 59). 
Eiseley, too, had found a termless wood where words and categories 
fail. 
Eiseley extends this shape-shifting to describe his very concept 
of himself. The "mental effort peculiar to man" could not hold the 
phantoms it wrenched into flesh, neither man nor dog: 
We were contradictions and unreal. A nerve net and the 
lens of an eye had created us. Like the dog I was destined to 
leap away at last into the unknown wood. My flesh, my own 
seemingly unique individuality, was already slipping like flying 
mist, like the colors of the dog, away from the little parcel of 
my bones. If there rl'as order in us, it was the order of change" 
(ST 59; emphasis added). 
586 
Chastened and unsure, Eiseley is left knowing only that "something 
was running and changing in the haunted wood" and that likewise 
his mind was "leaping and also changing as it sped" (ST 59-60). 
Through his leaping, changing mind would come "my own miracle ... 
in its own time and fashion." 
These episodes--the vain search for the miraculous in artificial 
lightning bolts and the pursuit of some alluring, shape-shifting 
phantom---prepare for the revelation which follows when Eiseley"s 
"true miracle" comes "in its own time and fashion" (ST 60). He 
describes being left alone on "an unengaging and unfrequented 
shore" near the broken prow of a boat left on the beach "by the 
whim of ancient currents." The bleached "upthrust ribs" of the boat 
carcass become a symbolic artifact connecting to the "1 ittle parcel of 
my bones" from which Eiseley has perceived his flesh and his 
seemingly unique individuality slipping. The boat ribs also become 
the harbinger for the bones that follow--the emaciated body of 
Eiseley"s dying father and the bones that are part of the "small 
miracle" Eiseley finally experiences. The fading autumn light of the 
late afternoon matches the elegaic feel of the isolated beach with its 
wrecked remains. Details convey the sense of an ephemeral, 
uncertain, fading world--the heavy sand which seems to draw the 
subsiding boat into it, the "shifting coast," the wavering horizon with 
"the tenuous outlines of a misplaced building, growing increasingly 
insubstantial" (ST 60). 
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What follows is both real and unreal, a kind of half awake 
dream vision taking place, we later learn, during the cold hours of a 
night spent under the overhang of the foundered boat. The beach 
world becomes even more insubstantial and mysterious with the 
appearance of the fog. Its .. extending immensity" swallows the 
voices of Eiseley' s departing companions, trails in wisps over the boat 
staves, and fingers "the tracks of some small animal, as though 
engaged in a belated dialogue with the creature's mind" (ST 60). The 
humanized fog hesitates "as though puzzled" over the crisscrossing 
tracks and then approaches and enwraps Eiseley who realizes "that I 
was not intended immediately to leave" (ST 60). Resting against the 
overturned boat, Eiseley watches as the.stillness intensifies and 
nothing escapes "the wandering tendrils of the fog": 
.. The broken cup of a wild bird's egg was touched tentatively~ 
as if with me.aning, for the /irst tirm. I saw a sand-colored 
ghost crab, hitherto hidden and immobile, begin to sidle amidst 
the beach grass as though imbued suddenf.v rvit.IJ a will derived 
ultimateJ..v /rom the foe A gull passed high overhead, but its 
cr..v took on the plaint of something other than itsel£" 
(ST 60; emphasis added) 
The egg, the crab, the gull are each changed by the touch of the God-
like fog. The egg takes on meaning, the ghost crab is suddenly 
invested with a will, the gull is touched by a mysterious otherness. 
Eiseley remembers what he calls a primitive dialogue of the sort that 
contains "not outworn speculations." The discussion centered on 
"whether God is a mist or merely a mist maker," a question Eiseley 
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finds neither irrational nor blasphemous: "How else would so great a 
being, assuming his existence, be able thoroughly to investigate his 
world, or, perhaps, merely a world that he had come upon, than as he 
was now proceeding to do?"(ST 60-61 ). Obviously, "so great a being" 
would be able to investigate thoroughly any world in ways not 
necessarily within the reaches of the human imagination. The 
question is really: How else can the human imagination conceive so 
great a being except as an exploring mist--or as a swan or a rain of 
gold or cloven tongues of fire, as a voice from a burning bush or out 
of a whirlwind.? 
Water is Eiseley's most frequent symbol for the fecund 
imagination. Water is where life began, and combined with sunlight 
and the elements, water continues its furtive breeding: "If there is 
magic on this planet, it is contained in water .... a wind ripple may 
be translating itself into life. Thin vapors, rust, wet tar and sun are 
an alembic remarkably like the mind; they throw off odorous 
shadows that threaten to take real shape when no one is looking" (lJ. 
15). Eiseley relates the birth of his mythic persona to water--
listening to the sound of the sea in a shell, following the ominous lure 
of underground water to the places below, feeling his isolated self 
dissolve and merge with the Platte River. Like water that reaches 
under, on, and above the earth, the imagination reaches beyond the 
known into the unknown, searching past and future. Like water 
which "can assume forms of exquisite perfection in a snow flake, or 
strip the living to a single shining bone cast up by the sea" (lJ_l6), 
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the imagination has tremendous potential for both creation and 
destruction. In "The Innocent Fox," water mists into an all-pervasive 
fog. 
Closing his eyes and allowing "the tiny diffused droplets of the 
fog" to explore his face, Eiseley feels "some unexplained affinity": "I 
felt my mind drawn inland, to pour smoking and gigantic as the fog 
itself, through the gorges of a neighboring mountain range" (ST 61). 
Man makes God in the image of a fog and then makes himself in the 
image of God; the likeness between God and human are likeness of 
imagination. Divine or human, the imagination fills the world with 
its curiosity and its search, its positing of meaning and will, and its 
perception of otherness. The imagination escapes the confines of 
time and place and the boundaries of selfhood. Like an immense 
mist, the imagination envelops and interpenetrates, blurring 
separateness and erasing the illusion of form. 
Eiseley describes his consciousness, only partly aware, in "a 
little shaft of falling light," moving like a mist, swirling "dimly over 
the tombstones of a fallen cemetery": "Something within me touched 
half-obliterated names and dates before sliding imperceptibly 
onward toward an errand in the city" (ST 61). That errand to the 
future is in interrupted, however, by a rising of his correcting, 
protective consciousness to a higher level of awareness. He perceives 
the lightening of the dream as a mercy guiding him away from the 
revelations that the errand to future might hold. 
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As suddenly as he had been dispersed like a mist, Eiseley is 
collected again, called "back among the boat timbers and the broken 
shell of something that had not achieved existence" (ST 61). He is 
haunted by a line from the dead poet Charles Williams: "'I am the 
thing that lives in the midst of the bones.'" He recognizes himself as 
a small form frozen or otherwise altered into a solid or semisolid 
state from the immense fluid mist: "It was true. I was merely 
condensed from that greater fog to a smaller congelation of droplets. 
Vague and smoky wisplets of thought were my extensions" (ST 61 ). 
With this last line, consciousness again lightens, and like the 
probing fingers of fog, his dreaming imagination explores not the 
future, but the past: "From a rack of bone no more substantial than 
the broken boat ribs on the beach, I was moving like that larger, all-
investigating fog through the doorways of the past" (ST 61). In his 
vision, the year is announced on a blowing newspaper as 1929, and 
the fog is transformed into a blizzard beating on the gate of St. 
Elizabeth's Hospital. Eiseley himself is transformed, coalescing out of 
the snowstorm--" I was no longer the b 1 izzard "--and becoming "a 
small dark shadow" hurrying up a stairway toward the sound of "a 
labored and importunate breathing" (ST 61 ). 
Imaginatively, Eiseley has returned again to the bed of his 
dying father-- "wracked, yellow, and cadaverous." He remembers the 
moribund man's preoccupation and the mere flicker of recognition 
for his younger son: " ... he knew me only as one lamp is briefly lit 
from another in the windy night" (ST 61 ). Eiseley realizes in his 
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dream what he had been too young to understand as he stood beside 
the death bed. His father was being held in life by "a magnificent 
heart that would not die," pursuing some unanswered question: "He 
was beyond speech, but a question was there, occupying the dying 
mind, excluding the living, something before which all remaining 
thought had to be mustered" (ST 61). Now, as "the hurrying shadow 
drawn from the wrecked boat" and "the insubstantial substance of 
memory, the dispersed droplets of the ranging fog," Eiseley the son 
would try to "interpret and relive the question." 
In memory, Eiseley watches as his father, in a last lucid 
moment, holds up his hands, the strong hands of a craftsman and the 
only parts of his body left unravaged by his illness. A shadow come 
back across forty years, Eiseley the son watches as his father, 
another shadow, "the mist in the gaping bones," appears to ponder as 
the "seemingly untouched deathless instruments rally as though with 
one last purpose before the demanding will" (ST 62). As he 
perceived the fog touch the egg with meaning, Eiseley invests his 
father's actions with meaning. The dying shadow seems to ask his 
living hands: "'Why are you, my hands, so separate from me at 
death, yet sti 11 to be commanded? Why have you served me, you 
who are alive and ingeniously clever?'" (ST 62). The dying man 
seems to have stepped outside of life and to be looking back, trying 
to understand the meaning of it: "He was outside, he was trying to 
look into the secret purposes of things, and the hands, the masterful 
hands, were the only purposes remaining, while he, increasingly 
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without center, was vanishing" (ST 62). To Eiseley, it seemed that his 
father's last thought was of these hands which had become strangers 
and denied the answer to his last question. 
Suddenly, stiff with the night's cold, Eiseley awakens; 
consciousness brings him back to the overhang of the boat. He is "no 
longer the extension of a blizzard beating against immovable gates" 
and the year is no longer a year of locust plagues in Nebraska but the 
present of the essay, "the year of the mist maker that some obscure 
Macusi19 witch doctor had chosen to call god" (ST 62). In the way 
that the fog had earlier touched the egg, the crab, and the gull and 
had seemed to endow them with meaning, will, and otherness, it also 
touched the man: " ... the mist maker had gone over the long-
abandoned beach, touching for his inscrutable purposes only the 
broken shell of the nonexistent, only the tracks of a wayward fox, 
only a man who serving the mist maker, could be made to stream 
wispily through the interstices of time" (ST 62). This streaming 
wispily through the crevices of time and space had taken the form of 
dream and memory; awakening as the fog and night were lifting, the 
anthropologist says that he chose not to examine his own hands. 
Returned from his far journey, Eiseley crouched in his heavy 
sheepskin waiting "without thought as the witch doctor might have 
waited for the morning dispersion of his god" (ST 63). As the dawn 
touched the sea and the worn timbers of the boat beside which he 
had sheltered, Eiseley the watcher begins to glimpse the world form 
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the "different perspective" that he had said earlier was necessary to 
perceiving a miracle. 
As he sighs remembering the miracle sought and lost in the 
fantastic flashes of artificial I ightning that his presumed mad 
s~ientists had played with so tantalizingly before they abruptly 
dis appeared, Eiseley sees his bonafide miracle: "I saw it because I 
was hunched at ground level smelling rank of fox, and no longer 
gazing with upright human arrogance upon the things of this world" 
(ST 63). He has earned his miracle in the way of mystics and 
visionaries--by recognizing and following a not clearly understood 
and unanswerable longing, by making his journey through the dark 
night of the soul, by revisiting painful memories, by humbling 
himself, changing perspective, and becoming quiet and receptive. 
His wandering attention centers on "nothing but two small 
projecting ears lit by the morning sun" and beneath them "a small 
neat face" looking shyly up. Crinkling only with curiosity and not 
fear, the ears of the fox cub move in response to every sound. The 
man, however, recognizes that the creature is very young and alone 
in "a dread universe." Eiseley says that he crawled around the prow 
of the boat and crouched beside the cub. There the man is invited to 
step across the illusion of form, to crawl through the hole in the 
hedge he had so long sought: 
He innocently selected what I think was a chicken bone from 
an untidy pile of splintered rubbish and shook it at me 
invitingly. There was a vast and playful humor in his face .... 
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... here was the thing in the midst of the bones, the wide-
eyed innocent fox inviting me to play, with the innate courtesy 
of its two forepaws placed appealingly together, along with a 
mock shake of the head. (ST 63-64) 
Remembering the British poacher in a pub who swore he would kill 
the last fox in the wodd if he could, Eiseley says he crouched even 
further and more painfully "away from human stature." In this 
prayerful posture, Eiseley experiences the undoing of the old law 
that one can never "get around to the front of the universe" and thus 
can see the universe only from its far side, realizing "nature only in 
retreat." With the young fox's playful invitation, "[t]he universe was 
swinging in some fantastic fashion around to present its face, and the 
face was so small that the universe itself was laughing" (ST 64). 
Eiseley concludes that this was no time for human dignity but 
a time "only for the careful observance of amenities written behind 
the stars": 
Gravely I arranged my forepaws while the puppy whimpered 
with ill-concealed excitement. I drew the breath of a fox's den 
into my nostrils. On impulse, I picked up clumsily a whiter 
bone and shook it in teeth that had not entirely forgotten their 
original purpose. Round and round we tumbled for one 
ecstatic moment. (ST 64) 
For that brief moment, the evolution into separateness is suspended 
and the man and the fox together become "the innocent thing in the 
midst of the bones"--the playful, exuberant, inexorable life urge that 
is "born in the egg, born in the den, born in the dark cave with the 
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stone ax close to hand, born at last in human guise to grow coldly 
remote in the room with the rifle rack upon the wall" (ST 64). 
Eiseley, however, is triumphant because he has had his miracle, has 
seen "the universe as it begins for all things .... a child's universe, a 
tiny and laughing universe" (ST 64). 
Quickly, before the magic ends, before the rising sun burns 
away the mist of imagination and brings back the "normal" world, 
Eiseley rolls the cub over on its back and flees for the nearest ridge. 
On the way he passes an adult fox returning to its den after a night 
of hunting. The fox and the man pass watchfully but their eyes do 
not meet; they are separated by their experiences of the world. 
Eiseley is content, however; he has had his revelation: 
" ... to me the mist had come, and the mere chance of two 
lifted sunlit ears at morning. I knew at last why the man on 
the bed had smiled finally before he dropped his hands. He, 
too, had worked around to the front of things in his death 
agony. The hands were playthings and had to be cast aside at 
last like a little cherished toy. There "'as meaning and there 
JJ~HS not meaning, and therein /a_v the agon.J(' 
(ST 64; emphasis added) 
As sixty-year-old men, Eiseley, and his dying father, had discovered 
that "[t]he meaning was all in the beginning, as though time was 
awry" and that "[i]t was a little beautiful meaning that did not 
stay" (ST 64-65). Either meaning attenuates with life, or humans 
move farther away from recognizing it. Eiseley concludes that "the 
old man on the hospital bed had traveled briefly towards [this 
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revelation] through the dark at the end of the universe" and had 
learned that "something in the desperate nature of the world ... had 
to be reversed" but had been too weak to tell him (ST 65). 
Forty years later, the groping fog of the imagination had, as 
Wordsworth described it, risen from the mind's abyss to enwrap the 
solitary traveler like a mist, and in it Eiseley found his miracle--
"very small, as is the way of great things." Permitted as he sees it to 
"correct time's arrow" for a space of five minutes, he calls on others 
also to "run the arrow backward": "Doubtless it is impossible in the 
physical world, but in the memory and the wi 11 man might achieve 
the deed if he would try" (ST 65). In a rare moment of humor, the 
scientist feels unabashed triumph in his earned miracle: 
For just a moment I held the universe at bay by the simple 
expedient of sitting on my haunches before a fox den and 
tumbling about with a chicken bone. It is the gravest, most 
meaningful act I shall ever accomplish, but, as Thoreau once 
remarked of some peculiar errand of his own, there is no use 
reporting it to the Royal Society. (ST 65) 
Eiseley's search for meaning and miracle is religious in the 
same sense that Wilbur finds poetry to be "essentially religious"--
because it asserts the relevance of all things to each other. In his 
essay on "The Innocent Fox" Eiseley finds connections among his own 
restless longing, artificial lightning bolts, a phantom dog, the ribs of a 
shattered boat, his dying father's fascination with his hands, and a 
playful fox cub. Auden, who called Eiseley "a deeply compassionate 
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man" and a man "unusually well trained in the habit of prayer ... 
the habit of listening," considered that the scientist had resolved two 
conflicting human impulses in his episode with the fox cub: "We 
oscillate between wishing we were unreflective animals and wishing 
we were disembodied spirits, for in either case we should not be 
problematic to ourselves" (Introduction 21-22). One solution to this 
ambiguity is laughter. On this occasion, the melancholic 
scientist/essayist resolved the conflict between flesh and spirit by 
playing with a fox cub. He solved one of nature"s hieroglyphs. 
Through imagination, memory, and will "man might achieve the deed 
if he would try." 
"On the Marginal Way": "May that vast motive wash and wash our 
own 
In an essay called "Paw Marks and Buried Towns," Eiseley 
writes of the need to know the past and understand our connections 
to it so that we may learn tolerance: 
We in the modern world have turned more stones, listened to 
more buried voices, than any culture before us. There should 
be a kind of pity that comes with time when one grows truly 
conscious and looks behind as well as forward, for nothing is 
more brutally savage than the man who is not aware he is a 
shadow. Nothing is more real than the real; and that is why it 
is well for men to hurt themselves with the past--it is one road 
to tolerance. (NC 85). 
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In his poem "On the Marginal Way," Wilbur remembers the past and 
examples of what Eiseley calls man's "disruptive malice": "It is as 
though we carried with us from some dark tree in a vanished forest, 
an insatiable thirst for cruelty" (NC 85). Wilbur hurts himself with 
the past so that the future may be healed. 
Wilbur might have chosen as an epigraph for his poem "On the 
Marginal Way" a line from Eiseley's The Invisible Pyramid: 
· ... when the light changes all is changed, including life" (IP 127). 
Eiseley speaks of not just the light outside but "the golden light that 
changes in the head of man ... [and] cries to memory out of vanished 
worlds, the leaf-fall light of the earth's eternally changing theatre" 
(IP 128). As he looks at the rock formations "On the Marginal 
Way, "20 the poet is reminded of events of recent human history in a 
compressed geology of the imagination, succeeding eras evoked by 
the changing light which suffuses the rubble of "strange rock." When 
seen as "sleek, fluent, and taffy-pale," the rocks are likened to "That 
catch of bodies on the sand, that strew I Of rondure, crease, and 
orifice, I Lap, flank and knee"--the "too abundant view" witnessed 
by Victorian missionary George Borrow of "A hundred women 
basking in the raw" on a beach in Spain. The light varies and the 
rocks alter from "sleek, fluent, and taffy-pale to flushed rose and 
"the melting shape of bodies fallen anyhow"-- "a Gericault of blood 
and rape":21 
Some desert town despoiled, some caravan 
Pillaged, its people murdered to a man, 
And those who murdered them 
Galloping off, a rumpling line of dust 
Like the wave's white withdrawing hem. 
(Poems 120) 
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The scene grows even worse when "greyed I By a swift cloud that 
drags a carrion shade." Wilbur describes "the vision of a colder lust" 
in which the rocks become bodies lying in a "death too dead to look 
asleep." In the grey light they resemble the "[p]oor slaty flesh 
abandoned in a heap" like "Auschwitz' final kill." 
Burdened by the horror of his vision, the poet explains that "It 
is not tricks of sense"--the variations in color as the sunlight change 
and clouds move-- "Which distracts I Least fancies into violence." 
The troubling comes from within; it is "the time's fright within me" 
which changes the beach rubb led with strange rock to scenes, 
unwillingly remembered, of communal brutality. What Wilbur 
means by the "time's fright" is indicated in the penultimate stanza: 
"high above the shore I On someone's porch, spread wings of 
newsprint flap I The tidings of some dirty war"--news of Vietnam 
specifically but also of any "dirty war." Shuddering from a 
imagination contaminated by a violent world, the poet withdraws--
"my thought takes cover in the facts"--into the terms of geology (just 
as in "In the Field" the mind tried to take cover in the details of 
astronomy). He muses on the origins of the rocky beach: 
" . . . how the bed 
Of layered rock two miles above my head 
Hove ages up and broke 
Soundless asunder, when the shrinking skin 
Of Earth, blacked out by steam and smoke, 
Gave passage to the muddled fire within, 
Its crannies flooding with a sweat of quartz, 
And lathered magmas out of deep retorts 
Welled up, as her~. to fill 
With tumbled rockmeal, stone-fume, lithic spray, 
The dike's brief chasm and the sill. 
(Poems 121). 
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This natural geologic violence continues in a slower, subtler way in 
the form of weathering: "By sanding winds and water, scuffed and 
brayed I By the slow glacier's heel." 
Actually, the poet's escape into fact has led him into metaphor 
--a natural, external equivalent for the internal chaos of the human 
species. The human imagination in its power and its violent potential 
mimics the creative disruptive forces which have shaped and 
continue to shape the earth. Humankind, too, has "the muddled fire 
within" which erupts in lathered magmas and sweats of quartz--and 
scenes of b load and rape and mass exterminations. How then can the 
poet, in the presence of remembered horror and present carnage, 
declare "It is a perfect day"? Is it sufficient that "the waters clap I 
Their hands and kindle, and the gull in flight I Loses himself at 
moments, white in white"? The final stanza is puzzling in its 
assurance: 
And like a breaking thought 
joy for a moment floods into the mind, 
Blurting that all things shall be brought 
To the full state and stature of their kind, 
By what has found the manhood of the stone. 
May that vast motive wash and wash our own. 
(Poems 122). 
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One is reminded of the assurances of Julian of Norwich that "All shall 
be well and all manner of things shall be well." The power which 
will bring all things ""ltlo the full state and stature of their kind is an 
ambiguous ""what"'-- ""By what has found the manhood of this stone." 
What indeed has found the manhood of the stone? Is it the poet's 
imagination that has seen life and death among the rocks? Or, is it 
the shaping force-"that vast motive"--which set into being the 
processes that created both the rock formations and the human mind 
which could then recreate the rocks imaginatively? Presuming a 
""vast motive"" behind creation suggests faith in an intentionality that 
has awareness, concern, and power to effect some cosmic plan. The 
dramatic changes of scene as the light changes also suggest the 
power of the imagination to make the world; the world becomes for 
us what our inner light imagines. 
The first line of ""On the Marginal Way"--""Another cove of 
shale" --conveys redundancy, repetition; nature's reiteration of coves 
of shale sets the mood of recurrence, of " de j'a vue all over again" in 
which scenes of dehumanization and violence are repeated in history 
and in memory. The poem works as a descent of the imagination 
into the hells of human making. In the first imagining of lust, 
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Borrow's too-much-of-a-good-thing glimpse of "rondure, crease and 
orifice" objectifies and depersonalizes the female form into parts 
trapped in a demeaning and powerless state, "in the raw." With the 
second scene change, the imagination steps deeper into the inferno to 
the Gericault-like scene of rape and murder. The third scene images 
a far "colder lust": the poor slaty flesh is destroyed before it dies and 
its bed is a mass grave. No one could think to put the consoling 
epitaph "just asleep" over the graves of the victims of Auschwitz. 
The imagination which conjures up these scenes of distaste 
progressing to revulsion and horror is redeemed with the last change 
of light. The sea is "[t]ransfigured by the sun's return." Previous 
emphasis on the alterations of light provoking changes of imagined 
setting allow the transformation by the return of sunlight to the 
rubbled beach. But more than a simple change of mood is implied. 
Awed and reverent before the fact of "tumbled rockmeal, stone-
fume, lithic spray," the speaker sees the stones recline and burn 
"lc]omely as Eve and Adam." Suddenly the world returns to 
innocence and among "the bright boulders," "three girls lie golden in 
the lee I Of a great arm or thigh." The guilty sea of earlier 
metaphors is also transfigured by the light: The caravan murderers 
galloped off "a rumpling line of dust I Like the wave's white, 
withdrawing hem." Auschwitz' final kill were bulldozed into a 
common grave "like sea-rocks buried by a wave." With the sun's 
return the transfigured waters "clap their hands and kindle" and 
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become the element of celebration--" 1 ike a breaking thought I joy ... 
floods into the mind." 
Though, high above the shore 
On someone"s porch, spread wings of newsprint flap 
The tidings of some dirty war, 
It is a perfect day: the waters clap 
Their hands and kindle, and the gull in flight 
Loses himself at moments, white in white, 
And like a breaking thought 
joy for a moment floods into the mind, 
Blurting that all things shall be brought 
To the full state and stature of their kind, 
By what has found the manhood of this stone. 
May that vast motive wash and wash our own. (Poems 122) 
The poet had insisted that it was "the time"s fright within me" 
which distracted "[l]east fancies into violence," but the present time 
only caused him to remember earlier times fraught with their own 
terrors. Bitter cruelty has been a recurrent theme in the history of 
"the sixth and human day." The violence of the human imagination 
expressed in acts of savagery and in their haunting remembrance 
contrasts to the forces of creation which cast up innocent rock 
shapes, playfully arranged in configurations suggestive to the 
perceiver of human forms--" found the manhood of this stone." The 
poet prays, "May that vast motive wash and wash our own." 
Repetition of "wash and wash" performs the sound and action of 
waves rising and breaking over rocks. Wash also suggests the judea-
Christian redemption: " ... though your sins be as scarlet, they shall 
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be white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shalt be as 
wool" (Isaiah l: 18). The hope for a better human day is in 
remembering and being, as Eiseley said, "hurt by the past." Human 
imaginations planned the murderous plundering of a caravan, the 
death camp at Auschwitz, and every "dirty war," but human 
imaginations also remember these acts and record them with 
anguish. 
Michelson finds it easier to say what "the final, difficult stanza" 
of "On the Marginal Way" does not mean than what it does mean. 
Warning that making too much of the religious vocabulary of 
Wilbur's poems can unfairly reduce and confine the achievement and 
"portray his vision as more bounded and safe than it is," Michelson 
writes: "The baptism-like end of 'On the Marginal Way· might make 
the yearned:..for redemption at the ending eerily familiar or consoling 
and 'Christian-like,' but finally it does not seem Christian in 
substance, and it is not affirmed in any final gesture of faith" (99). 
Michelson too quickly disavows a Chrisitian tone to a poem written 
by a poet who declares himself to be a Christian. Besides those 
Michelson mentions, there are several other Christian allusions 
within the poem. The "sixth and human day" and "Eve and Adam" 
echo the Genesis stories of creation. "Transfigured by the sun's 
return" has contained within it a religious pun--"transfigured by the 
Son's return," suggesting the Christian redemption to be brought to 
perfection upon the Second Coming. The evi 1 bird of war-- "spread 
wings of newsprint flap I The tidings of some dirty war"--is 
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counterpointed by an emblem suggestive of the Holy Spirit-- "the gull 
in f1 ight I Loses himself at moments, white in white." These Christian 
symbols suggest that the human imagination is capable of not only 
horrors but also of redemptive myth. 
An interpretation which neither precludes nor requires the 
strictly Dlristian resolution is possible. Perhaps the answer to the 
poem is in its creation, in the power of the imagination. The events 
the poet recounts tell of the savage, dark side of human creativity, 
but the mind which creates the poem out of these cruel memories 
longs for a redeemed imagination that delights in the creation rather 
than destroys it. The acts of remembering and of making a poem out 
of historical terrors render to the past the only recompense possible 
--attention and sympathy. As the walker in "Walking to Sleep" must 
stare his brother down by lifting his gaze to look full in the face at 
the man on the gallows whose eye sockets have been pecked hollow 
by crows, the poet in "On the Marginal Way" must look full at the 
horrors at the past. An imagination that remembers and is hurt by 
the past and pays attention to the present has an opportunity for 
redemption in the present. What Wilbur offers is an act of the 
imagination which is a "brilliant negative" to the brutalities past and 
present and a strong affirmation of the "vast motive" that may "wash 
and wash our own." This answer is neither facile nor ineffective; it 
requires strenuous, continual, and imaginative commitment by the 
poet and by those who would to share his vision. 
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Payne says that in "On the Marginal Way," "the world acts as a 
redemptive force which grounds the mind, saving it from the terrors 
of its own imaginings" ( 192). Wilbur sets against the man-made 
horrors what he sees as the invincible beauty and goodness of 
creation. Wilbur places against those horrors his faith that the 
universe is full of glorious energy which takes pattern and shape 
despite evil and disorder and his conviction that the ultimate 
character of things is "comely and good." Wilbur has a kind of 
humble conviction that humankind does not have the last word in 
the nature of things. What Wilbur says of landscape painting in 
"Regarding Places" he would probably also find true of poetry: 
... for landscape painting to attempt its fullest possibilities in 
any period, there must be some painters who embody the 
attitude of V. D. Perrine, who said of rocks, trees, and rivers 
that they were 'symbols of a great Universal Power ... which 
makes and shapes tree and rock and river equally with myself.' 
Provided the holder of such a view can also paint, he may help 
to redeem us from indifference or subjective deformity by his 
achievements of place--a place being a fusion of human and 
natural order, and a peculiar window on the whole. ( 159-160) 
"On the Marginal Way" offers "a peculiar window on the whole" by 
juxtaposing the horror of human disorder against the beauty of 
natural order. 
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"The Star Thrower": "The stars throw well. One can help them." 
In "The Star Thrower," Eiseley describes his "fugitive glimpse" 
of "what man may be." As in "The Innocent Fox," his moment of 
insight comes "along an endless wave-beaten coast at dawn": "As 
always, there is this apparent break, this rift in nature, before the 
insight comes. The terrible question has to translate itself into an 
even more terrifying freedom" (UU 67). Eiseley arrives on the 
shores of Costabel-- "[pJerhaps all men are destined at some time to 
arrive there as I did" --as a desiccated, withered Giacometti figure 
seeking meaning in a place where nothing makes sense, where a 
woman in a dingy restuarant could be heard saying--as if in a 
disconnected bit of conversation from "The Wasteland"--" 'My father 
reads a goose bone for the weather'" (68). Eiseley himself is the "eye 
glaring in the skull" mentioned in the epigraph from Seccho ("Who is 
the man walking in the Way? I An eye glaring in the skull"): 
I was the skull. I was the inhumanly stripped skeleton without 
voice, without hope, wandering alone upon the shores of the 
world. I was devoid of pity, because pity implies hope. There 
was, in this dessicated skull, only an eye like a pharos light, a 
beacon, a search beam revolving endlessly in sunless noonday 
or black night. Ideas like swarms of insects rose to the beam, 
but the light consumed them. (68) 
This man reduced to a "skull of emptiness" with its "revolving light 
without pity" conceals himself with fisherman's cap and sunglasses 
and so manages to look 1 ike everyone else on the beach. 
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This pitiless seeker has brought his emptiness to a place 
equally without pity. The beaches of Costabel are scenes of carnage 
--nature-made and man-made destruction, a damp wasteland 
"littered with the debris of life." 
Shells are cast up in windrows; a hermit crab, fumbling for a 
new home in the depths, is tossed naked ashore, where the 
waiting gulls cut him to pieces. Along the strip of wet sand 
that marks the ebbing and flowing of the tide death walks 
hugely and in many forms. Even the torn fragments of green 
sponge yield bits of scrambling life striving to return to the 
great mother that has nourished and protected them. (UU 69) 
But the sea-mother rejects her offspring, leaving them to struggle 
silently and unavailingly in the surf. Trapped on the shore, the 
breathing pores of the starfish fill with sand and their mucilaginous 
bodies dry and shrivel in the sun. "The seabeach and its endless war 
are soundless. Nothing screams but the gulls" (UU 69). Yet, not only 
nature is cruel. In the tourist season and after fierce storms, "one 
can observe another vulturine activity." In a kind of greedy, 
competitive madness, professional shellers scurry along the beaches 
during the night hours before dawn. Using electric torches, they 
gather the storm-stranded starfish and mollusks. The living shells 
"will be slowly cooked and dissolved in the outdoor kettles provided 
by the resort hotels for the cleaning of specimens" (UU 70). Eiseley 
says that it was "[f]ollowing one such episode" that he met the star 
thrower. 
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Sleepless, he had walked out into the pre-dawn, post-storm 
world where the lights of shell hunters flashed on a beach torn and 
ragged, blown sand powdering the air. It was a world of natural 
destruction busy with those who preyed on the helplessly stranded. 
The detritus of the sea included "upended timbers, conch shells, sea 
wrack wrenched from the far-out kelp forests," a pink-clawed crab 
in a cup of green sponge, and "ll]ong-limbed starfish ... strewn 
everywhere, as though the night sky had showered down" (UU 70). 
His pharos, searching eye is met by the sand-bleared but beautiful 
dark-lensed eyes of a dead octopus. Walking on past the shellers to 
a steeper part of the shore where "the sound of the sea [grew I 
heavier and more menacing," Eiseley rounded a point hoping for 
refuge from the wind. Behind him in the eastern sky the sun was 
"an ominous red glare amidst the tumbling blackness of the clouds," 
but before him shimmered "a gigantic rainbow of incredible 
perfection." At the foot of the rainbow Eiseley saw a human figure, 
oblivious, gazing at something in the sand. Reaching the figure, 
Eiseley watches as the stranger gently takes a living starfish 
struggling against suffocation in a pool of sand and silt and hurls it 
over his head far out into the sea. In answer to Eiseley's question, 
the star thrower tells him that he collects only the living and "'lo]nly 
like this'": "'The stars throw well. One can help them'" (UU 72). 
Responding to the unspoken question that kindles in the stranger's 
eyes, Eiseley declares that he does not collect: '"Neither the living 
nor the dead. I gave it up a long time ago. Death is the only 
successful collector"' (UU 72). 
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Looking back as he walks on, Eiseley sees the star thrower 
continue his quixotic effort against death: "For a moment, in the 
changing light, the sower appeared magnified, as though casting 
larger stars upon some greater sea. He had, at any rate, the posture 
of a god" (UU 72). But the cold, world-shriveling eye in the skull 
reasserts dominance, and Eiseley reminds himself that the star 
thrower is only a man and that "death is running more fleet than he 
along every seabeach in the world" (UU 7 2 ). As he returns to his 
hotel past the starfish gatherers and the shell collectors, Eiseley 
chooses "to look full at the steaming kettles in which beautiful 
voiceless things were being boiled alive" (UU 7 3). He concludes that 
Costabel is one of those place set apart for shipwreck and that he has 
unerringly made his way there. 
In this four-part essay, Eiseley uses part one to introduce the 
wasteland of Costabel and the vaster wasteland of his interior being. 
Peter Heidtmann describes Costabel as "a region of the spirit 
externalized for the sake of narrative" (UU 83). In a letter toW. H. 
Frey, Eiseley admitted that he picked up the name Costabel "by 
listening to a seashell many years ago somewhere on what has been 
called the coast of illusion" (qtd. in Angyal 81). Andrew Angyal 
notes that Eisetey was in the habit of heightening or altering or even 
inventing the details of his "numinous encounters" with mysterious 
others like the star thrower: "Clearly, these autobiographical 
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passages, which seem so disingenuous and candid, are actually highly 
contrived literary efforts" (81). These encounters contain 
imaginative truths not inhibited by or contained in the mere facts. 
Eiseley"s descriptions of himself as a pitiless wanderer absorbed in 
his own aridity and anguish are truths of the spirit, and the place 
Costabel and the star thrower are truths of the imagination. 
Together, parts one and four present the mythic and memorable 
expressions of desolation and hope and the choice for life that 
becomes his paradigm for moral action. Parts two and three are the 
sections where Eiseley passes through the dark night of his soul and 
earns the right to make his myth. In these central sections, he 
moves from passages describing events and anguish of his actual 
boyhood on the western plains to discussions of science and 
evolution and man's place in the cosmos. The shifts between subject 
matter are, as Angyal suggests, carefully wrought and flow naturally 
one into the other, building toward the revelation that finally comes. 
At the beginning of part two, Eiseley, having vividly created 
the charnel house of Costabel, asserts a connection between the 
earth's terrain and "our human outlook." He suggests that unlike the 
born plains-dweller who can reasonably expect one step to lead to 
another, the mountaineer may discover that one step leads to 
another only "by a desperate leap over a chasm or by an even more 
hesitant tiptoeing across precarious snow bridges" (UU 73). He finds 
in these opposed landscapes an "analogue to the mind of man." We 
abandoned "the protected instinctive life of nature" for "an 
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adventurous existence amidst the crater lands and ice fields of self-
generated ideas" (UU 74). Now, on "the level plains of science," we 
seem to have stepped out of illusions into a world of "imposed order" 
and "the enormous vistas of past and future time." Little or nothing 
remains unmeasured except the interior terrain--the mind of man. 
Remembering the flat, predictable prairies of his youth, Eiseley 
acknowledges the "one contingent aspect of that landscape"--
twisters, cyclonic funnels that could tear across the land with 
devasting fury or could manifest as whimsical "dust devils," dancing 
and spinning gently on hot days. These twisters and dust devi Is 
were "the trickster part of an otherwise pedestrian landscape" (UU 
75). Unlike more prudent neighbors, Eiseley's parents never 
constructed a storm cellar. Buffeted by the trickster element in 
nature, his father and mother rejected planning: "Unconsciously, 
they had arived at the philosophy that foresight merely invited the 
attention of some baleful intelligence that despised and persecuted 
the calculating planner" (UU 75). Eventually, Eiseley came to 
recognize in the human mind a "maleficent primordial power" akin to 
"the wandering dust storms of the exterior world" (UU 75). This 
hidden dualism of the inner world that mimics the outer is called 
good and evil by religion, form versus chaos by science. 
However, since the dominance of the theory of evolution, even 
form seems an unstable illusion: "Our apparent shapes .... waver 
and dissolve into the unexpected" (UU 76). 
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We are rag dolls made out of many ages and skins, changelings 
who have slept in wood nests or hissed in the uncouth guise of 
waddling amphibians. We have played such roles for infinitely 
longer ages than we have been men. Our identity is a dream. 
We are process, not reality, for reality is an illusion of the 
daylight--the light of our particular day. (UU 76) 
Even so, buried within the human psyche, contained in the shell of 
our wavering forms, is an injunction, "a plea to wait upon some 
transcendent lesson preparing in the mind itself" (UU 76). 
Yet, Eiseley finds the "facts we face ... terrifyingly arrayed 
against us" (UU 76-77). He likens this threat to the trickster he saw 
perform at the devout ritual of a primitive people. The trickster 
mimicked in silent, carefully choreographed derision behind the back 
of the officiating priest. In modern, scientific times, contingency, the 
indeterminable, dances at our backs. Eiseley concludes that the 
primitives had found a way to acknowledge the "dark message" of 
the cosmos: "Perhaps the primitives were wiser in the ways of the 
trickster universe than ourselves; perhaps they knew, as we do not, 
how to ground or make endurable the lightning" (UU 77). At this 
point, Eiseley says he can understand why a modern primitive (the 
father of the woman overheard in the dingy restaurant in part one) 
"reads goose bones for the weather of his soul" (UU 77). He himself 
is pursued and will be pursued till his death by a shadow, mocking 
and posturing behind him. 
Eiseley concludes that folklore has long recognized that 
"lilnstability lies at the heart of the world" (UU 78). 
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With uncanny foresight folklore has long toyed symbolically 
with what the nineteenth century was to proclaim a reality, 
namely, that form is an illusion of the time dimension, that the 
magic flight of the pursued hero or heroine through frogskin 
and wolf coat has been, and will continue to be, the flight of all 
men. (UU 78) 
This power to change can be either creative or destructive and must 
be counterbalanced by "an equal impulse toward specificity" to avoid 
the "formless and inchoate void of the possible" (UU 78). Each form, 
individual or species, clings to its identity and "strives to contain the 
creative and abolishing maelstrom that pours unseen through 
generations" (UU 78). Though life struggles "to maintain every 
manifestation, every individuality, that exists .... life always fails, 
but the amorphous hurrying stream is held and diverted into new 
organic vessels in which form persists, though the form may not be 
that of yesterday" (UU 78-79). Life, like the galaxies, rushes from 
some unknown center to the periphery of the ever-retreating edges 
of possibility: 
As the spinning galactic clouds hurl stars and worlds across the 
night, so life, equally impelled by the centrifugal powers 
lurking in the germ cell, scatters the splintered radiance of 
consciousness and sends it prowling and contending through 
the thickets of the world. (UU 79) 
The pharos eye of the alienated man upon a bed in Costabel has 
discovered this "devious, tattered way" of life which continuously 
fails to perfect or maintain a single form but also continuously 
creates out of its failure the possibility of new forms. 
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Eiseley, the eye within the skull, also becomes aware that he is 
being searched out by another eye --perhaps an exteriorized, 
haunting projection from his own mind. It, too, transforms from 
"something glaucous and blind beneath a web of clinging algae" to 
"the sand-smeared eye of the dead cephalopod ... encountered on 
the beach" to the childhood memory of "the beaten, bloodshoot eye of 
an animal" to "an eye that seemed torn from a photograph" (UU 79-
80). Eiseley recognizes the last, the eye that looked through him "as 
though it had already raced in vision up to the steep edge of 
nothingness and absorbed whatever terror lay in that abyss," as his 
mother's. This revelation ends part two. 
At the beginning of part three, Eiseley retreats (as though in 
dread of the encounter with his mother) from the personal after 
linking the question as to why a man who pursues knowledge should 
be left with "a revolving search beam in the head whose light falls 
only upon disaster or the flotsam of the shore" to the question as to 
why ships should seek the coasts that invite shipwreck. He describes 
a world changed for all humankind, from a supernatural world in 
which prophecy was sought in bones ("quaint almanacs of nature's 
intent") and hunters apologized to the souls of the animals they 
hunted to a natural/scientific world, "a place of homeless frontiers 
and precipitous edges" and "terrible freedoms" where tomorrow was 
not manageable and where tools revenged themselves on their 
-- -----~-----
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creators. Science could create tools out of nature but could not 
control their ambivalence nor "that urge for tampering and 
dissolution," "that subconscious poltergeist" which the human 
inventors had inherited from primate ancestors. In the enchanted 
forest of the supernatural, pre-scientific world, "we had been safe ... 
because of our weakness" --what we did not know and could not 
alter. "When the powers of that gloomy region were given to us, 
immediately, as in a witch's house, things began to fly about 
unbidden" (UU 81 ). Blinding illuminations were accompanied by 
huge shadows. Not only priests, but scientists had the trickster 
dancing malignly at their backs. 
Bacon, Darwin, Einstein, and Freud were "carriers of the light," 
but they also cast unexpected shadows. What began as a retreat of 
darkness "presaged the emergence of an entirely new and less 
tangible terror" (UU 82). Finite in power himself, man had released 
unlimited natural forces: "They were the irrevocable monsters 
conjured up by a completely amateur sorcerer" (UU 82-83). Eisetey 
lists the nineteenth-century discoveries "that now threaten to induce 
disaster": 1) the discovery of the interlinked and evolving web of 
life; 2) Darwin's description of the struggle for existence which he 
saw as purely selfish--one organism never acting with purely 
disinterested concern for another--ironically companioned by his 
comforting assumption that man, unlike other living species, had a 
future '"of inappreciable length'"; and 3) Freud's revelation that the 
"secure, stable, and sunlit province of the mind" was in reality a 
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place of contending furies. "Ghostly tranformations, flitting night 
shadows, misshapen changelings existed there, as real as anything 
that haunted the natural universe of Darwin" (UU 84). Eiseley 
recognizes: that it was the contending furies in his own mind that 
brought him as the destruction-seeking skull and eye to Costabel. 
Haunted by the agonized eye in the remembered photograph, 
his mother's eye, Eiseley recalls sorting through her belongings after 
her death and the years of emotional and physical estrangement that 
preceded it. In the attic he had found his old satchel containing a 
jackknife, a "rat" of hair fashionable in the early part of the century, 
"two incredibly pointed slippers" intended for a formal ball to which 
his mother would never have been invited, and a packet of studio 
portraits bound in rotted string. Also in the satchel were two 
separate notes, each declaring: '"This satchel belongs to my son, 
Loren Eiseley'" (UU 85). He recognizes the town name stamped on 
the back of a photograph "Dyersville, Iowa" as his mother's 
hometown and for the first time thinks of it as "the dire place." At 
the edge of the Dyersville photograph stand two young girls, the 
younger clinging reluctantly to the older. Looking at the picture of 
the six-year-old girl, Eiseley winces at the knowledge that "[h]ere it 
beg1.n, her pain and mine": 
The eyes in the photograph were already remote and 
shadowed by some inner turmoil. The poise of the body was 
already that of one miserably departing the peripheries of the 
human estate. The gaze was mutely clairvoyant and lonely. It 
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was the gaze of a child who knew unbearable difference and 
impending isolation . 
. . . The last message had come from Dyersville: 'my son.' 
The child in the photograph had survived to be an ill-taught 
prairie artist. She had been deaf. All her life she had walked 
the precipice of mental breakdown. Here on this faded porch it 
had begun--the long crucifixion of life. (UU 86) 
This man who had himself been a lonely, frightened child--shut out 
of normal expressions of maternal affection, terrified by his mother's 
outbursts, and ashamed of "the gross gesticulations" that passed as 
communications between them--finally recognized his mother as the 
tormented child in the photograph. 
Feeling the burden of her confronting presence, Eiseley 
remembers the Biblical injunction to "lllove not the world, neither 
the things that are in the world." With her torn eye upon him, 
Eiseley whispers to "a waiting presence in the empty room": 
'But I do love the world .... I love its small ones, the things 
beaten in the strangling surf, the bird, singing, which flies and 
falls and is not seen again .... I love the lost ones, the failures 
of the world.' (UU 86) 
With this confession, Eiseley feels as though he has renounced his 
scientific heritage,21 but with it the "merciless beam" no longer 
traverses his skull and with it the torn, sad eye of his mother 
surveys him one last time and is gone. With his confession, two rifts, 
one universal and one personal, close. Imaginatively and 
compassionately, he has reached across time and long-harbored, 
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corrosive anger and rejection to the suffering child who had been his 
mother. He recognizes in the erratic deaf woman who had danced 
like a malevolent shadow at his back--darkening his life with her 
rage and selfishness and bizarre behavior--the loneliness, isolation, 
failed expectations, and mental instability of another human being 
who suffered. Though she had been as destructive to her child as the 
violent, storm-tossed sea at Costabel which had littered the beach 
with her castoff progeny, Eiseley was finally able to hear his 
mother's last message left in a satchel in a dusty attic-- "my son ... 
my son." Tacitly he acknowledges her as one of the beaten things, 
one of the lost ones and failures of the world. His understanding and 
implied forgiveness free him of the trickster at his back and the 
"dark impulse toward destruction" lurking in the subconscious that 
had brought to this place demanding shipwreck. 
The second rift-- "one of the last great rifts in nature" --becomes 
"a joining." By "the expression of love projected beyond the species 
boundary by a creature born of Darwinian struggle," the star thrower 
annihilated Darwin· s theory of the purely self- interested fight for 
existence and reasserted "the human right to define his own frontier" 
(UU 87). Eiseley concludes that "through war and famine and death, 
a sparse mercy had persisted, like a mutation whose time had not 
yet come" (UU 87). Out of that "sparse mercy," a creature born of the 
contentious struggle for survival had "stretched out its hand in pity." 
With the act of throwing living stars back into the sea, the star 
thrower had challenged the pre-existing boundaries: "He had moved 
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to the utmost edge of natural being, if not across its boundaries. It 
was as though at some point the supernatural had touched 
hesitantly, for an instant, upon the natural" (UU 87). 
Nature had created a projection out of herself: "Out of the 
depths of a seemingly empty universe had grown an eye ... " (UU 
87). Looking out upon itself and searching, this eye had assumed 
"the shape of man" and "had ascended like a vaporous emanation 
from the depths of night." Thus nature had found a way to confront 
and observe herself: 
The nothing had miraculously gazed upon the nothing and was 
not content. It was an intrusion into, or a projection out of, 
nature for which no precedent existed. The act was, in short, 
an assertion of value arisen from the domain of absolute zero. 
A little whirlwind of commingling molecules had succeeded in 
confronting its own universe. (UU 87) 
Man had arisen as mysteriously as one of the dust devils or twisters 
which created itself out of the sky and earth of the prairie. Nature 
chose to be conscious of herself and out of desolation had come 
mystery: "Some ancient, inexhaustible, and patient intelligence, lying 
dispersed in the planetary fields of force or amidst the inconceivable 
cold of interstellar space, had chosen to endow its desolation with an 
apparition as mysterious as itself" (UU 88). Thus, unrestrained by 
"what is vulgarly called the natural," man is fated to be nature's 
consciousness--an "ever recurrent, reproachful Eye floating upon 
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night and solitude," telling nature of her own existence. "[T]hought 
mediated by the eye is one of nature's infinite disguises" (UU 88). 
As Eiseley sees it, man, born out of the the desolation of the 
universe, is inevitably condemned to "endless disillusionment." Yet 
out of that condemnation comes an incredible liberty not extended to 
nature's other manifestations that are not burdened with a higher 
consciousness: " ... out of such desolation emerges the awesome 
freedom to choose--to choose beyond the narrowly circumscribed 
circle that delimits the animal being" (UU 88). In that choosing, the 
struggle between chaos and order are re-enacted and "contend for 
the destiny of a world." 
Having gone through the dark night of his soul in parts two and 
three of "The Star Thrower" and having made the choice to reach 
across the gulf of years and estrangement to his dead mother, Eiseley 
is ready in part four to align himself visibly with the star thrower. 
"In the sweet rain-swept morning," he finds the thrower again 
standing at the foot of "that great many-hued rainbow." Silently, 
Eiseley bends beside him to pick up a starfish and spin it far out to 
sea. He tells the star thrower, '"I understand ... Call me another 
thrower'" (UU 89). Knowing that they are the first of a breed, that 
other star throwers will come after, Eiseley feels himself and the 
original thrower "part of the rainbow--an unexplained projection of 
the natural" (UU 89). He could feel "the drawing of a circle in men's 
minds" and saw the rainbow as "a visible model of something 
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toward which man's mind had striven, the circle of perfection" (UU 
89). 
Having found some degree of reconciliation with his personal 
past and a new hope in the present, Eiseley is able to make other 
connections. He is able to imagine and then identify with some giant 
Star Thrower on the rim of space hurling real stars: "I could fee~ the 
movement in my body. It was like a sowing--the sowing of 1 ife on 
an infinitely gigantic scale" (UU 90). He can believe that because he 
and the thrower standing in the rainbow are flinging their living 
stars against "the insatiable waters of death" that some Thrower "far 
off, across bottomless abysses" hurls another world more joyfully. 
Eiseley can think of the Thrower in human terms--lonely, with the 
end toward which he labors also hidden. Eiseley, this melancholic 
man, could throw in "a frenzy of joy," but knowing that it is men as 
well as starfish he is trying to save, he sets himself to throw 
deliberately and well. 
Eiseley also experiences "a great atavistic surge of feeling," a 
spiritual kinship with the ice age hunters whose rituals had included 
"making obeisance to the souls of the hunted." He feels the return of 
a prehistoric memory: "the perfect circle oi compassion from life to 
death and back again to life--the completion of the rainbow of 
existence" (UU 90). He has the sense of having reached again "the 
last shore of an invisible island" that the primitives of the ice age had 
always known: "They had sensed intuitively that man cannot exist 
spiritually without life, his brother, even if he slays" (UU 91 ). Eiseley 
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is able to fling himself "as forfeit ... into some unknown dimension 
of existence" because nature had set the example, evolving in the 
star thrower a creature who "loved not man, but life": 
In the night the gas flames under the shelling kettles would 
continue to glow. I set my clock accordingly. Tomorrow I 
would walk in the storm. I would walk against the shell 
collectors and the flames. I would walk remembering Bacon's 
forgotten words 'for the uses of life.' I would walk with the 
knowledge of the discontinuities of the unexpected universe. I 
would walk knowing of the rift revealed by the thrower, a hint 
that there looms, inexplicably, in nature something above the 
role men give her. I knew it from the man at the foot of the 
rainbow, the starfish thrower on the beaches of Costabel. 
(UU 92) 
He chose to walk like his imagined cosmic Star Thrower, in desolation 
but not defeat. 
Eiseley knew that "lm]en have long memories when the 
memories are clothed in myth" (NC 28), and his essay "The Star 
Thrower" has the beauty and power of myth. Its imaginative 
evocation of life-affirming good gets its power, however, not from its 
framing tale of the mythic figure engaged in an apocalyptic gesture 
of world-sowing but from the dark night of soul of the interior tale in 
which Eiseley confronts the difficulty of love and forgiveness. 
Without the persona's confrontation with his own inner desolation 
and rage, the tale of the Star Thrower would be a simple morality 
fable, an exemplum of limited effect. What Eiseley does, in fact, is 
retell The Rime of the Ancient Mariner. The Mariner is not freed 
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from his guilt, isolation, and despair until he reaches across the 
barrier of form to see their beauty and bless the water-snakes. 
Looking at the "!b]lue, glossy green, and velvet black" of the coiling 
"happy living things," the Mariner felt a spring of love gush from his 
heart "!a]nd I blessed them unaware" (Coleridge 409). Eiseley had to 
come to realize that loving "the things beaten in the strangling surf .. 
. . the lost ones, the failures of the world" meant that he would also 
have to love and forgive his mother. As he saved stranded starfish, 
Eiseley also reached imaginatively into the past--beyond his own 
suffering child-self to the suffering child who was his mother. 
It is hard to create an acceptable myth in an age that knows so 
much that the good becomes ambiguous. As symbolism and as a 
direct act of care for a fellow living thing, throwing stranded starfish 
back into the sea would see unimpeachable. However, no good deed 
is without its consequences. In his review of The UnexP-ected 
Universe at the time of its publication, William Caldwell pointed out 
that starfish are no sea-innocents but voracious marauders of beds of 
shellfish. Caldwell termed the starfish "a murderous monster" and 
said that "one starfish can clean out a bed of clam or oysters in a 
week" (qtd. in Heidtmann 83). Thus, saving starfish condemns large 
numbers of the species on which they feed. Caldwell therefore found 
it "disconcerting to hear a scientist giving himself virtuous airs for 
engaging in such an irresponsible caper" as interfering on behalf of 
one species without regard for the ecological consequences. One 
might also point out that though Eiseley piously sets himself apart 
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from the shellers whom he portrays as heartless collectors preying 
on stranded shellfish, a quick death in a pot for mollusks and 
echinoderms is probably more merciful than slowly shriveling in the 
sun. 
Eiseley succumbs at times to the malady that Maritain found 
afflicting a number of modern writers; he described it as "a 
weakening in the movement toward beauty, together with a 
weakening in the movement toward the work, or a kind of desertion 
of the work as master object to which the operative intellect is . 
vowed." Instead, the writer--and this is Eiseley's greatest failing--
becomes "more interested in constructing his own image as an 
example, for the generation to come, of a martyr imprinted on paper 
... " (Maritain 150). Eiseley often portrays his persona as a Saint 
Francis figure juxtaposed to some "other" who is uncaring or actively 
malign--like the would-be fox-killer he mentions in "The Innocent 
Fox"--and then self-righteously congratulates himself. In The 
Firmament of Time, Eiseley tells of a lake-edge encounter with a 
young muskrat that had not yet learned the survival s-kill of fearing 
humans. Coming very near the man, the muskrat rose out of a lake 
on which, later in the day, "young Apollos" and attractive girls would 
speed about in high-powered motorboats. Eiseley describes the 
muskrat as "an edge-of-the-world dweller, caught between a 
vanishing forest and a deep lake pre-empted by unpredictable 
machines full of chopping blades" (FOT 156). Piously, Eiseley warns 
"my muskrat" away with a few pebbles and then, as the animal 
---------. 
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vanishes in an oncoming wave, walks away "obscurely pleased that 
darkness had not gained on 1 ife by any act of mine" (FOT 157). Yet 
what he had in fact done was to send the muskrat to shelter in a lake 
where he himself trying to swim would have been "gaily chopped to 
ribbons by teen-age youngsters whose eyes were always immutably 
fixed on the far horizons of space, or upon the dials which indicated 
the speed of their passing" (FOT154). 
Near the end of The Firmament of Time, Eiseley describes 
another one of his "savings." In a remote desert area where rocks 
seemed to be the only thing alive, Eiseley encountered a bizarre 
phenomenon--so bizarre that the event seems highly unlikely. From 
the distance he sees what appears to be a stone trailing a rope rising 
and then falling back to the ground. As he comes nearer, Eiseley 
discovers a pheasant hen partially encoiled by a black snake. The 
bird tries vainly to fly, getting only a few feet off the ground before 
dropping back, battering the snake in the gravel. Eiseley presumes 
that the blacksnake had approached the bird's nest and been 
attacked and had managed to wrap a coil around the defending 
mother bird. Unable to stand "that ceaseless, bloody pounding in the 
gravel," Eiseley separated the two and carried the snake over the 
next ridge "where he could do no more damage" (FOT 175). Eiseley 
says that "[t]he bird had contended for birds against the oncoming 
future; the serpent writhing into the bunch grass had contended just 
as desperately for serpents" ( 175). Eiseley concludes that he had 
struggled "for a greater, more comprehensive version of myself" 
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( 176). Eiseley's parable underestimates the attention of his reader. 
If, in fact, he has removed the snake to where it can do no harm, he 
has doomed it to starvation. The snake, like much of creation, must 
kill to live. Eiseley longs for a return to the Garden of Eden, a fantasy 
world where the lion and the lamb (or the snake and the pheasant) 
lie down together and the lamb does not get eaten. His impulse may 
be altruistic, but his zoology is bad. 
His desperate need to put things right had its origin in his 
childhood. The image of Eiseley separating the blacksnake and the 
pheasant recalls a scene recounted in A 11 the Strange Hours. As a 
frightened, anxious toddler, Eiseley rose from his bed and wordlessly 
approached his parents who had been arguing furiously and, taking 
their hands, silently pleaded with the them for peace. On that 
occasion, Eise!ey says peace was briefly restored. His separating the 
snake and the bird, trying to save both, seems an older version of the 
child's actions--Eiseley trying to bring together his warring parents, 
trying to make an impossible peace. If the event actually occurred 
as Eiseley describes, it seems likely that neither the battered snake 
not the half-throttled pheasant would survive. And if they did, the 
snake would still have to eat some bird's eggs. 
Knowledge of the interrelatedness of life makes for ambiguity. 
Outside of myths, no solution is without problems. Alfred North 
Whitehead expressed the painful truth that "all life is robbery." 
Nothing comes into being without feeding on or displacing other life. 
Perhaps that biological fact is the source of the concept of original 
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sin: to be alive is to be guilty. So far as we know, only we human 
beings feel the guilt and would somehow absolve ourselves. 
Throwing stranded starfish back into the sea is act of rebellion 
against the natural order, against the terrifying design of the 
universe that plants white spiders on white heal-alls to catch white 
moths and that teaches sphex wasps how to paralyze cicada s\J as to 
provide fresh, living meat for their iarvae. 
Both "The Star Thrower" and "The Innocent Fox" are stories 
excreted around a nidus of personal pain-- ""The Innocent Fox" around 
Eiseley"s hurt that his dying father barely recognized him though he 
knew his older half-brother and ""The Star Thrower" around the 
torment of his relationship with his difficult mother. Cast into a 
world where the earlier taxonomies of existence--religious, cultural, 
scientific--had dissociated, Eiseley developed a style that attempted 
to meld the disparities of the modern world and his own private pain 
into the cohesive web of his personal vision. To reassemble the 
shambles into some kind of coherence, Eiseley had to construct from 
the rubble of his own psychic life a persona, a mythic self, who could 
act as the bardic seer of a prophetic vision. According to Gerber and 
McFadden, Eiseley"s belief in "the fleshly continuity of evolving life .. 
. . calls humanity to no less a task than redefining its relation to the 
entire nonhuman world." They see Eiseley "as the modern 
counterpart of St. Francis of Assisi, preaching the brotherhood of the 
species and the sacred primacy of created life"" (63). Seen in the 
context of what Gerber and McFadden describe as Eiseley"s call for "a 
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new ethic founded upon a new religious and ecological sensibility" 
(72), Darwin ironically becomes "the founder of the new faith" based 
on evolutionary relatedness (63), and Eiseley becomes his prophet. 
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CONCLUSION 
Of the two antithetical impulses Richard Tarnas in The Passion 
of the Western Mind describes at work in the post-modern world--
"one pressing for a radical deconstruction and unmasking ... and the 
other for a radical integration and reconciliation"--Eiseley and Wilbur 
are driven by the latter. Operating implicitly on the Emersonian 
precept that "[t]ruth, and goodness, and beauty, are but different 
faces of the same All," Eiseley and Wilbur integrate and reconcile the 
scientific with the religious and the poetic in their writings. 
At their best, neither Wilbur nor Eiseley hesitates "to risk I His 
dream-stuff in the fitting rooms of fact," but each discovers as 
William James observed that "truth and fact well up into our lives in 
ways that exceed verbal formulations." They both find as James 
found that "in the living act of perception always something ... 
glimmers and twinkles and will not be caught ... " (456-457). Both 
naturalist and poet have a profound sense of pervasive, alluring 
mystery behind existence--what Otto calls the "ineffable something 
that holds the mind," something which is intensely present but 
eludes apprehension. This mystery lures them to be seekers, 
pursuing understandings of the world--within and without--in all its 
complexity. They puzzle over the natur~ of mind and the meaning of 
time, and they struggle with the power and limitations of words as 
ways of knowing. The world's plenitude and marvel inspire what 
Eliade calls an "unquenchable ontological thirst"; Wilbur says that 
"joy's trick" is to supply us "with an ache I Nothing can satisfy." 
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Both Wilbur and Eiseley describe life as a perpetual reaching 
out beyond the boundaries of self, beyond the boundaries of what is 
known. Poetry makes possible what Maritain calls the 
"'intercommunication between the inner being of things and the inner 
being of the human Self," so that seli and thing interact in ways that 
remove the veneer of visibility, making things stand out in their 
"unconcealedness," thereby revealing both self and thing. Thus, the 
imagination can partly elude the trap of matter. Able to reach across 
space and through time, imagination explores the rubble of memory 
and creates in the "eternal, dangerous present" the substance out of 
which the future must be made. Accessing pre- or extra-linguistic 
knowledge and awareness, imagination can discover or create unity 
amid what seems only disparity and multiplicity. This imaginative 
power to bind things together in patterns that cohere replicates in 
miniature what Wilbur calls some cosmic "grand arcanum," some 
universal word that holds all that is and keeps creation "from 
foundering in points and waves." 
ln Beyond Belief, sociologist Robert Bellah writes of the need to 
develop an integrated view that brings all the powers of the mind to 
bear on understanding the nature of reality which he believes cannot 
be comprehended through any one facet of the human imagination: 
... in the fruitful ~nterchange between social science and 
religion we may be seeing the beginnings of the reintegration 
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of our culture, a new possibility of the unity of consciousness. 
If so, it will not be on the basis of any new orthodoxy, either 
religious or scientific. Such a new integration will be based on 
the rejection of all univocal understandings of reality, of all 
identifications of one conception of reality with reality itself. It 
will recognize the multiplicity of the human spirit, and the 
necessity to translate constantly between different scientific 
and imaginative vocabularies. It will recognize the human 
proclivity to fall comfortably into some single literal 
interpretation of the world and therefore the necessity to be 
continuously open to rebirth in a new heaven and a new earth. 
It will recognize that in both scientific and religious culture all 
we have finally are symbols, but that there is an enormous 
difference between the dead letter and the living word. 
(Bellah 246) 
Man names and categorizes, but the wonder remains: " ... we are 
stardust that somehow assembled itself first into life and finally into 
consciousness." For Eiseley, that evolution from inanimate dust to 
life to consciousness "implies strange forces in the universe that no 
amount of naming b~' man can make ordinary" (LN 1 06). Goethe, 
both poet and scientist, argued that understanding the phenomena 
would require an imagination of wholes rather than a reductionist's 
view of the constituent parts but that such a comprehensive vision 
would lead to new cognitive faculties, novel perceptions, and a seeing 
into the nature of things. 
The "most enormous extension of which life is capable" and 
"the supreme epitome of reaching out" is the projection of self into 
other lives. This ability to honor reality and the wisdom and 
strength to reach across the barrier of form can come only after the 
struggle with something that Wilbur describes as "powerfully other." 
If there is to be an "endurable future," Eiseley says it must come 
from such reaching out. 
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If man is to seek happiness, he must grow outward into the 
world he has discovered. He must pass the borders of his own 
being. He must dream with the dreaming greatness of the vast 
multicolored shape of life itself, not of man, nor of serpents, but 
of that enormous whole that contains them, as it contains lover 
and the wandering stars and the enormous freedom to change. 
(LN 113) 
Uncovering old wells may indeed reveal the something there is that 
doesn't love the sun, and crossing verges will eventually lead to "the 
pitchy whirl at the mind's end," but the adventure makes life "risk-
hallowed." 
Wilbur and Eiseley believe that the discoveries of meaning and 
beauty and natural law are not the imposition of human vision and 
order upon nature. Instead, they are the bringing to consciousness of 
the nature of nature through the human mind, itself one of nature's 
many manifestations. The pull of "the hid pulse of things" is not a 
tease, but a promise. When the imagination--embracing "the 
mystery of things that are" with its whole attention--acts as the 
agent of nature's self-revelation, it is indeed possible that 
"something may be understood." Discovery, however, may come with 
defeat: "It is by words and the defeat of words, I Down sudden 
vistas of the vain attempt, I That for a flying moment one may see" 
(Poems 274). We may not see the thing we seek; we may instead 
find a playful fox cub shaking a chicken bone or discover "the 
knitting of light in fennel-plumes I And dew like mercury on 
cabbage-hide." 
--··-----··-
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FOOTNOTES 
Introduction 
l George Steiner in Real Presences argues that language itself is 
an act of faith; he claims that "any coherent understanding of what 
language is and how language performs ... any coherent account of 
the capacity of human speech to communicate meaning and feeling 
is, in the final analysis, underwritten by the assumption of God's 
presence" (3). Steiner asserts that "the experience of aesthetic 
meaning in particular ... infers the necessary possibility of this 'real 
presence'" and that "the wager on the meaning of meaning ... is a 
wager on transcendence" (3-4). 
2 Maritain points out that "Coleridge used the word poes_v with 
the same universal meaning: · ... poesy in general, as the proper 
generic term inclusive of all the fine arts as its species"' (Creative 
Intuition 297}. 
3 Jacob Bronowski's concept of induction responds affirmatively 
to James' rhetorical question: 
The man who proposes a theory makes a choice--an 
imaginative choice which outstrips the facts. The creative 
activity of science lies here, in the process of induction 
understood as the making of hypothetical theories. For 
636 
induction imagines more than there is ground for, and creates 
relations which at bottom can never be verified. Every 
induction is a spceculation, and it guesses at a unity which the 
facts present but do not strictly imply" ( 10- i I). 
Thomas Kuhn writes in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 
Observation and experience can and must drastically restrict 
the range of admissible scientific belief, else there would be no 
science. But they cannot alone determine a particular body of 
such belief. An apparently arbitrary element, compounded of 
personal and historical accident, is always a formative 
ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a given scientific 
community at a given time. (4) 
4 Bronowski's observation that the sciences and the arts have 
historically flourished together seems at least a pariial refutation of 
Richards' concern for poetry. Bronowski points out that "the great 
creative periods of literature and art"--during the Golden Age of 
Greece (from 600 BC till 300 BC) and during the Renaissance--were 
"the two periods in which science was born" (A Sense of the Future: 
Essays in Natural PhilosonhY. 8). 
5 Falck says that to survive, theologians must become literary 
critics: 
If there is to be such a separately identifiable discipline as 
theology at all, it can now coherently be based only on the 
recognition of the true nature of myth, and must be a matter of 
critical exploration of the principal mythic structures which the 
texts (in the widest sense) of our culture present us with .... 
the available mythic texts must in fact comprise the whole of 
-----------
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our known mythology, including the whole of our poetry and 
literature. ( 132) 
Falck also believes that if anything "which can be distinctively 
identified as religion is to survive," then art must become its "reality-
inscribing heart and soul" (77). 
6 Schlain offers a multitude of insistences of what he believes is 
revolutionary art anticipating visionary science. For example, 
Leonardo da Vinci's studies of light and motion preceded Newton's 
by two centuries--including Leonardo's articulation of a concept of 
inertia that stood as the "Principle of Leonardo" until Newton 
published the Principia and declared his First Law of Motion. Schlain 
says that Leonardo's attempt to understand the concept of inertia 
brought his "astonishingly close to the central clue that allowed 
Newton to elaborate his laws of motion two centuries later." 
Leonardo's Principle states: "All movement tends to maintenance, or 
rather all moved bodies continue to move as long as the impression 
of the force of their motors (original impetus) remains in them." 
Newton's First Law of Motion states: "Every body continues in its 
state of rest, or or uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is 
compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it" (qtd. in 
Schlain 75). 
Newton described the nature of light in his Ogticks, but long 
before Newton, Leonardo painted the rare qualities of light: " ... the 
mysterious opalescence of the distant atmosphere .... ineffable 
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vistas of faraway mountains, the wordless interplay of ethereal light 
upon a woman's mile, the rippling fasiculations of a horse in motion" 
(77). Schlain says that" [u]sing both brush and pen, Leonardo 
changed the way we see the world and this subtle shift in mind-set 
prepared people to be receptive when Newton introduced a new way 
to think about the world .... the artist's revelation preceded the 
physicist's" (83). According to Schlain, "Newton repeatedly worked 
out with mathematical precis ion what Leonardo had expressed in 
concise drawing" (78). Bronowski says that Leonardo gave science 
what it most needed-- "the artist's sense that the detail of nature is 
significant" ( 10). 
7 Eiseley found this phenomenon in literature. He asserts that 
"[g]reat literary geniuses often possess an ear or sensitivity for things 
in the process of becoming, for ideas which are just about to be 
born." He cites as an example Coleridge's reference in a lecture in 
181 9 to "a belief which has become quite common even among 
Christian people, that the human race arose from a state of savagery 
and then gradually from a monkey came up through various states to 
be man" (FOT 61 ). Darwin claimed to have heard only talk of the 
permanence of the species. 
8 Zajonc says that "the suggestion is very often advanced that 
we must give up understanding in favor of computing." He says "this 
is to give up too much" ( 121 ). 
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9 References to Eiseley' s works wit be documented 
parenthetically in the text using the following abbreviations: The 
Immense journey (IJ). Darwin's Century (DC), The Firmament of Time 
(FOT), The Mind as Nature (MAN), The Unexnected Universe (UU), 
The Invisible Pvramid (IP), The Night Country (NC)_, Notes of an 
A I chemist (NOA), The Innocent Assassins (lA), All The Strange Hours: 
an Excavation of a Life (ASH), Another Kind of Autumn (AKA), The 
Star Thrower (ST), All the Night Wing£ (ANW), and The Lost 
Notebooks of Loren Eiseley (LN). 
10 Maritain distinguishes between poetic m..vtbs and 
melapby-sica/ myths. He describes poetic myths "as the symbolic 
approaches of imaginative thought, ceaselessly renewed by poets and 
as part of the nature of poetry. He calls metapb}··-sica/ lll.J··tbs those 
which are "the organic signs and symbols of some faith actually 
lived": " ... they are forms ... through which a conviction of the 
entire soul nourishes and quickens from within the power of creative 
imagination. Such myths have no force except through the faith man 
has in them. It is essential to them to be believed in" (318). 
Maritain believed that poets need metaphysical myths in order to 
create poetical myths: "Metaphysical myths are needed by poetry, 
but they cannot be provided by poetry" ( 318). 
11 Gerber and McFadden identify six motifs, based on his 
concept of evolution, that occur throughout Eiseley's writing: 1) 
"Time is immense, linear, and creative." 2) "Humanity belongs to the 
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community of descent." 3) "The human brain creates a second 
World." 4) "For the evolutionist, the common day has turned 
marvelous." 5) "Guided by Bacon's ideas, science can serve human 
ends." 6) "Scientific knowledge bestows neither freedom nor the 
capacity for love." (50-53). 
12 Citations from Wilbur's poems will be taken from his New 
and Collected Poems and will be documented parenthetically in the 
text as (Poems). In addition to twenty-seven of his most recent 
works, this collection reprints in their entirety, in reverse 
chronological order, the poems from Wilbur's six preceding volumes. 
13 Woodard comments on the critics produced in the beat and 
confessional era: "We appear to have reared a race of critics who go 
about with their tongues probing their aching teeth, hungering to see 
lepers, monstrosities, freaks, wounds, blood, madness. We require to 
be told that we are mad, or have at least the rich potential for going 
mad" ("Richard Wilbur's Critical Condition" 223). 
14 Michelson suggests without elaborating that Wilbur's life has 
had more difficulty than weeding his mother's roses: "From Wilbur 
himself, and from people who know him well, one can gather enough 
indications that his life has been more complex and difficult than the 
reserved demeanor of some of his poems might imply" (Wilbur's 
Poetry 199). 
15 Scott qualifies his encomium of Edwards with "before 
Reinhold Niebuhr" ("Poetry of Richard Wilbur" 9). 
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16 W i 1 bur says that he does not make much use of Christ ian 
symbols or doctrine in his poetry because he "cannot bear to borrow 
the voltage of highly-charged words" and because "[p]oetry full of 
ready-made emotional value will also not represent the movement of 
the mind and heart toward understanding and clarification, and 
poetry has to be discovery rather than the celebration of received 
ideas" (qtd. in Cummins "Questionnaire to Mr. Wilbur" 42). 
17 Although the war prompted him to write poetry, Wilbur 
says he got few "printable, usable, bearable poems" out of the war. 
(qtd. in Broughton, "An Interview with Richard Wilbur" 143). 
18 Among those poets and poems Langbaum cites as 
participating in the revival of the "new nature" poetry are Wallace 
Stevens ("The Snow Man," "Tatoo"), Marianne Moore ("A Grave," "The 
Plummet Basilisk," "The Fish"), to a lesser extent Robert Frost ("The 
Need of Being Versed in Country Things", "Desert Places"), Richard 
Wilbur ("The Toad"). and Richard Eberhart ("The Groundhog"), W. S. 
Merwin ("The Mountain"). Langbaum describes a revival of nature 
poetry in the twentieth century among American poets who have 
embraced a non-anthropomorphic concept of nature, "the only one 
that could inspire conviction ... the mindlessness of nature, its 
nonhuman otherness: a concept having nothing to do with optimism 
~- ··----···-· -·. ·-· 
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or pessimism" ("The New Nature Poetry" 324). According to 
Langbaum, the new nature poetry "deals often with the line between 
nonliving and living unconsciousness .... the new nature poetry is 
really about that concept by which living unconsciousness has come 
to be understood as a form of consciousness and, paradoxically, the 
most vital form of it" (332). The new concept of nature has 
"connected the substratum of our minds with the minds of the very 
lowest reaches of animal life, thus reanimating all of nature and 
making nature poetry possible again" (332). 
19 Hill cites as particularly good examples of the imagination 
triumphing over fact the following poems: "Cigales," "In a Bird 
Sanctuary," "Objects," "Popular, Sycamore," "'A World Without Objects 
... , " "Merlin Enthralled," and "Love Calls Us to the Things of This 
World" 
l According to Barrett, Heidegger's use of the term Dasein 
avoids the assumption of "a definite obj'ect with a fixed nature" that 
comes with the term man, and it avoids the Cartes ian dual ism 
inherent in the term consciousness (Irrational Man 218). 
2 Falck relates the impulse to live an authentic existence to a 
pre-conscious purposiveness: 
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That it is a part of the human condition that we should be faced 
with the possibility, or the task, of striving for a relatively 
authentic, rather than a relatively inauthentic apprehension of 
the world around us follows directly from our nature as 
embodied and striving beings. As conscious and language-
using organisms, it is a part of our nature that our language 
should both give structure to, and be dependent for its 
evolution upon, our transient perceptions, and that the capacity 
of our languge to reach beyond, or to transcend, the forms or 
experience and understanding which we at any time possess 
should be shaped by a pre-conscious purposiveness which is 
partly governed by our physical and biological organization. 
Our pursuit of such authenticity, or our embracing of such 
transcendence, is a care, or a concern, to relate authentically to 
reality, and is a continuation at the human level of the 
adaptiveness which is the essence of all life. ( 1 02-l 03) 
3 While concurring in the central place poetry must play in 
restoring our spiritual vision, Colin Falck describes Heidegger's view 
derived from his meditations on Holderlin as "unreconstructedly 
priestly" (Myth, Truth and Literature 144). 
4 Charles Hartshorne was convinced that the chief weakness of 
traditional arguments for God lay in the inadequacy of the idea of 
God they intended to prove (Cobb & Griffin 40). Process theology 
uses the conventional word God for an unconventional concept. 
Process theology discards traditional concepts of God including: the 
idea of God as a "cosmic moralist" dispensing law, judgment, and 
punishment; the concept of God as immutable, passionless, absolute, 
and irresponsive; the idea of God as a controlling power who 
determines every detail of the world; the idea of God as protector of 
the status quo of ordained order; and the concept of God as male--
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"dominant, inflexible, unemotional, completely independent" (Cobb 
and Griffin 8-1 0). 
5 William Barrett quotes Pascal on the negative potential of 
play: "Both habit and diversion, so long as they work, conceal from 
man 'his nothingness, his forlornness, his inadequacy, his impotence 
and his emptiness'" (Irrational Man 112-113). 
6 Lawrence I. Berkove says that "Eiseley was not a I ittle 
Melvillean in his apprehension that the events of nature seemed like 
pasteboard masks, and that if nature was not an agent, it was an 
inscrutable prinicipal" ("Refuge" 89). 
7 Stevenson describes Mr. Hyde as "pale and dwarfish, he gave 
the impression of deformity without any nameable malformation, he 
had a displeasing smile, he had borne himself ... with a sort of 
murderous mixture of timidty and boldness, and he spoke with a 
husky, whispering and somewhat broken voice ... " (20). Dr. Jekyll, 
on the other hand, was was "a large, well-made, smooth-faced man of 
fifty, with something of a slyish cast perhaps, but every mark of 
capacity and kindness ... " (25). Dr. Jekyll writes: 
It was on the moral side, and in my own person, that I learned 
to recognise the thorough and primitive duality of man; I saw 
that, of the two natures that contended in the field of my 
consciousness, even if I could rightly be said to be either, it was 
only because I was radically both .... It was the curse of 
mankind that these incongruous faggots were thus bound 
--- -----~ ----
together--that in the agonised womb of consciousness, these 
polar twins should be continuously struggling" (91-91). 
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8 Andrew Angyal cites W. j. Locke"s romantic novel about 
Gypsies, The Golden journey of Mr. Paradyne, as an influence on 
Eiseley's "The Golden Wheel." In a letter written from a campsite of 
a paleontological dig to his friend Wilbur Gaffney, Eiseley tells of 
seeing in the distance a beautiful young gypsy woman and thinking 
that he should have been born to an outcast people "who have no ties 
but a duty to horizons." He also asked Gaffney for "the name of that 
book in which a man escaped his world by way of a pedlar's cart" 
(Angyal ). 
9 Eiseley speaks of those "seriatam events" that biologically 
preordain subsequent possibilities. One of those events occurred "the 
moment when bats dropped into air and fluttered away from the 
insectivore line that gave rise to ourselves." Eiseley wonders "!w]hat 
fragment of man, perhaps a useful fragment, departed with them?" 
What was lost "had it lingered, might have made a small, brave, 
twilight difference in the mind of man" (55). 
l 0 Cobb and Griffin describe the upheaval in the human psyche 
that occurred with the axial period as a mixed blessing: 
Consciousness by testing :'the results of the free play of psychic 
activities against the world it highlights in sense experience" 
disciplines the "nonconscious imaginative life." "The ascendancy of 
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the rational consciousness and the reordering of the inner life to 
conform with it constituted the crossing of another major threshold 
in the historical development of structures of existence" which 
Whitehead called the emergence of "rational ret ig ion" and jaspers 
called the "axial revolution" (89 ). The price of the advance of 
rationality was the dis-ease resulting from the psyche's 
subordination of the body. The primary activity of the psyche was 
no longer nonconscious and "prethematized," no longer influenced 
primarily by the body, the tribe, the natural environment, or the 
divine reality. "The environment, including both the body and other 
people, was sharply distinguished from the self whose seat was now 
in the rationalized consciousness" (90). Cobb and Griffin conclude 
that "[t]he rational religions that arose in the axial perod were at 
once the vehicle of this deepening of the 'fall' and ways of salvation 
from its consequences" (90). 
11 Eiseley would have been less than three years old in 191 0 
when Halley's Comet was visible. It is extremely unlikely that he 
would have any memory of the event, let alone such a detailed one. 
Of course, his father may actually have taken him out to look at the 
night sky and then spoken of it on later occasions so that what he 
remembers are his father's memories. Eiseley is so bad at writing 
dialogue that everything he writes in that form sounds stilted and 
unnatural. 
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12 Written in groups of one hundred, the meditations were 
intended for Traherne's friend Mrs. Hopton, the center of a small 
society at Kington in Herefordshire that devoted itself to the study 
and practice of religion (Margolioth vi). Interestingly, The Oxford 
Comnanion to English Literature, notes that Traherne was "among the 
first English writers to respond imaginatively to new ideas about 
infinite space, and at times virtually equates infinite space with God" 
(992). Asked to name the philosophers and theologians who have 
had the greatest impact on him, Wilbur listed Traherne along with 
Augustine and Pascal (Cummins, "Questionnaire to Mr. Wilbur" 43). 
13 Only one brief treatise, "On the Sizes and Distances of the 
Sun and Moon," survives and Aristarc hus' early heliocentric 
speculations are known only through the writings of Plutarch and 
Archimedes. 
14 Photosynthesis, the process whereby the energy of sunlight 
is absorbed by the chlorophyll pigments in green plants and then 
transformed and stored, provides for life on earth: "The chemical 
energy and electrical energy used by brain cells, for example, were 
once sunlight that was absorbed by the chlorophyll in green plants" 
(Basham 14: 366). Incarnation is a religious myth and a scientific 
fact. All that live on Earth, including our sense-born imaginations, 
are the "loose change" of sunlight. 
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15 John Reibetanz believes the primary causes of Wilbur's 
affirming imagination are "deeply personal, and seem to involve a 
slow and perhaps largely unarticulated process of mutual 
accommodation between a strong need to love--to see, know and 
accept what is·--and an equally stong need to create--to envision and 
figure forth a new reality" ("What Love Sees" 76). Harris suggests 
that Wilbur's devotion to the craft of poetry and his "capacity for 
joyful love" have kept his work vital for forty years ("Forty Years" 
415). 
16 Riebetanz notes that when love call us, the first thing that 
happens is "The eyes open" (73) 
17 Stitt notes that "Wilbur's injection of motion into a scene is 
his way of imagistically indicating the presence of the spiritual 
within the material" (26). 
18 Frank Littler points out that the argument of "Love Calls Us 
to the Things of This World" contradicts the admonition of I John 
2:15: "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world." 
19 Wilbur's lines that describe "holy things" as 
. . . more warmly constant than the sun, 
At whose continual sign 
The dimly prompted vine 
Upbraids itself to a green excellence (Poems 244) 
express a milder version of the vegetable urge than the fallowing 
lines from Stevens' "Nomad Exquisite": 
As the immense dew of Florida 
Brings forth 
The big-finned palm 
And green vine angering for life (Palm 44) 
Wilbur's vine "upbraids" itself. Stevens' vine "angers" for life. 
20 The fovea centra/is is a small rod less area of the retina 
which affords acute vision. 
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21 Hylas, whose name comes from the Greek word for matter, 
is the name of one of the two participants in Berkeley's Three 
Dialogues between Hy:las and Philonous. Philonous, whose name 
means "lover of mind," is the voice of Berkeley's immaterialist 
viewpoint, and Hylas argues for the Cartesian or Locke an dualist 
position regarding mind and matter. A devoutly religious man, 
Berkeley attempted to vindicate Christian tenets without 
undermining the impressive discoveries of eighteenth-century 
science. Berkeley wrote that "la]ll the Choir of Heaven and the 
furniture of earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the 
mighty frame of the world, have no substance without a mind" (qtd 
in jones 3. 288). 
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22 Whitehead's cosmological and theistic process 
theology/philosophy offers categories "for speaking about God and 
the nonhuman world as they exist independently of human 
perception and thought." Cobb and Griffin perceive a need for a 
"cosmological phifosophy ... confirmed by the incurable realism of 
human beings": 
We cannot finally live except as if the world exists 
independently of human experience. Our incurable realism 
shows that we are directly aware of being in a world of other 
things which are actual independently of our awareness of 
them. They are given to us, and given as having existence, 
structure, and qualities apart from our perception of, and 
thought about, them. This implies that the natural sciences 
tell us something about reality and not merely about human 
experience. Accordingly, people cannot be satisfied with 
theologies that relegate the revelations of science to the status 
of information about mere appearance, and thereby fail to 
discuss science in terms of the same set of concepts used to 
discuss religion, ethics, and aesthetics. ( 161) 
23 Samuel Johnson also had something to say about cows and 
sceptics: "Truth Sir, is a cow, which will yield such people [sceptics] 
no more milk, and so thay are gone to milk the bull" (qtd. in Oxford 
DictionaLY...QLQuotations 275). 
24 The French Alexandrine was subsequently perfected by the 
great dramatists of the seventeenth century, including Racine and 
Moliere whom Wilbur has translated to considerable acclaim. 
25 Nathan Scott in "The Poetry of Richard Wilbur: "The 
Splendor of Mere Being" also notes this connection with Stevens: 
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... the final clause of the poem, in reminding us that "a sighted 
ship I Assembles all the sea," puts us in mind of Stevens' 
"Anecdote of the jar," a jar which he placed amidst "the 
slovenly wilderness" of a desolate Tennessee landscape: "The 
wilderness rose up to it, I And sprawled around, no longer 
wild," the jar having taken "dominion everywhere"--by dint of 
its being a work of artifice, a work of the imagination, which, as 
such, substantializes a form round which the formelessness of 
this wilderness can assemble itself. (27) 
26 Ogival refers to the s-shaped curves of some moldings or the 
voluptuous curves of a pointed arch. 
27 The phrase "subject goddess of the dreams of men" brings to 
mind Wilbur's poem "Playboy" which presents a stockboy having his 
lunch over a pornographic magazine. A naked girl kneels "in a 
supple pose" amid all the pink cliches of an erotic decor. Wilbur's 
description of the young woman subject and the playboy who 
masters her with his gaze suggests a "Grecian Urn" amusingly 
debased: 
Nothing escapes him of her body's grace 
Or of her flood lit skin, so sleek and warm 
And yet so strangely like a uniform. 
But what now grips his fancy is her face, 
And how the cunning picture holds her still 
At just that smiling instant when her soul, 
Grown sweetly faint, and swept beyond control, 
Consents to his inexorable will. (Poems 1-46-147) 
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28 john Gery in "The Sensible Emptiness in Three Poems by 
Richard Wilbur" sees the diction of this section as much more 
positive and affirming: "The despairing image of just a few lines 
before is dramatically countered by both the sensuous imagery of 
the field and the buoyant language of the next three stanzas: beheld, 
starn·~ manifold, lift, white, dais.v-drifi, clJasms, strews, commit . ... 
All that surrounds us, all of nature, seems to have conquered 'the nip 
of fear' that pervades the earlier stanzas" ( 122). Grey, however, 
finds that the imagined annihilation in "In the Field" takes 
"precedence over our language, our sensible experience, and nature 
itself" and finds in the poem "if not a loss of faith in nature as a vial 
for the spirit, a profound skepticism" ( 123). 
29 The form of "Sunlight Is Imagination" affirms its message of 
mutability. The poem is full of words of movement and change: 
shift, cleave, gone, waving away, to light, climbing, shining, ciphered, 
cleanse repair, makes, barrens, bleeds, parches, spring, breaks, 
resign, crave, pine, save, touch, spare, shattering, beseech, is changed, 
die, swings, run, blight, trust, falls, undone, lose, choose, welcome, etc. 
The lengths of the lines vary like the light and shadow of wind-
tossed trees; the pattern of stresses for each stanza is more or less I, 
4, 4, 4, 5. 4, 2, 2, I, 5. The basic rhyme pattern of the ten-line 
stanzas is a, b, c, c, b, b, d, b, d, e with the short first tines connected 
by rhyme to the last word of the-preceding stanza. The form of the 
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poem itself presents variation within design, each change a part of 
and justified by a larger pattern of dec 1 ine and renewal 
30 In the eleventh book of The Odyssey, Odysseus descends 
into Hades and speaks with the ghosts of dead heroes, including 
Achilles. Reminding Achilles that he was given "'one honour with 
gods"' in life and that he is now "'a great prince here among the 
dead,"' Odysseus urges the son of Peleus to "'let not thy death be any 
grief to thee, Achilles.·" Achilles replies: "'Nay, speak not 
comfortably to me of death, oh great Odysseus. Rather would I live 
on ground as the hireling of another, with a landless man who had no 
great livelihood, than bear sway among all the dead that be 
departed"' (Homer 176). 
31 As Yeats put it in "Among School Children," "0 body swayed 
to music, 0 brightening glance, I How can we know the dancer from 
the dance?" (Collected Poems 214). 
32 Hecht says that Wilbur's recurrent subject is "not only the 
motion of change and transition but how that motion ... is the very 
motion of the mind itself." Hecht finds in Wilbur's poetry "the most 
important and best aspects of cinematic film: the observation of 
things in motion from a viewpint that can, if it cares to, move with an 
equal and astonishing grace." Unlike motion pictures, Wilbur's poems 
can also make "a transition, or rather. a translation, of outward 
physical action ... into a condition of the imagination; a dissolving of 
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one real of reality into another ... " ("The Motions of the Mind" 126-
127). 
1 Penrose defines a computation as "the action of a Turing 
machine" and explains that a Turing machine is "a mathematically 
idealized computer ... [that] never makes any mistakes and can run 
on for as tong as is necessary ... [and] has an unlimited storage 
space" (Penrose 17). By "noncomputational" Penrose does not mean 
chaotic or random or environmentally influenced or unmanageably 
complicated; rather, noncomputational problems cannot be solved 
algorithmically in practice or principle. 
2 Eiseley's descriptions of the evolution of life and mind have 
those qualities which Ian Barbour attributes to myth: They offer a 
version of cosmic order. They provide the cognoscenti with ways of 
structuring and understanding experience in the present. And they 
inform human beings about the nature of their self-identity and the 
framework of significance in which they participate (Barbour 5). 
However, Eiseley' s myth of on-going creation offers the order of 
constant change, an understanding of experience and identity based 
on mystery, and a framework of significance that guarantees human 
life no special significance. 
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3 Wilbur's position in "Lamarck Elaborated" seems close to 
Goethe's insistence on recognizing the validity and primacy of 
phenomena: "Goethe proposed that by staying with the phenomena, 
varying their conditions of appearance, experimenting with them but 
holding the phenomena always in view, cognitive capacities would 
arise suited to the proper understanding of them" (Zajonc, "Light and 
Cognition" 125). In Scientific Studies, Goethe wrote, "'Every new 
object, clearly seen, opens up a new organ of perception in us'" (qtd. 
in Zajonc, "Light and Cognition" 125). 
4 Euclid's mathematical inquiries into the nature of sight 
became the basis for subsequent Arab work on optics and laid "the 
foundation for the discovery of linear perspective by Brunelleschi, 
Alberti, and Durer centuries later" (Zajonc, Catching the Light 25). 
However, Zajonc says that this "mathematization" of vision came at a 
price: "It distanced man from the earlier and more immediate 
experience reflected in the Platonic understanding of sight" (25). 
With Euclid, the subjective experience of seeing began to be 
abstracted into mechanics and mathematics. "Euclid's handling of 
light foreshadows the growing separation of sight as lived experience 
from sight as a formal object of investigation" (26). 
5 The cochlea contains fluid which is set in motion by the 
vibrations of soundwaves traveling along the malleus, incus, and 
stapes. Movements of the footplate of the stapes agitate the cochlear 
fluid which in turn causes movement of the basilar membrane within 
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the cochlea. This movement stirs the hair cells of the organ of Corti 
to slide against the tectorial membrane. The bending of the hairs 
stimulate the attached cochlear nerve fibers and cause the cochlear 
nerve to transmit impulses to the hearing center in the brain's 
temporal lobe. On the other hand, movement of fluid in the three 
semi-circular canals of each ear sends signals to the brain to help 
maintain balance. Depending on the direction of the motion, more 
signals come from one ear, less from the other; if the head is 
stationary, the brain get equal signals from both ears. The brain is 
able to interpret these signals along with other data to determine the 
head's position. The semi-circular canals empty into the utricle 
which is connected by a duct to the saccule. The utricle and saccule, 
fluid-filled sacs within the vestibule of the inner ear, are lined with 
delicate hairs connected to nerve fibers. Above the hair cells are 
membranes containing grains of minerals called otoliths. The 
vestibular nerve fibers are stimulated by pressure from the otoliths 
which respond to the pull of gravity. Transmitted by the vestibular 
nerve to the brain, this information allows a person to maintain the 
body's posture. 
6 One wonders on what evidence Nietzsche could describe man 
a "once and for all a sociable and pacific creature." 
7 Wilbur describes a phenomenon similar to the mind's 
graceful, cave-correcting error in his poem--"April5, 1974." 
Strolling in a "dull pasture," the poet notices the world about him 
doing strange things: 
"Dead grass appeared to slide and heave, 
Though still too frozen-flat to stir, 
And rocks to twitch, and all to blur. (Poems 78) 
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He wonders what causes "this rippling of the land": "Was matter 
getting out of hand I And making free with natural law?" Peering 
about, the poet discovers "a fact as eerie as a dream": 
There was a subtle flood of steam 
Moving upon the face of things. 
It came from standing pools and springs 
And what of snow was still around (Poems 78) 
His perception of the late winter/early spring world is altered by the 
shape-shifting motion of the steam, frozen winter's vaporizing as the 
world warmed to spring. The poet explains the phenomenon and 
draws a telling comparison: 
It came of winter's giving ground 
So that the freeze was coming out, 
As when a set mind, blessed by doubts 
Relaxes into mother-wit. 
Flowers, I said, will come of it. (Poems 78) 
Nature, giving up the frozen form of winter, relaxes into the chaotic, 
creative exuberance of spring. just so, a mind which relinquishes its 
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rigid set and is "blessed by doubt" has the chance of making a 
"graceful error," of learning or imagining something new: "Flowers 
... will come of it." 
8 Marjory Scheidt Payne says that Wilbur's image of the 
struggling starling is, in part, a metaphor for a painful episode in his 
daughter Ellen's life: " ... he remembers a time of great suffering 
and vulnerability in his daugher's life two years previously. The 
pain of that memory as well as Wilbur's habitual sense of tact 
prevents him from referring to the incident openly" (Giver of Due 
Regard 2 13). 
9 Anthony Hecht finds in the "ingenious philosophic course" of 
"The Event" a cavorting "with the pre-Socratic puzzle of the 'the One' 
and 'the Many,' a playfulness that is carefully carried out in such 
words as 'their image' (which is singular and plural), 'singular vision' 
(s.), 'divergences' (pl.), 'alone' (s.), 'images' (pl.), and 'formations' 
(both s. and pl.)" ("Master of Metaphor" 24). 
I 0 "And the Lord went before them by day in a pi liar of a 
cloud, to lead them the way; and by night in a pillar of fire to give 
them light; to go by day and night." (Exodus 13:21) 
11 One of the tenets of Whitehead's process theology is that 
"true individuals are momentary experiences" which means "that 
what we ordinarily call individuals, the sorts of things that endure 
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through time, are not true individuals, but are 'societies' of such. 
Personal human existence is a ·serially ordered society' of occasions 
of experience" (Cobb and Griffin 15). 
12 Virtue, however, could not be fated. Virtue depended on 
the interaction of the chosen life and all its manifold qualities with 
the choices made in 1 iving: " ... Virtue owns no master: as a man 
honours or dishonours her, so shalt he have more of her or less. The 
blame is his who chooses" (Plato 355). In order of the lots that felt to 
them, they might rummage among the sample lives representing 
various combinations of qualities and choose a role to play in the 
coming life "but in none of these lives was there anything to 
determine the condition of the soul because the soul must needs 
change its character according as it chooses one life or another" (Plato 
356). The chooser determines the nature of his soul-- "calling a life 
worse or better according as it leads to the soul becoming more 
unjust or more just" (356). Ironically, a sojourn in heaven was not 
the best preparation for a virtuous life for returning souls to earth. 
As Er watched, the heaven-returned soul to whom the first lot fell 
chose the role of "the most absolute despotism"; among the evils 
fated to his life was the devouring of his own children. Plato wrote 
that the ease of his previous life on earth and then in heaven did not 
prepare him for making wise choices: 
He was one of those who had come down from heaven, having 
spent his former life in a well-ordered commonwealth and 
become virtuous from habit without pursuing wisdom .... not 
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the least part of those who were caught in this way were of the 
company which had come from heaven, because they were not 
disciplined by suffering; whereas most of those who had come 
up out of the earth, having suffered themselves and seen 
others suffer, were not hasty in making their choice. For this 
reason, and also because of the chance of the lot, most of the 
souls changed from a good life to an evil, or from an evil life to 
a good. (Plato 357) 
13 The "printless sea" recalls the epitaph Keats chose for his 
tombstone: "Here lies one whose name was writ in water." Dying of 
consumption, Keats feared that he might "cease to be" before his pen 
had "glean'd" his "teeming brain I Before high-piled books, in 
charactery" would hold "like rich garners the full-ripened grain." 
14 The phrase "at the receipt of custom" appears in three of the 
gospels--Mathew 9:9, Mark 2:14, and Luke 5:27. jesus saw a man 
(called Matthew in the book of Matthew and Levi in Mark and Luke) 
"sitting at the receipt of custom" and called upon the man to "'Follow 
me.·" The publican did so and held a great feast for jesus and his 
disciples. Seeing this, the scribes and pharisees complained about 
the religious teacher dining with publicans and sinners. jesus 
responded: "'They that are whole need not a physician; but they that 
are sick. I am come not to call the righteous, but sinners to 
repentance'" (Luke 5:31-32). 
15 According to the Dictionary of Saints, Saint Michael bears 
the traditional honor of being captain of the heavenly host, protector 
of Christians (especially soldiers), and guardian of the sick. He was 
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said to have been seen in a vision at Monte Gargano in southern Italy 
between 492-496 A.D. In Revelation 12:7-9, Michael and his angels 
are described fighting a great red dragon and his angels. Michael 
and his host prevail and cast the dragon--the Devil Satan--out of 
heaven and on to the earth where Satan vents his rath. 
16 Wilbur himself has said that "The Mind-Reader" is "a poem 
about the mind of God. When one considers the agony of the mind 
reader, one thinks of the unimaginable tolerance with which the 
deity is willing to listen to us all, be aware of us all. There is an utter 
incapacity of the human mind to tolerate what God would tolerate" 
(qtd. in jackson 145). 
17 The botanical urge as an expression of the life force sounds 
in other modern poems. The opening line of "Seed Leaves"--"Here 
something stubborn comes" --describes the same urge Roethke 
captures in "Cuttings (later)": 
The urge, wrestle, resurrection of dry sticks, 
Cut stems struggling to put down feet, 
What saint strained so much, 
Rose on such lopped limbs to new life? 
(Roethke 754) 
Wilbur's poem begins as a milder, less focused version of Roethke's 
other "Cuttings": 
Here something stubborn comes, 
Dislodging the earth crumbs 
And making a crusty rubble. 
Roethke's poem tells the same sequence but in the manner of a 
delayed-action camera tightly focused on one particular sprout: 
One nub of growth 
Nudges a sand-crumb loose, 
Pokes through a musty sheath 
Its pale tendrilous horn. 
(Roethke 754) 
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The same powerful, procreant urge is "the force that through the 
green fuse drives the flower" and drives Dylan Thomas' "green age." 
Thomas acknowledges from the first lines of his poem that the force 
that propels the flower is also the same force "that blasts the roots of 
trees" and is the poet's own destroyer. Like Shiva, the force that 
creates, eventually destroys. The "something stubborn" of Wilbur's 
poem appears also in William Carlos Williams' "Spring and All." As 
"sluggish I dazed spring approaches," "the reddish I purplish, forked, 
upstanding, twiggy I stuff of bushes and small trees" enter a new 
world "naked, I cold, uncertain" and become quickened and defined: 
Now the grass, tomorrow 
the stiff curl of wildcarrot leaf 
One by one objects are defined--
With this quickening comes "clarity, outline of leaf"--"the profound 
change" that causes bush and tree to root--"grip down and begin to 
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awaken" (Williams 291 ). In "Tortoise Gallantry," a faunal version of 
this floral urge, D. H. Lawrence calls the force, "This grim necessity 
from within" (Lawrence 315). 
18 "Seed Leaves" is also a poem about writing poetry--in this 
case escaping the dominance of a powerful mentor. The epigraph 
indicates that "Seed Leaves" is a "Homage toR. F."--Robert Frost. 
Michelson points out how Wilbur's poem echoes Frost's "Putting in 
the Seed"--
... just as the soil tarnishes with weed, 
The sturdy seedling with arched body comes 
Shouldering its way and shedding the earth crumbs. 
and sounds like "Nothing Gold Can Stay"--
Nature's first green is gold, 
Her hardest hue to hold. 
Her early leaf's a flower; 
But only so an hour. 
Then leaf subsides to leaf. 
So Eden sank to grief, 
So dawn goes down to day. 
Nothing gold can stay. 
Michels on suggests that Wilbur has paid a star student's homage of a 
teacher "by going with refreshed eyes into problems which the 
teacher has found and mapped out" and succeeds in making his own 
poem with his own prosody and "his own meditation of fate and the 
natural world" (30, 31). 
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19 Wilbur's choice of the verb "stoke" is a pun for the initiated 
--a tongue-in-cheek allusion to Bram Stoker, the author who stoked 
the twentieth century imagination with his tale of vampirism, 
Dracula. 
20 In "On the Eyes of an SS Officer" Wilbur speaks of "this I My 
opulent bric-a-brac earth." 
21 In his essay "Redemption Through Nature: A Recurring 
Theme in Thoreau, Frost and Richard Wilbur," George Monteiro 
quotes from a 19 i 6 interview in which Robert Frost said that love, 
the moon, and murder have poetry in them, but so does "the axe-
handle of a French Canadian whoodchopper": "You know the 
Canadian woodchoppers whittle their axe-handles, following the 
curve of the grain, and they're strong and beautiful. Art should 
follow lines in nature, like the grain of an axe-handle. False art puts 
curves on things that haven't any curves" (qtd. in Monteiro 797). 
22 Robert Shaw says that "Children of Darkness" is "like many 
other poems of Wilbur's ... natural history with a strong 
undercurrent of natural theology" ( 182). 
23 The eighteenth-century uniformitarian geologist james 
Hutton saw the earth made by a continuous process of decay and 
renewal and blessed the former for creating the possibility of the 
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latter: '"This decaying nature of the solid earth is the very perfection 
of its constitution as a living_ world'" (qtd. in DC 72). Hutton had the 
vision to find perfection in decay. 
24 Near the midpoint in time between Wilbur and Bede, there 
is another connection which lies unspoken but implicit in "Gnomons." 
When asked which poem in all of literature he would like to have 
written, Wilbur replied, "'the Divine Comedy,_"' and he studied Italian 
to become competent to read it in the original (Conversations 160). 
Therefore, it is fair to assume Wilbur's knowledge that in The 
Paradiso Dante makes the heavenly Bede a focus of dancing light. 
Dante locates Bede in the "Region of the Sun" where he along with 
Aquinas and ten other doctors of the church-- "those Sun-surpassing 
souls"--dance in radiant pleasure like a crown of living lights around 
Dante and Beatrice. Also, in the Canto X of The Paradiso, Dante 
celebrates the heaven-ordained obliquity of the zodiac that makes 
possible life on earth. In his verse translation, Allen Mandelbaum 
renders Dante's appreciation that a minor change in the· architecture 
of the heavens would have obliterated life on earth: 
For if the planets' path were not aslant, 
much of the heavens' virtue would be wasted 
and almost every power on earth be dead 
(Paradiso 85). 
Dante, who was both villified and celebrated for including much of 
his encyclopedic knowledge of science in The Divine Comedy, was 
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more right than he knew: The earth's position relative to the sun 
allows for the solar constant (the steady delivery of 1.99 calories of 
heat energy per square centimeter of the earth's surface per minute) 
which is essential to life on this planet. For Dante, the light-and-life-
giving Sun is "Nature's majestic minister ... I who writes the will of 
Heaven on the earth I and with his light measures the hours that 
run" (Paradiso 118 ). For Dante, the earth's sun-- "as much as any eye 
has known of light"--serves as a pale metaphor for God, "the Sun of 
Angels." Like Wilbur who can speak his awe in only a "dusky 
rhyme," Dante records his inability to say the fullness of what he has 
seen: 
Though genius, art, and usage stored my mind, 
I still could not make visible what I saw 
(Paradiso 119) 
I Falck refutes Coleridge's assumption that the artist has a 
different kind of imagination: 
Coleridge made a well-known distinction between the 'pdmary' 
and the 'secondary' imagination--between the imagination 
inherent in 'all human perception' and the imagination of the 
artist which 'disolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order tore-
create'--but the distinction is in fact philosophically groundless. 
Coleridge had his own reason for wanting to hold on to his 
doctrinally-underwritten notions of virtue and true religion--in 
his case Christianity--and for not wanting to allow the human 
imagination to become our onl,.v arbiter of what can count as 
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real. (70) 
2 Edward Lucie Smith in his introduction to Musee d' Orsay_;_ 
Impressionist and Post-Impressionist Mastergieces describes how 
the concept of morality in art changed in the nineteenth century: 
One of Monet's innovations was to paint the same motif over 
and over again .... Monet may have chosen Rauen Cathedral as 
the subject for one of these series with polemical intent, since 
here was a major Gothic structure infused'with a wide range of 
meaning for all Frenchmen, and indeed for all Europeans who 
might see it. But these meanings were something the painter 
simply chose to ignore. He was intent only on recording the 
permutations of light and atmosphere on the complex facade, 
whose sole function was to modulate the atmospheric flux and 
make it visible. The Impressionist obsession with analysis of 
light and the process of seeing becomes the be-all and end-all 
of art; everything else is pushed aside as irrelevance. 
Monet's studies of Rauen Cathedral are of particular 
importance because they are the clearest demonstration of the 
way in which Impressionism altered the morality of painting. 
Until the middle of the ninreteenth century, it had been a 
universally agreed idea that art was meant to express some 
moral standpint espoused by the artist. Impressionism 
changed all this. It declared morals in paintings to be 
irrelevant, yet at the same time it turned the actual practice of 
painting into a series of moral choices: the painter had to be 
completely true to his own feelings concerning the nature of 
art. It is this conviction which links two artists otherwise as 
different from one another as Monet and Cezanne. (9-l 0) 
3 Wilbur coincidentally has a poem about finding when he was 
ten the decaying carcass of his pet dog. As a boy he had been too· 
horrified to go near the corpse putrefying in the summer heat. As a 
man, he, like Eiseley, feels the need to pay the necessary respect to 
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something that had lived and been loved. In a poem he asks for "The 
Pard on" and mourns the dead: 
My dog lay dead five days without a grave 
In the thick of summer, hid in a clump of pine 
And a jungle of grass and honeysuckle-vine. 
I who had loved him while he kept at ive 
Went only close enough to where he was 
To sniff the heavy honeysuckle-smell 
Twined with another odor heavier still 
And hear the flies' intolerable buzz. 
Well, I was ten and very much afraid. 
In my kind world the dead were out of range 
And I could not forgive the sad or strange 
In beast or man. My father took the spade 
And buried him. Last night I saw the grass 
Slowly divide (it was the same scene 
But now it glowed a fierce and mortal green) 
And saw the dog emerging. I confess 
I felt afraid again, but still he came 
In the carnal sun, clothed in a hymn of flies, 
And death was breeding in his lively eyes. 
I started in to cry and call his name, 
Asking forgiveness of his tongueless head . 
. . . I dreamt the past was never past redeeming: 
But whether this was false or honest dreaming 
I beg death's pardon now. And mourn the dead. 
(Poems 285) 
4 The Second Law of Thermodynamics describes the impulse in 
any closed part of the universe toward thermodynamic equilibrium--
heat energy moving from hotter to colder bodies until the energy is 
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evenly distributed throughout and chaos replaces organization; the 
process leads inexorably to maximum disorder or entropy. Referring 
to Eisetey's use of scientific concepts like evolution on or the Second 
Law, Gerber and McFadden say that "Eiseley does not hold his 
scientific subject matter at safe distance" but "entangles it in an 
intricate web of meditations and narrative so that the reader 
experiences the theories." Referring specifically to "The Last 
Neanderthal," they find that the Second Law becomes "merely one 
more way of speaking about time, remembrance, estrangement from 
nature, and self-transcendence" (Gerber and McFadden 24). 
Although scientific knowledge undergirds the essay, "the knowing 
scientist with his personal quest remains central" (27). 
5 Xanthus, also called Scamander, was the name of a river and 
the god of the river. As it is told in Book XXI of The Ill iad, the 
Xanthus flooded its banks to stop the great slaughter of the Trojans 
by Achilles. At Hera's request, Hephaestus set the river afire as it 
raged after Achilles; the fierce blaze caused the waters to recede to 
the river's usual confines and protected Achilles, Hera's protege. 
6 Wendy Salinger finds "Wilbur's most moving political poem is 
at its heart about language" ( t 7). 
7 Eiseley also expressed his horror of a nuclear holocaust in 
terms of what it would destroy besides human beings. In the 
technical analyses of the potentials for human death and survival 
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after a nuclear war, Eiseley found little "to indicate concern for the 
falling sparrow, the ruined forest, the contaminated spring--all ... 
that still spells to man a life in nature" (ST 261). Eiseley himself 
hoped that "somewhere, a cardinal may still be whistling on a green 
bush when the last man goes blind before his man-made sun. If it 
should turn out that we have mishandled our own lives as several 
civilizations before us have done, it seems a pity that we should 
involve the violet and the tree frog in our departure" (ST 261 ). 
Involving not only man but life itself in a final holocaust-- poisoning 
"in one's death throes, the very spring of life itself"--would, Eiseley 
said be "an act of petulant, deliberate blasphemy" (ST 261 ). 
8 The lines "'Dig deep enough and you might see the sky I As 
clear as at the bottom of a well" recall Frost's poem "For Once Then 
Something" in which the speaker tries to see past the surface 
reflection to something beyond: 
Others taunt me with having knelt at well-curbs 
Always wrong to the 1 ight, so never seeing 
Deeper down in the well than where the water 
Gives me back in a shining surface picture 
Me myself in the summer heaven god like 
Looking out of a wreath of fern and cloud puffs. 
Once, when trying with chin against a well-curb 
I discerned, as I thought, beyond the picture, 
Through the picture, a something white, uncertain, 
Something more of the depths--and then I lost it. 
Water came to rebuke the too clear water. 
One drop fell from a fern, and to, a ripple 
Shook whatever it was lay there at bottom, 
Blurred it, blotted it out. What was that whiteness? 
Truth? A pebble of quartz? For once, then, something. 
(Poems 276) 
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9 The place names are fate's gift to a poet. Folly Bridge is 
actually the name given to the bridge which crosses the Thames 
(called the Isis in Oxford) east of Christ Church College where St. 
Aldate's becomes Abingdon Road. At the base of Folly Bridge, punts 
can be rented, and there the famous "bump races" are held. Gods tow 
with its bridges and weir is about three miles southwest of Oxford. 
10 Vicksburg was a vital transfer point for rail and river traffic 
bringing food and military supplies into the Confederacy from the 
Southwest. Unfortunately for the Union, the city possessed 
"formidable natural defenses"--a perch on bluffs as high as 300 feet 
above the river with bayous and swamps to the west in Louis ian a 
and a hillside command of the plains to the east. 
II After months of study and diversionary skirmishes north of 
the city, Grant proceded on a plan that his aides declared might 
destroy the Union's chances of winning the war. Abandoning all 
precedent and his supply lines, Grant sailed his army on Admiral 
David Dixon Porter's boats directly under the Confederate artillery on 
the heights of Vicksburg and disembarked scuth of the city. He took 
jackson to the east of Vicksburg and settled into a siige facing the 
rebel armies of General Pemberton in the west and General johnston 
to his east. When he received a telegram from his commander in 
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Washington (General Halleck) telling him to desist in his foolhardy 
plan, Grant stuffed the message away and persisted. Gene Smith 
says that what Grant did was "positively Napoleonic in concept. He 
had split his enemies, routed them, driven them away or into their 
defensive works, marched and countermarched in their country 
I ,000 miles from home without a base of supplies" ( 152). 
12 Hard Times Landing, Louisiana, was the assembly point for 
Union troops waiting to cross the Mississippi to participate in the 
assault on Vicksburg. 
13 Admiral Porter tried to circle and approach Vicksburg 
through flooded woods and bayous. 
15 Wilbur uses "termless" in ''Marc be au.:t· Oiseawr.<-- "The 
buyers in their termless hunt for love" --where termless suggests 
endless, inarticulate, unconditional longing (Poems 296). 
16 In his Preface, Copernicus mentions the speculations of 
Philolaus, Heraclides and Aristarchus, but it is not known whether he 
actually drew on these ideas or whether he was simply mentioning 
them to gain credibility for his own speculations (Armitage 133). 
li Writing before "The Fourth of july" was published, Cummins 
says that Wilbur's poetry "is not littered with dying gods, authors, 
historical personages" and that his use of allusion is "neither 
~- ---------
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excessive nor obtrusive," but enhances both meaning and mood 
without calling "excessive attention to [the allusions] themselves" 
( 18). Cummins believes that allusion functions in Wilbur's poetry "to 
keep alive the human capacity for seeing the magic in life" in an era 
that "prides itself on eliminating the mystery of natural phenomena" 
( 19). 
1966: 
18 Wilbur did not like the view he saw from the window in 
Our center of political power, Washington, is a literary and 
intellectual vacuum, or nearly so; the church, in our country, is 
broken into hundreds of sorry and provincial sects; colleges of 
Christian foundation hold classes as usual on Good Friday; our 
cities bristle like quartz clusters with faceless new buildings of 
aluminum and glass, bare of symbolic ornament because they 
have nothing to say; our painters and sculptors despair of 
achieving any human signifircance, and descend into the world 
of fashion to market their Coke bottles and optical toys; in the 
name of the public interest, highways are rammed through old 
townships and wildlife sanctuaries; all other public expenditure 
is begrudged, while the bulk of the people withdraw from 
community into an affluent privacy. 
("Poetry and Happiness" 1 07) 
19 Macusi refers to a Cariban (Amerindian) people of Brazil or 
British Guiana. 
20 Michelson says that the Marginal Way is "a popular walk by 
the ocean's edge near Ogunquit, Maine" (93). 
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21 Gericault was a French painter of the early nineteenth 
century. Among his large, dramatic compositions abounding in 
baroque vigor, the most famous are Raft of the Medusa and Mounted 
Officer of the lmgerial Guard. Raft of the Medusa portrays the dead, 
dying, and desperate crew of the ship Medusa sunk off the West 
African coast. The Mounted Officer pictures a sabre-wielding soldier 
looking backward from his rearing horse (Janson 480-481). 
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